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In this study I am principally concerned with Hume's discussion of a
number of related topics in the philosophy of mind, including emotions, desires,
volitions, and actions. I am particularly concerned to elucidate Hume's views
on the nature of motivational explanations of human actions, and I have dis¬
cussed at length the question of whether, or in what sense, according to Hume,
we may speak of free actions. I also consider, in some detail, Hume's account
of the lav?s of association and of mental dispositions.
To prosecute this study successfully I have found it necessary to consider
several methodological questions. In the first chapter I attempt to clarify the
character of the inquiry in which Hume believes himself to be engaged. Having
concluded that Hume looks upon the main pert* of his inquiry as one which we
would today describe as scientific, I discuss, in the second chapter, Hume's
theory of scientific explanation.
All references within parentheses in the text are to the Selby-Sigge editions
of A Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding
and Concerning the Principles of Morals. I have used the following abbreviations:
(a) T, 67: A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 67; (b) £HU,55: Enquiry Concerning the
Human Understanding, p. 55; (°) EFM, 200: Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals, p. 200. All other references are placed in footnotes.
In the Bibliography I have mentioned those books or articles which, as I
am conscious, have influenced my interpretation of Hume, or my discussion of the
philosophical issues raised, or both.
CHAPTER I
ANALYSIS
1. The Science of Human Nature
One of the principal difficulties in understanding lime's Treatise is
that of knowing "both what Hume is trying to do and what he is actually doing.
Put very roughly, the difficulty is one of determining whether Hume is doing
philosophy or science. Is what Hume has to say in the Treatise to be read
as a contribution to metaphysios, philosophical logic, the philosophy of
science, the philosophy of mathematics, philosophical psychology, ethical
theory, and so on, or as a contribution to some branch of the social sciences,
such as psychology or sociology? This question is a vexing one, and is com¬
plicated by the fact that neither Hume nor any of his contemporaries seem to
have been alive to the importance of making these distinctions. I shall make
a start at answering this question by considering what Hume has to say about
the "science of human nature" in which he claims to be engaged.
Hume uses the expression "science of human nature" in at least two senses.
On the one hand, the expression designates a group of inquiries whose object,
generally, is human behavior. Thus, in the "Advertisement to Book3 I and II"
he mentions the examination of the human understanding, the passions, morals,
politics, and criticism as the subjects which will comprise his Treatise of
Human Nature. (T, xii) Later he refers to the "four sciences of Logic. Morals.
Criticism, and Politics", and states that in them "is comprehended almost every
thing, which it can in any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can
tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind". (T, xix-xx)
A discrepancy between the two lists should be noticed: the first mentions
the examination of the understanding and the passions; in place of this the
seoond mentions logic. This suggests that perhaps Hume's "logic" comprises
both these studies. Though this3s a peculiar reading of "logic", it is lent
some support by Hume's remark that these two studies "make a compleat chain
of reasoning by themselves". (T, xii) Hume adduces this fact as justification
for publishing Books I and H of the Treatise as an independent piece of work.
I 3hall offer another reason for taking this view of Hume's "logic" after I
have considered what he says about the dependence of various sciences on the
science of human nature.
At other places Hume seems to use "the science of human nature" as
synonymous with "logic". He says that "Mathematics. Natural Philosophy, and
Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of man". (T, xix)
In saying this he is not making the unlikely claim that the study of mathematics,
for example, depends on the study of politics. Rather, he clearly intends to
assert the dependence of the three sciences mentioned on the study of logic
(and thus on only one of the sciences of human nature). These three sciences
are said to depend on the scienoe of man because "they lie under the cognizance
of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties". (T, xix) But, as
Hume points out, "the sole end of logic is to explain the principles and opera¬
tions of our reasoning facility, and the nature of our ideas". (T, xix) This
makes it reasonably plain that mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural
religion are not alleged to depend on the science of human nature, in the
above sense of logic, morals, politics, and criticism, but on the science of
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human nature in the restricted sense of logic.
Admitting this use of "the science of human nature" also makes it
possible to interpret Hume's reference to "a dependence on the knowledge of
man" of "the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more dose
and intimate /than is that of mathematics, etc./". (T, xix) Some distinction
is implied here between "the knowledge of human nature" and other sciences
which have a dose or intimate connection with human nature. This is plaus¬
ibly interpreted as a distinction between logic, on the one hand, and morals,
politics, and criticism, on the other. This is to say that some of the
"sciences of human nature" (in the broad sense of that expression) have a
dependence on the "science of human nature" (in the sense of logic).
The reason which Hume gives for the dependence of all the sciences,
including the sciences of politios, morals, and criticism, on logic, does not,
however, seem consonant with my earlier suggestion that Hume's logic includes
a study of the passions as well as of the understanding. There is no particular
reason to think that a study of the pas:-ions will contribute to an understanding
of the "powers and faculties" of men that is requisite for conducting the other
sciences. It does not seem likely that Hume is thinking of the study of the
passions when he says that mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion
would be improved and changed "were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent
and force of human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas
we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings". (T, xix) Thus
it seems that we must distinguish a broad and a restricted use of the tern
"logic". In its broad use, the tern stands for the study of the understanding
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and the passions; in its restricted use it refers to only the first of these
studies.
These inconsistencies in Hume's use of the expressions "science of
human nature" and "logic" are connected, I would submit, with certain
ambiguities in Hume's aocount of the way in which other sciences depend on
the science of human nature or on logic. Hume distinguishes, though not very
dearly, two rather different sorts of dependence. The first sort of dependence
is that in which any science depends on that other science which deals with
"the extent and force of human understanding", and "the nature of the ideas
we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings". (T, xix) This
is the sort of dependence Hume most often stresses. Moreover, it would seem
that when a science is said to be dependent in this sense it is said to depend
on lojfcio, in the restricted sense of that term. All the sciences are dependent
in this sense, because human beings are "the beings, that reason", (T, xix)
The other sort of dependence is that which obtains between some science
and the science of human nature by virtue of the fact that the dependent science
is a science about human beings. Such sciences are said to be dependent on
the science of human nature because human beings are the "objects, concerning
which we reason". (T, xix) Those sciences which depend on the science of
human nature in this sense include the sciences of natural religion, morals,
politics, criticism, and perhaps others as Trail. Two things may be noted
about this dependence. When these sciences are said to depend on the science
of human nature, the expression "science of human nature" must be being used
in the restricted sense, as not referring to more than a study of the under-
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standing and the passions. Otherwise, Hume would he saying that politics
depends on politics, and so on. Moreover, it is likely that Hume here intends
to suggest that such scienoes as morals and politics depend on an understanding
of the basio elements of human psychology, which basic elements are discovered
in the science of logic, taken to inolude the study of understanding and the
passions. This is certainly suggested by Hume's insistence that the studies of
the understanding and the passions "make a compleat chain of reasoning by them¬
selves". (T, xii) It is also supported by the faot that Hume's actual disouss-
ions of morals, politics, and criticism do depend on hi 3 prior disoussions of
the understanding and the passions. It is these two latter studies which provide
Hume with the psychological theory which underpins his theories of morals,
politics, and criticism. In short, all the sciences depend on the sort of
inquiry Hume conducts in Book I of the Treatise: some of the sciences, namely,
those concerned with human behavior, depend on the inquiries conducted in Book II
as well as Book I of the Treatise.
To understand Hume's enterprise it is not, however, sufficient merely to
know what scienoes are alleged to be dependent on what other sciences. We must
also know how the alleged dependence is to be characterized. As is only to be
expected, Hume is not very clear about the nature of the dependence. I shall
restrict myself to drawing attention to some of the ways in which Hume seems
to envisage it. One of the sorts of dependence Hume seems to be thinking of
is the dependence of the lower-level laws in a scientific explanatory systen
on higher-level laws in that system. Read in this way, Hume is suggesting
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that the 1&«3 whioh govern human thinking and human emotional life are the
most general laws in terms of which the laws which operate in the realms of
morals, politics, and criticism are to he understood. Morals, politics, and
criticism would thus he relatively specialized sciences of human nature when
compared with the empirical study of the understanding and the passions. It
is in this way that some of the sciences of human nature are dependent on
others.
The dependence of all the sciences on the science of human nature must
he read in a different way. Hume seems to suggest thai since all the soienoec,
whether their subject matter he human behavior or the movements of the planets,
are forms of inquiry, concerned with coming to know something, their procedures
for coming to know should he studied in their own right. This study of cognitive
activity of any sort is the proper province of logic, in the restricted sense.
Regrettably, however, Hume tends to think of his logic as itself a scientific
inquiry, roughly equivalent to what we would today call the psychology of
thinking. That is, he looks upon his logic as an inquiry into what takes place
in our minds when we make inductive or deductive inferences, when we make judg¬
ments, when we come to have beliefs, when we form ideas of this or that. Hume
apparently thinks that a study of the psychology of thinking is necessary for
the suocessful p osecution of any other scientific inquiry, whether that he
mathematics, natural philosophy, or the study of political systems.
his way of presenting Hume's views on the dependence of all the sciences
on the science of logic, though faithful to much that he says, is, however,
seriously misleading. Though it fits reasonably well his account of belief,
it fails to do full justice to his remarks on the differ:;nee between matters
of faot and the relations of ideas, or the relations between impressions
and ideas, and other central elements in his philosophioal system. Clearly
Hume was intending to give what we would today call a psychological account
of thinking; but he was also trying to do other things as well. Though Hume's
conceptual scheme was not such as to enable him to make the distinction, he
was in fact discussing topics both in psychology and in philosophy, especially
the philosophy of knowledge. Though Hume certainly did not make this distinct¬
ion, we muit make it, if we are to understand what Hume was actually about.
He is not simply saying that all the sciences depend on a scientific investi¬
gation of the laws which govern our thinking. He is rather, at least at times,
asserting that any science is in some way dependont on a philosophical inquiry
into suoh topics as the nature of knowledge, of truth, of induotion and deduction,
and others as well. This in part is to say that all the sciences are somehow
dependent on a philosophical investigation of such things as the concepts and
the forms of inference used in those sciences. Science, that is, depends on
the philosophy of science.
There are, then, at least three ways in which Hume talks of the dependence
of one science on another. Specialized soiences depend on more general sciences
in the sense that the laws of the former are lower-level laws in the explanatory
system of laws of whioh the laws of the latter are the more general laws. All
sciences are alleged to depend on a scientific inquiry into the (psychological)
laws of human thinking. All sciences are alleged to depend on the study of
"logic", in the sense that an adequate philosophy of science is of use to the
conduct of a scientific inquiry. Somehow or other, the philosophy of, say, the
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social soienoes is supposed to facilitate the doing of psychology, sociology,
politics, and the other social sciences. Presumably it does this by
elucidating the character of the laws of these sciences, the forms of the
arguments proper to them, and the fundamental concepts of which they make use.
It is important to realize that Hume is thinking of these various sorts
of dependence between one science and another if one is to correctly interpret
what he thinks himself to be doing. He is, after all, in Books I and II of
the Treatise, engaged in doing that logic or science of human nature on which
all the other sciences are 3aid to depend. Presumably, then, he is doing each
of the essential things to ,.hioh we have referred. Presumably he is stating
the general laws of human psychology, paying particular attention to the laws
of human thinking, and presenting a philosophy of science. In fact, as we
shall see in the course of this dissertation, Hume is doing all of these things.
I would particularly stress that he is doing the first. According to Passmore,
one can think of Book I of the Treatise, without anachronism, as "Hume's
1
methodology of the social sciences". This remark, though illuminating, is
misleading in ableast one important respect. Hume is not only offering a
methodology of the social sciences; he is also doing social science (at least
if the social sciences include psychology). 'That is to say, Hume is not only
giving a philosophical account of the empirical science(s) of human conduct;
he also considers himself to be making such an inquiry.
^"John Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1952), p. 6.
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There is, in fact, a serious ambiguity in Hume's project. He is apparently
trying to use a method of empirical inquiry (psychology) in order to give a
philosophical account oi :>uch empirical inquiries. He does not clearly 3ee
that the services which he hopes to provide by his science of human nature
cannot be provided by using psychology. Hume fails, in faot, to see the
difference between the second and the third sorts of dependence described above.
He does not, as Easanore suggests, try to reduce logic to psychology;^" it is
more accurate to say that he failed to notice that there is a difference. It
is this whici-iiequently entangles Hume in confusion. It is precisely because
Hume is providing a methodology of the social sciences, and engaging in at
least one of them (psychology of an introspective, armchair variety), and failing
to see the difference, that he can be so unclear about the precise sort of
depen ence which the other sciences have on the science of human nature.
Hume's science of human niture* is, then, a composite with both philoso¬
phical and scientific elements, and Hume fails to see the difference between
the two, (This, of course, does not mean that he denies the differences between
them.) At times, in fact, Hume speaks in terms that are appropriate only if
his investigation is a scientific one. This is particularly,though not exclus¬
ively, true of his account of the passions in Book II, Recognizing this fact,
it is essential, if we are not to misinterpret Hume, to have a quite precise
understanding of the scientific project in which he believes himself to be
engaged. To this end, I have devoted the remainder of this chapter, as well
"H • m/We /i.e. Hume/ is bound to argue that logical relationships are
reducible to psychological connexions . . .".Passiaore, p, 12.
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as the next, to a discussion of what may be called methodological questions.
In this chapter I shall consider some of Hume's objectives in the Treatise.
as well as the techniques he uses to secure these objectives. This requires
a discussion of his views on language as well as of the crucial distinction
between matters of fact and relations of ideas. In the next chapter I shall
consider three topics in hi3 philosophy of science: the nature of scientific
explanation; the character of scientific laws; and the notion of probability,
2, Confuai>n and Clarification
An important part of Hume's programme in the Treatise is the clarification
of the ooncepts with which we describe, explain and evaluate human conduct,
concepts such as those of causation, emotion, motivation, freedom and respons¬
ibility. Hume suggests that the analysis of these ooncepts is a necessary or
at least useful preliminary to the scientific study of human conduct. It is
Hume's conviction that the failure to make such a conceptual inquiry seriously
hampers the attempt to construct an adequate and coherent body of scientific
knowledge about human behavior. Unless people are sufficiently clear about
what causes, and emotions, and motives, and freedom, and responsibility, are unless
they are clear what is meant by the words which refer to theui^ they are apt
to fall into more or less erious confusions. Such a conceptual inquiry is
one of the ways in which Hume's "science of human nature" serves as a prolegomenon
to the social sciences.
The fact that concepts such as these require clarification does not imply
that they are, in their ordinary use, confused. It is obvious that men are
often able to talk sense about their own conduct and that of others. Talking
of pride and humility, Hume claims that "as these words, pride and humility.
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are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of
any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without
any danger of mistake". (f,277) Being able to use a word does not, however,
3how that we can say what it means# Nor does an ability to use an expression
in ordinary circumstances show that one can use it without mistake in novel,
and especially theoretical contexts. Since saying what a word means is a
relatively unusual occupation, it is quite possible that someone who knows
how to use a word may get confused when he begins to talk about its meaning.
Since it is most often philosophers who ask questions about the meanings of
words, it is most often philosophers who get into these confusions. The
confusions are sometimes compounded when, originating with philosophers (or
ordinary people in their philosophical moments), they are imported into ordin¬
ary speech and common practice. A good example is the concept of freedom.
This i3 an ordinary, not a tecinica". concept; men use it in their day-to-day
activities. The practice of imposing legal sanctions involves questions of
freedom. Men are very much concerned with the preservation and the enhance¬
ment of their freedom. And yet philosophers continue to debate about whether
men are or are not free. This is a good 3ign, Hume suggests, of a conceptual
con \ision. "From this circumstance alone," he remarks, "that a controversy
has been long kept on foot, and remains 3till undecided, we may pro ;ume that
there is scrae ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix
different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy". (SHU, 80) The proper
way of dealing with such a problem as that of freedom is not, then, to take
sides and continue the argument, but to dispel the confusion by considering
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how the concept of freedom is used by non-philosophers, or even how it could
be used. Now to the extent that a scientific study of human oonduct depends
on having a clear understanding of the conc§> ts we ordinarily use about human
conduct, and to the extent that its progress can be hampered by conceptual
confusions of the kind described, philosophical analysis is useful and some¬
times even necessary to science.
In what does suoh conceptual oonfusion consist? Hume nowhere give3 a
sustained account of conceptual confusion, but his views can be gathered from
remarks made ai several places in the Treatise. At one point he suggests that
many of the errors of metaphysicians result from the fact that "'tis usual for
men to use words for ideas, and to talk instead of thinking in their reasonings".
(T, 61-62) It is possible, that is, for men to operate with words without
those words being attached, as it were, to any definite concept. This is a
matter of merely going through various verbal manoeuvres without actually
thinking, and perhaps without knowing that one is not aotually thinking. When
such camouflaged prattling takes the place of thought, serious confusions arise.
A case in point is the philosophical discussion of causality. Philosophers
have talked of things being "endow'd with a power or force, proportion'! to
their effect/s/". (T, 162) Ihey have talked, too, of a "necessary connexion
betwixt objects", this necessary connection depending "upon an efficaoy or
energy, with which any of these objects are endow'd". (T, 162) "In all these
expressions," Hume asserts, "so apply'd. we have really no distinot meaning,
andmake use only of common words, without any clear* and determinate
ideas". (T, 162) In a similar vein, "when. . . we make the terms of power
13-
and efficaqy signify something, of which we have a clear idea, and which is
incompatible with those objects, to whioh we apply it, obscurity and error
begin then to take place, and we are led astray by a false philosophy". (T, 168)
Vexy roughly, then, conceptual confusion arises from the misapplication of
perfectly good words. These words have a correct use, and it is this fact
which gives them a semblance of meaning when they are used by philosophers.
But too often philosophers fail to pay attention to the conditions which
justify their use in ordinary situations. Once this happens, the danger of
confusion is present. This is not to say that a word cannot be used in a non-
ordinary way. But if this is the case, then one i3 no longer concerned with
the analysis of the word as ordinarily used. More importantly, however, it
is necessary that the new use be a justified one, which is to say that there
must be some experiential or observable circumstances whose occurrence will
justify the use of the word. It is this condition which is apparently not
satisfied by the philosophers whom Hume has in mind.
For further light on what it is to be confused about the meaning of a
word we may turn to Hume's account of what it is to know the meaning of a word.
We can begin by considering his account of what it is to know the meaning of
a general term. According to Hume, knovdng the meaning of a general term is
a matter of having acquired a rather complex habit or ability, the ability
to use the word correctly, according to the conventions which govern its use,
in a variety of situations, and for a variety of purposes. To know the meaning
of "red" is to be able to do such things as: think of various instances of red
objectsj classify objects as "red" or "not red" ?vhen required to do so; avoid
making nonsensical statements involving the use of "red"; correot others
when they make such statements; teach the use of "red" to other people.
Consider same of the things he says in the Treatise discussion of abstract
ideas. To know the meaning of a general term is to he ready or able to think
of an appropriate instance of the concept in question, "as we may be prompted
by a present design or necessity". (T, 20) To know the meaning of "triangle"
is to be able, ahould I or someone else say "that the three angles of &
triangle aro equal to each other". to think of triangles such as scalene
and isosceles triangles, of which this proposition is not true, and thus
"perceive the falsehood of this proposition", though it be true of some
triangles. (T, 21) To know the meaning of the words is "to keep the mind in
readiness to observe, that no conclusions be form'd contrary to any ideas
/i.e. particular instances/, which are usually compriz'd under them", (T, 21-22)
To know the meaning of a word is to be able to "avoid talking nonsense" when
using the word, and to "perceive any repugnance among the ideas" corresponding
to the words which make up a sentence. (T, 23) "Thus if instead of saying,
that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation, we shou'd say,
that they have always recourse to conquest, the custom which we have acquir'd
of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes
us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition". (T, 23) ."hat I
would emphasize here is the fact that Hume cashes the notion of knowing the
meaning of a general term in terms of an ability to operate correctly with that
term in a variety of situations. He also has a psychological theory about the
way in which one manages to use a word correctly, but there is no need to consider
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that here.
By implication we can see what it is to be confused about the meaning
of a word. To be confused is to use a word in a situation in which the word
cannot appropriately be used. There are, obviously, certain standards for
the use of the word; the word only applies in a restricted range of situations,
and to use the word outside that range, even in a situation that bears sane
resemblance to an appropriate situation, is to be confused, (At least, that
is, if one fails to recognize that one is disregarding accepted usage and
creating a neologism). Conversely, a person is confused if he refuses to use
a term in one situation, while permitting its use in another situation that
is, in all relevant respects, the same as the first, A person is confused,
also, if he permits or makes assertions which contradict the implications of
a proposition which he accepts. These are some, at least, of the sorts of
confusion which it is part of Hume's objective in the Treatise to eliminate
by his analysis of some of the concepts necessary for the social sciences,
Hume gives examples of each of these kinds of confusion when he discusses
the question of free will and the difference between reason and the passions.
How are we to remedy such confusions? How are we to make clear the
meanings of words? The nub of Hume's answer lie3 in his recommendation of
the "experimental method". To make clear the meaning of a word is ultimately,
and in large part, a matter of drawing a person's attention to the observable
circumstances which govern the use of that word. Remedying confusion is just
one aspect (though a fairly sophisticated one) of teaching a word's meaning.
And we teach the meaning of a word by indicating or describing situations in
which it is correctly used. Though not unequivocally, Hume seems to be thinking
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along these lines when he says in the Treatise; "To give a child an idea of
scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objeots, or in other
words, convey to him these impressions". (T, 5) To teach a child the use
of the word "orange" I show him several orange objects. If he is confused
about the meaning of "orange", if, for example, he calls both red and orange
things "orange", I try to sort out the confusion by showing him several red
objects, emphasizing that these are called "red", as well as several orange
objects, emphasizing that these are to be called "orange", thus trying to
get him to notice the difference between the two cases. In this procedure
I am simply trying to focus the listener's attention on that state of affairs
the obtaining of which justifies the use of the word whose meaning is to be
determined.
I would suggest that Hume thinks of clarifying the meaning of at least
a good many words along lines very similar to those of the color-model. The
faot that a concept whose meaning is to be made clear is a complex concept
does not basically alter the procedure to be followed. If I am trying to
clarify the meaning of tV . \ord for a complex concept, I may have to draw
attention to a number of conditions which together justify the use of the
word. But in the end this is but a more complicated version of the procedure
described in the case of color-words. Take the case of the meaning of "cause".
At least on one interpretation of Hume's account of causation, to clarify the
meaning of "cause" for someone would require drawing his attention to recurrent
event-sequences, to temporal and perhaps spatial proximities between the events,
to feelings of expectation that he experiences when one member of the event-
sequence occurs^ and so on. It is the satisfaction of these, and perhaps other
conditions, which justifies one in using "cause", and thus the meaning of the
term must be elucidated by reference to these conditions. The same is true
of such other concepts as those designated by the expression "pride" or
"moral evaluation". To elucidate these expressions I must draw my listener's
attention to thosepeculiar feelings which justify the use of either according
to Hume's theory. This, in turn, may require drawing his attention to a
number of other circumstances. But mention to these psychological concepts
raises special problems which must be deferred until later.'*'
It is a corollary of this view about the way in which to clarify the
meanings of words that if there are no experiences or observable situations
which justify the U3e of the word, then the alleged word has no meaning. Thus,
in discovering what experiences or observable situations justify, by convention,
the use of a particular word, I discover that the word lias meaning. If I dis¬
cover that there are no experiences or observable situations which would justify
a word'3 use, I discover that the word has no meaning. Looking to experience
is both a test for the meaningfulness of a word, and a way of discovering its
meaning.
Both aspects of this general approach are apparent in Hume's discussion
of the meaning of such worts as "libery" and "freo". Hume points out some,
at least, of the criteria which awe in fact used to determine whether or not
a man ha3 liberty or is free. In doing this he both shows that the words have
meaning, and goes some way toward clarifying their meaning. But Hume also
considers the criteria for the proper use of these words which are suggested
by the libertarian theory of human conduct. On that theory, according to Hume,
the only elements of a man's conduct that are freo actions of his are elements
of his oonduct whioh originate with the man himself in some peculiar and special
sense. But, so Hume argues, no account can be given of any conditions the
"*"3ee Chapter IV, Section 2.
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satisfaction of which would show that a man's behavior originated with him
in this special sense, or did not originate with him. The fact that a man's
behavior originated or did not originate with him in this special sense is
compatible with the obtaining of any observable or experiential conditions.
But if this is so, then the alleged conoept of a man's behavior originating
with himself, as well as the concept of a free action which it is intended
to elucidate, is a meaningless concept."'" Generalizing from this example, we
may say that part of the job of conceptual clarification is that of showing
that a word could not mean what some philosophers ha'- claimed it means. This
is done by showing that the philosopher can pro-ride no criteria for his use
of the word.
Hume argues for this view about the conditions for meaningfulness, and
about the manner in which to discover and clarify the meanings of words, in
arguing for his principle of the priority of impressions over ideas. He states
this principle when he says: "All our simple ideas in their first appearance
are deriv'd from simple impressions. which are correspondent to them, and
which they exactly represent." (T, 4) This is, at least in part, to say that
all concepts are derived from experience. Hume's formulation of his principle
is, however, unfortunate. If, as I have assumed, this principle has a bearing
on the question of the meaningfulne3s of words, it may perhaps be tempting
to construe it as offering an account of the meanings of words. That is,
"'"For a more extensive discussion of Hume's argument, see Chapter V, Section 2,
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sincs the "ideas'* are said to "exactly represent" the "impressions" to which
they correspond, words may be thought to represent the conditions whose
occurrence justifies their use* Using this model, words would, one and all,
be thought to refer to the oauditions which justify their use; they would be
names for these oonditions, As I shall argue in the next section of this
chapter,however, it does not seem to be Hume's view that all words refer to
the oonditions which justify their use and thus give them meaning* Hume does
not, at least as a general theory, have a referential theory of meaning* If
this is so, then in asserting that a word is meaningful only if there are
observable or experiential oonditions justifying its use, Hume is not
necessarily asserting that these oonditions are named or referred to by the
word in question. It is still an open question whether the oonditions which
justify the use of a word justify in one or a variety of ways*
3* aoaie Remarks About Language
In the previous section I suggested that one of Hume's objectives, in
his "science of human nature", was to clarify the meanings of some of the words
we use to describe, explain, and evaluate human conduct. Hume's "science of
human nature" was prompted, at least in part, by the fact that other philosophers,
in analysing our psychological concepts, had become involved in what Hume took to
be conoeptual confusions, Hume's "science of human nature" had, then, the
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therapeutic task of remedying some of these oonfusions. Since I am contending
that Hume was in some sense interested in the meanings of words, I must now
oonsider what he actually has to say about language,
I must begin by entering a disclaimer. Though Hume was interested in
language in the sense of wanting to eliminate the confusions that surround
some of the words we use, he nowhere attempts to state a general philosophical
theory of language. If this is the point he intends to mate, Flew is quite
oorreot when he says: "Unlike such of his classical predecessors as KLato or
Hobbes or Looke or Berkeley, Hume seems himself to b' 3 had little interest
in or respect for any questions which he thought of as semantic".^" Neverthe¬
less, Hume cannot help making, in passing, remarks which reveal some of his
assumptions about the way language works. If this is so, and if these remarks
may serve to throw light on the character of Hume's inquiry, then there is
point in drawing attention to them. One must avoid two equally untenable
extremes: assuming that Hume has a fully-formed theory of language; and over¬
looking occasional remarks on language that may prove useful for interpreting
his philosophy, I shall proceed to investigate what Hume has to say about
words and about sentences, I am particularly concern ;d to discover whether
Hume thinks that words and sentenoes refer to the experiencesor observable
"'"Antony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1961), p. 37.
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situations which justify their use. The answer to this question will assist
us in determining whether Hume intends to give an aocount of the meaning of
words and sentenoes, or whether even the elarifioatory part of his programme
must be interpreted in another way.
On a number of occasions Hume speaks of words as names which refer to
objects, or activities, or qualities, and so on. He speaks, for example,
of "the name, which distinguishes the mode". (T, 17) At another place he
says: "The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a
oolleotion of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a
particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to recall, either to
ourselves or others, that collection". (T, 16) Later he suggests: "When we
have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we
apply the same name to all of them". (T, 20) At another point he claims that
"common language ... has generally call'd by the same term all such /operations
of the mind/ as nearly resemble each other". (T, 105) Such remarks certainly
indicate that Hume thought of at least some words on a naming model. They
are, however, too sketchy. They do not support a claim that Hume thought of
all words as names. Would he, for example, have wanted to say that the words
for logical constants are names? There is no particular reason to think so.
Would he say that verbs have a referring function? It is difficult to give
an unequivocal answer. But, as we shall see later in this section, lie does
seem to think that at least one verb, "promise" in the first-person use, does
something other than refer to a state of affairs. Nevertheless Hume does seem
to have been impressed by a similarity between the use of names (proper names)
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and other grammatically substantival words. It is interesting that the
examples he gives of names are words for modes, substances, objects, and
activities, When he talks of names he seems to be thinking of such words
as "dancing", "apple", "thinking", "anger", and so on. It is words such
as these which give some plausibility to a referential theoiy of the meaning
of words,
Antony Flew suggests that, on Hume's theoiy, "the meanings of words are
ideas, ideas , , , being identified with mental images",'*' If words are con¬
strued as names, then, presumably, they are the names of ideas, This seems
a highly unlikely view to attribute to Hume, but there is textual support
for it, Hume does frequently talk of a connection bp ween words and ideasj
"The idea of a substance , , , is nothing but a collection of simple ideas,,,,
/that7 have a particular name assigned them", (T, 16) He speaks, too, of a
"term which ♦ , , has a relation to many other particular ideas", and says
that "we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any general term",
(T, 22) Moreover, there are places in which Hume connects the notions of idea
and meaning. In the first Enquiry he says: "When we have often employed any
term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it ha3 a
determinate idea annexed to it", (SHH 21-22) In the same place he refers to
the "suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or
idea". (SHU, 22)
Despite the apparent support which can be derive! from the text, however,
Flew's interpretation must surely be incorrect. Consider the sentence
"*"Flew, p, 22,
"This apple is rotten", used in a normal context. If the word "apple", as
used in this sentence, is a name, does it stand only for an "idea" of an
apple, and not for the apple I see? Perhaps Flew is thinking of Hume's
theory of perception, taken to imply that what I see is not a public object,
but something that no longer exists when I shut my eyes. But if Flew is
thinking of Hume's perception theory, he would surely have to agree that the
word "apple" in the above sentence stands for an "impression", not an "idea".
In Hume's teohnioal vooabulary, "idea" stands in contrast to "impression".
Thus, to say that a word stands for an idea implies that it does not stand
for an impression. This would mean that "apple" refers to the apples I remem¬
ber or imagine, but not to the ones I am now looking at or eating. There is
no real reason to think that Hume wanted to endorse this view.
Flew'a interpretation runs counter, as well, to what Hume clearly intends
when he says: ".'/hen we have found a resemblance among several objects. that
often ooour to us, we apply the same name to all of them". (T, 2(\ Italics mine.)
Or consider what he says about the word "belief" in the first foiquiry: "Belief
is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no one is ever at a loss to
know the meaning of that term; because every man is every moment conscious of
the sentiment represented by it". (3HH, 48-49) Clearly enough, "belief" can
represent the belief I now experience, as well as that which I remember. It
is the name, if it is a name, of impressions as well as of ideas. Perhaps
Hume would want to say that a general term like "belief" can only function
as a name because it can stand for imagined or rememt <red experiences, as well
as aotual ones. But this is very different from restricting the class of things
named by a word to "ideas".
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To the extent that Hume thought of words as names which have meaning
"by referring to the states of affairs which justify their use, it is
tempting to think that he also considered sentences to have meaning by some¬
how referring to the states of affairs which justify their use. Sentences
as well as words have meaning, and if words, or at least the only words
Hume explicitly talks about, have meaning by referring, then perhaps sentences
also have meaning by referring, "The cat is on the mat" has meaning by refer¬
ring to, or perhaps describing, a certain situation. This sentence says that
the cat is on the mat, and is justified by the fact that the oat is on the mat,
A general objection to the claim that Hume holds, as a general theory,
that sentences have meaning by referring to the states of affairs which justify
their use, is the fact that Hume simply does not have a general theory of
language. Just as in the case of words, there is thus no justification for
extrapolating a general theory from the little evidence we have for Hume's
views about language. More importantly, however, ^ are occasions on which
Hume a iparently invokes other models for understanding the meaning of sentences.
In the case of evaluative language, he tends to talk of what may be called
motive meaning. In the case of promises he seams to think that the normal
use of "I promise" is a performative one, I shall consider both these oases
in some detail.
The general thesis that Hume thinks of sentences as descriptions has a
particular form. It is sometimes said that those sentences whose use is just¬
ified, according to Hume's account at any rate, by the occurrence a given
psychological state, refer to that state, or say that that state obtains. For
example, it is sometimes said that Hume believes that a sentence subh as "Smith
is a wicked man" says something about the speaker, vis, that he has a certain
feeling upon the oontemplation of Smith's conduot or character. If
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this interpretation is correct, it provides further support for the view
that Hume thinks of the meaning of sentences on a referring-model. I shall
begin by arguing that this is not Hume's view of the function of evaluative
language. At least in this case Hume is not guilty of what Austin has called
1
the "descriptive fallacy".
Geoffrey Hunter gives rn account of Hume's theory of moral judgement
2
such that Hume obviously commits the descriptive fallacy. Hunter quotes two
passages in which Hume seems to do this. In the Treatise Hume says: "When
you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but
that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of
blame from the contemplation of it". (T, 469) Similarly, in the Inquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals he says:
The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that
morality i3 determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be
whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the
pleasing sentiment of approbation: and vice the contrary. (EPM, 289)
Starting from these two passages, Hunter argues that, for Hume, moral judge¬
ments are statements of psycuolor>cal fact. He claims that "it is a oetsral
part of Hume's moral theory that moral judgements are statements of fact . . .,
namely statements to the effect that there is a causal relation between the
speaker's contemplation of some actual or imagined state of affairs and his
"^J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances," Philosophical Papers. ed. J. 0. Urmson
and G.J. Waraock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19*6l), p.* 221.
^Geoffrey Hunter, "Hume on 'Is'and 'Ought'," Philosophy. XXXVII (1962), pp.
148—152.
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feeling certain 'peculiar* . . • 'feelings* or •sentiments*"."*' He claims
that "what Hume is saying here /I.e. in the first passage quoted above/ is
that *This action is vicious* just means 'Contemplation of this action causes
2
a feeling or sentiment of blame in me*". Later he says that on Hume*s view
"a moral judgment states that there is a causal relation between the contem¬
plation by the speaker of some actual or imagined state of affairs and a
certain sort of feeling or sentiment that he has when he does the contemplating"
Hunter's interpretation of these passages depends on the assumption that
in them Hume intended to endorse a view about the character of evaluative
utteranoes. That is, he assumes that Hume intends to provide an analysis of
the meaning of utterances of the form "X is virtuous (good)" or "X is vicious
(bad)". It seems clear, however, that to interpret Hume in this way is
seriously to misconstrue the character of his enquixy into moral evaluations.
As P.S. irdal has convincingly argued,^ Hume does not intend, at least
in his Treatise account of moral evaluation, to give an account of moral
language. His objective is rather to give an account of the nature of eval¬
uations, and of the conditions which give rise to them. His interests are
psychological, not linguistic. He is attempting to describe the state of
mind of a person making an evaluation, and to state those psychological laws
1Hunter, Philosophy. XXXVII (1962), p. 149.
2Ibid.
"^Hunter, Philosophy. XXXVTI (1962), p. 151.
r.S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1966), pp. 190-212.
whioh govern the occurrence of this state of mind. It ia within this context
that one must interpret the two passages quoted by Hunter. Is Hume, in these
two passages, endorsing a thesis about language, or is he simply summarizing,
albeit in a misleading way, the results of his previous discussion of whether
moral distinctions derive from reason or from sentiment? If he is stating a
linguistic thesis it appearr out of the blue, as it were; it has no obvious
connection with anything that has gone before. If he is not intending to
state a linguistic thesis, then perhaps he is just using a striking formulation
to drive heme the point for which he has been arguing throughout Part I of
Book III: that moral evaluations are matters of feeling. The latter seems
to me the more convincing way to describe what Hume is doing.
It should be noted that the view of evaluative language which Hunter
attributes to Hume is a very odd one indeed. On this view, when a person makes
use of a sentence such as "Smith is a wicked man" he is in fact doing no more
than making a psychologloal report about his own feelings. Thi3 sentence is
allegedly equivalent to "When I think of Smith* s character I have a pecul iar
feeling which is called moral disapproval". Such an interpretation of ;he
meaning of evaluative utterances has no prima facie plausibility at all. One
wants to insist that when one makes an evaluation, whatever one is doing, one
is not talking about what is going on in one's mind. But, as Ardal has empha¬
sized, if one is to attribute a clearly and seriously questionable view to a
perceptive thinker, one must at least be able to give 3ome account of the
considerations vdiich would have led him to adopt that view. In the present
case, where the apparently linguistic remark lias been preceded by no explicit
discussion of language, the reasons would presumably have to be of a more
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genaral sort. Perhaps the need of consistency within his philosophical system
would have required Hume to adopt this peculiar theory of evaluative language.
The trouble is, however, that no account has been given of these requirements.
Nor does it seem at all likely that there are any such requirements within
Hume's system. It would seem, then, that we must read the quoted passages
in some other way. If Hume is adopting any linguistic thesis at all it is
that evaluative utterances, unlike statements of faot or of logioal relation,
are not properly characterized as true or false. But this surely would fit
ill with Hunter's interpretation.
But what of my suggestion, in the previous 3oction, that Hume is at
least partly interested in the clarification of the concepts with which we
describe, explain, and evaluate human conduct? Does he not think that, in
his account of moral evaluation, he has clarified the concepts of evaluation,
approval, disapproval, nmi so on?! would submit that Hume does think he has
clarified these concepts, but that he has not done so by providing an analysis
of the meaning of the lingui tic expressions with which we express our
evaluations* Sather, he has gJren an account of the conditions which justify
us in using these expressions. In Hume's view, a moral evaluation is a peculiar
feeling which occurs when certain conditions, e.g. the adoption of an unbiased
viewpoint, have been satisfied. It is only when one has this feeling that
one is, in fact, evaluating in a moral way. Thus, it is only when one has
this feeling upon the contemplation of Smith's behavior or his character that
one is justified in saying "Smith is a wicked man". But to say that one is
only justified in saying "Smith is a wicked man" when one has this feeling,
is not the same as saying that what one means, when one says "Smith is a
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wioked man", is that one has this feeling.
I am not saying that Hume intended to give an account of the conditions
which justify the use of an expression rather than of the meaning of that
expression. To say this would seem to imply that Hume was aware of the
difference, and ohose to do the one and not the other. I agree with Ardal
when he says that it is not "too fanoiful to suggest that Hume may have
written in such a way as not to distinguish dearly between the analysis of
the meaning of an expression, and a description of the conditions which justi¬
fy its use"."1' What I am saying is simply that the points Hume makes in the
oourse of his disoussion of evaluation have a bearing on the one question,
but not necessarily on the other.
The faot that Hume did not see dearly the distinction between these
two questions is evident in something he says in the course of his discussion
of causation in the first Enquiry. There he offers the following "definition"
of a causes
An object, followed by another, and where all the objects
similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the
second. Or in other words where, if the first object had
not been, the second never had existed. (SHU,76) ™
The crucial thing to note is the actual lack of equivalence between the first
and second italicized passages, despite Hume's suggestion that they are
equivalent. It should further be noted that the first italicized passage
may be taken as an account (an inadequate account) of the conditions which
justify one in saying that one event is the cause of another, whereas the
second italicised passage can be taken as a (partial) account of the meaning
^Ardal, p. 203
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of a causal statement. This certainly suggests that Hume was not dearly-
aware of the distinction that I am here making "between the meaning of an
expression, and the conditions which justify its use.
If my discussion of Hume's aocount of moral evaluation is correct, we
have found at least part of the anwer to the question with which we started.
That is, it does not seem that Hume believes that all sentences have meaning
by referring to or describing the conditions which justify their vise. In at
least the case of moral ju&gnents, when one uses an evaluative utterance, one
is justified in doing so by the fact that one has the appropriate feeling,
but that one has this feeling is not reported by the utterance. Thus it would
appear the Hume is not assuming, uncritically, a referential theory of the
meaning of sentences.
To say that Hume is not trying to provide an analysis of the meaning of
evaluative language, and that Hunter incorrectly ascribes to Hume the view
that moral judgments are statements about the feelings of the speaker, is notf
however, to 3ay that one cannot conjecture about the theory of evaluative
language to which Hume would have been sympathetic had he raised the issue.
As Ardal suggests, there are three reasons for thinking that Hume would have
been sympathetic to an anlysis of morallanguage similar to recent emotivist
theories. For one thing, an emotivist theory seems most consonant with Hume's
account of evaluations a3 forms of emotion. For another, Hume does seem aware
of the emotive force of language, and of the fact that language can be used
to create feelings of approval and disapproval in others and thus influence
their conduct. Hie refers, for example, to the fact that politicians, in their
"talk of honourable or dishonourable. praiseworthy or blameable." may "assist
nature in the producing of those sentiments, which she suggests to us, and
may even on some occasions, produce alone an approbation or esteem for any
particular action". (T, 500) Finally, the possibility of an emotivist theory
of evaluative language was not unknown in the eighteenth oentury. Thomas
Reid, for example, criticized Hume "for maintaining the, to Reid, erroneous
view that approvals and disapprovals are feelings not judgments, and the
correlative view that evaluative verbal expressions are not to be assessed
in terms of truth or falsity","*" It is interesting to note as Ardal points
out, that Reid also criticizes Hume for taking the quite different view of
moral language suggested by Hunter, thus revealing that the linguistic question
was probably not a live one. But it is at least dear that to suggest that
Hume might have adopted an emotivist theory of moral language is not to be
guilty of on anachronism. To suggest that Hume would have been sympathetic
to an emotive theory of moral language is not, however, to say that this was
Hume's theory. It is much closer to the truth to say that he had no explicit
theory of evaluative language at all, but that of the usual linguistic theories
emotivism would be the most consonant with Hume's views on the nature of
evaluation.
Independent support for the view that Humo is, at least in some cases,
not offering an analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions, but rather
an account of the conditions which justify their use, can be derived from his
acoount of causal necessity. As is well known, Hume offers an account of the
necessary connection between a cause and its effect according to which the
Ardal, p. 209
idea of necessary connection has its origin in a feeling which I come to have
when I have had the experience of the constant conjunction of two events,
C and E, the feeling of being determined or forced to expect E when I have
encountered an instance of C, and vice versa. In Hume's words:
... After a frequent repetition /of two spatially and
temporally contiguous events/, I find, that upon the
appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd
by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider
it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the
first object. 'Tis thi3 impression, then, or determination.
which affords me the idea of nee- ssity. (T, 15&J
But if this feeling is the source of the idea of necessity, then perhaps Hume
would want to say that one is justified in asserting that two objects are
necessarily connected only if one has this feeling when one encounters an
instance of one of the two objects.
Hie question then arises about the analysis of the meaning of the propo¬
sition: C causes E. Is this a statement about C and E, or is it a statement
about the speaker's feelings? Suppose one were tc lopt Hunter's interpre¬
tation of Hume's theory of moral language as an account of his theory of the
language of causal necessity. Just as the sentence "Smith is a wicked man"
is construed as a statement about the speaker's feelings, so also, one might
expect, the sentence "C causes E" is a statement about the speaker's feelings.
Hume's account of the justification of either sentence is, in important
respects, similar. "Smith is a wicked man" is justified if the speaker has
a special sort of feeling upon the contemplation of Smith's actions or
character. "C causes E" is justified if the speaker experiences the peculiar
feeling of a determination to think of E when he encounters an instance of C,
and vice versa. That is, each sentence is justified if the speaker has certain
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feelings. But if this is so, then one would expect either sentence to have
meaning in the same way. If "Smith is a wicked man" has meaning by referring
to the feelings of the speaker, then T causes E" should have meaning by
referring to the feelings of the speaker.
There is, however, no reason at all to think that Hume intended to
provide an analysis of the E;eaning of sentences involving the concept of
causal necessity that would ma'ro them equivalent to reports about the mental
life of the speaker. For one thing, he gives no explicit account of the
language of causal necessity. For another, the analysis suggested is a most
implausible one. It just does not seem to be the case that if I were to say
"Fire causes heat" I would be talking about my thoughts, feelings, or compul¬
sions, and not about fires and heat. Nor is there any reason to believe that
anything in Hume's general philosophical position requires him to adopt this
peculiar view about the language of causes. The ascription of this view to
Hume would therefore seem wholly gratuitous.
There is a further and apparently conclusive objection to attributing
this view Of causal language to Hume, If the view were Hume's, he would
presumably be saying that the sentence "Fires cause heat" is equivalent in
meaning to some such sentence as "The thought of fire determines (causes) me
to think of heat". But Hume could not allow this equivalence since he quite
unequivocally asserts that the causal connection between any two objects, say
fire and heat, is distinct from the causal connection between the thoughts of
those objects. As he writes in the Treatise:
-JVr-
When any object is presented to us, it immediately conveys
to the mind a lively idea of that objeot, which is usually
found to attend it; and this determination of the mind foims
the nece3saiy connexion of these subjects. But when we change
the point of view, from the objects to the perceptions; in
that case the impression is to be considered as the cause,
and the lively idea as the effeot; and their necessary
connexion is that new determination. which we feel to pass
from the idea of the one to that of the other. The uniting
principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible
as that among external objeots, and is not known to us any
other way than by experience. (T, 169. Italics mine.)
The point of this passage is to counter the objeotion that Hume's account of
causal necessity involves him in an infinite regress. That is, it is objeoted
that if C's being a cause of E is a matter of one's thought of C causing one's
thought of E, one must prooeed to elucidate this latter causal connection in
terms of a causal connection between the thought of the thought of C and the
thought of the thought of E, and so on. Hume counters this objection by say¬
ing that the feeling of determination, and thus the oausal connection, is in
each of the oases mentioned distinot. I can think that C is the cause of E
without thinking that my thought of C is the oause of my thought of E, But
if this is so, then it hardly makes sense to say that "C causes E" means the
same as "The thought of C causes the thought of E", A different causal con¬
nection is reported by eaoh of these sentences.
These remarks suggest an analysis of the language of causal connections
to which Hume might be expected to have been sympathetic. In saying that fire
causes heat I am saying or asserting something; viz: that fire and heat are
oonstantly conjoined. I am not, however, saying that I have a feeling of
determination to think of heat when I see fires, and so on. The way this
feeling is involved in the utterance "Fire causes heat" is this: that utterance
expresses the feeling of determination which I have. We "draw the idea of
it /i.e. of necessary connection between objects/ from what we feel internally
in contemplating them /i.e. the objects/". (T, 169) But in saying that two
objects are necessarily connected we do not say that we have this feeling;
we rather express this feeling linguistically. As Macnabb says,interpreting
Hume:
It is a true proposition that flame is necessarily connected
with heat. But this proposition does not mean that the
impression of flame is necessarily connected with the idea
of heat. It simply expresses the feeling of customary
transition from the impression to the idea, and asserts the
constant conjunction of flame and heat."*-
If this gloss on Hume's account of causal necessity is correct, one has
both independent support for the aocount of Hume's theory of moral evaluation
offered earlier, and further grounds for rejecting the thesis that Hume operates
with a referential theory of the meaning of sentences. If the upshot of Hume's
view about causation is that one is justified in saying "Fire causes heat"
only if one has a feeling of determination to think of heat when one sees fire,
and yet this sentence does not say that one has this feeling, then the relation
between the feeling and the sentence cannot be construed as a relation between
referring expression and state of affairs referred to. Thus, there must be
more than one kind of relation which can hold between a linguistic expression
and the conditionswhich justify its use. But this is not to say that Hume
has a formal theory about the meaning of the language of causes. In suggesting
that Hume would be sympathetic to the application of an emotivist analysis to
*4).G-.C. Kacnabb, David Hume: His Theory of KnoT/ledge and Morality (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1966}, p. 114. ———
-36-
causal statments, I am only pointing out a view about language that appears
consonant with Hume's theory of causal necessity. As Hume presents his
theory, there is seme reason to take it as an account of the conditions which
justify causal statements. There is much less reason to read it as an analy¬
sis of the meaning of these statements.
We may now turn to Hume's disoussion of promises, a discussion which
shows quite conclusively, I would submit, that Hume does not think that all
sentences have meaning by referring to or by describing the conditions which
determine whether they have been properly used. A sentence of the form
"I promise to does not, according to Hume, say anything about the world.
More particularly, such a sentence does not say anything about the mind of
the speaker. Such sentences have a performative, not a descriptive job to
do. Nevertheless, there are, as for any sentences which have a meaning,
conditions which must be satisfied if the sentences by which we make promises
are to be justified.
"Promises," Hume says, "are human inventions, founded on the necessities
and interests of sooiety". (T, 519) The institution of promising is one
which has its point in making possible an "interested" commerce between men.
(T, 521-22) In order to make such interested commerce possible, "there is
a certain form of words invented . . . , by which we bind ourselves to the
performance of any action". (T, 522) "This form of words constitutes what
we call a promise". (T, 522) Hume refers to this "form of words" when he
says that there are "certain symbols or signs instituted, by which we . , .
give each other security of our conduct in any particular incident". (T, 522)
By virtue of this institution, then, when we utter a certain form of words,
in conditions which need to be further specified, we bring about certain
effects, such as binding ourselves to do what we promised, and giving others
security that we will do it.
Promising is not merely a matter of resolving to do what we promise to
dot "Were there no more than a resolution in the case, promises wou'd only
declare our former motives, and wou'd not create any new motive or obligation"•
(T, 522) Nevertheless, there is a connection between resolving to do some¬
thing and promising to do it: "A resolution is the natural aot of the mind,
which promises express", (T, 522) What must be accounted for, however, is
the "new motive or obligation", (T, 522) This is supplied by the use of
the conventional formula for making a promise; for example, by saying "I
promise to ffn, "When a man says he promises anv thing, he in effect expresses
a resolution of performing it; and along with that, by making use of this
form of words, subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again
in case of failure". (T, 522) Throughout the discussion emphasis is placed
on the conventional promising formula: "The will alone is never suppos'd
to cause the obligation, but must be express*d by words or signs, in order
to impose a tye upon any man". (T, 523)
Though it is normally the case that when one premises to do something
one is also resolved to do it, one can make a premise without being resolved
to keep it, or even when one is resolved not to keep it: "Nor will a man be
less bound by his word, tho' he seoretly give a different direction to his
intention, and with-hold himself both from a resolution, and from willing
an obligation". (T, 5-3) This is so because the expression of the premise
is usually "the principal part of the promise". Other conditions may, how¬
ever, have a bearing on whether a person who says "I premise to has in
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fact made a premise. A person "who shou'd make use of any expression
Iof promising/, of whioh he knows not the meaning, and which he uses with¬
out any intention of binding himself, wou'd not certainly be bound by it",
(T, 523) Moreover, a person who uttered a promise-making expression, know¬
ing its meaning, but who uttered it "in jest only, and with such sigis as
shew evidently he has no serious intention of binding himself, * • • wou'd
not lie under any obligation of performance", (T, 523-524)
Etametodiscussion of promises, and particularly the question of whether
conditions other than those mentioned above have a bearing on whether a
person who says "I promise to 6" has made a promise, is too long to be
treated in detail. What has been said so far is quite sufficient for our
present purposes. It should be noticed, first, that Home's discussion of
promises is an admirable pieoe of conceptual analysis. This supports my
earlier contention that Hume was, at least in part, interested in the clari¬
fication of concepts. In fact, Hume begins his discussion by warning against
the absurdities men can fall into on the question of promises because their
"ideas are . . . confounded with prejudice and the fallacious use of language",
(T, 517) Moreover, the manner in which Hume conducts his analysis of the
concept of premising is instructive. The principal question to which he
apparently addresses himself is: ?/hat conditions must be satisfied if the
expression "I promise to jtf" is to have meaning, and is to do the job it is
supposed to do? That is to say, under what conditions does the utterance
of the sentence "I promise to fin constitute a promise? Somewhat differently,
under r.hat conditions; would it be correct to say that so-and-so had promised
to 1&1 This is at least interestingly similar to the questions which, as I
suggested, Hume seems to be trying to answer in his accounts of moral evaluation
and of causal necessity; Under what conditions is it proper to say "X is
virtuous (vicious)"? Under what conditions is it proper to say "C causes
E"?
Of equal importance is the precise account which Hume gives of the
linguistic expressions V the use of which we make promises. Clearly enough,
his point is that such utterances have a performative funotion. That is, in
uttering a sentence suoh as "I promise to fi" the speaker does not report or
describe any state of affairs. Rather, he brings about seme state of affairs
by uttering these words. By saying "I premise to fi" a person gives an assu¬
rance that he will f$t and thus creates an obligation that he f(. By uttering
these words in the appropriate oircumstances he does more than express a
resolution to fi; he binds himself to fi, It is this 3tate of being bound to
fi or obligated to fi whioh is created by the speaker*s words. In this, the
use of "I promise to fi" is similar to the use of "I name this ship *Intrepid,n,
spoken by the appropriate person in the appropriate circumstances. The
person who christens a ship does not say anything about the ship; he gives
it a name. Before he speak3 the ship has no name; after he has spoken the
ship has been r imed. Similarly in the case of promising. When a person say3
"I promise to fi" he does not make a report about his feelings, or about the
way the world is. Nor does he make a prediction. He i3, quite simply, creat¬
ing an assurance that he will fit and thus binding himself to do so. It is
interesting to note the analogy that Hume himself sees between the language
of promises and the language of certain religious practices, suoh as
"transubstantiation. or holy orders". (T, 524) In the case of these religious
practices it is alleged that "a certain form of words, along with a certain
intention, chanftes entirely the nature of an external object, and even of
a human creature", (T, 524# Italics mine,)
In noticing this feature of "I promise to )6n Hume moves very far from
a simply referential theory of the meaning of sentences. In realizing this
Hume at least implicitly suggests that the meaning of a sentence is to be
discovered by discovering how it is used, and under what conditions. This
is a major contribution, though perhaps an unintended one, to the theory of
meaning,
I shall end this account of Hume's presumptive views on language by
stating the conclusions which, it would seem, may be drawn, (l) Hume does
not provide, at least in the Treatise, a general and explicit theory of
language. (2) He is more plausibly interpreted as offering an aocount of
the conditions which justify the use of an expression than an analysis of
the meanings of expressions. (3) Hume tends to think of words as names,
but too much weight must not be given to this fact. (4) Hume does not
think that all sentences refer to or describe the states of affairs which
justify their use. In the case of moral evaluations there is reason to
think he would endorse an omotivist theory. In the case of promises he
clearly looks upon promising language as performative. With respect to the
language of causes, where Hume may, to some extent, make use of a referential
theory of meaning, it is reasonable to 3uimise that he would also admit same
sort of adapted omotivist analysis, (>} Granted the points made in (4) it
would seem that Hume would allow a variety of kinds of relation, and not
just one, between a linguistic expression and the conditions which justify
its use.
4. The Sources of Information
In this section I wish to consider the sources of information which Hume
uses in his science of human nature, and to make a few comments on his charac¬
teristic methods. Hume uses three different sources of information: the
language people use; his own private experience; and people's conduct in various
circumstances. It is important, if one is to read the Treatise correctly, that
one be aware of the manner in which and the extent to which Hume uses each of
these sources of information, as well as the relative importance he attaches
to each. I begin by considering the way in which Hume deals with the facts of
linguistic usage.
Hume sometimes uses language as a starting point for discussion. That
is, he occasionally begins by pointing out that a certain word is used in a
certain context, or how it is used. Usually the language from which Hume begins
is the language of other philosophers. In some cases, however, it is the
language of ordinary discourse. He observes, for example, that philosophers
and non-philosophers sometimes speak of "the combat of passion and reason"
(T, 413), and this leads to a discussion of motives. Hb notes the fact that
philosophers, in their theoretical discussions of ethics, frequently move,
without explaining or justifying their move, from the use of "is" to the use
of "ought". As he says in the Treatise:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I
have always remark*d, that the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a
3udden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copu¬
lations of propositions, is. and is not. I meet with no propo¬
sition that is not connected with an ought or an ou^fct not. (T, 469)
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He suggests that attention to the differences between "is" and "ought" is
necessary, or at least useful, for understanding moral evaluation. "For as
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis
necessary that it /i.e. the new relation or affiimatiori/ 3hou'd be observ'd
and explain*d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from
others, which are entirely different from it". (T, 469) Hume points, too, to
the fact that philosophers have often opposed the two words "libery" and
"necessity", and have gone on to defend the ascription of one or the other to
human oonduot. (T, 399 ff«) They have sometimes, as well, distinguished a
"liberty of spontaneity" and a "liberty of indifference". and considered the
distinction to be philosophically relevant. (T, 407) A consideration of these
contrasts assists Hume in his discussion of human freedom. The case is similar
when philosophers suggest there is an important distinction marked by the use
in English of "natural abilities" and "moral virtues" (T, 606), or between
"virtue" and "vice" on the one hand, and "talents" and "defects" on the other.
(iSBf, 312) In each of these cases, the faots of linguistic usage, either
ordinary or philosophical, provide an occasion for the discussion of an import¬
ant philosophical problem.
At times, too, Hume uses the facts of (ordinary) linguistic usage as a
critical weapon against the claims of philosophers. He defends, for example,
a three-fold distinction of the "degrees of evidence" into "that from knowledge.
from proof3. and from probabilities". against a similar two-fold distinction
into "knowledge and probability". (T, 124) This latter division, though used
by other philosophers and by Hume as well, is inferior to the former because
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the former, for one thing, "preserve/s/ the common signification of words",
(T, 124) When talking of the distinction between the liberty of spontaneity.
as it is call1! in the schools, and the libertyof indifference: betwixt that
which is pppos*d to violence, and that which moans e negation of necessity
and causes," he describes the first as "the most common sense of the word" and
@oe3 on to defend the propriety of this sense, (T, 407) Similarly, he supports
his rejection of the alleged importance of the distinction between virtues and
talents by pointing out that the moral language of the ancients does not bear
this out, nor is it borne out by the practice of men "in common life and
conversation", (T, 60?)
There is a great difference, however, between sometimes beginning a
discussion by observing some general facts about the way language is vised, or
making occasional use of ordinary language as a critical weapon against philos¬
ophical theories, and making a careful, detailed analysis of the ordinary
use of words and sentences. Thus, in pointing out that Hume sometimes draws
attention to the way words are used, I am not suggesting, what is obviously
false, that Hume is doing linguistic analysis in the style of some contemporary
ordinary-language philosophers.
Though Hume occasionally admits the demands of ordinary language, he is
often quite ready to suggest revisions of ordinary usage, either explicitly
or implicitly. The clearest oase of an explicit attempted revision is his
suggestion that the word "self-love" is inappropriate on two counts: the feel¬
ing referred to differs widely from the feeling referred to by "love"; and,
in contrast to "love", "self-love" refers to a feeling whose object is the
self, not someone else, (T, 329) Less explicitly, Hume is practising ling¬
uistic revision when he distinguishes "knowledge" from "probability" ( or even
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from "proof" and "probability"), or when he says that "we speak not strictly
and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and reason". (T, 2+15)
It is interesting to note that Hume replaces the original division of kinds
of evidence into "knowledge" and "probability" with the more adequate division
into "knowledge", "proof" and "probability", so as to "preserve the common
signification of words J1 and yet fails to note that his use of the word "know¬
ledge" is equally at variance with ordinary usage. With respect to "reason"
and "passion", it is clear that Hume wants both to restriot the ordinary usage
of "reason" and its linguistic dependents (e.g. "reasonable", "rational"), and
extend the use of "passion".^- The point of these revisions is obvious. If
adopted they would reduce or eliminate the possibility of overlooking the
crucial differences between necessary and contingent propositions, as well as
a most significant feature of human actions. The difficulty with them is that
they tend to blur other important distinctions.
Closely connected with Hume's occasional willingness to revise ordinary
language is his frequent indifference to the way words are ordinarily used.
This indifference is most apparent in the course of Hume's discussion of the
indirect passions in Book II of the Treatise. There Hume uses a highly
artificial scheme, the four main points of which are called "pride", "humility",
"love", and "hatred". Though Hume sometimes uses each of these terms in a way
consonant with ordinary usage, he as often uses them as technical words designat¬
ing a great many different though related passions. When he talks of "love",
"hatred", "pride", or "humility" he is sometimes talking of the emotions usually
designated by these terms, and sometimes about such other things as esteem, malice,
contempt, benevolence, vanity, or shame. In some instances, of course, he pays
"*"For a discussion of Hume's use of "passion" see Chapter IV, Section 2, For
the contrast between reason and passion see Chapter V, Section 1.
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attention to the differences "between the very different passions he calls by
the same name. But when his interest is directed -o the associationist
explanation of the passions, these differences frequently go unnoticed. To
this extent Hume's scientific interests oonflict with his desire for clarity,
Tt would seem, then, that Hume does have some interest, albeit a minimal
one, in the "acts of ordinaiy or other linguistic usage. He has 3ome interest,
as well, in suggesting revisions in ordinaiy usage so as to eliminate the
possibility of conceptual confusion. It may, however, seem peculiar to stress
these points. Is it not obvious that Ifume has no really serious interest in
questions of language 2 According to Antony Flew:
Unlik® such of his classical predecessors as Plato or I-Iobbes or
Locke or Berkeley, Hume seems himself to have had little interest
in or respect for any questions whioh he thought of as semantic.
Thus in this Inquiry he contemptuously presents the upshot of his
'reconciling project with regard to the question of libertyand
necessity* as a demonstration 'that the whole dispute, , , has been
hitherto merely verbal'A
Now if Flew's point here is that Hume is not concerned to offer a general philos¬
ophical theory of language, I would quite agree. But this point doe3 not seem
to "be supported by the comments quoted fror. the Enquiry, At best uhase comments
might show that Hume had little respect for problems of language connected with
the free-will controversy. Perhaps, however, they do not even have this implic¬
ation, The same is true of Hume's oft-quoted remarks distinguishing the philos¬
opher from the grammarian, (EFM, 312) It is not at all clear that the point
of Huso's distinction between the two, and his disparagement of grammarians,
"*Tlew, p, 37, Quoted remarks are from 3HU, 95.
is to express a lack of respect for the project of stating a general theoxy
of language. Nor, I would submit, do these rernar- ever, show that Hume had
no interest in consulting the facts of linguistic usage in order to settle a
point of philosophical interest. If my interpretation of both these passages
can be supported, it would mean that cc nmentators can not use either passage
to assert, unequivocally, that Hume had an anti-linguistic bias. Hume does
not often raise questions of language, but this need not stem from the belief
that such questions can have no interest for philosophy.
It is true that Hume does speak of the free-will controversy as a merely
verbal dispute. But what does this mean? To understand what Hume intends by
this m ark we must notice the way in which he conducts hi3 own discussion of
the question of human freedom. Hume wants to say that one has just as good
grounds for saying that all human actions are causally determined as one has
for saying that gill physical events are causally determined. He wants also
to draw some line between those elements of his behaviour for whioh a man is
responsible, and those for which he is not responsible. Determinists, claim¬
ing that all human actions are causally determined, had alleged that a man
oannot legitimately be held responsible for his conduct. Libertarians, being
convinced that men are sometimes legitimately held responsible, argued that
for this to be so it must be the oaso that some elements of human behavior are
undetermined. The way past this impasse, Hume insists, is to see that th
impasse is simply the result of a conceptual confusion. Both determinist and
libertarian assume that "free" and "causally determined" are incompatible
predicates when applied to the same human action. This, Hume argues, is not
the case. To say that an action is free is to say that the person acting lias
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"a power of acting; or not acting, according to the determinations of the will",
(TJHtJ, 95) Thus, to say that an action is free is to say that the agent was
not constrained to act as he did. This is quite different from saying that
the action has no cause; in faot it implies that the action does have a cause,
namely 'he agent. To say that an action is not causally determined, on the
other hand, is to say that it is a chance event, one that cannot be explained.
But there is no reason why one should think that only inexplicable actions are
actions for which a man can be held responsible. Thus there is no reason to
think that the thesis of determinism is incompatible with human freedom. In
fact, according to Hu a, there is reason to think that unless determinism is
true nc sense can be made of holding a man responsible for his conduct.
The problem, on Hume's account, is that both the determinist and the
libertarian have failed to consider two things. First of all, they have failed
to consider with sufficient care the criteria which support the assertion that
an event is, or that all events are}, causally determined, or that an action is
free. Thus, they have failed to realize what it is they are saying when they
say that an action is free or determined. 'econdly, they have fail d to realize
that the alternative criteria for the proper use of "free" and "determined"
which they apparently assume could be used are not criteria at all. That is
to say, the determinist thinks there are criteria for saying that an action
is determined which are sufficient to rule out the possibility that the action
is free. Similarly, the libertarian assumes that he has criteria for the
assertion that an action is free which imply that the action is undetermined.
But, Hume insists, no account can be given of these criteria. What the
libertarian apparently, in his confusion, thinks would justify the ascription
of freedom to a human action is not a condition whose obtaining or non-obtaining
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could ever be known by anyone, including the agent hims< If. But this is to
say that the libertarian in fact has no oriterion '"or his ascription of free¬
dom to human action, and thus has no concept of freedom other than the usual
concept. And this concept is not inconsistent with determinism.*
Ifanything, I would submit, Hume's discussion of the free-will controversy
shows that ho was greatly interested in semantic questions. He is in fact con¬
cerned with determining the conditions which justify the use of the predicates
"free" and "determined". He is concerned both to state what those justifying
conditions are, and to show that alternative suggestions cannot do the job
required. In dismissing the free-will controversy as a "merely verbal dispute"
he is ne t, then, displaying his contempt for semantic questions. He is rather
denigrating those philosophers who had permitted themselves to get engaged in
a controversy which depended on the faot that all the protagonists be confused.
The controversy between libertarian and ieterminist is a "merely verbal dispute";
i.e. it is a dispute resting on a conceptual confusion. If only the controver¬
sialists were aware of the meaning of the terms over whose application they are
quarreling, they would agree that sexne human actions are free, and idLght perhaps
agree that all events are caused. But Hume's discussion of the free-will con¬
troversy is not, as he would insist, open to the same sort of objection. His
discussion has an important point: to eliminate confusion. To do this, Hume
points out what he takes to be the ordinary criteria for the use of the words
" and "determined", and displays the incoherence of the positions defended
For a more adequate account of Hume's discussion of the free-will controversy
see Chapter V.
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by both libertarian and determinist. There is no reason to think that because
he sees no point in participating in a conceptual confusion, Hume 3ees no point
in talking about language.
The case is somewhat different when one turns to consider what Hume lias
to say about the distinction bet-ween virtues and talents. His remarks in this
connection seem, if anything, much more pointedly anti-linguistic than those
about the problem of free-will. He 3ays, for example: "Nothing is more usual
than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of the grammarians; and
to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine they are handling cwncro?ers-
ies of the deepest im crtance and concern", (HBI, 312) He 3ays, too, that
the question whether moral virtues can be clearly distinguished from natural
abilities, "1 ing merely verbal, cannot possibly be of any importance", (SBI, 314)
Similarly, it is "of pr-eater consequence to attend to things than to verbal
appellations", (Elft, 322) In the Treaties Hume contrasts the philosopher and
the grammarian in the following illuminating way:
There is a sentiment of esteem and approbation, which may be excited,
in some degree, by any faculty of the nind, in its perfect sta 3 and
condition; and to account for this sen iment is the business of Philos¬
ophers. It belongs to Grammarians to examine what qualities are entitled
to the denomination of virtue; nor will they find, upon trial, that
this is so easy a task as at first sight they may be apt to imagine,
(T, 610)
I would suggest, however, that these remarks should be read not so much
as denying the value of considering the conditions which justify the use of a
word, but as expressing Hume's view of what is central to a philosophical
inquiry, A philosopher's principal objective is to state the empirical laws
which govern the course of events, A philosopher of human nature is specifically
concerned with the laws which govern human conduct. Understanding the philos¬
opher's task in this way, it is clear that a purely conceptual inquiry can have
only a derivative value, in so far as it facilitates the discovery of such
empirical laws "by eliminating some obstacles in the way of their discovery.
So the extent, then, that a simple consideration of the conditions which
justify the use of a word does not provide any information in the \ ay that an
empirical law does, questions c" language are philosophically of only secondary
importance.
But what, it may he asked, of the supposed fact that Hume does admit the
usefulness of conceptual clarification? Isn't he implicitly denying this, or
disregarding this, when he dismisses "disputes of words" into the province of
"nrammarians"? I do not think that this is so. In the case under discussion
Hume is not asserting a general thesis that questioiB of language have no
philosophic"1 relevance. Rather, he is saying that in the specific case of
virtues and talents little will he gained by paying attention to the language
men us9. ("3FM, 313-314) As he quite aptly points out, none of the criteria
which are offered with the intention of delimiting the scope of the supposedly
mutually exclusive terms "virtue" and "talent" serve unambiguously to disting¬
uish the one from the other. There simply is no clear line of demarcation
between the two concepts.
Now none of this entails that Hume is uninterested in semantic questions,
at least in the sense that talking about language has an important place in
a philosophical inquiry. In fact, if the sections on virtues and talents ore
re~l carefully, one finds good grounds for suggesting that the situation must
be otherwise. Three features of Hume's discussion ere particularly instruc¬
tive. First, for Hume to have been able to make the claim that none of the
suggested criteria for distinguishing virtues and talents are sufficient to
sustain a distinction, he must have afcleast considered the usual criteria for
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the use of the words, and thus engaged in some kind of linguistic inquiiy.
Secondly, Hume actually suggests that the distinction should not he made, or
not given any importance, both because it found no place in the morallanguage
and practice of the ancients (M, 318-321), and because it is not borne out
by the practice of men "in cossnon life and conversation". (T, 609)
A third feature of Tdime's discussion is perhaps the most significant.
According to Hume, one of the difficulties which embarrass modem ethical
theories is the tendency of theorists to assimilate the notions of ethics to
those of theology, or of civil law. This, he urges, has had the effect of
distorting the ordinary language of morals, and the theortiioal language in
which ethical theories are couched. As a result of the interference of theo¬
logy, "reasoning, and even language, have been warped from their natural course,
and distinctions have been endeavoured to be established where the difference
of the objects was, in a manner, imperceptible". (EFT!, 322) This explains how
the notion of voluntariness has come to be so important for ethical theory.
"Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals as
on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the sanflbions of reward and
punishment, were necessarily led to render this circumstance, of voluntary or
involuntary, the foundation of their whole theory", (3FM, 322) Hume is concerned,
then, with what he considers a confusing, unwarranted theoretical assimilation
of the concepts of ethics to theological and legal concepts. Surely, if '--his
assimilation is unjust and/or confusing, a first step toward eliminating it
is to point out, as Hume himself sometimes does, that the implications such
an assimilation would lead one to expect are simply not drawn in ordinary talk
about moral matters. If the language of morals is distorted by confusing it
with the language of the law courts or the language of :heology, then surely
one can begin by distinguishing the one usage fron the others. Possibly Hume
ould want to say that the confusing assimilations have run so far that ordin¬
ary language is itself distorted by the lawyer's and theologian's distinctions.
Thus little may be gained by an appeal to ordinary language. But it is one
thing ' o -a- that Hume had reservation about the utility of pursuing sua analy¬
sis of ordinary language, at least in the present case, and a very different
thing to say that he was uninterested in ordinary language. After all, one of
the chief causes of philosophical perplexity is, on hi3 account, the fact that
people have started talking with terms borrowed, unreflectively, from philos¬
ophical and theological theories, Hume is, then, interested in semantic questions,
at least in the sense that he wants to rid the language we ore narily use of
many of the confusions in which it comes frequently to be involved, some of
which stem from incorporating the suspect distinctions of philosophical and
theological theories into common parlance.
It is time to sum up what has been said about the use Hume makes of the
faots of language in the course of his science of human nature. It appears
false to say that Hume has "little interest in or respect for semantic quest¬
ions", at least if this means anything more than that Hume did not try to
provide a general theory of language. Generally, he is interested in dispell¬
ing the confusions which, as he thinks, surround the use oi. any words in
ordinary speech, and in displaying the absurdities which follow from some of
the things philosophers say. At times he takes the facts of linguistic U3?.re
as the starting point for a philosophical inquiry, and at times he uses argu¬
ments based on ordinary language as a critical weapon against a philosophical
theory. Sometimes he thinks it important to revise the ordinary use of a word,
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especially when it is colored by philosophical theory, so as to avoid confusion*
It is just as false, however, to 3ay that the problems of his science of human
nature always, or even a good deal of the time, presented themselves to Hume
in a semantic guise. Hume thought of himself as engaged in the project of
explaining human conduct in terms of psychological laws. His project was, at
least in intention, one "hieh we would today call scientific. Seeing Hume's
science of human nature in this light enables us to see why he could only have
allotted an ancillary role to his essays in conoeptual analysis. And this goes
a long way toward explaining his rather half -hearted interest in speoifioaliy
linguistic questions.
If Rune's working procedure is only occasionally one of attending to the
way people s. iak, how does he normally go about the business of his science
of human nature? Quite clearly, Hume's standard procedure is to reflect on
his own private experiences. Hume gives a hint of the nature of this procedure
when, in the first section of the aiquiry. he talks of its difficulties.
It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that,
though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become
the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscurity; nor
can the eye readily find those lines a id boundaries, which
discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to
remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be appre¬
hended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from
nature, and improved by habit and reflexion. (HHU, 13)
The objects of his attention, when he is engaged in his soienoe of human nature,
are those "operations of the mind" which are "intimately present" to him. If
he is concerned to talk about memory, or thinking, or imagining, or believing,
or deciding, or choosing, or being angry, or any other "operation of the mind",
he must turn his attention inward, and observe himself thinking, remembering,
being angry, and so on. Hume seems to assume, without question, that the
principal source of his information must he his own thoughts, feelings, and
other mental experiences. He assumes that one must turn one's attention to
such mental events if one is to be clear about the meaning of the terms which
designate mental states or activities."'' His quite explicit objective is to
explain the occurrence of these phenomena. And, in a restriction of his ob¬
jectives which I shall have occasion to discuss later, he sets out to explain
these phenomena only in so far as they can be explained by the occurrence of
2
other similar mental phenomena. He does not think that-tMs is the only sort of
explanation possible of such phenomena, but it is the only sort of explanation
which he considers appropriate to his own science of human nature, or mental
science. He sets out, that is, to explain one mental phenomenon, say the
feeling of pride to which only he has direct access, by the occurrence of some
other mental phenomenon or phenomena, such as a belief or an evaluation to
which, again, only he has direct access.
If the results of such an inquiry are to be of general interest it must,
of course, be assumed that each man's mind is, at least to some degree, similar
to each other man's mind, Hume makes this assumption explioit when he says:
"The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations, nor can
any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some
degree susceptible". (T, 575-576) This assumption underlies, of course, his
doctrine of sympathy. Whether Hjme tries to justify this assumption, or
whether it could be justified, is not something that need concern us here.
But it should be noted that what Hume takes to be the standard procedure and
the proper objective of his science of human nature depends on the truth of
X
See Chapter IV, Section 3.
2
See Chapter III, Section 1.
-55-
the assumption, A consequence of this view is that the truth of a scientific
theozy in the soience of human nature, at least if it be a general theory
applicable to more than the one person who expresses it, depends on a proced¬
ure of private verification on the part of the mental scientist's readers.
That is to say, each of the readers is expected to look into his own mind to
see whether what the philosopher (or scientist) says is true of his mind is
true of the reader's mind as well. It is at least possible, on such a view,
for the philosopher's claims, even if they be true of his own inner experience,
to be false of everyone else's.
At one point in the Treatise Hume remarks that "the perceptions of the
mind are perfectly known", (T, %G) Perhaps what he really wants to say is
that they are, in principle, knowable. What he cannot want to say is that it
is always immediately obvious what one's state of mind is, for he puts a good
deal of stress on the difficulties which beset the scientist of human nature
when he sets out to reflect on his own inner experiences and to state the laws
governing their occurrence. In the passage quoted above, in which Hume describes
his introspeotive procedure, he refers to some of these difficulties. When the
scientist tides to reflect on the operations of his mind they seem "involved
in obscurity", (HHU, 13) It is difficult to "discriminate and distinguish"
one mental operation from another, (SHU, 13) These operations of the mind
must be "apprehended in an instant", because they are "too fine to remain long
in the same aspect or situation", («HJ, 13) To be able to do his job properly
the scientist of human nature must have a "superior penetration, derived from
nature, and improved by habit and reflexion", (SHU,13) Hume refers to the
obscurity and complexity which beset the scientist of human nature in an instruc-
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tive passage in the Treatise as well. After recounting the difficulties of
pursuing an inquiry in natural science I fume asks:
If this be the case even in natural philosophy, how much more in
moral, where there is a much greater complication of circumstances,
and. where those views and sentiments, which are essential to any
action of the mind, are so implict and obscure, that they often
escape our strictest attention, and are not only unaccountable in
their causes, but even unknown in their existence? (T, 175)
Besides the fact of the greater obscurity and complexity of the objects
of its investigation, in comparison to those of natural science, Hume's mental
science labors as well under a burden that is not shared by natural science.
The very attempt to observe one's inner experiences may well distort the situa¬
tion that one wishes to describe and explain.
Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which
is not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it
cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a
manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty
which may arise, When I am at a loss to know the effects of one
body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that
situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour
to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy,
by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, 'tis
evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the oper¬
ation of ny natural principles, as must render it impossible to fonn
any just conclusion from the phaenomenon, (T, xxii-xxiii)
That is to say, the fact that the self-observing scientist is observing what
is going on in his own mind may, at least in some cases, make it impossible
for him to secure an unambiguous specimen of the mental operation to which
he wishes to attend. Perhaps he wants to observe his mind when he is in a
state of angry rage. But if he is successful in turning his attention to his
own state of mind, the effect will be that the feelings of rage have been dis¬
sipated. Perhaps he wants to observe his reaotion when someone insults him,
so he brings about a situation in which he is insulted. But the very fact of
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having brought about the situation himself, with the intention of observing
his response, makes it impossible, at least in many cases, to secure the
response wanted. In this way the difficulties of securing proper experi¬
mental conditions are much greater in mental than in natural science.
To remecty- this situation, Hume suggests that we must "glean up our
experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and
take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's be¬
haviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures". (T, xxiii) That
is, he invokes the third of the three sources of information for his science
of human nature: human behavior in various circumstances. It is not, how¬
ever, immediately clear how this reference to human conduct, and the circum¬
stances in which it occurs, is supposed to remedy the defects of the mental
scientist's introspective method. It does not seem to be the case that a
study of the public phenomena of men's behavior and its circumstances is
intended to provide a substitute or alternative subject matter for the scienoe
of human nature. There is no reason to think that, because it is alleged to
be difficult Hume gives up Ms project of stating the laws which oorrelate
the occurrence of one kind of mental phenomenon with another, for another
project in wMch one publicly observable kind of phenomenon is explained by
reference to another. Rather, a consideration of these public phenomena is
alleged to assist the mental scientist in the prosecution of his original
project, by enabling him to overcome or circumvent the peculiar difficulties
wMch he encounters when he tries the direct introspective method.
I would suggest that Hume is working with the following sort of model.
When a person is placed in certain publicly observable circumstances certain
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non-publio mental events take place. Perhaps a whole series of mental events
take place, some causing others. These mental events, in turn, give rise
to certain forms of publicly observable behavior. It is possible to establish
laws correlating these circumstances with this behavior via reference to the
internal, mental events. That is, one may establish a law correlating facts
about a person*s situation (e.g. the fact that someone acts kindly toward
him) with facts about his oonduot (e.g. the faot that he acts kindly in
return) via facts about his purely mental life (e.g. he feels pleasure as
a result of that person's actions, thus feels love for that person, thus
feels benevolence for that person, thus deoides to do something which he
believes will result in pleasure for that person, and so on). On this model,
a man's mind is the point of interaction between his ciroumstanoes and his
behavior, and there are empirical laws correlating mental events with both
circumstances and conduct.
If we read Hume's suggestion that we "glean up our experiments in this
science from a cautious observation of human life" within this very rough
framework, we can understand somewhat, I think, the way in which his knowl¬
edge of publically observable states of affairs is supposed to assist the
mental soientist. Attention to the circumstances men find themselves in,
and the way they behave in those circumstances, lias the auxiliary role of
facilitating the mental scientist's observation of what goes on in his own
mind. Because he can somehow use what he knows about the way men act in the
circumstances in which they act, he can overcome the perplexities bo exper¬
iences when he simply introspects. The relatively easily accessible publio
knowledge he has at his disposal enables him to find his way more easily
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through the complex and obscure regions of his own mind. This is not to
say that Hume, in his science of human nature thinks there is nothing of
genuine and intrinsic interest to be gained from the observation of human
behavior. He is surely, at times, interested in publicly observable
phenomena for their own sake, as in the study of economics. It is simply
to say that within the narrow confines 01 '"/he scienoe of human nature as
presented in the Treatise, where the science of human nature is a mental science
in a peculiar sense, the study of human behavior can only have the auxiliary
role of facilitating the study of the laws of internal mental phenomena.
Information about publicly observable circumstances and conduct is, in the
end, only grist for the introspectionist's mill.
Of the three sources of information mentioned at the start of this
section, linguistic usage, private experience, and public conduct and cir¬
cumstances, it i3 clearly private experience which Hume considers of great¬
est importance. The other two have only a secondary role to play, Hume
considers linguistic usage only sporadically. And when he does so, it is
usually in cases where he is concerned to eliminate a conceptual confusion
which stands in the way of the scientific study of human nature. When his
attention is directed to the scientific explanation of mental phenomena he
pays practically no attention at all to what people say. The subsidiary
role which Hume allots to the study of such public matters as the circum¬
stances and conduct of men is somewhat more surprising. Nevertheless, it does
seem that the principal objects of Hume's attention are the private phenomena
which he takes thoughts, recollections, feelings, desires, and choices to be,
/And hi3 principal objective, especially in Books I and II of the Treatise.
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is to state the laws vrhioh govern their occurrence. Ideally, then, the
scientist of human nature should fix his attention on the things that go on
in his own mind. It is only the difficulties of this procedure which lead
him to look elsewhere for hi3 information,
5. Relations of Ideas
One feature of Hume's philosophy which has far-reaching consequences
for manytopics that I shall treat in the oourse of this dissertation, and
which it is convenient to consider at this point, is his distinction between
matters of fact and relations of ideas. In this seotion I shall try to
elucidate Hume's acoount of this distinction, at least so far as is neoess-
ary for my purposes in this dissertation, I shall also draw attention to
the bearing which this distinction has on our understanding of the logical
character of Rime's soience of human nature.
Though the distinction is an important one for Hume, it is not vexy
clearly drawn. This is particularly true of the account of the distinction
offered in the Treatise. In the Treatise (p, 69) Hume divides the seven
philosophical relations into two classes. The first class comprises the
relations of resemblance, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any
quality, and contrariety. The second olass comprises the relations of iden¬
tity, time and place, and causation. Several criteria are offered for dis¬
tinguishing the two classes. Relations of the first class "depend entirely
on the ideas, which we compare together"; such a relation "is invariable,
as long as our idea remains the same". (T, 69) Relations of the second
class "may be chang'd without any change in the ideas". (T, 69) Again,
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relations of the first class are those "of which v?e receive information
from ... abstract reasoning or reflexion"; of relations of the second
class "we receive information from experience". (T, 69) Relations of the
first sort are expressed by "propositions, that are prov*d by intuition or
demonstration", (T, 95) In their case, "the person who assents to a pro¬
position not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is
necessarily determine to conceive them in that particular manner, either
immediately or by the interposition of other ideas". (T, 95) With proposi¬
tions expressing relations of the second sort, "this absolute necessity can¬
not take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sidfi3 of the
question", (T, 95) The reason given for this difference is interesting:
"Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination
to conceive anything contrary to a demonstration", (T, 95) Further, when
the understanding "judges from demonstration /i.e. considers relations of
the first sort7 , , . it regards the abstract relations of ideas"; when it
"judges ... from probability /i.e. considers relations of the second sort7
. . . it regards ... those relations of obiects, of which experience only
gives us information", (T, 413) Truth, similarly, is of two kinds} it con¬
sists "either in the discovery of the proportion of ideas, consider*d as
such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence".
(T, 448) On the basis of this distinction of the two kinds of relations one
can distinguish two "operations of human understanding": "the comparing of
ideas" and "the inferring of matter of faot". (T, 463)
Despite the mary interesting contrasts drawn in the Treatise account of
the distinction, however, mary ambiguities remain. It is sufficiently clear
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that one fundamental distinction which Hume is making is that between necess¬
ary and contingent propositions. Seme propositions are such that, if they
are true they are necessarily true, and if they are false they are necessarily
false; others are such that if they are true it is possible that they be false,
and if they are false it is possible that they be true. It is not, however,
clear that Hume intends to draw a distinction between analytic and synthetic
pro^ "itions. In fact it appears quite difficult to claim that all the pro¬
positions which would, according to Hume, express relations of ideas are
analytic ones. Consider some of his examples of relations of ideas. The
judgment we make, when we decide that one object is hotter than another is
apparently, for Hume, a judgment about a relation of ideas. (T, 70) Similarly,
the judgment one migfrt make that, of three colored patches, two are more
resembling than the third, is a judgment based on a relation of ideas, (of. T, 70)
But it is at least not obvious how the statements made in xese judgments
are analytic statements."'" Doubtless Hume would say that allanalytic state¬
ments express relations of ideas, not matters of fact. But there is certainly
some reason to think that the class of propositions asserting relations of
2
ideas is larger than the class of analytic statements.
The difficulty in determining whether Hume intends a distinction corre¬
sponding to that between analytic and synthetic statements is connected with
difficulties in interpreting the various criteria which Hume offers for making
This is not to say that it is obvious how such statements could be necessary
statements.
2
For support of this interpretation see Arthur Pap, Semantics and Necessary-
Truth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 69-56. tfhe first half
of my present section has been much influenced by Pap's account of Hume's
distinction.
Ills crucial distinction. Hume's account of these criteria is, in fact, far
from satisfactory. At times the distinction between the two sorts of propo¬
sition depends on whether or not the person who assents to the proposition
is constrained, in some very strong sense, to assent to it. At Other times,
the distinction depends on whether the state of affairs described by the
negation of the proposition in question o n or cannot be imagined or oon-
cei-rd. The distinction also, at times, depends on whether the proposition
is proved by experience, or by either intuition or demonstration. But Hume
nowhere tries to show that these different oriteria in fact support the same
distinction, or, if they do, how they are related one to another. Aside from
these difficulties Hume also tends, in the Treatise. to blur the differences
between three separate distinctions: the distinction between necessary and
contingent propositions; the distinction between deductive and inductive
arguments; and that between deduotive arguments whose promises are necessar¬
ily true, and deductive arguments whose premises are, if true, only conting¬
ently so.
The issue is somewhat more clearly defined in the first Siquiry. It
is there that Hume introduces the terms "Relations of Ideas" and "Matters
of Fact". (SHCJ, 25) These are the two kinds of "objects of human reason
or enquiry". (SHU, 25) Relations of ideas are the object of "the sciences
of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation which
is either intuitively or demonstratively certain", (SHU, 25) Hume offers
two mathematical examples of propositions which assert relations of ideas.
The proposition expressed by "The square of the bypothermae is equal to the
square of the two sides" is one which "expresses a relation between these
figures", (EH(J, 25) That expressed by "Three times five is equal to the
half of thirty" i3 one which "expresses a relation between these numbers"#
(EHU, 25) Such "intuitively or demonstratively certain" propositions are
"discoverable by the mere operation of thought"# (EBtJ, 25) Further, they
have no "dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though
there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated
by Euolid would for ever retain their certair by and evidence", (EHU, 25)
Hume states his two principal criteria for distinguishing relations of
ideas from matters of fact much more explicitly in the Enquiry than in the
Treatise. "The contrary of every matter of fact", he says, "is still poss¬
ible; because it oan never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the
mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to
reality", 25) Presumably the "contrary" of a proposition asserting
a relation of ideas is impossible: that is cannot be conceived, and implies
a contradiction. One can "demonstrate the falsehood" of the contradictory
of true propositions asserting relations of ideas. This is not so in the
case of propositions asserting matters of fact. Were the contrary of a
true proposition asserting a matter of fact "demonstratively false, it would
imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind".
(EHU, 26)
I am not suggesting that the Enquiry account of the distinction between
relations of ideas and matters of fact supersedes that of the Treatise. es¬
pecially if one's interest in this distinction stems from its utility in
interpreting other parts of the Treatise. In fact, several elements in the
Treatise account fail to appear in the much briefer discussion in the Enquiry.
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In the Treatise Hume begins by distinguishing two classes of relations; in
the Enquiry he tends rather to stress the fact that he is talking about two
different kinds of proposition. This perhaps explains the absence of some
of the more puzzling examples of relations of ideas offered in t-s.: ''reatise.
such as those concerning color perception and temperature discrimination.
Nevertheless, though the best source of i: "ormation for the interpretation
of o "reatise is the Treatise itself, the ainuiry account can be of some
assistance. It is helpful particularly in this redact, that two of the
criteria which Hume offers for distinguishing matters of fact and relations
of ideas in the Treatise are more explicitly stated in the Enquiry.
By putting the two accounts together one can derive the following out¬
line of an important part, at least, of what Hume has to say about relations
of ideas and matters of fact. A proposition p is, if true, necessarily true,
and thus a proposition asserting a relation of ideas, if -p is impossible.
To say that -p is impossible is to say either: (a) -p is inconceivable; or
(b) -p can be shown to be self-contradiotory; or (c) both. A proposition
p i3, if true, only contingently true, and thus a proposition asserting a
matter of fact, if -p is possible. To say that -p la possible is to say
either: (a) -p is conceivable; or (b) -p can not be shown to be self-con¬
tradictory; or (c) both. In both cases "conceivable" tends to be taken as
synonymous with "imaginable". On the basis of these criteria, it is alleged
that "Three times five is equal to the half of thirty" expresses a necessar¬
ily true proposition, asserting a relation of ideas; whereas "The sun will
rise tomorrow" expresses a contingent proposition, asserting a matter of
fact. Many difficulties may be raised about both the interpretation and the
adequacy of these criteria, but to consider them here would take us too far
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afield. That has been said so far should be sufficient to enable us to
understand what Hume intends to say when, for example, he says that it is
a contingent matter that an emotion such as pride occurs only in circum¬
stances where a person receives an independent pleasure upon the contemplat¬
ion of some action that has been performed, or some quality that is possessed
by someone whom he believes bears a special relation to himself. In saying
thi3 Hume is saying: (a) that it is conceivable thrt a person be proud in
circumstances where neither of these two conditions is satisfied; or (b)
that the assertion that a person is proud without either of these conditions
being satisfied can not be shown to be self-contradictory; or (c) both.
There is no necessary connection, that is, between being proud and these
conditions being satisfied. One discovers the connection between being proud
and the satisfaction of these conditions not by the "mere operation of thought",
but by consulting experience. The situation which does obtain could be other¬
wise.
I mentioned earlier that there are good reasons, in interpreting the
Treatise, for denying the contention that Kurae,s distinction between rela¬
tions of ideas and matters of fact is intended as a distinction between ana¬
lytic and synthetic propositions. The case is somewhat altered in the inquiry.
In at least one instance, the reason which Hume offers in explanation of the
fact that a proposition is necessarily true is the fact that its terms have
a certain moaning, "But to convince us of this proposition, that where there
i3 no property, there can be no injustice. it is only necessary to define the
terms,and explain injustice to be a violation of property". (iHU, 163) This
is apparently true of other propositions as well, since, for 3ome other
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propositions at least, the only reason why their truth is not immediately
obvious is the fact of "the undeterminate meaning of words, which is correc¬
ted by juster definitions". (EHU, 163) This, of course, is not surprising#
Since Hume distinguishes simple and complex ideas, the analysis of a complex
idea would consist in analytio statements. But even in the Baguirr Hume does
not make very explicit his belief, if it is his belief, that all necessarily
true propositions are analytic ones# For the :.:ost part, Hume just doesn't
raise the question#
Havin0 considered the character of Hume's distinction of relations
of ideas and matters of fact, we may now notice one way in which this dist¬
inction has a bearing on the interpretation of Hume's science of human nature.
In the famous peroration of the first Brauirv. Hume divides the objects of
human reason into two classes: those sciences which involve "abstract reason*
ing concerning quantity or number", and those involving oerlmental reason¬
ing concerning matter of faot and existence". (SHU, 165) The first sciences
are composed of propositions asserting relations of ideas, and the second of
propositions concerning matters of faot. This, is not, of course, to say
that all propositions asserting relations of ideas are mathematical ones.
As we have just seen, lime does recognise non-mathematical, non-contingent
propositions. But these propositions are dismissed as trivial. The only
really worthwhile propositions are mathe tical ones, or those which state
matters of fact. The question then arises: Does Hume think his soienoe of
human nature consists only of empirical prepositions, or does it require
necessary propositions as well? And if it requires necessary propositions,
are these mathematical or trivial, or is this dichotomy too rigid? The fact
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of the matter seems to he that Hume is just not clear on this point. Mapy
things he says seam to imply that his science of hui in nature is a purely
empirical study. Nevertheless, at least in a number of interesting oases,
Hume, does, quite consciously, make assertions which are alleged to he
necessarily true, hut which are neither mathematical nor trivial. Having
seen, in the first section of this chapter, that Hume does not see any dist¬
inction between a philosophical and a scientific enquiry, this need not sur¬
prise us.
In at least one case Hume quite unequivocally makes n assertion that
is neither a mathematical assertion, nor a trivial one, hut which he describes
as being necessarily true. In Book I, Part II of the Treatise,Hume discusses
the question whether space and time are infinitely divisible, and concludes
that it i3 "impossible" that they be infinitely divisible, (T, 31) His
arguments for this conclusion need not detain us; it is sufficient for our
present purpose to notice a comment which Hume makes on the conclusion to
the argument,
I doubt not but it will readily be allowed by the most obstinate
defender of the doctrine of infinite divisibility, that these
arguments are difficulties, and that 'tis impossible to give any
answer to them which will be perfectly clear and satisfactory.
But here we may observe, that nothing can be more absurd, than
this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demon¬
stration. and endeavouring by that means to elude its force and
evidence, 'Tis not in demonstrations as in probabilities, that
difficulties oan take place, and one argument counter-ballance
another, and diminish its authority, A demonstration, if just,
admits of no opposite difficulty; and if not just, 'tis a mere
sophism, and consequently can never be a difficulty, 'Tis either
irresistible, or has no manner of force. To talk of objections
and replies, and ballanoing of arguments in such a question as
this, is to confess, either that human reason i3 nothing but a
play of words, or that the person himself, who talks so, has not
a capacity equal to such subjects. Demonstrations may be diffi¬
cult to be comprehended, because of the abstractedness of the
subject; but can never have any such difficulties as will weaken
their authority, when once they are comprehended. (T, 31-32)
In Hume's terminology, to say that a proposition has been demonstrated is
to say that it is neoessarily true; that its negation is inconceivable and
can be shown to be self-contradictory. That is, Hume at least claims that
the proposition expressed by "Space and time are not infinitely divisible"
is a necessarily true proposition. But this proposition is not a mathe¬
matical one. Nor is it a trivial ones Hume spends a great deal of time
arguing for its truth. Nor is Hume's comment a mere passing remark or slip
of the pen: Hume belabors his point. Thus we may conclude to the falsity
of the assertion that all the statements in Hume*3 science of human nature
are intended to be statements asserting matters of faot, and thus to be only
contingently true.
A somewhat more interesting case is the way Hume deals with the propo¬
sition expressed by "Where there is no property, there oan be no injustioe".
In the Enquiry, though this proposition is admitted to be necessarily true,
it is dismissed as trivial, "This proposition," Hume says, "is indeed,
nothing but a more imperfeot definition". (SHU, 163) To know its truth it
is "only necessary to define the terms". (HHU, 163) In this respect it is
just like "all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found
to abound in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity
and number". (EHU, 163) Such trivial though necessary truths should not be
considered among the "proper objects of knowledge and demonstration", (EHU, 163)
"The only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration," Hume is em¬
phatic, "are quantity or number"; "all attempts to extend this more perfect
species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion".
(EHU, 163)
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Deapite the aaperaions oast on propositions like that expressed by
"Where ther0is no property, there can be no injustice", however, Hume at
times appears to think that such propositions can have important jobs to do.
In Book III of the Treatise, when Hume is discussing property and justice,
conceptual connections of the sort expressed in the quoted proposition are
taken to be quite significant, Hume insists that such conceptual connections
must be noted if one is to avoid confusion about the nature of property,
rights, and obligation, Hs talks of a convention being entered into by men
to respect the possessions of others, H© then suggests that when "this
convention , • . is enter1d into, and every one has acquir'd a stability in
his possessions, there immediately arises the ideas of justice and injustice;
as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether
unintelligible without first understanding the former", (T, 4-90-491) This,
he suggests, is an important point to notice when one is theorizing about
the nature of rights, property, eto, "Those , • • who make use of the words
property, or right, or obligation, before they have explain1d the origin of
justice, or even make use of them in that explication, are guilty of a very
gross fallacy, and can never reason upon any solid foundation". (T, 4-91)
It would seem, then, that Hume is interested in the elucidation of the
relations between these several ooncept3, and that, in the course of this
elucidation, he would want to say that such-and-such relations are necessary,
or that such-andeuch propositions expressing these relations are necessarily
true. This would at least compromise his suggestion that the science of
human nature has no use for necessarily true propositions asserting relations
of ideas.
On some occasions, then, Hume does make use, in his science of human
nature, of statements that he thinks of as necessarily true, and perhaps
as analytic. In a good many other places, as well, he makes claims which
he takes to be only contingently true, but which seem in faot to be ana¬
lytically true. The clearest instances of this occur in the course of his
disoussion of the passions. One is thus faced with a very puzzling question.
Why did Hume apparently want to say that the science of human nature does
not require or make use of necessarily true propositions, and why does he
so often mistake the logical status of the assertions he makes? One would
have expeoted a bit more clarity on the part of a philosopher who so strongly
emphasized the difference between necessary and contingent truths.
Two reasons for Hume's reluctance to admit propositions asserting rela¬
tions of ideas into his science of human nature suggest themselves. As is
dear from a careful reading of the closing paragraphs of the Enquiry, one
point that Hume wants to insist on is that no matters of faot can be demon¬
strated. Having talked of the sciences of "quantity and number", Hume says:
"All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and
these are evidently incapable of demonstration". (EHU, 163-164) But if a
non-mathematical science purports to make claims about the way the world is,
these claims can not be necessary truths. They are truths which are discovered
by experience, or which are not known at all. There is no sense, then, to
be made of the suggestion that one construct a physical science or a science
of man in which a matter of fact is derived from a relation of ideas. Since
any proposition asserting a matter of fact could logically be false, the
truth of such a proposition can only be learned by experience. In so far
then, as Hume was engaged in a polemic against theorists who, so Hume thought,
assumed that such a deduction of matters of fact from relations of ideas was
possible, it is understandable that he would put great emphasis on his belief
that a science must be empirical. But this does not, of course, imply that
no propositions asserting relations of ideas could have a place in Hume's
inquiry. As I suggested earlier, one of Hume's objectives was to eliminate
conceptual confusions. Surely in so far as this is one of his objectives
he can allow a legitimate use of analytic statements within his science of
human nature. In fact, as I have pointed out, he does make use of such
statements.
Perhaps, however, Hume would want to insist that even for the purposes
of conceptual clarification there is not a great deal to be gained by making
analytic statements. This may be a useful preliminary to such a conceptual
clarification, but is hardly enough. In the case of justice and property,
for example, it may well be analytio that where there is no property there
can be no injustice. But simply becoming explicitly aware of this truth
does not take one very far in understanding why there is such a conceptual
connection. The really interesting questions lie in the attempt to explain,
by reference to known human needs and motives, how we could come to have the
institutions and practices that we do have, and how one institution or
practice depends on or presupposes another. Only when this inquiry has taken
place, ha3 one provided a genuine elucidation of the conoepts in question.
A second consideration that may explain Hume's apparent neglect of the
role of analytic statements in his science of human nature is his tendency
to demand that statements be genuinely informative, or that they contribute
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toward the securing of information. Though admitting the possibility of
non-mathematical, non-contingent propositions, Hume would perhaps insist
that such propositions do not pass the test for a worthwhile proposition:
that it contribute, directly or indirectly, to the store of information
that we haye about the world or about ourselves. In not being informative,
suoh propositions are contrasted, to their own disadvantage, with any empi¬
rical proposition, and especially with the propositions of a scientific
explanatory system, such as that of Newton*s mechanics. In not contributing
indirectly to the inorease of information they are contrasted, again to
their disadvantage, with the propositions of mathematics. The propositions
of mathematics, though non-informative, have at least this to commend them:
they are an essential part of scientific inquiry, at least of the Newtonian
sort. One i3 reminded here of Hume*s remarks about "mixed mathematics" in
the Enquiry. where he draws attention to the fact that geometry oan be
"taken into the assistance of natural philosophy", or "assists us in the
application" of the law3 of natural science. (SHU, 31) The trouble with
non-mathematical, non-contingent propositions is that they cannot perform
even this function. Once again, however, to say that such propositions do
not have an informative function does not imply that they have no function
at all. In his polemics Hume fails to make this distinction.
To conclude this section, and this chapter, I would just stress the
fact that Hume is far from clear about the nature of the inquiry in which
he is engaged in the Treatise, and especially about the nature of the
propositions which comprise that science, as it is presented in the Treatise.
By all counts, the Treatise should only consist of empirical statements.
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Quite obviously it does not* It is Hume's failure to realise that all of
his objectives could not be aohieved by the use of empirical propositions
alone that occasionally throws his inquiry into confusion. And his fail¬
ure to get quite dear about the nature of his crucial distinction of re¬
lations of ideas and matters of fact explains, at least in part, his some¬
times complete misconstruction of what he is doing.
CHAPTER II
EXPLANATION
In the previous chapter, while stressing the variety of the investigations
which comprise Hume's science of human nature, and. especially the place Hume give s
to conceptual inouiry, I have maintained that Hume's objectives were principally
such as would today be described as scientific. 'flint is, Hume believes himself
to be engaged in a project of discovering those empirical laws which govern the
occurrence of such mental phenomena a3 thoughts, beliefs, recollections, feelings,
desires, and choices, and thus the character of human conduct. It is time now to
consider Hume's views on the nature of such an apparently scientific project. In
this chapter I shall discuss Hume's general theory of explanation, introducing no
restrictions concerning the class or classes of phenomena to be explained, Ihe
chanter has three sections dealing, respectively, with the nature of explanation,
causal laws, and probability. The discussion of these topics will provide much of
the necessary background for my later accounts of Hume's theory of the passions, of
motives, and human freedom.
1. The Mature of Explanation
For Hume, to explain an event is to subsume that event under a law which may
be said to govern its occurrence. To take a simple example, one explains the fact
that a piece of gold has dissolved by pointing out that it has been placed in a
solution of acua regia. and by invoking the law that gold dissolves in aqua regia.
Similarly, one explains the fact that one feels warm by pointing to the burning
coals in the fireplace, and invoking the law that fire produces heat. In each
case one makes use of a law stating a connection between two classes of events, and
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a proposition stating the occurrence of an instance of one of the two classes of
events, in order to explain the occurrence of an instance of the other of the two
classes of events. In invoking the law, one shows that the event to be explained
is just what one would have expected, were one aware of the law, and aware that an
instance of one of the classes of events correlated by the law had occurred, An
event is explicable in so far as its occurrence is governed by a law, or rather in
so far as the law which governs its occurrence can be stated. To say that an event
is inexplicable is to say thet no law is known which governs its occurrence.
This account of the explanation of events is present in both the Treatise and
the first inquiry. In the Treatise Hume points out that to explain an event is to
provide the law which governs its occurrence when he suggests that "to explain that
act of the mind, which we call belief" is to "give an account of the principles,
from which it is fieriy'd".^, 178) Later, talking of pride, he refers to "the
principles, from which they /i.e. the "effects'.'/ arise".(T,282) It is such prin¬
ciples which are used "in order to explain every different operation".(T,282) One
objective of the scientist is to "adapt" a "phaenomenon" to a "principle".(T,282)
This was part of liewton's project, when he "determined the laws and forces, by which
the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed".(EHU,14)
It is not, however, sufficient, at least for a scientific enterprise of explana¬
tion, that one be able to subsume a great many events or classes of events under the
particular laws which govern their occurrence. This might only supply a multipli¬
city of more or less ad hoc explanatory principles. Hie purposes of science require
that one systematize this wealth of particular laws by displaying their deductive
connections with other, more general laws. Hint is, one must construct an explana¬
tory system of laws in which some laws ("lower-level laws") are derivable from others
("higher-level law3"). In such an explanatory system, the lower level laws are
adaptations of or instantiations of the higher-level laws of the system. Hie higher-
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level laws are more general, and thus more simple, than those laws which can be
derived from them. Taking an example from the Treatise, the fifth law of associ¬
ation, which states that one complex mental state gives rise to another complex
mental state if there is a double relation of impressions and ideas between the
two, is of a higher-level than the law which states that the complex mental state
comnrising the feeling of nride and the thought of oneself is caused by a prior
complex mental 3tate comprising an experience of pleasure and the thought of some
action performed or some quality possessed by someone believed to bear a special
relationship to oneself. This latter law, governing the occurrence of nride, is
an instantiation of the more general lav/ of the double relation of impressions and
ideas.
Hume stresses both the systematic objectives of a scientific inquiry, and the
contrast, in terms of generality and simplicity, between the higher- and lower-
level laws in an explanatory system, in both the Treatise and the first Enquiry.
As he points out in the inquiry: "It is probable, that one operation and principle
of the mind depends on another; v/hich, again, may be resolved into one more general
and universal".(I2IU, 14-15) Li ter he soys: "The utmost effort of human reason is
to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity*
* • *
and to resolve the many particular effect- into a few general causes".(EHU,30)
Because such higher-level laws are general and simple, they are fewer in number than
the less general, les3 siranle lower-level laws which fall under then. "We find in
the course of nature, that tho' the effects be many, the principles, from which they
arise, are commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the sign of an unskilful
naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every diff¬
erent operation".(T,282) The case of the development of physical science illustra¬
tes the importance which must be attributed to the process of subsuming particular
laws under more general, simpler laws:
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Ihe ancients, tho' sensible of that maxim, that nature does
nothing in vain, contriv'd such intricate systems of the
heavens, as seem'd inconsistent with true philosophy, and
gave place at last to something more simple and natural. To
invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenom-
enon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our
hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs,
that none of these principles is the just one, and that we
only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our ignor¬
ance of the truth,(T,282)
For Hume, then, the explanation of an event is fundamentally a matter of being
able to show that it is the sort of thing that normally occurs in such-and-such cir¬
cumstances, One's ability to explain events depends, in large part, on one's exper¬
ience of txie constant sequences of events. In a similar fashion, the explanation
of a lower-level explanatory law is a matter of displaying the fact that the corre¬
lation of events governed by the law is a particular instance of a more general kind
of correlation, i oreover, in so far as one displays the daductive connection be¬
tween the particular law which explains an event and the higher-level laws from
which it is uerived one renders the event to be explained more intelligible.
Negatively, this is to say that explanation is not a matter of understanding, simply
from a consideration of the nature of things, and without some experience of the way
they react in given circumstances, how thqy will behave in those circumstances. Some
philosophers liaa suggested that we cay come to know how a given type of object must
behave simply by reflecting on the known properties of that object. They thought
that we may "discover the dependence of one /objec%j upon the other" by a "pene¬
tration into their essences", (T,86) They talked as though one could know that oil
and water do not mix by simply thinking of the nature of both, but without ever having
observed them together. One who has tne necessary "insight into the internal struc¬
ture or operating principle of objects"(T,169) would understand why it must be the
case that they behave in the way they do. Thus, to explain why a certain kind of
object 0 reacts in a certain way R when in circumstances C one must elucidate those
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elements of the nature of 0 which determine it to react in that way. In under¬
standing 0*s nature in the requisite sense, one conies to discover the necessary
truth of certain propositions describing 0's reactions in circumstances C. One
understands that 0 could not have reacted in any other way in C because it has
such and such a nature. All of this is alleged to be possible without having
ever observed 0, or some object relevantly similar to 0, in circumstances C.
The "Cartesians", Hume remarks, thought that one could make claims about the poss¬
ible behavior of material objects by virtue of jU3t such an understanding of the
nature of matter:
...the Cartesians in particular, having establish'd it as
a principle, that we are perfectly acquainted with the
essence of matter, have very naturally inferred, that it
is endow'd with no efficacy, and that 'tis impossible for
it of itself to communicate motion, or produce any of those
effects, which we ascribe to it. As the essence of matter
consists in extension, and as extension implies not actual
motion, but only mobility; they conclude, that the energy,
which produces the motion, cannot lie in the extension.(T, 159)
The belief in such a priori explanations, Hume insists, rests on a confusion.
There are, of course, some lands of propositions which are necessarily true. But
these propositions are not of the right sort to do the explanatory job that these
philosophers require. Only those propositions are necessarily true which depend,
for their truth, solely on our ideas. The propositions of mathem tics provide the
chief instances of this sort of proposition. But these propositions purchase their
necessary truth at the cost of having nothing to say about "matter of fact and exis¬
tence" . (EHU, 163-164) And it is just this latter property, that of being about a
matter of fact or existence, that a proposition must have if it is to be capable of
explaining events in the world. I.Hen philosophers suggest that one can explain
events by invoking necessarily true propositions about the nature of objects, they
fail to see that the only sort of proposition that could be necessarily true could
not explain the occurrence of any event because it is not itself factual. Only
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empirlcal propositions will do, but empirical propositions are all only contingent¬
ly true, if they are true.
Thus the explanation of any event can only be a matter of showing that that
event was only to be expected, given the facts of the situation in which the event
takes place. And one only knows what to expect in a situation if one has witness¬
ed a sufficiently similar situation before. One cannot explain an event by means
of one's knowledge of the natures of things if this means either: (a) a knowledge,
independent of experience, of a matter of fact} (b) a knowledge, expressible in a
necessarily true proposition, of a matter of fact; or (c) both. There are no a,
priori explanations of the way things happen. All explanatory laws are, if true,
only contingently so.
To say that science requires hierarchical sets of explanatory laws in which
some laws (lower-level laws) are derivable from others (higher-level laws) in no
way compromises this thesis about the contingent character of explanatory laws.
The deducibility of one proposition from another does not depend on the non-contin¬
gent character of either. Hume seems not always to have been alive to this fact,
and at times talks in a way which appears to rule out the possibility of deducing
i
one factual proposition from another. As I have mentioned in another place, Hume
sometimes does not keep sufficiently separated the distinctions between necessary
and contingent propositions, between deductive and inductive arguments, and between
deductive arguments with necessarily true premises, and deductive arguments with
contingent premises. But nothing that he says in fact calls into question the
possibility of deducing one proposition, whether necessary or contingent, from an¬
other. What Hume does argue is that no new contingent truth may be discovered by
deduction. But this certainly is compatible with the belief that one contingent
proposition may be deductively connected with another. It is just this point which
Hume is, perhaps not with full awareness, insisting on, when he talks of "reduc/ing/
See page 65.
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the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and...
re3olv/ing/ the many particular effects into a few general causes".(EHU,30) The
relation of the more general principles of a science to its less general ones, pro¬
vided they are not independent, can only be a deductive one. But this involves no
demonstrations of matters of fact.
I shall conclude this section by summing-up the main noints of Hume's theory
of explanation that have been noted thus far. One explains an event by invoking
the law which governs the occurrence of that event, and by referring to the occur¬
rence of the other events whose occurrence is lawfully correlated with the event to
be explained. It is possible to construct complex systems of explanatory laws in
which laws of varying degrees of generality and simplicity are deductively related.
The construction of such structured systems of explanatory laws is a prime task of
scientific inquiry. Though the laws in such a system are deductively related one
to another, they are, all of them, only contingently true, if they are true. No
matter of fact can be explained by the use of a necessarily true proposition.
2. Causal Laws
Besides insisting that the generalizations in a scientific explanatory system
are contingent propositions, Hume also claims that they are causal propositions.
It is not, however, immediately clear how this claim should be interpreted. Does
it, for example, imply that Hume believes there are no non-causal explanatory gen¬
eralizations? In this section I shall try to elucidate what Hume means by this
claim, and shall begin by showing that he does make the claim,
Hume's belief that all explanatory generalisations are causal propositions is
apparent from sone introductory remarks he makes when beginning his discussion of
inductive inference in the Treatise. Having distinguished propositions asserting
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relations of ideas from propositions asserting matters of fact, Hume divides :he
class of factual propositions into propositions about relations of identity, spatial
and temporal relations, and causal relations, lie then argues (a) that "all kinds
of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison. and a discovery of those relations,
either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other" (T,73);
ar ■ (b) that reasoning is further restricted to case3 in which the mind goes "beyond
what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or
the relations of objects".(T,73) Of the three factual relations, "'tis only
causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the exist¬
ence or action of one object, that 'twas follow*d or preceded by any other existence
or action".(T,73-74) Of the three factual relations which could conceivably be
asserted by a general proposition in explanation of the occurrence of some event,
only that of causation is c propriate. Hie other two relations can only be made u3e
of in reasoning "so far as they either affect or are affected by it /i.e. causation/".
(T,74) Later Hume makes the same point again: "The only connexion or relation of
objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and sense,
is that of cause and effect; and that because 'tis the only one, on which we can
found a just inference from one to another".(T,89) If we may assume that explana¬
tion and prediction are cognitive processes with the same logical structure, it would
seem that, on Hume's view, explanatory generalizations are causal ones.
Turning to Hume'3 account of the concept of causation, we may center our atten¬
tion on three points: the alleged spatial contiguity of a cause and its effect;
the temporal priority of a cause to its effect; and the notion of causal necessity.
Hume often speaks as though spatial contiguity of cause and effect is essential
to the relation of causation. In the first Treatise "definition" of causation he
remarks that if an object is • cause it must be "contiguous to another".(T,170)
In listing the rules for judging of causes and effects he also says, quite explicitly,
that "the cause and effect must be contiguous in space ".(T,173) He says, too:
whatever objects are consider'd as causes or effects,
are contiguous; and ... nothing can operate in a time or
place, which is ever so little remov'd from those of its
existence. Tho' distant objects may sometimes seem pro¬
ductive of each other, they are commonly found upon exam¬
ination to be link'd by a chain of causes, which are
contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects;
and when in any particular instance we cannot discover
this connexion, we still presume it to exist. We may
therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as essential
to that of causation"»(T,75)
Significantly, however, he adds after this last passage: "At least /we/ may suppose
it such, according to the general opinion, till we can find a more proper occasion
to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of
juxtaposition and conjunction",(T,75)
Despite these apparently unequivocal claims, however, Hume later admits the
possibility that a cause and its effect may not be spatially contiguous. In the
section "Of the immateriality of the soul" he argues for the view "that an object
mav exist, and yet be no where".(T.255) In the course of this argument he asserts
that "an object may be said to be no where, when its parts are not so situated with
respect to each other, as to for;;, any figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect
to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance".(T,235-236)
This, he says,
...is evidently the case ivith all our perceptions and objects,
except those of the sight and feeling. A moral reflection
cannot be plac'd on the right or on the left hand of a passion,
nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or square fig¬
ure. These objects and perceptions, so far from requiring any
particular place, are absolutely incompatible with it, and even
the imagination cannot attribute it to them.(T,236)
Whatever the merits of this particular argument, we may notice that Hume denies the
propriety of applying spatial predicates to some "objects and perceptions", and goes
on to say that the relation of causation may exist "betwixt the extended object and
the quality, which exists without any particular place".(T,237) Nor is this an
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isolated remark. As we shall have ample opportunity to notice through the rest
of this study of his philosophy of action, Hume continually both describes mental
events as non-spatial events, and considers them as causes and effects of spatial
and non-spatial effects and causes. Clearly then, spatial contiguity is not, for
Hume,essential to causation* If an event is not spatial it can not be spatially
contiguous to anything. Significantly, in his Enquiry definitions of causation
he makes no reference to spatial contiguity of cause and effect.. "We may define a
cause to be an ob.iect. followed by another, and where all the objects similar to
the first are followed by objects similar to the second"• (EHU,76) At the very
most Hume can only be asserting that for one spatial object or event to be the cause
or effect of another spatial object or event, the two must be spatially contiguous.
But even this, he makes clear, is an empirical question. There is no logical
absurdity in the notion of action at a distance.
Similar reservations must be made (though admittedly the case is not so straight¬
forward) about the claim that a cause must be temporally prior to its effect. Hume
certainly claims that a cause must precede its effect, as in the first Treatise
definition of causation where a cause is an "object precedent ... to another" (t,17o),
or when he says that "the cause must be prior to the effect".(t,173) In another
place he states: "The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and
effects.../isy7 that of PRIORITY of time in the cause before the effeet".(T,75-76)
He admits, after making this assertion, that the temporal priority of a cause may be
a matter of controversy, but offers one argument as proof that a cause cannot be cotemp-
oral with its effect. And in the Enquiry he still retains temporal priority of cause
to effect as an essential ingredient of causation.
Nevertheless, in at least one place in the Treatise Hume seems to allow that a
cause and its effect may be cotemporal. In talking of the "many other relations"
that may obtain between an "extended object" and "another, that exists without any
place or extension" he says:
Urns the taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from
its other qualities of colour and tangibility; and which¬
ever of them be the cause or effect, 'tis certain they are
always co-existent. Nor are they only co-existent in
general, but also co-temporary in their appearance in the
mind; and 'tis upon the application of the extended body
to our senses we perceive its particular taste and smell>
(T,2J7. Italics mine.)
One may question, of course, the propriety of calling the color of an apple the
cause of its taste, or vice versa. But what is interesting to notice is that Hume
admits that a cause and its effect may be cotemporal. If the case he gives of such
cotemporality is not one we would normally call a case of cause and effect, this can
only enhance its interest for the problem of determining what Hume means when he
refers to explanatory generalizations as causal ones, Hume is here, in effect,
saying that an explanatory generalization need not imply that one of the kinds of
events which it refers to is temporally prior to the other. If this is so, there
is reason to think that Hume's talk of causal explanations may not be as restrictive
as it sounds.
A point of the greatest interest for determining Hume's meaning when he talks
as though all explanations are causal explanations is his insistence that the notion
of necessity is an essential element of the notion of causation. "Necessary connex¬
ion". he points out, "...makes /an/ essential...part of it /i.e. the notion of
causation/".(T,£7) Later he writes: "According to my definitions, necessity makes
an essential part of causation".(T,407) If one says "A causes B"^ one of the things
one wants to say is that if an A occurs a B must also occur. In his discussion of
causation, Hume spends a great deal of time providing an account of this necessity.
One of the things on which Hume is quite clear is that the notion of necessity-
present in talk of causes and effects is not the same as that present in talk of
necessarily true propositions. -That is to say, no causal statement is a necessary
i
Throughout this section I shall use the formula "A causes B" to stand for a general
causal statement as "aqua regia dissolves gold" or "Fire produces heat". I shall
also assume the following simplifications: (a) A is the sole cause of B; (b) B is
always caused.
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statement; the denial of any causal statement whatever is not self-contradictory.
Thus Hume is faced with the problem of explaining causal necessity in a way that
does not turn it into the logical necessity of propositions asserting relations of
ideas. A proposition of the form "A causes B", though it involves the concept of
necessity in some way, is a contingent proposition.
As is well known, Hume claims that the source of this idea of causal necessity,
the impression from which it is derived, is a certain feeling one has when, having
experienced the constant conjunction of members of two classes of events, A and B,
and having encountered an A, one expects to encounter a B, As he says in the
Enquiry:
In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds,
there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequent¬
ly can suggest any idea of power or necessary connexion. But
when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is al¬
ways followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain
the notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new senti¬
ment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought
or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and
this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for.(EHU,78)
The impression which quarantees that the term "necessity", in the sense of "causal
necessity", has meaning, is this feeling. This discovery suits Hume's objectives
in two ways. For one thing, it enables him to give an account of causal necessity
that does not involve the concept of necessary truth, and thus a denial of the con¬
tingency of all causal statements. For another, it is consonant with, in fact an
instance of, the association of ideas which is one of the principal parts of his
science of human nature.
The fact that this account of causal necessity is consonant with Hume's associa-
tionist explanation of mental phenomena is an important point to notice. As Flew
has observed, this explains why Hume should light on the alleged impression of
mental determination, not some other impression such as the feeling of effort when
one tries to move some object, to explain the notion of causal necessity.^ But it
View, p. 118. At many points in the present section I am indebted to Flew's account
of causal necessity in his Hume's Philosophy of Belief, pp. 117-139.
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is clear that this account of necessity will not do the job it is required to do,
for it can not explain the concept of causation. In saying that the members of
two classes of events are causally related we are saying that they, i.e. the events,
are necessarily connected. We are not saying that we have a certain feeling of
determination to think of a member of one of these classes when we encounter an
instance of the otherJ The problem then is one of analyzing what it is that we say
when we assert a causal connection, and talk of the feelings we may have whoa we
experience a constant conjunction of events does not contribute in any very obvious
way to this analysis.
It is tempting to suggest that Hume was himself aware of the inadequacy of his
official account of causal necessity when, both in the Treatise and the rhouiry. he
framed his "definitions" of causation. Hume offers two definitions in each case.
In the Treatise the two are distinguished in so far as the first provides a defini¬
tion of causation as a philosophical relation, and the second a definition of causa-
2
tion as a natural relation. In the Inquiry these terms are dropped, though the
two definitions offered correspond to those in the Treatise. Let us consider the
first of each set of definitions; that is, the definitions of causation as a
philosophical relation. In the Treatise Hume says: "We may define a CAUSE to be
'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling
the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects,
that resemble the latter'".(T,170) In the -inquiry the corresponding definition runs:
"We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects




When Hume talks of the causal relation of A's and B's as a "philosophical relation"
he is referring to those observable facts about A's and B's which lead one to say
that they are causally related. By "natural relation" he means a relation between
mental phenomena, e.g. the thought of an A and the thought of a B.
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Curiously enough, in neither definition does Hume mention the notion of necessity.
He mentions spatial contiguity (at least in the .Treatise), temporal priority of the
cause, and constant conjunction, but says nothing of the necessary connection which
as he elsewhere claims in the Treatise, makes an "essential part of causation",(T,407)
He finds himself able to introduce mention of the impression from which he claims the
idea of necessity is derived only when he offers his definitions of causation as a
natural relation. But even if it is arguable that Hume's definitions of causation as
a philosophical relation are intended as an analysis of the meaning of causal statements,
there is no reason to think that when he talks of causation as a natural relation he
intends to provide an analysis of the meaning of such statements. Thus, neither in the
Treatise nor the Enquiry does Hume introduce the concept of necessity at that point at
which he might, with some plausibility, be interpreted as offering an account of the
meaning of causal language. Though liume believes himself to have shown the origin of
the idea of causal necessity, he has not shown how this illuminates the meaning of what
we say when we utter a proposition of the form "A causes F'.
At one point, however, Hume makes a remark which does illuminate the sense of
necessity present when we utter a causal statement. In the first of the two Enquiry
definitions Hume makes an interesting emendation. Having said that a cause is "an
object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed
by objects similar to the second", he continues: "Or in other words, where, if the first
object had not been, the second never had existed".(EHU.76)
It may be argued against Hume that the second italicized passage in this definition
is not equivalent to the first italicized passage because an unrestricted universal state¬
ment of the form "All A's are followed by B's", which corresponds to the first, does not
entail a subjunctive conditional of the form "If an A were not to occur, a B would not
occur", which corresponds to the second. That is to say, some unrestricted universal
statements are only accidental statements, stating correlations that just happen to occur«
Given such an accidental universal statement, we may not legitimately infer the subjunctive
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conditional "If an A were not to occur, a B would not occur". Other unrestricted
universal statements, sometimes called "nomologicals", state correlations that, in
some sense, must be the case. 1?rom these universal statements we are entitled to
infer the appropriate subjunctive conditional.
This distinction between nomological and accidental universal st tements on the
basis of the entailment or non-entailment of sub^unotive conditionals is, of course,
a matter of controversy among contemporary philosophers. Some, such as K.R. Popper,
argue that all unrestricted universal statements entail subjunctive conditionals, and
thus we crust look elsewhere if we are to elucidate the notion of a natural law. As
he says: "There is no need to operate with subjunctive conditionals, since a univer¬
salized subjunctive conditional is equivalent to an ordinary universal statement"J
Other philosophers, such as William Kneale, insist that one must distinguish universal
material implications which are and those which are not laws. Hie difference, he
suggests, is that there is a "possibility of deriving contrary-to-fact conditionals
2
from statements of natural law". laws of nature, he says, "are not merely universal
■5
material implications". Though the matter must be admitted to be a controversial one,
Flew, in defending the distinction between nomological and accidental universal state¬
ments, does offer an example which 3eems to require that the distinction be made.
Having said that "subjunctive conditionals cannot validly be deduced from statements of
mere conjunction" he describes the following case:
Suppose two mechanically ideal clocks placed side by side. Clock
one is a split second fast on clock two. Every state of clock one
will be followed by a similar state of clock two. So every speci¬
fiable state of clock one will be constantly conjoined with and
succeeded by a parallel state of clock two. It is surely immediate¬
ly obvious that it would be impossible to deduce that if some parti¬
cular state of clock one had not occurred the customarily conjoined
state of clock two would not have occurred.4
This example would seen, as Flew claims, to bring out that "subjunctive conditionals
^
K.R. Popper, 'A Note on Natural laws and So-Called 'Contrary-To-Fact Conditionals1",
rind, LVIII (1949), p.66.
^William Kheale, "Natural Laws and Contrary-To-Fact Conditionals", Analysis. X (1950),
p.121.
"^Kneale, p.125. ^"lew, p. 131 ♦
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cannot be deduced from assertions only of constant conjunctions",1
Perhaps, however, Hume is only 3peaking loosely, and does not intend to say that
the two italicized passages in his definition are equivalent. He himself elsewhere
recognizes that no statement of constant conjunction entails a causal, and thus necess¬
ary, connection. This is one of the main points of his Treatise section entitled "Of
the inference from the impression to the idea". In that section, having hit upon the
notion of constant conjunction as an important element in the analysis of causation,
Hume could still say:
We may now see the advantage of quitting the direct survey of this
relation /i.e. causation/, in order to discover the nature of that
necessary connexion, which makes so essential a part of it. There
are hopes, that by this means we may at last arrive at our propos'd
end; tho' to tell the truth, this new-discover'd relation of a con¬
stant conjunction seems to advance us very little in our way,(T,87-88)
In fact, it is just because the constant conjunction of two kinds of events does not
entail their causal connection that Hume has room for the account of causal necessity
which he gives. His psychological theorizing has a point because constant conjunction
and temporal succession are not sufficient to account for causal necessity.
Prescinding from the question whether Hume thought that "All A's are followed by
B's" is equivalent to "If an A were not to occur, a B would not occur", however, it is
important to see that Hume is in fact putting his finger, whether justifiably or not,
on the crux of the problem of causal necessity. Though the statement "All A's are
followed by B's" does not entail "If an A were not to occur, a B would not occur", the
2
statement "A causes B" does. That is to say, causal statements do, and statements of
3
mere constant conjunction do not, entail a corresponding subjunctive conditional.
This is the chief difference between the two. And it is this logical difference which
explains the notion of necessity involved in causal statements, and not in statements
Flew, p.131.
2
Recall the simplifying assumptions stated earlier, p. 85.
^1 am here taking universal causal statements as instances of nomological universale.
Later in this section I shall consider whether Hume would construe all nomologicals
as universal causal statements.
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of mere constant conjunctions. when we say that there is a causaj. ana "cnus a necess-
ary connection between A and B we are in part saying: If A, then B; and if not A,
then not B, The necessity is of this sort: If an A occurs, we can infer that a B
will occur, and if an A does not occur, we can infer that a B will not occur. The
necessity, that is, is connected with the notion of inference, and is thus a form of
logical necessity. It is not a form of logical necessity in the sense that a state¬
ment of the form "A causes B" is necessarily true? such a statement is contingent.
Rather, it is a form of logical necessity in the sense that if the causal statement is
true, and if we know the occurrence of one of the causally related events, we are
entitled to infer that the other will occur. Prom the statement "All A's are followed
by B's", interpreted as an accidental universal statement, together with the knowledge
that an A has occurred, we are not entitled to infer that a B will occur. Thus, as
Plew has remarked, Hume was on the right track when he looked for the source of the idea
of causal necessity in situations where one infers to the occurrence of a B, given the
occurrence of an A, In Hume's words: "Perhaps it will appear in the aid, that the
necessary connexion depends on the inference, instead of the inference's depending on
the necessary connexion".(T,88) In Plew's words: "He /i.e. Hume/ always appreciated,
even though he found no adequate formulation for, the point that the relevant kind of
necessity was in some fashion very intimately connected with inference".^
If we read Hume's account of causal necessity in this way we can see more clearly
the connection between the constant conjunction of members of two classes of events and
the claim that members of the one class are causes or effects of members of the other.
The fact that the members of two classes of events, A and B, are constantly conjoined
does not entail the truth of the statement that A causes B, Such a constant conjunc¬
tion of A's and B's is, however, evidence for the claim that A's and B's are causally
related. And if one finds that A's and B's are not always conjoined, one has falsified
View, p. 118,
the claim that A causes B, Moreover, if the statement "A causes B" entails the sub¬
junctive conditional "If an A, then a Bj and if not an A, then not a B" one is entitled
to infer that any A one comes across will be conjoined with a B, and vice versa, and
any A that one might have come across would liave been conjoined with a B, and vice versa.
That is to say, in talking of constant conjunction, Hume is providing a (partial) account
of the conditions which justify the use of causal language, rather than an analysis of
the meaning of such language.^
I began this discussion by asking what was involved in Hume's a-nparent belief that
all empirical explanations are causal explanations. We may now see that to say that an
explanatory generalization is a causal generalization implies at least, for Hume, that
the generalination has a certain element of necessity about it. On what ma:/ with some
propriety he called Hume's "official" theory of causation, this amounts only to saying
that one would experience a certain feeling of determination in connection with the
observed constant conjunction of members of two classes of events, Reading Hume more
liberally, however, and following up some of the suggestions present in his account of
causation, we may construe this causal necessity in a different way. To say that an
explanatory generalization is a causal one is in part to say that it is a lawlike general¬
ization in this sense, that it entails an appropriate subjunctive conditional, A
statement of the form "A causes B" entails a statement of the form "If an A were not to
occur, a B would not occur". Assuming that explanation and prediction have the same
logical structure, one would explain the occurrence of a B by referring to the prior
occurrence of an A, and by invoking the inference-liceneing lawlike generalization " A
causes B". One can explain a B by referring to an A precisely because the generaliza¬
tion correlating the occurrence of A's and B's is a lawlike one. The generalizations
in Hume's scientific explanatory system are, then, in so far as they are said to be
causal generalizations, said to be lawlike generalizations. They are, in fact, con¬
tingent laws.
It is not, however, sufficient just to say that lavlike generalizations differ from
^See Chapter I, Section 3»
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non-lawlike or accidental generalizations in that the former do and the latter do not
entail appropriate subjunctive conditionals. We are still left with the question of
how one determines what generalizations do and what do not entail the subjunctive con¬
ditional. Put somewhat differently: granted that if a generalization is a lawlike
one it entails an appropriate subjunctive conditional, how does one know that a given
generalieation _is lawlike?
Hume's account of inductive inference contains two suggestions that are pertinent
to the solution of this problem. He points out, first of all, that propositions assert¬
ing a causal connection between the members of two classes of events can be tested to
determine whether the regular conjunctions of events on which the propositions depend
are causal or merely accidental conjunctions. That is, one can inaugurate tests which
enable one to distinguish the "essential" from the "superfluous" circumstances in some
allegedly causal situation. (T, 148) To distinguish essential from superfluous circum¬
stances, or the "efficacious causes" from the "accidental circumstances"(T,149)» we may
make use of "general rules...form'd on the nature of our* understanding, and on our
experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects"»(T,149) It
is by these general rules that we "ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and
effects",(T,149) Some of these general rules are discussed in the section entitled
"Rules by which to judge of causes and effects", where it is made clear that their
purpose is to enable one to determine when objects "really are", as we may think they
are, "causes or effects to each other".(T,173)
There is no need to consider each of Hume's eight rule3 in detail* It is suffic¬
ient for our present purposes to look briefly at the fifth, sixth and -seventh rules.
The fifth rule st; tea that "where several different objects produce the same effect, it
must be by means of some euality, which we discover to be common amongst them".(T,174)
The sixth states that the "difference in the effects of two resembling objects must pro¬
ceed from that particular in which they differ".(T,174) The seventh states that "when
any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its cause 'tis
to be regarded as a compounded effect, deriv'd from the union of the several differ¬
ent effects, which arise from the several different parts of the cause",(T,174)
These three rules bear obvious, though schematic, resemblances to Mill's induc¬
tive methods of, respectively, agreement, difference, and concomitant variation. It
should be clear, however, that Hume's very brief account of these rules is hardly
sufficient for his stated purpose of enabling the investigator to determine when
objects "really are" causes or effects of one another, Each is stated so schemati¬
cally as to be no more than suggestive of actual scientific methods. No very clear
distinction is made between scientific techniques for discovering causal connections
and methods for testing alleged causal connections. No clear distinction is made
between the necessary and the sufficient conditions for an effect, a distinction which
is essential for properly interpreting each of the methods. Nor is any recognition
taken of the fact that the use of the methods in any particular case depends on certain
v.
assumptions being made} e.g, the assumption that the necessary and sufficient condi¬
tions for an effect are among those antecedents of the effect which have been observed,^
What principally concerns us here, however, is not the adequacy of Hume's formula¬
tion and account of these rules, but the fact -feat in formulating them he reveals at
least some awareness that alleged or suspected causal connections are open to tasting.
That is to say, he is aware that one's belief that members of A and B are causally
connected does not depend simply on one's passive observation that members of each have
been conjoined in the past. As we have seen already, such a constant conjunction is
not sufficient to justify the assertion of a causal connection. But to the extent
that an alleged causal connection can survive the demands of the tests Hume mentions
it is confirmed as a causal connection. Regrettably, Hume does not notice the differ¬
ences between the confirmation and the disconfirmation of an hypothesis, and thus gives
no very satisfactory account of what can be proved, and what disproved by such tests.
^Cf. Arthur Pap, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (London* Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1963), pp, 152-154,
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But he is aware that one's causal claims do not depend solely on the regular conjunc¬
tions of events that one happens, passively, to notice. As Flew has pointed out,*
to say that a conjunction of events is a causal one is in part to say that it is one
on which we can rely. More generally, to say thst a connection between events is a
lawlike one (whether or not the connection is a causal one) is in part to say that it
is one on which we can rely. And we determine whether a connection is reliable, or
whether the empirical proposition which asserts it is a law, by subjecting it to an
appropriate series of tests. Roughly speaking, to the degree that an alleged law
survives our tests, to the degree that it is confirmed by our tests, or survives
attempts at disconfirmation, to that extent it is to be considered a law. Uiis is
one way in which we distinguish accidental from lawlike generalizations, statements
of mere constant conjunction from statements of causal or other lawful.connections.
A second suggestion concerning the manner of distinguishing lawlike and acciden¬
tal generalizations is contained in Hume's remarks, discussed earlier, concerning the
nature of a scientific system of explanatory laws* Starting from these remarks, we
may say that an empirical generalization is a lawlike generalization to the extent
that it has a place in such a scientific system of lawg. That is to aay, to the
extent that an empirical generalization is either a lower-level law deducible from
a higher-level law in such a system of laws, or a higher-level law from which lower-
level laws are deducible, to that extent it is confirmed as an empirical law. More
accurate 11 y, an alleged lower-level empirical law L is confirmed as an empirical law
to the extent (a) that it is deducible from a higher-level lew H and(b) that H is
confirmable by observations that do not directly confirm L. An alleged higher-level
law H is confirmable as a law to the extent that lower-level laws deducible from it
are directly confirmable. As Arthur Pap says, elucidating the notion of a law of
nature: "A universal statement is lawlike to the degree that it is indirectly con¬
firmed by instances that directly confirm more general hypotheses from which it
*Flew, pp. 158-159*
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follows or less general statements that follow from it".1 This is not to say that
alleged laws are not directly confirmable, but only that they are also indirectly
confirmable. The degree of a law's confirmation is increased by the degree of con¬
firmation of the whole system of laws of which it is a part.
I an not suggesting that Hume explicitly adopted this device for distinguishing
accidental and lawlike empirical generalizations. Surely he did not. I am rather
suggesting that this way of handling the problem of lawlike empirical generalizations
is one that is quite consonant with his theory of scientific explanation, and is, at
least in broadest outline, suggested by that theory, "To invent without scruple,"
Hume says, "a new principle to every new phae.^inenon, instead of adapting it to the
old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs,
that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number
of falsehoods to cover our ignorance of the truth".(T,282) If the fact that one's
principles cannot be systematized into a structure of laws shows they are not "just",
it is plausible to suggest that the fact that they can be so systematized tends to
confirm than.
We have, then, two complementary ways of determining whether an empirical general¬
ization is an accidental or a lawlike generalization. We may subject the alleged law
to an appropriate series of tests, such as those mentioned in the section on "Rules
for judging of causes and effects". To the extent that the alleged law survives dis-
confirmation it has the status of a law. This doe3 not, of course, convert the con¬
firmed law into a necessary truth; it is always, in principle, open to falsification.
Secondly, we may consider whether the alleged law has a place in a system of laws, and
what place it has. To the extent that the alleged law is indirectly confirmable in
this way it has the status of a law.
We may now return to a question raised but left unanswered at the start of this
1Pap, Introduction, p. 302.
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section. In saying that all explanatory generalisations are causal statements, does
Hume intend to deny the possibility of non-causal empirical laws, or must his refer¬
ence to causation be read in some other way? I shall begin by considering a sample
of empirical laws mentioned in the Treatise and the first Enquiry.
Among the laws mentioned in the Treatise are the following: the law stating
that wines from the Champagne region of France have such and such a character (T,401);
the law stating that two flat pieces of marble, if placed together in such and such a
way, will cohere together (T,401-02); the law stating that the climate of a place
determines the ripening process of fruits produced in that place (T,402); the law
according to which striking the neck with a sharpened axe with a certain force severs
the head from the trunk (T,406); the laws stating that lead is more fusible than silver
and that gold is heavier than mercury (T, 95) I the law that motion in one body causes
motion in another upon impulse (T,76-77)? the law of gravitational attraction (T,12-13);
the laws according to which particular fruits have particular tastes (T,237); the geo¬
metrical laws concerning light (T,58).
In the first Enouiry Hume says: "Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communi¬
cation of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles we
shall ever discover in nature"-. (PHU,30) He refers also to "a law of motion, discovered
by experience, that the moment or force of any body in motion is in the compound ratio
or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity".(EHU,31) In the Enquiry he
refers also to the following empirical laws: "crystal is the effect of heat, and ice
of cold" (EHU,32); "a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state,
till put from it by some new cause"(eHU,73H)» "a body impelled takes as much motion from
the impelling body as it acquires itself"•(EHU,7311)
We can refrain here from commenting on the great variations in generality and degree
of precision of the mentioned latra. The relevant point to notice is that in so far as
Hume considers these to be instances of empirical laws which provide the basis for
factual inference, whether explanatory or predictive, he would describe than as causal
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laws. Clearly, however, many of than would not, in contemporary usage, be called
causal laws. Hie law of gravitational attraction, for example, or the geometrical
laws concerning light, or many of the laws of chemistry are not causal laws. They
do not state that a given physical state or event causes another state or event.
Rather, they provide formulae for determining one physical state* or the occurrence
of one physical event, given knowledge of the requisite facts about another event
or state. These laws provide equations whereby, given the values of some of the
variables, the values of other variables can be determined. Thus if one knows the
appropriate laws, and the values of a sufficient number of variables, one can deter¬
mine the position of a planet at some future time (or at some past time), or the
length of the shadows thrown by a given opaque body. But it would surely be in¬
appropriate to talk of a body's position at time jt causing its position at time
(just as it would be inappropriate to talk of the mathematical formulae causing its
position at _t). It is true that the position of a body at Jfc determines its position
at t^ in the sense that, given the appropriate laws, and the values of the appropriate
variables, one can determine the value of other variables. But this does not mean
that the states of affairs, whose values are those of the given set of variables,
cause the state of affairs whose value is that of the determined variable. Rather
one should say that the value of one variable in the equation is a function of the
values of the other variables. It is in this sense that the values of the one vari¬
able are determined by the values of the others. With such laws as these, the lang¬
uage of determination is appropriate, but not the language of causation. As Russell
claims in the case of the law of gravitation in particular, and the science of physics
generally, "there is nothing that could be properly called 'cause* and nothing that
could be properly called 'effect' in such a system".''
To talk of such explanatory laws as causal laws is, then, mistaken. And, as we
^Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause", mysticism and logic (London: TJnwin Books,
1963), p. 141.
--99-
have seen, T'ume does talk as though all explanatory laws are causal ones. Too much
weight should not, however, be placed on this fact* It is probably true that Hume
thought, uncritically, that the class of causal laws is coextensive with that of
empirical laws* But from this it does not follow that Hume would have denied the
distinction which must be made between causal and non-causal laws of nature* Surely
it is more plausible to suggest that he simply failed to see the difference*
This failure to distinguish the two is quite understandable in the context of
Hume's philosophizing. For one thing, Hume fails, in his discussion of inductive
inference, to take into account the differences between the common-sense and the scien¬
tific levels of prediction and explanation. Hume talks as though what one could say
in explanation of the souring of a glass of milk on the superficial level of observa¬
tion differs in no important respect from what could be said, using the lairs of
mathematical physics, in explanation of the position at jt of a particular planet.
On the everyday level, one is quite content with rough explanations in terms of obser¬
vable event sequencea Thus, one is content with the statement "The milk was left to
stand in the warm sun for several hours" in explanation of the fact that it soured,
But scientific explanation, especially in the physical sciences, is a matter of much
greater precision, and, more importantly, is a matter of expressing empirical regulari¬
ties in mathematical terms. Once the mathematicization of explanations is taken
seriously, of course, it is an easier matter to distinguish the notions of causal con¬
nection and functional dependence. Now it is clear that Plume did recognize, to some
extent, the mathematical character of explanation in physics. In his account of
"mixed mathematics" in the first Enquiry he notes that "every part of mixed mathe¬
matics proceeds upon the supposition that ce tain laws are established by nature in
her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience in
the discovery of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular instances,
where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity".(EHU,31) He then
goes on to mention the Newtonian law of motion which I quoted earlier. Nevertheless,
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in not placing any very great emphasis on this fact about the character of scienti¬
fic explanation, Hume condemned himself to working with an over-simplified model
of explanation, the everyday one**
This in itself is not, however, sufficient to account for Hume's apparent belief
that all empirical laws are causal laws, since it would not explain why he would con¬
strue the observational laws stating that particular fruits have particular tastes
as causal laws* (cf* T,2J7) To account for this peculiar doctrine one must notice
Hume's failure to recognize that the concept of causation is a practical concept*
That is to say, the concept of a cause is one which finds its first application in
situations in which agents do things such as light fires, break windows, and turn on
lights** Ihis suggestion that the assertion of a causal connection in a situation
wherein no sense could be made of an agent's doing anything should at least sound
odd* Thus it is that Hume's law which states that the motion of one billiard ball
causes motion in another billiard ball upon impulse is easily intelligible as a causal
lsw; We know how to produce motion in the seoond by producing motion in the first*
Thus it is, too, that no sense can be made of Hume's apparent suggestion that the
"laws" according to which certain fruits have certain tastes are causal laws: there
is no way in which, by changing the color of oranges, say, or their shape or size, we
can produce a change in their taste, '.hat is somewhat surprising is that Hume should
have failed to notice the practical character of causation, despite his own methodo¬
logical principle of discovering the meaning of a term by looking to the kinds of
situation in which the term is used* However this is to be accounted for, it remains
apparent that Hume does fail to notice the differences between discovering non-causal
empirical laws, and discovering how to shatter a pane of glass*
Despite these failings, however, the main points of Hume's discussion of explana¬
tory lawa have aa much application to the case of nonl causal laws as they do
to that of causal laws. An
*Cf. Douglas Gasking, "Causation and Recipes", Mind, LXIV (1955)* PP* 479-487*
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explanatory law, whether causal or non-causal, has the two properties which Hume is
particularly concerned to emphasize. That is, any such law is both contingent and
lawlike. Mopting a liberal reading of Hume's theory of necessary connection, any
explanatory law, whether causal or non-causal, entails a subjunctive conditional, and
is lawlike to the extent that it is directly confirmable by the failure of appropriate
attempts at disconfirmation, or indirectly confirmable via its deductive connections
with other laws in a scientific system of explanatory laws. The deficiencies in
Hume's account of the concept of causation, and his uncritical assumption that all
empirical explanations are causal, do nothing to detract from the value of these cen¬
tral points in his theory of explanation.
3. Probability
An important element of Hume's theory of explanation is his account of
those scientific laws which are statistical rather than universal. In this
section I shall consider, fairly briefly, what Hume has to say about such
laws. As a preliminary, however, it will be necessary to disentangle the
various senses in which Hume uses the terms "probable" or "probability",
I shall also point out, at the end of this section, Hume's view that a
determinist thesis is not called into question by the fact that, in some
cases, a scientist must make do with statistical rather than universal laws.
It is possible to distinguish at least three senses of "probability"
in the Treatise. For purposes of clarity of exposition I shall call these
"logical probability", "probability of events", and "probability of state¬
ments". It will become apparent that Hume does not always clearly disting¬
uish the two latter senses.
To say that a proposition is a logically probable proposition is to
say two things: (a) the proposition is true; (b) the truth of the proposit¬
ion cannot be demonstrated.* That is to say, any true proposition whose
contradictory is not self-contradictory is only probable, in this sense of
probability. Hume introduces the notion of logical probability when he
including oondition (a) in my elucidation of the notion of logical
probability I am implying that the distinction between "knowledge" and
"probability" is not identical with that between necessity and conting¬
ency. A statement is a necessary one if it is the sort of statement that
if true, is demonstrable, and if false, is self-contradictory. But to say
that a statement is an instance of knowledge, in Hume's use of "knowledge",
is to say both that it is a necessary statement and that it is true. One
cannot know that p unless p is true. Thus, in contrasting "probability"
with "knowledge" flume shouXd be taken to imply that a probable statement
is a true one. Hume is not, however, very clear on this point.
contrasts probability with knowledge. He says, for example, that "those
philosophers, who have divided human reason into knowledge and probability.
and have defin'd the first to be that evidence, which arises from the comparison
of ideas, are oblig'd to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects
under the general term of probability", and that "in the precedent part of this
discourse, I have follow*d this method of expression". (T,124-) (Presumably
Hume here refers to such things as the title of Part III of Book I: "Of
knowledge and probability",) Later in the Treatise he shows quite clearly
that the distinction he makes between knowledge and probability is the same as
that between propositions asserting relations of ideas and those asserting matters
of fact; "The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as it
judges from demonstrate on or probability; as it regards the abstract relations
of ideas, or those relations of objects, of which experience only gives us
information", (T, 413) Using "probable" in this sense, it is only probable
that all men now living will die, or that the sun will rise tomorrow. In this
sense of "probability", a proposition cannot be more or less probable. If it
is true it is probable or non-probable. If it is true and non-probable it is
necessarily true.
Perhaps Hume chose to draw the contrast between necessarily true and
contingently true propositions as one between knowledge and probability in
order to secure the maximum emphasis for a logical distinction which he felt to
be a crucially important one. There was, however, historical precedent for so
doing. As he himself points out, the distinction was made in these terms by
Locke: "Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative or probable".
(EHU, 56n) Nevertheless, Hume does recognize that this use of "probable" is
a technical, even misleading one, and outrages common speech. "One wou'd
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appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise
to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho* 'tis plain we have no further
assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us." (T, 124) "For
this reason", he says, "'twould perhaps be more convenient, in order at once
to preserve the common significationcf words, and mark the several degrees of
evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kind3, viz. that from knowledge.
from proofs, and from probabilities". (T^ 124)
The second sense in which Hume uses "probability" is the sense in which
one may ask the probability that a given event will occur. I shall call this
the "probability of events". One may ask, for example, the probability that
any man whatever will die, or the probability that a particular man will con¬
tract lung cancer, or the probability that another man will roll a three on a
single roll of an unbiased die whose 3ides are numbered from one to six. Given
the law that all men must die, the probability that any given man will die is 1.
Given the law that 80% of those who smoke over a certain number of cigarettes
per day, for a certain minimum period of time, will oontract lung cancer, the
probability that Jones, who satisfies all these conditions, will contract cancer
of the lungs is 4/5» Given that a certain die is unbiased and has sides
numbered from one to six, the probability that a three will be rolled in a single
roll is 1/6.
What I have said so far is not, however sufficient to delimit those
cases to which Hume refers in using "probability" in this second sense, for
it does not permit Hume to distinguish "proofs" from "probabilities" as he does.
In using "probability" in the sense of "probability of events", but in contrast
to "proofs", Hume is in fact ruling out the first sort of case mentioned above
as a case of the probability of events. In Hume's usage one cannot speak of the
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probability of an event if the probability of that event's occurrence is 1.
By "proofs" Hume means "those arguments, which are deriv'd from the relation
of cause and effeot, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty".
(Tj 124) By "probability", in contrast, he means "that evidence, which is
still attended with uncertainty"• (T, 124) Hume makes the same distinction
between "proofs" and "probabilities" later in the Treatise when he says: "When
the conjunction of any two objects is frequent, without being entirely con¬
stant, the mind is determin'd to pass from one to the other; but not with so
entire a habit, as when the union is uninterrupted, and all the instances we
have ever met with are uniform and of a pieoe". (T, 132-133) The distinction
is made more clearly when he contrasts "that judgment, which is deriv'd from a
constant and uniform connexion of causes and effects" with "that which depends
upon an interrupted and uncertain"• (T, 134) The contrast Hume has in mind
is this# Given a law of the form "All A's are B's" and the occurrence of an
A, a B must occur. But given a law of the form "Eighty per-cent of A's are
B's and the occurrence of an A, it is not the case that a B must occur. The
probability of a B's occurrence is less than 1. The first case is a case of
"proofs"; the second is a case of "probabilities". Thus Hume uses "probability",
in the sense of the probability of events, in such a way that one may only speak
of the probability that an event will occur if the probability of that event's
occurrence is less than 1. If the probability of an event's occurrence is 1
one must speak of proof, not probability. In distinguishing "proofs" from
"probabilities" Hume is in fact distinguishing universal or non-statistical
from statistical empirical laws.
The third sense of "probability" current in the Treatise is that whioh I
have called the "probability of statements". In this sense of "probability"
it is proper to inquire into the probability or likelihood that a given state-
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ment is true. Restricting ourselves to statements of empirical laws, this is
a question of the degree to which a given law has been confirmed. In this
sense of "probability" one may ask how probable it is that the laws expressed
by "51% of children bom are boys" or "All ravens are blaok" are true laws.
The difference between the present and the immediately preceding sen3e of
probability can be put in this way. The probability of an event is a function
of the law which governs the occurrence of the event. Assuming that the law
"51% of children bom are boys" is justified, the probability that a new-bom
child will be male is 51/100. The probability of a statement is a function
of the standard procedures for confirming or disoonfinning that statement.
If the statement the probability of which is to be determined is allegedly an
empirical law, factors such as those considered in the previous section (viz.
attempts to disconfirm the law, or to confirm the law indireotly by directly
confirming other laws with which it has deductive connections) will determine
its probability. R.B. Braithwaite, in distinguishing what I have called the
"probability of events" and the "probability of statements", reserves the term
"probability" for the former, and calls the latter "reasonableness",^
Braithwaite also provides an example which bring3 out this distinction quite
clearly: "That the probability of a radium atom disintegrating within 1700 years
is ^ is a hypothesis within the body of physics; since it is reasonable to
believe this hypothesis at the present time, the hypothesis itself may be said
2
to be probable in the second sense of probability".
^"R.B, Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation Cambridge: Cambridge University




Hume coneg nearest to making explicit use of the concept of the probability
of statements In that section of the Treatise entitled "Of scepticism with regard
to reason", "In every judgment", he says, "which we can form concerning probability,
as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment,
deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another judgment, deriv'd from the
nature of the understanding", (T, 181-182) Further, he talks of a "new species
of probability to correct and regulate the first, and fix its just standard and
proportion", and goes on to say: "As demonstration is subject to the controul
of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex aot
of the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from
the first probability become our objeots", (T, 182)
Without following Hume to the sceptical conclusions which he draws in
this section of the Treatise, we may 3tress the way in which Hume uses
"probability" in these passages. For one thing, Hume is consoious that he is
talking here of a "new species of probability". For another, he characterises
the difference between this "new species of probability" and the older species
(the probability of events) in a way that suggests a difference of order between
the two. This "new species of probability" has "the nature of our understand¬
ing, and our reasoning" for its "objeots"; presumably the older species has a
different object. This new probability is "deriv'd from the nature of the
understanding"; the other probability is "deriv'd from the nature of the object".
It ie^ moreover, the function of this new species of probability to "correot
and regulate", to "controul" judgments involving probability of the older variety.
In short, to talk of probability in this new sense is to talk of the probability
that some proposition, whether it be a proposition involving knowledge, proof,
or probability, is true.
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The account which Hume gives in the section "Of scepticism with regard
to reason" of the ways in which we determine the truth-probability of a
proposition is both sketchy and one-sided. He in fact restricts his attention
there to what may be called the subjective criteria for determining the truth-
probability of a proposition, That is to say, he there talks only of the ways
in which we determine the likelihood that a given person will be correot in
asserting a given proposition. Thus, he points out that it is more likely that
a person of "solid sense and long experience" would be correot in his assertions,
than one who is "foolish and ignorant", (?, 182) He points out, too, that even
a man of "solid sense and long experience ,,, must be consoious of many errors
in the past", and thus that even such qualities are no guarantee that what he
says will be true# Considerations such as these are, however, of only minor
interest when one is trying to determine the probability or likelihood that a
given proposition is true, especially when the proposition in question is an
alleged enpirical law, whether universal or statistical. When we wish to
determine the probability of an alleged scientific law we are concerned not with
the credentials of the person who utters the law, but with the degree to which
the alleged law has been confirmed. For an account of Hume's views on questions
of this sort we must read not the section entitled "Of woepticism with regard to
reason" but such sections a3 those entitled "Rules by whioh to judge of causes
and effects" or "Of unphilosophical probability". But we have already considered
Hume's views on these questions when we considered the ways in which, according
1
to Hume, we confirm the law3 in a scientific system of laws.
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Hume consistently maintained
the distinction between the probability of events and the probability of state-
^"Chapter II, Section 2,
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ments# The opposite seems rather to be the case. Consider his suggested
revision of Looke* s division of arguments into demonstrations and probabilities.
In the first Enquiry Hume suggests that if we are to "conform our language more
to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and
probabilities". (EHU, 56n) He then goes on to say that by "proofs" he means
"such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition".
(EHO, 56n) In the Treatise the differences are drawn in the same ways
By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the
conparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, whioh
are deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and
which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty#
By probability, that evidence, which is still attended
with uncertainty. (T^ 124)
In both these passages Hume seems not to notice that there are two
quite distinct sources of a possible doubt or uncertainty about some future
event. On the one hand, our past experience may have revealed only a statis¬
tical regularity between the occurrence of an A and the occurrence of a B.
Thus, we cannot be certain that any given occurrence of an A will be conjoined
with an occurrence of a B. It can only be more or less probable that, given
an A, a B will occur. On the other hand, we may never have encountered an
occurrence of an A that was not conjoined with an occurrence of a B. We might
thus be lead to expect that any new occurrence of an A will be conjoined with
the occurrence of a B. But, as much of our experience has convinced us, it
is often not the case that a past experience of the constant conjunction of
members of two classes of events is sufficient to enable us to predict that
any occurrence of an A will be conjoined with that of a B. Only when A1 s and
B*3 are lawfully correlated can we predict with certainty that a B will occur
if an A has occurred. It is only to the extent that "All A* s are B's" has
been confirmed as a law that we can predict that, given an A, a B will occur.
That is to say, our uncertainty about the occurrence of a B, given the occurrence
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of an A, may havo two different origins. The uncertainty of a B's occurrence
nay he due to: (a) the fact that the law governing the conjunction of A's and
B's is a statistical one, or (b) the fact that the law governing the conjunction
of A's and B's, though 3tated in the universal form "All A's are B's", is not
sufficiently confirmed. It is this distinction which Hume tends to neglect when
he presents a straightforward contrast between proofs and probabilities in terms
of the difference between a uniform and non-uniform regularity as stated in the
empirical law which governs the prediction. One can only contrast proofs and
probabilities as Hume does if one assumes that in each case the law which
licenses the prediction is equally and adequately justified. In the passages
quoted above, Hume does not make this assumption explicit,
Returning to the probability of events, we may notice that Hume dis¬
tinguishes two kinds, the probability of chances and the probability of causes.
The distinction corresponds to that often made between a -priori and a posteriori
probability. Hume's example of the probability of chances is the determination
of the probability that a given side of an unbiased die will appear uppermost
when thrown; his example of the probability of causes is the determination of
the probability that a ship will return safely to port. The difference between
the two can be best seen by contrasting the way in which the probability of an
event is determined in each case. In the case of the die, one considers
certain present features of the die: it has six 3ides, they are numbered from
one to six. On this information, one determines the probability of a three
appearing uppermost when the die is tossed as 1/6. That is, one divides the
number of favorable chances by the nun&er of possible chances. In the probab¬
ility of causes, one consults past experience to determine the relative frequency
with which members of a class of objects K have had the property P, and thus
the probability that a particular member of K will have P. One discovers,
in Hume's example, that 19 of 20 ship3 return safely to port; on this information
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one judges that the probability of a given ship's returning to port is 19/20,
With respect to Hume's discussion of the probability of chances, the
only point we need notice is his insistence that the a priori determination ©f
probability depends on the assumption that certain conditions obtain which are
normally taken for granted, and thus not mentioned in our determination of
probabilities. These conditions may be conveniently summarized by saying that
they limit the number and kinds of states of affairs that can or will be considered
possible. Thus, in calculating the probability of a three on a single toss of a
die with six sides numbered one to six, one assumes that the die is unbiased, and
one rules out the possibilities that the die, when thrown, will disappear, or
develop several extra sides, or come to rest on one of its edges, and so on. We
allow only six events to be possible: the appearing uppermost of one or another
of the six different sides of the die. Unless we make these assumptions, we
mannot derive a probability fraction of 1/6 because we have no way of ascertaining
the denominator of such a fraction. This appears to be Hume's meaning when he
says, of the probability of chances:
Where nothing limits the chances, every notion, that the
most extravagant fancy can form, is upon a footing of
equality; nor oan there be any circumstance to give one
the advantage over the other. Thus, unless we allow,
that there are some causes to make the djoe fall, and
preserve their form in their fall, and lie upon some one
of their sides, we can form no calculation concerning the
laws of hazard, (T, 126)
The calculation of ohance* presupposes the assignment of limits to the possible
outcome of a toss of the die. The particular limits set are, of course, a
function of both the properties of the die and the relevant laws of nature,
Hume's disoussion of the probability of chances has, according to Hume
himself, "no other purpose, than to assist U3 in explaining the probability
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of causes'". (T. 130). It is this latter "species of probability", he says,
that "we must chiefly examine", (T, 130 ) Despite his insistence on its
importance, however, Hume's acoount of the probability of causes is, as MacNabb
has claimed, seriously inadequate,"'" Consider the description Hume offers of
the procedures whereby we derive statistical laws from e.:perience, and thus
2
determine the probability of a given event's occurrence. In ascertaining a
statistical law, Hume says, "we commonly take knowingly into consideration the
contrariety of past events; we compare the different sides of the contrariety,
and carefully weight the experiments, which we have on eaoh side". (T. 133)
He further says that "that effect, which has been the most common, we always
esteem the most likely", (T. 133) He further claims that "the only cir¬
cumstance, which can give any event, that is contingent, a superiority over
another, is a superior number of chances", (T. 136) Moreover, "when we
transfer the past to the future, the known to the unknown, every past
experiment has the same weight, and ,,. 'tis only a superior number of them,
which can throw the ballance on any side". (T, 136) Consider, too, his account
of determining the probability that a ship will return safely to port. The
only factor indicated as being relevant is the numerical relation between those
ships which have, and those which have not returned safely, (T, 134)
It is obvious, however, that the probability of a particular ship returning
to port may be affected by such things as the condition of the ship, the time
of year at which it sails, the length of its journey, its destination, its
^"D.G-.C. MacNabb, David Hume: His Theory of Knowledge and Morality (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, , p. 89, ~ -~
^In using "statistical" here I do not intend to suggest that Hume considers
only those statements to be probability statements which contain some
numerical statement of probability. In many cases Hume seems to be thinking
only of oases in which we would say "Most (the largest proportion, very few)
A's are B's".
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cargo, and so forth. Before one would plaoe any credence in the assertion
that 95% of ships that leave port return safely, or the assertion that the odds
are 19 to 1 that this particular ship will return 3afely, one would want to "be
assured that such factors as I have mentioned have been taken into consideration,
both in the derivation of the statistical law and the prediction of the
particular event * As MacNabb points out:
iSxperienoe of cyclical, progressive and irregular
fluctuations in the frequency of many conjunctions
quiokly leads us to distrust it^~i.e. the simple
counting-procedure described by~Hume_7» What we
look for in statistical evidence is either a pro¬
portion which is approximately constant in any
random selection of cases, or, failing that, a
description of the fluctuations either in terms of
periodic cycles or of special factors on which they
depend
In fairness to Hume, hov/c-ver, it should perhaps be assumed that he intended
his later account of the rules for judging of causes and effects and his comments
on general rules in his discussion of unphilosophical probability, to cover
the confirmation of statistical as well as non-statistical laws. His account
of statistical probability need not, then, in fact be as over-simplified as it
at first appears. Since I have already discussed Hume's view in these matters
at some length, I shall not delay over them at this point.
The point I would stress, however, is the importance which Hume attaches
to his discussion of the probability of causes, or a posteriori probability.
We have already seen that he considers his discussion of the probability of
chances to be only a prolegomenon to his account of the probability of causes.
The reason for this insistence is plain: the probability of causes does, the
•'■MacNabb, pp. 89-90.
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probability of chances does not, have a significant role to play in scientific
inquiries of the sort Hume is interested to make. And it is quite clear that
Hume believes that statistical empirical laws are an essential element of any
scientific account of the physical world, and especially of human conduct.
The scientist, Hume 3eems to assume throughout the Treatise, aspires towards
the discovery of universal laws. In some cases, he sugs©sts» it ia possible
to achieve such laws. In many cases, however, and espeoially when the subject
is human conduct, such laws are not, in fact, within our grasp. The causal
laws which do (as he assumes) always operate are simply to© cosplex to be
discovered.
Hume stresses this difficulty at many places in the Treatise. In con¬
cluding his discussion of the rules for determining causal relations, for
example, he says}
There is no phaenomenon in nature, but what is
compounded and modify*d by so many different cir¬
cumstances, that in order to arrive at the decisive
point, we must carefully separate whatever is super¬
fluous, and enquire by new experiments, if every
particular circumstance of the first ex periment was
essential to it. These new experiments are liable to
a discussion of the same kind; so that the utmost
constancy is requir'd to make us persevere in our
enquiry, and the utmost sagacity to ohoose the right
way among so many that present themselves. If this be
the oase even in natural philosophy, how much more in
moral, where there is a much greater oonplication of
circumstances, and where those views and sentiments,
which fre essential to any action of the mind, are so
implicit and obscure, that they often escape our
strictest attention and are not only unaccountable in
their causes, but even unknown in their existence?
(T. 175)
He points up the saiae difficulty when, in criticising philosophers and
scientists who oversimplify the laws governing human behavior, he claims that:
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The common error of metaphysicans has lain in
ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of
these principles, and supposing the other to have no
influence. Men often act knowingly against their
interest: For which reason the view of the greatest
possible good does not always influence them. Men
often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of
their interests and designs: 'Tis not therefore the
present uneasiness alone, which determines them. In
general, we may observe, that both these principles
operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that
either of them prevails, according to the general char¬
acter or present disposition of the person. tfhat we
call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the
calm passions above the violent; tho' we may easily
observe, there is no man so constantly possess'! of
this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the
sollicitations of passion and desire. From these
variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of
deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men,
where there is any contrariety of motives and passions.
(T. 418)
The same difficulty is referred to when he says:
Upon the whole .../"thcJatruggLe of passion and
reason, as it is callTa, diversifies human life, and
makes men so different not only from each other, but
also from themselves in different times. Philosophy
can only account for a few of the greater and more
sensible events of this war; but must leave all the
smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent
on principles too fine and minute to her comprehension.
(T. 438)
These difficulties underlie Hume's stress on the difference between
"proofs" and "probabilities", which, as we have seen, is mainly the difference
between universal and statistical laws. They lead him to stress the necessity
of making use of statistical laws if any scientific explanation at all is to
be provided for many of the things we observe. Thin, in turn, leads to the
necessity of displaying the logic of such laws: how they are discovered,
how they licence predictions, how they explain. This Hume considers one of the
main tasks of the Treatise. It is not, however, just the case that Hume
emphasises the importance of statistical laws, and attempts to provide an account
of them. Quite often in the course of the Treatise Hume gives ample notice
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that the supposedly scientific laws which he is himself trying to establish are
themselves to be construed as statistical, not universal causal l§ws# He
frequently offers explanations which he takes to be statistical and not universal#
The emphasis on statistical laws, it should be noted, does not in Hume*6
view run counter to his well-known advooacy of the principle of universal
determinism. Hume several times makes quite explicit (a) that the use of
statistical rather than strictly universal laws is demanded by the limits of
our knowledge, which limits are imposed by the vast complexity of the causal
conditions whioh determine the occurrence of events; and (b) that scientific
activity nevertheless proceeds on the assumption (the truth cfwhioh is not
analytic) that all events are causally determined# He emphasises that the
uncertainty which is presupposed by our dependence on probability laws, is an
uncertainty in our knowledge, not in things themselves# "Chance", he says,
"is nothing real in itself, and, properly speaking, is merely the negation
of a cftuse"# (T. 125) It is only "the vulgar", not "philosophers", who give
up the principle of universal determinism in the face of the irregularities of
events;
The vulgar, who take things according to the first
appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to
such an uncertainty in the causes, as makes them
often fail of their usual influence, the* they meet
with no obstacle nor impediment in their operation#
But philosophers observing, that almost in every
part of nature there is contain*d a vast variety of
springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of
their minuteness or remoteness, find that *tis a#
least possible the oontrariety of events may not
proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from
the secret operation of contrary causes# This
possibility is converted into certainty by farther
observation, when they remark, that upon an exaot
scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a
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oontrariety of causes, and proceeds from their
mutual hindrance and opposition. A peasant can
give no better reason for the stopping of any
clock or watch than to say, that commonly it does
not go rlghtj But an artisan easily perceives, that
the same force in the spring or pendulum has always
the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its
usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust,
which puts a stop to the whole movement. Prom the
observation of several parallel instances, philoso¬
phers form a maxim, that the connexion betwixt all
oauses and effects is equally necessary, and that
its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds
from the secret operation of contrary causes,
(T. 132)
The same is true of our judgments about human behavior: if we "see a
person free from the3e/~i.e. strong/ motives, we suppose a possibility either
of his acting or forbearing^ and tho* in general we may conclude him to be
determdn'd by motives and causes, yet this removes not the uncertainty of
our judgments concerning these causes", (T, 313) Hume makes the same point
when, in his discussion of the problem of free-will, he points to the
similarities in our attitude toward human behavior and to the occurrence of
physical events. He suggests that:
In judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon
the same max!as, as when we reason concerning
external objects, When any phenomena are constantly
and invariably conjoin*d together, they acquire suoh a
connexion in the imagination, that it passes from one
to the other, without any doubt or hesitation. But
below this there are many inferior degrees of evidence
and probability, nor does one single contrariety of
experiment entirely destroy all our reasoning. The
mind ballance3 the contrary experiments, and deducting
the inferior from the superior, proceeds with that
degree of assurance or evidence, which remains. Even
when these contrary experiments are entirely equal, we
remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the
operation of contrary and conceal*d causes, wo conclude,
that the chance or indifference lies only in our
judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in
the things themselves, which are in every case equally
necessary, tho* to appearance not equally constant and
certain. (T. 4-03-04)
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It is Hume's view, then, that the claim that all events are caused is
logically independent of the claim that, in many causes, one can discover
only statistical laws governing the occurrence of events. We shall have
occasion later to see the importance of this view In Hume's discussion of the
problem of freedom.
CHAPTER III
THE EXPLANATION OF MENTAL EVENTS
1. The Laws of Association
In the present section I will discuss in some detail Hume's theory of
associations. Given the objectives of this thesis, a discussion of Hume's
associationism is important for three reasons. First, his theory of asso¬
ciations is Hume's most sustained attempt at a systematic, scientific explana¬
tion of events. Thus the present discussion should throw some light on Hume's
theory of scientific explanation, discussed in the previous chapter. Secondly,
since the theory of associations is a specifically psychological theory, an
account of it should contribute to an understanding of Hume's projected "science
of human nature", a project which I discussed in Chapter I. Thirdly, as shall
become clear in this section and the following chapters, a knowledge of the de¬
tails of Hume's theory of associations is essential if one is to understand his
theories of the passions and of motivation. In the course of this section I
shall be primarily concerned to elucidate Hune's theory, rather than to criti¬
cize it.
Since the discussion in this section is a complex one it is well to begin
by stating what questions I shall be considering. I shall point out, first,
that Hume considers the laws of association to be a contribution to mental science,
and what the subject matter of his mental science is. I shall then provide an
account of each of the laws of association, making use of a distinction between
a mental act and its object. Since an understanding of the fifth law of associa¬
tion is particularly important for an understanding of Hume's theories of the
passions and motivation I shall emphasize this law, and try to elucidate the
character of the causal connection which it is alleged to assert. Having con¬
sidered three interpretations of the fifth law of association, I shall move on
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to a discussion of the way in which the laws of association are alleged to ex¬
plain events, placing particular emphasis on Hume's notion of the "appropriate¬
ness" of certain causal connections. I shall then consider the question whether
the associations of impressions and ideas are supposed to depend on an awareness
of the associating relations of resemblance, continuity, and causation. Follow¬
ing this, I shall discuss Hume's views on the adequacy of his associationist
theory for a science of mental phenomena. Lastly, I shall consider two problems
relating to the language with which Hume formulates his theory.
It is quite clear that Hume looks upon his elaboration of the laws of asso¬
ciation as a project which we, today, would call a scientific project. Hume is
quite concerned to stress the similarities between his own project, concerned
with human nature, and the project of Newton, concerned with physical events.
An implicit reference is made to Newton in Hume's talk of "introducing] the
experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects". (T,xi) More explicitly,
Hume several times draws analogies between his own principles of association,
and the Newtonian concept of attraction or gravitation. Concluding his first
account of the principles of association Hume says: "Here is a kind of
ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary
effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms".
(T,12-13) Elsewhere he speaks of "an attraction or association among impressions,
as well as among ideas" (T,283), and claims that "nature has bestow'd a kind of
attraction on certain impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its
appearance, naturally introduces its correlative". (T,289) Hume draws the
analogy between mental and physical science equally explicitly in the first
Enquiry, though perhaps with a diminished confidence that he had already made
the main discoveries in the science of mind:
Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving,
from the phenomena, the true motions, order, and magni¬
tude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at
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last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to
have also determined the laws and forces, by which the
revolutions of the planets are governed and directed.
The like has been performed with regard to other parts
of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal
success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers
and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and
caution. It is probable, that one operation and prin¬
ciple of the mind depends on another; which, again,
may be resolved into one more general and universal.
(ehu, 14-15)
This analogy with Newtonian science is made quite clearly in the Dissertation
on the Passions, where Hume says: "It is sufficient for my purpose, if I have
made it appear, that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is
a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisi¬
tion, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philo¬
sophy 'O
In the light of what we have seen in the previous chapter, this description
of the laws of association as scientific laws has at least two particularly in¬
teresting implications: the laws of association have the peculiar necessity
proper to laws, and they are only contingently true. The contingency of these
laws will have important consequences for Hume's theory of the passions.
The laws of association are psychological laws, and are alleged to provide
the fundamentals of a systematic scientific account of man's cognitive and emo¬
tional life. They have, however, a very specific and peculiar range of applica¬
tion. That is, they correlate the occurrence of one conscious mental state or
event with another; thus, they do not refer either to physiological conditions
or overt behavior. Nor do they apply to all classes of conscious mental states
or events. Some mental phenomena, including all "impressions of sensation" and
all bodily pleasures and pains, are not susceptible of a scientific account in
terras of the laws of associations. If any account is to be given of such mental
1
The Philosophical Tories of David Hume, ed. T.H. G-reen and T.H. Srose London,
1874), IV, p.166.
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phenomena, it must be in terms of physical, not mental causes, in terms of
laws correlating physical events with mental events, not laws correlating men¬
tal events. As Hume remarks in the Treatise:
'Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin
somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their
correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which
without any introduction make their appearance in the soul.
As these depend on natural and physical causes, the examina¬
tion of them wou'd lead me too far from my present subject,
into the sciences of anatorgy and natural philosophy. (T,275*76)
This is to say that, so far as Hume'3 science of mind is concerned, no
empirical laws will be stated to account for present perceptions ("impressions
of sensation") of colors, tastes, sounds, and other immediately observable
qualities of physical things. This is a matter of decision on Hume's part.
If a law is to be a law in his science of mind, it is a necessary condition
that the if-clause of the law make reference only to mental, and not to physi¬
cal events. The physical conditions which are assumed to cause any present
perceptions are physical conditions, and for this reason are ruled-out as poss¬
ible antecedents in any empirical law governing mental phenomena. The same is
true of bodily sensations of pleasure and pain which do not have causes within
consciousness.
Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many
passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind;
but arise originally in the soul, or in the body,
whichever you please to call it, without any preceding
thought or perception. A fit of gout produces a long
train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but it is not ^
deriv'd immediately from any affection or idea. (T,276)
In doing mental science Hume is less stringent in his requirements about the
kinds of conditions which may be referred to in the then-clause of his scientific
laws. As we shall see in Chapter V, he has a good bit to say about the correla¬
tion of mental states with overt, physical behaviour. Surely this is because
A
For further discussion of these points see Chapter IV, Section 1.
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his science of human nature is concerned, at least in part, with explaining
how men come to do the things they do. Nevertheless, it i3 quite clear
throughout the Treatise that Hume's principal object of investigation is the
laws correlating one kind of conscious mental phenomenon with another. And
chief among these laws are the laws of association.
Hune states five laws of association. Since I shall be referring to
them throughout the present section, it is important to identify them expli¬
citly at this point. The first three laws are laws governing the association
of ideas, and may be formulated as follows:
(1) One idea gives rise to another idea if the two ideas are related
by resemblance.
(2) One idea gives rise to another idea if the two ideas are related
by spatial or temporal contiguity.
(3) One idea gives rise to another idea if the two ideas are related
by causation.
The fourth law governs the association of impressions, and may be formulated in
this way:
(4) One impression gives rise to another impression if the two im¬
pressions are related by resemblance.
1
The fifth law, which Kemp Smith calls "the principle of concurrent direction",
governs the double association of impressions and ideas, and may be formulated:
(5) One impression and one idea give rise to another impression and
another idea if the impressions are related by resemblance and
the ideas are related by resemblance, spatial or temporal con¬
tiguity, or causation.
A first point to be noticed about the five laws of association is that
each is a law correlating the occurrence of members of various classes of mental
states. These mental states may be roughly classified as cognitive mental
states and emotional mental states. The first three laws, those governing
^Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London; Macmillan, 1941),
p. 184.
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the association of ideas, correlate the occurrence of members of classes of
cognitive mental states. The fourth law, concerned with the association of
impressions, correlates the occurrence of emotional mental states. The fifth
law, concerned with the concurrent direction of associated ideas and impres¬
sions, correlates the occurrence of complex mental states, each complex state
being in some sense a compound of a cognitive and an emotional mental state.
Thus, where Hume talks of an association of ideas, I shall talk of an associa¬
tion of cognitive mental states; where he talks of an association of impres¬
sions, I shall talk of an association of emotional mental states.
This terminological change will eliminate two minor sources of confusion.
First, it will eliminate confusions engendered by Hume's occasionally talking
of an association of ideas obtaining between an idea and an impression. Con¬
sider the ambiguities engendered in this way by Hume's claim: "When the mind,
therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or
belief of another, it is not deterrain'd by reason, but by certain principles,
which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the
imagination". (T,92-Italics mine.) The sort of case Hume has in mind is one
in which, seeing a fire burning, I expect that, were I to draw closer to it,
I should feel its warmth. The first "idea" here is ngy present perception of
the fire; the second "idea" is tgy thought of its warmth. In such a case,
Hume's talk of the "association of ideas" is simply short-hand for an"association
of cognitive mental states", which may obtain whether the mental states be
"ideas" (in Heme's sense) or "impressions". Bassmore seems to miss this point
when he says, in elucidation of Hume's distinction between natural and philoso¬
phical relations, that "Hume's distinction between these two sorts of relation
^It should be noted that Hume does not allow for an "association of ideas"
between two (cognitive) "impressions", or from an "idea" to a (cognitive)
"impression".
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is identical with William James's distinction between connexions thought of ...
1
and connexions between thoughts". He goes on to say that "the relations be¬
tween our thoughts (associative relations) bring our ideas before our mind in
2
such a way that we can think of these and other relations between them".
That we must not restrict the "association of ideas" to an association of
thoughts (in the sense of "ideas") is, however, abundantly clear from the
passage quoted earlier. It is clear as well from Hume's frequent insistence
on the need of a present impression for causal inference, as when he says:
"When we pass from the impression of one [ object] to the idea or belief of
another, we are not determin'd by reason, but by custom or a principle of
association". (T,97. Italics mine.)
Ky terminological change will help obviate a second confusion perhaps en¬
gendered by the use of the word "impression" in the expression "the associa¬
tion of impressions". As Kemp-Smith has pointed out, when Hume talks of the
"association of impressions" he is talking exclusively of the passions.^ Thus
the word "impression", which normally in the Treatise has a much wider exten¬
sion, can only be misleading. Both confusions are avoided by the use of the
expressions "cognitive mental states" and "emotional mental states", with the
emphasis on "cognitive" and "emotional". By using the phrase "mental state" I
wish to emphasize that the laws of association are psychological laws.
A point to be stressed is that, on Hume's account, each of the five laws
of association is a causal law. Hume's terminology is perhaps misleading. Con
sider the first three laws of association. Hume is certainly saying that the
various relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation obtain between the
associated ideas. This is the respect in which the first tiiree laws of associa
tion differ from one another. But each association of ideas is alike in this,
1
Passmore, p.114»
^Passmore, p.114« Italics mine.
J ;emp Smith, p. 184.
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that the associated ideas are causally related to one another. Thus, one cog¬
nitive state of mind is causally related to another cognitive state which, in
some sense, resembles the first. Likewise, a particular cognitive state is
causally related to another which, in some sense, is also related by spatial
or temporal contiguity to the first. The fact that one here is talking of the
relation of soatial contiguity between two cognitive states of mind should be
sufficient to put one on one's guard. But the peculiarities of Hume's view
can be brought out even more forcefully by an insistence that, when iiume talks
of the association of ideas by virtue of causation, two quite distinct causal
relations are in question. Cn the one hand, two such cognitive states are
causally related in a sense identical with toe sense in vmich two resembling
cognitive states are causally related: the sense in which all laws of associa¬
tion are causal laws. On the other liand, two sucn cognitive states are caus¬
ally related in a sense in which two cognitive states associated by resemblance
are not causally tela ted: the sense in which two cognitive states may be re¬
lated by resemblance or contiguity or causation, and not necessarily by causa¬
tion. ^his is the sense in which not all laws of association depend on the
concept of causation.
Similar considerations arise with respect to the fourth and fifth laws of
association. The law correlating resembling impressions or resembling emotion¬
al states, is a causal law, as are all the laws of association, but it does not
require the concept of causation in the second of the two senses described above:
it rather makes use of the concept of resemblance. The law concerning the con¬
current direction of associated impressions and ideas is, in this matter, just
a more complicated extension of the first four laws. Depending on one's inter¬
pretation of this law, it asser's the obtaining of either one or two causal con-
1
nections in the first of the two senses described above. Hither a single
The matter is more complicated than this. See my discussion of the fifth law
of association on pp. 158-146.
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causal connection is alleged to obtain between one complex mental state com¬
prising a cognitive and an emotional mental state, or a two-fold causal con¬
nection is alleged, one between the emotional states in each of the successive
complex states of mind, and the other between the cognitive states in each of
the more complex mental states. Besides this single or two-fold causal con¬
nection, however, another quite different sort of causal connection may obtain.
That is, the cognitive components of the complex mental states in question
(but not the emotional components) may be related by causation, though they
need not be: they might instead be related by resemblance or contiguity, and
not by causation. Let us distinguish the relations of causation^ and causa-
tion^. The relation of causation^ obtains between any cognitive or emotional
mental states which are said to be associated; that of causation^ obtains
only between some cognitive mental states, those, namely, which are said to be
associated by causation.
To elucidate this contrast, which is, I would insist, essential for inter¬
preting Hume's associationism correctly, we may make use of a distinction which
Hume sometimes makes in the Treatise between a mental act and the object of
that mental act, at least in the case of what I have called cognitive mental
states. Thus, we may distinguish between thinking and that of which one thinks,
believing and that which one believes, remembering and what one remembers, imag¬
ining and what is imagined, and so on. It may be argued that such a distinction
fits ill with Hume's early account of his doctrine of impressions and ideas. I
would not wish to deny this. It is quite clear, however, that Hume does, in
several places, both require the distinction and actually make it.
At one point Hume finds himself required to give an account of having an
idea of an idea, as, for example, when we remember having had a certain thought
at some time in the past. There he says:
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In thinking of our past thoughts we not only delineate
out the objects, of which we were thinking, but also
conceive the action of the mind in the meditation, that
certain je-ne-scai-quoi, of which 'tis impossible to give
any definition or description, but which everyone suffi¬
ciently understands, (T,106)
It is this distinction between "the action of the mind" in thinking, and "the
objects, of which we were thinking" to which I would call attention. A similar
distinction is suggested when Hume gives an account of our commonsense belief
that some of the things we perceive continue to exist even when we are not per¬
ceiving them. In explanation of this he says: "An easy transition or passage
of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted percep¬
tions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider
one constant and uninterrupted perception". (T,204) He elucidates this remark
in a footnote where he says:
We may observe, that there are two relations, and both
of them resemblances, which contribute to our mistaking
the succession of our interrupted perceptions for an
identical object. The first is, the resemblance of the
perceptions: The second is the resemblance, which the
act of the mind in surveying a succession of resembling
objects bears to that in surveying an identical object.
(T,205n)
The same distinction seems also to be at work in many remarks made in the course
of his account of association. At one point Hume remarks:
'Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing
their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly,
and taxe them as they lie contiguous to each other, the
imagination must by long custom acquire the same method
of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time
in conceiving its objects. (T,11)
In talking of resemblance as a "fertile source of error" in our thinking, Hume
makes the requisite distinction in most explicit terms:
Resembling ideas are not only related together, but
the actions of the mind, which we employ in consider¬
ing them, are so little different, that we are not able
to distinguish them. This last circumstance is of great
consequence; and we may in general observe, that wherever
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the actions of the mind in forming ary two ideas are
the same or resembling, we are very apt to confound
these ideas, and take the one for the other. (T,6l)
Making use of this distinction between a mental act and its object, we
can state Hume's theory of the association of ideas in the following ways in
some circumstances, one cognitive state will give rise to another cognitive
state, when the object of the first is related by resemblance, spatial or
temporal contiguity, or causation to the second. The association of ideas does
not depend on relations of resemblance or contiguity, or causation^ obtaining
between one cognitive state, qua mental act, and another cognitive state, qua
mental act. For one thing, no sense could be made of an alleged association
of ideas here, since the two cognitive states are themselves present exper¬
iences. and would thus more suitably come under the heading of "impressions".
Nor could one speak of an "association of impressions", since that phrase is
reserved for an association of passions, or of bodily pleasures or pains and
passions.^
Let us consider some examples. Consider two cognitive states, one being
the recollection of St. Mark's Cathedral in Venice, and the other the recollec¬
tion of the Doge's ^lace, also in Venice. Qua mental acts, the two states are
similar in that each is a recollection. They differ, however, in their objects.
1
This interpretation is, of course, inconsistent with much of what Hume says
about impressions and ideas, and especially his theory of belief. According
to that theory, the "vivacity" of one cognitive state is "transferred" to a
second cognitive state, of which the first is a part cause. This case is
particularly interesting because Heme does not want to construe belief in
terms of "some impression or feeling, distinguishable from the conception".
(T,625) "Belief", he says, "only modifies the idea or conception! and
renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct im¬
pression". (T,627) What is not clear in this claim, however, is whether the
terms "idea" and "conception" are equivalent. For further discussion of the
distinction between mental acts and their objects in the Treatise see my
Chapter IV, Section 1, and ny account of the objects of the passions in
Chapter IV, Section 2.
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But there is also a sense in which their objects are related. As Hume would
put it, the objects are contiguous to one another, in fact spatially contig¬
uous to one another. Now in fact only the cathedral and the palace can be
spatially contiguous to one another; two recollections, as recollections, can
not be spatially related. But one can have the recollection of spatially re¬
lated objects, or two distinot recollections, one of one object, and the other
of another object, where the objects which one recollects are spatially related.
This is the case of which Hiroe is thinking. At one time, _t, 1 recall St, Mark's
Cathedral; at another time, , I recall the Doge's Palace; assuming certain
other conditions to be satisfied, we might say that recalling St. Mark's caused
me to recall the Doge's Palace. The recollection of the first object causes
me to recollect the seoond, spatially contiguous object. It is in this sense,
and only this sense, that the law of the association of ideas by spatial con¬
tiguity is used. The two recollections are not spatially contiguous; indeed,
as Hume remarks, "thought ... and extension are qualities wholly incompatible,
and never can incorporate together into one subject". (T,254-235) A distinc¬
tion is thus necessazy between thinking, considered as psychological state,
and the object of thought, which may be a physical object. In the following
paragraphs, I shall argue that the same distinction must be made in interpret¬
ing other instances of the first three laws of association, governing the
association of ideas, and to some extent in interpreting the fifth law of asso¬
ciation, governing the double relation of impressions and ideas.
Let us now consider the relation of temporal contiguity between associated
ideas. Here, as in the case of causation to be considered later, confusion is
quite easy. If, as seems obvious, Hume is asserting a causal connection between
cognitive states whose objeots are temporally contiguous, he is also asserting,
given his own general theory of causation, that the two cognitive states are
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themselves, qua psychological states, temporally contiguous. If they were not
so, they would not be taken to be oausally related* But every cognitive state
is temporally contiguous to whatever other cognitive state succeeds it. Thus,
no specific causal explanation could be given by reference to relations of
temporal oontigulty, if the temporal contiguity in question were simply that
of two successive psychological states. Clearly, Hume is thinking of the
causal relation (and thus the relation of temporal succession) between two
cognitive states whose objects are temporally related. For example, if, in
a day-trip from Edinburgh, I spend a pleasant half-hour at Ninewells and, a
bit later, enjoy a walk along the quay at Eyemouth, the later recollection of
the one incident may lead me to recall the other. On Hume's theory, the first
cognitive state (recollection of time spent at Ninewells) causes the second
(recollection of time spent at Eyemouth), and two temporal relations are in¬
volved. The first recollection is temporally prior and contiguous to the
second; the situations recollected (the "objects" of recolleotion) are or
were temporally contiguous, in a sense that we shall have to consider later,
the fact that the two incidents were temporally contiguous explains the fact
that the recolleotion of the one causes the recollection of the other.
Similar interpretative moves must be made in talking of the association
of ideas by resemblance. When he invokes the notion of a resemblance between
two ideas, Hume is not thinking of a resemblance between two cognitive states
qua mental acts, whether the act in question be that of remembering, perceiving,
imagining, thinking, or whatever. Rattier, it should by now be obvious that Hume
is thinking of a resemblance between the "objects" of successive cognitive
states, which resemblanoe explains the occurrence of the second, given the
occurrence of the first. Thus, seeing or thinking of the Swiss Alps might, in
Hume's view, cause me to think of the Rocky Mountains.
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The crucial case is that of the association of ideas by causation* As 1
mentioned earlier, to understand Hume's view it is necessary to distinguish
two causal relations, that between the successive cognitive states qua psycho¬
logical states (causation^) and that between the objects of the successive
cognitive states (causation2). My perception of a roaring fire might cause
me (causation^) to think of the warmth emanating from the fire, and the (partial)
reason for this is the faot that the fire is the cause (causatioz^) of warmth.
It is the causal connection between fires and warmth which explains the causal
connection between the thought of the fire and the thought of its warmth.
It would be well at this point to sum up the remarks made thus far about
the association of ideas* To do this we may make use of the concepts of causa¬
tion^ and causatlong, resemblance^ and resemblance^ temporal contiguity^ and
temporal contiguity2, and spatial contiguity (with no need for a distinction
of kinds). On Hume's account of the matter, one can discover causal^ laws
correlating cognitive mental states- Cognitive mental states thus causally^
related are also temporally^ contiguous. Qua psychological state all cogni¬
tive states are resembling^* Causal^ laws correlating cognitive mental states
can be discovered between the following classes of cognitive mental atatess
those whose objects are causally2 related; those whose objects are temporal-
ly2 or spatially related; those whose objects are resemblingg. It is illtm-
inating to notice that no distinction of sense is required in the case of
spatial contiguity since, in Hume's theory of mind, no sense can be made of a
spatial relationship between thoughts qua psychological states; the only
spatial relationship of whioh we can speak is that between the objects of
thoughts, recollections, perceptions, and other cognitive states.
Very interesting variations from this general account of associations
arise when one moves to the fourth law of association, that correlating
resembling emotional states. Before considering these variations, however,
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some important similarities must be noted* First, the law of the association
of resembling impressions, or resembling emotional states, is a causal one*
Second, the events correlated by the law are conscious mental events or states.
The fourth law of association is not concerned with physical or physiological
causes, or physical or physiological effects. Now for the variations*
As we shall see at some length in the next chapter, Hume has a most pecul¬
iar doctrine concerning the passions* Passions are, in themselves, simple im¬
pressions. At least many of the passions have objects, in somewhat the same
sense in whioh cognitive states have objects, but the object of a passion is
only contingently, and not logically related to the passion.1 A passion is
likewise logically independent of its causes* Thus, any passion logically
could exist given causes quite different from those which now cause it or
given no cause at all, or with a different or no object* For example, a man
logically could be proud of what he took to be the valueless behavior of some¬
one wholly unrelated to himself, and his pride could be "directed" (in Hume's
sense) to that other, unrelated person.
Thus it is not open to Hume to construe the associative links which
explain the causal connection between one emotional state and another in terms
of relations between the objects of the emotional states (though these will, in
fact, have objects, at least in many cases). If he is to assert empirical laws
correlating the occurrence of passions, qua passions, he must talk only of the
correlation of simple impressions. This, ultimately, is what explains the
"remarkable difference" which Hume notes between the association of ideas and
the association of impressions, viz. "that ideas are associated by resemblance,
contiguity, and causation} and impressions only by resemblance". (T,283)
1See Chapter IV, Section 2. It is impossible to say whether Hume thought the
connection between a cognitive state and its object is a logical or a con¬
tingent one. As we have seen, Hume does not consistently make a distinction
between a cognitive state and its object. And, when he does make the distinc¬
tion, he does not indioate how the relation between the two is to be construed.
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Pasaions, qua passions, are simple states, and thus one cannot distinguish a
twofold set of relations between one passion and another. Using ray earlier
terminology, there is no use, in talking of the passions, of Hie concepts of
causation2, resemblance^, or temporal,, contiguity. (Nor is there any use for
the conoept of spatial contiguity, since passions are not spatially related:
"Can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an
inch in thickness?" T,234)
Passions can, of course, be temporally^ contiguous} they must be if they
are to be taken as causally related. They are also causally^ related: the
point of the discussion is to discover what causal laws in fact obtain between
distinct passions. But neither of these relations can account for what particu¬
lar passions are temporally contiguous to, or causally related to, other passions.
To account for these particular connections, Hurae invokes the notion of resem¬
blance (in the sense of resemblance^) between some passions, and not between
others. There is thus a much more remarkable difference between the association
of ideas and that of impressions than Hume would oare to draw attention to. Cog¬
nitive states are associated by virtue of the relations of contiguity, causation
and resemblance whioh obtain between the "objects" of the cognitive states; they
are not associated by the resemblance which may obtain between one cognitive state,
qua psychological state, and another. In contrast, emotional states are not asso¬
ciated by relations between their "objects" (indeed, in "the fourth law of asso¬
ciation, the "objects" of the passions, which are only contingently related to
them, are not even mentioned), but by the resemblance of the passions qua psycho¬
logical states. There are thus two important differences, and not just one, be¬
tween the association of ideas and the association of impressions.
Obviously Hurae must be thinking of rather specific kinds of resemblance
determining the change from one passion to another. The resemblance between two
passions simply in so far as they are passions, and thus different from cognitive
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states of mind will not do. This might explain why one passion gives rise to
another passion, and not to a cognitive state of mind, but not why one passion
or kind of passion would be caused, and not another, A fortiori, other possible
resemblances, as, for example, the resemblance between a passion and a cognitive
mental state, precisely as mental rather than physical states, is insufficient
for Hume's purposes. Nor, in connection with the fourth law of association, can
Hume very easily make use of similarities between passions in so far as they are
direct or indirect. Nor does he suggest that the resemblance in question is
that between two calm, or two violent passions. The resemblance which Hume does
point to is that of pleasantness or unpleasantness of sensation. Consider the
examples he gives to illustrate the fourth law of association.
Grief end disappointment give rise to anger, anger to
envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till
the whole circle be compleated. In like manner our
temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws it¬
self into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride,
and the other resembling affections. (T,283)
As we shall see later, Hume does not, in fact, think that all the passions in
the first list are similar in the unpleasantness of their sensation, or that
those of the seoond list are all pleasant. If this were the sole associative
link, malice should come in the second list, and pity in the first, a conse¬
quence that is, on the faoe of it, implausible. Thus Hume is led to talk of a
resemblance of direction rather than of sensation. Nevertheless, at this early
stage in his account, Hume would certainly tend to construe the requisite re¬
semblance in terms of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the sensation of
the passion.
But even if we accept Hume's examples as instances ©f causal sequences
governed by the law of resembling impressions, how is he, among other things,
to account for the fact that anger, for example, gives rise to envy, and not
envy to anger? That is to say, how is he to explain the precise order the
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passions do, on his account, follow? Clearly the fourth law of association
gives him no assistance on this matter* This weakness in the fourth law, I
would suggest, makes it essential for Hums to state his fifth law, that
correlating an association of impressions with an association of ideas* The
association of ideas which is part of this law enables Hume to get past some
of his difficulties by adding a certain specificity to the passion which will
arise from a present passion,
Hume, in his formal account of the fifth law, desorlbes it in the follow¬
ing terms:
•Tis observable of these two kinds of association
[viz. the association of ideas and the association
of impressions], that they very much assist and
forward each other, and that the transition is
more easily made where they both concur in the same
object. Thus a nan, who, by any injury from another,
is very much discompos*d and ruffled in his temper,
is apt to find a hundred subjects of disoontent,
impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; espe¬
cially if he can discover these subjects in or near
the person, who was the cause of his first passion.
Those principles, which forward the transition of
ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the
passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on
the mind a double impulse. The new passion, there¬
fore, must arise with so much greater violence, and
the transition to it must be render*d so much more
easy and natural* (T,283-284)
There are many ambiguities in this acoount which require elucidation. Hume's
theory is, in fact, much less clearly stated than most commentators have
noticed*
The basic situation Hume seems to be thinking of is this* At some time,
_t, a person is in a partioular emotional state, let us say hatred. Now,
though hatred is, for Hume, a simple impression, logically unrelated to any¬
thing else, it is a matter of fact that it is always "directed" to some person
other than one's self. That is to say, the simple impression of hatred always
in fact ocours in conjunction with a cognitive state describable in some such
terms as "the thought of x> where x is some person other than one's self. It
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is also a matter of faot that all oases of hatred are caused by a complex
4
mental state oomprising both an emotional and a cognitive element. The emo¬
tional element is a particular unpleasant sensation; the cognitive element is
the awareness of that action, say, which causes the unpleasant sensation, and
the awareness of it as being the action of some person, x. A first instance
of the concurrent association of impressions and ideas can now be described
in this way. Given the first complex mental state comprising an unpleasant
sensation, and the awareness of the action which causes the unpleasantness,
and the awareness of this action as originating with some person, x, a second
logically distinct, complex mental state ooours. This second state comprises
that distinct unpleasant sensation which is hatred, and the logioally distinct
thought of that person, x, who is said to be the "object" of the hatred. With
the occurrence of the feeling of hatred, the "view" of the angry person is
"directed" to the "object" of his anger, via, the person x.
In the case as desoribed, where are we to locate the association of im¬
pressions and the association of ideas which together in some way ma&e up the
"double relation of impressions and ideas"? Clearly enough, the association
of impressions is to be located in the relation of resemblance which obtains
between the unpleasant sensation in the first eoBg>lex mental state,, and the un¬
pleasant feeling (the feeling of h tred) in the second complex mental state.
Similarly, the association of ideas is to be specified by reference to the re¬
lation of resemblance (or even "identity", as Hume uses that term in his dis¬
cussion of indirect passions) between the person, x, who was the objeot of the
first cognitive state, and whose action oaused the original unpleasant sensation,
and the same person, considered as the objeot of the feeling of hatred,
^My use of the term "emotional" here is somewhat inaccurate, since the causal
element in a causally related series of impressions might be a physical
pleasure or pain, and these are not, for Hume, emotions or passions. See
Chapter IV, Section 1.
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It is possible, too, that another eomplex mental state arise from the
seoond state just described. That is, given the occurrence of the feeling of
hatred directed towards x, it stay happen that the person who hates x will ex¬
perience a "correspondent desire of the misery of the person, who is the
object" of the hatred, (T,368) The complex structure of this new state of
mind (which Hum calls "anger") will, in important respects, be similar to
that of the prior state of hatred: it will comprise an emotional and a cogni¬
tive element. Moreover, there will be a "double relation of impressions and
ideas" between it and the prior hatred: a resemblance of impression between
the feeling of anger and the desire, and a resemblance of idea (an "identity")
between the "objeots" of the two emotional states.1
Having reached this point of analysis the difficulties in interpreting
the fifth law of association become most pronounced, A first difficulty con¬
cerns the question: Is there only one causal connection in question here, or
are two distinct causal connections being described? This is to say, is Hume
asserting (a) that one of the complex mental states desoribed causes the
occurrence of another complex mental state: or is he asserting (b) that one
component (the emotional component) of the first complex mental state causes
the occurrence of one component (the emotional component) of the seoond com¬
plex mental state, and the other component of the first state (the cognitive
component) causes the other component (the cognitive component) of the second
state? (I should make it clear that the two different interpretations of the
causal relationship asserted by the fifth law of association which I am oon-
sidering here are both oonoemed with causation in the causation^ sense de¬
scribed earlier, I am not at this point concerned with the contrast between
causation-] and causatioi^.)
1At least two assumptions are being made here: that a desire is a simple im¬
pression, and that it has an object. These points will be discussed in
Section 2 of tho next chapter.
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This question is difficult to answer. Many considerations favor the
double-causation interpretation. For one thing, if the situation described in¬
volves both a relation of impressions and a relation of ideas, and if both
there relations are, in Hume,s general theory, causal relations, it would seem
that the case in question involves two distinct causal relations. That is, if
the concept of an association of impressions (or an association of ideas) is
initially elucidated independently in terms of a causal connection, one must
assume that, nothing to the contrary being stated, when the ooncept is used in
a later, more complex situation, it is still being used with reference to speci¬
fic causal relations. This double-oausation view is supported, as well, by the
language Hume uses in introducing the fifth law of association, where he says:
"these two kinds of association ,., very muoh assist and forward each other,
and ,,, the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same
object'', (T,283-284)
This view receives some support as well from Hume's "experiments" to
confirm his associationist system concerning the passions of love and hatred,
(T,332-347) In the third "experiment" (T,334-35) he seems to consider the
association of impressions as an independently operating causal connection. In
the third experiment a person is supposed, in company with another, to encounter
an object that is pleasing, but that bears no special relation to himself or his
conpanion. Thus, it could not be the source of the relation of ideas requisite
for either pride or love. Nevertheless, it can give rise to other pleasant
emotional states, though not, apparently, to those unique pleasant states which
are pride or love, "To consider the matter first a priori". Hume says "... we
may conclude, that the object will have a small, but an uncertain connexion
with these passions [i.e. love or pride]". (T,334) Nevertheless,
if we consider ... that this transition from the
sensation to the affection is not forwarded by any
principle, that produces a transition of ideas; but,
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on the contrary, that tho* the one impression "be
easily transfus'd into the other, yet the change of
objects is suppos'd contrary to all the principles,
that cause a transition of that kind; we may from
thence infer, that nothing will ever be a steady or
durable cause of any passion, that is connected with
the passion merely by a relation of impressions. (T,335)
More cautiously, then, Hume concludes that:
An objeot, which produces pleasure or uneasiness,
but has no manner of connexion either with our¬
selves or others, may give such a turn to the dis¬
position, as that it may naturally fall into pride or
love, humility or hatred, and search for other objects,
upon which, by a double relation, it can found these
affeotions; but that an object, which has only one
of these relations, tho' the most advantageous one,
can never give rise to any constant and established
passion, (T,335)
Hume's remarks would seem, then, to support the conclusion that the association
of impressions and the association of ideas, which together constitute the
"double relation of impressions and ideas", are, each of theu, independent
causal connections, though, by occurring in conjunction, they assist one
another.
That Hume fails to give any serious consideration to this question, is,
however, clear from remarks he makes in the course of his second "experiment",
(T,334) In this "experiment" the reader is invited to imagine a situation in
which, together with another person, he encounters some indifferent object
that has some special connection either with himself, or with that other per¬
son. In Hume's words: "Suppose, I regard a stone or any common object, that
belongs either to me or my companion, and by that means acquires a relation of
ideas to the object of the passions". (T,334) The case described is intended
to be one in which all the pre-requisites for an association of ideas are present.
This being so, one would expect Hume to say, as he did in the third experiment,
that the first cognitive state had some, even uncertain connection with a later
cognitive state. He might of course not want to say that the causal sequence
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would in fact take place. But he should at least have said that a particular
causal law had a possible appropriateness here.
Instead, Hume is oontent to point out that "a priori, no emotion of any
kind can reasonably be expected". (T,334) Concerning a possible effect, by
association of ideas, of the cognitive state described, Hume says only;
"Besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and oalmly on the mind,
it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and humil¬
ity, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves or others;
which opposition of the paseions must destroy both, and leave the mind per¬
fectly free from any affection or amotion", (T,334-) Though Hume is perhaps
assuming that an association of ideas would oocur in suoh a case, he certain¬
ly does not say this; instead he talks of the possible causal connections
between the cognitive state described and a later complex mental state compris¬
ing an emotional and a cognitive element. His remains, then, would clearly not
lend support to the view that a double association of impressions and ideas
oomprises two independent causal connections, one of impressions and one of
ideas, hatever is ooncluded in the ease of the passions, this position is
not clearly adopted with respect to ideas.
Perhaps, however, this account of the association of ideas which constitutes
an element in the double relation of impressions and ideas is unfair to Hume.
As I shall have oceasion later to point out, in his account of the assooiatiLon
of ideas Involved in the first three la'S of association Hume is asserting that
the occurrence of the first of the two associated ideas is not, of itself,
sufficient to explain the occurrence of the second. One must also talk at
least of a conditioning acquired by experience whereby associative links have
been set up between the two ideas, and perhaps also of a present need or require¬
ment. In the absence of those supplementary conditions, no transition of ideas
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ia to be expected. Perhaps in the ease of the fifth law of association similar
considerations apply as well. Perhaps, that is, Hume intends to say that the
transition from one idea to another in a case of a double relation of impres¬
sions and ideas requires the satisfaction of a special supplementary condition,
via, the natural tendenoy to transition of a passion connected with the original
idea. Some grounds for interpreting Hume in ifris way are provided by his re¬
marks that "these two kinds of association ... very much assist and forward each
other, and ... the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the
same object" or that the "principles, which forward the transition of ideas,
here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one
action, bestow on the mind a double impulse". (T,283-284-) That is to say, Hume
may not intend to assert the view that the occurrence of an idea is sufficient,
of itself, to give rise to another idea related to the first by the relation of
resemblance, or contiguity, or causation. In the sort of case under discussion,
Hume might simply intend to assert that the occurrence of one idea has a ten¬
dency to be followed by the occurrence of another, related idea, but tiiat this
tendency is only realized with the satisfaction of other conditions.
At this point, however, it is well to notice a certain peculiarity involved
in Hume*s principle of the concurrent direction of impressions and ideas. In
most instances of this principle cited by Hume, the relation alleged to asso¬
ciate ideas in question is one of identity, i.e. the cognitive element in the
first complex mental state is describable as, say, "the thought of Smith", and
the cognitive element in the second complex mental state is likewise described
as "the thought of Smith". The object of both thoughts is the same person. In
the case of the double relations between the causes of hatred and hatred, for
exasple, it is suggested that one "idea", the thought of Smith, causes another,
logically independent "idea", the thought of Smith. Now there seems to be no
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objection to talking of two distinct thoughts of the same object. Neverthe¬
less, in some cases, as in the one described, it seems implausible in the
extreme to suggest that if Jones experiences at one time, _t, both pain re¬
sulting from some action of Smith's, and hatred for Smith, he has two dis¬
tinct thoughts of Sn&th. But if the association of ideas is a causal connec¬
tion between two cognitive states, this would follow. It is interesting that
"identity" becomes an associating relation only in terms of the fifth associa-
tionist law governing the double relation of impressions and ideas, and is not
used in the case of the first three laws which govern only the assocation of
ideas, and make no mention of impressions.
There is some reason, however, to think that the attempt to construe the
association of ideas in a double relation of impressions and ideas as a speci¬
fic oausal relation between two cognitive states is misguided. Several commen¬
tators have, in fact, apparently not understood the association of ideas in
this way, at least in the case of the double relation of impressions and ideas.
Without apparently considering the view of association of ideas I have describ¬
ed, Kemp-Smith describes what he calls the "four-stage, complex mechanisms
which condition the experiencing of pride and humility" in the following way:
Besides thus insisting on the complex constitution of
the 'cause', Hume also dwells upon the four-stage se¬
quence whereby (l) starting from the idea of this
complex 'subject', into which the idea of the self
enters as a component, the mind is carried (2) in
and through a separate 'sensation of pleasure or
pain' and (3) through the consequent passion of
pride.or humility, (4-) back to the idea of the
self.1
Kemp Smith goes on to say:
The four stages, he [Hume] insists, are distinct and
separate - the 3en3ation of pleasure for instanoe is,
^Kemrp Smith, pp. 181-182.
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he maintains, distinct from the passion of pride,
just as truly as the passion, in itself simple, is
distinct both from its exciting 'subject' and from
its 'objeot*. And it is because he regards these
stages as distinct that he is committed to the task
of explaining why the steps thus follow in sequence,
and how in so doing .they combine to support and re¬
inforce one another.
On this view of the matter, an original cognitive state gives rise to an emo¬
tional state, which, in turn, causes a second emotional state, which, finally,
causes a second co^iitive state,
A similar view is adopted by Dr. Ardal, who gives the following account
of "the way in which pride or humility arises":
If thinking of x pleases me, and x is related to me, then
the pleasure gives rise to pride,""which is related to
pleasure by similarity. Pride in turn is naturally such
as to make one think of oneself, We thus have a double
association, between oneself and the object related to
oneself and pleasure and pride, v/hich is itself a
pleasant passion. This double association is oonoeived
as a mechanism by whieh the passion is produced.^
What I would especially call attention to in this aocount is the suggestion
that the immediate cause of the second thought of oneself is not the first,
similar thought, but the simple impression of pride. The first thought is the
cause of the second only in the sense that it contributes to the occurrence! of
pride, whioh in turn causes the second thought of oneself.
There is certainly strong textual support for this account. Identifying
the objeot of pride and humility as the self, Hume says: "Here the view always
fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions", (T,27?) Similarly he
says: "Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either
of these passions", (T,286) Kemp Smith, commenting on the "naively realistic
... manner" in which Hume, "using physiological analogies", discusses the in¬
direct passions, quotes the following passage:
"*Kemp Smith, pp. 182,
fly
Ardal, p, 26. Only "naturally" is italicised in original.
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That we nay comprehend this better, we oust suppose, that
nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain
disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emo¬
tion, which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign*d
a certain idea, viz, that of self, whioh it never fails to
produce. This contrivance of nature is easily conoeiv'd.
We have many instances of such a situation of affairs. The
nerves of the nose and palate are so dispos'd, as in oertain
circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the
mind: The sensations of lust and hunger always produce in
us the ideas of those peculiar objects, whioh are suitable
to each appetite. These two circumstances are united in
pride. The organs are so dispos'd as to produce the passion?
and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a
certain idea. All this needs no proof. *Tis evident we
never shou'd be possest of that passion, were there not
a disposition of the mind proper for itj and 'tis as evi¬
dent, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves.
and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances.
(T, 2S7V Only ' •'pride", "viz.", and "self" are italicised in
original.)
In remarks suoh as these Hume seems unambiguously to endorse the view that the
cause of the idea of self which in part constitutes the second state of mind
is the passion of pride, not the earlier view of "the self.
But if we take thia to be Hume's considered view, a peculiar consequence
follows for his general theory of associations: the three kinds of association
of ideas which are governed by -the first three laws of association of ideas
turn out to be quite different, in a crucial respect, from the association of
ideas involved in the fifth law. In the first three laws, an immediate causal
connection is asserted between two cognitive states when the "objects" of the
cognitive states are related by resemblance, contiguity, or causation. Thus,
for example, the thought of a fire is the immediate cause of the thought of
it3 warmth, assuming the satisfaction of oertain other conditions. But on the
present interpretation of the fifth law of association (that governing the
double relation of impressions and ideas) this notion of an 1mmediate causal
connection breaks down. The immediate cause of my thought of myself, which is
an element of my complex mental state when I am proud, is not a prior thought
of myself but my feeling of pride. In the fifth law of association, therefore,
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the principle of the association of ideas has a very different job to do than
it has in any of the first three laws. One is in fact left to wonder what work
is being done by the association of ideas according to the fifth law.
If one thus separates the notion of the association of ideas from the
notion of a causal law, one is left simply with the claim that the oognitlve
element oi one complex mental state bears, with respect to its objeot, a rela¬
tion of resemblance, contiguity, or causation to the cognitive element of an
earlier complex mental state. But the one cognitive state is not the direot
cause of the other, as would be the oase in terms of the first three laws of the
association of ideas. Somehow this simple obtaining of a relation between the
two cognitive states explains the occurrence of the latter, given the former,
though they are not directly causally related.
I have tried to show that Hume interprets his own fifth law of associa¬
tion in at least three different ways: (1) as a law that is in fact a short¬
hand formulation of two distinct laws, one correlating the occurrence of
resembling emotional states, and one correlating the occurrence of cognitive
states whose objects are related by resemblance, spatial or temporal contiguity,
or causation; (2) as a single law asserting a single causal connection between
a compound cause (comprising an emotional end a cognitive element1 and a com¬
pound effect (also comprising an emotional and a cognitive element); (3) as
a law correlating a temporal series of four distinct mental states, the first
and last Belabors of the series being cognitive mental states. These three
interpretations are, it seems to me, mutually incompatible. The only conclu¬
sion we can draw is that Hume has simply not worked out with any precision the
exact nature of this allegedly causal law which is certainly intended as the
central element in his projected scientific explanation of the occurrence of
the passions.
We may now move on to a question which is, I take it, one of the most
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interesting questions concerning the laws of association, vis, the question of
the way in which they are alleged to explain the events they are called upon
to explain.
If my account of Hume's general theory of scientific explanation is correot,
it may be presumed to apply as well to the allegedly scientific laws of associa¬
tion. Prom this it would follow that, in explaining the occurrence of a particu¬
lar mental state by reference to one of the laws of association, one does no
more than show that the occurrence of that mental state is what one would have
expected, had one known the law of association in question. One simply shows
that it is governed by an empirical law, and what that law is. The desire for
explanation arises from a state of puzzlement, and, acoording to Hume's theory,
■this puzzlement is dispelled (and can only be dispelled) by showing that the
puzzling occurrence is lawfully correlated with some other event or set of
events. There are, of course, different levels of explanation, depending on
the complexity of one's explanatory system. To the extent that one can unify
a large number of lower-level laws under more simple, higher-level laws, one
increases the intelligibility of the events correlated by the lower-level laws.
But on any level of this explanatory system of laws, even the highest level,
the laws are only contingently true. Their truth is a mere brute matter of
fact. They singly express how the world happens to be, and very different laws
could operate in the world.
Hume's way of making this claim is his insistence that the truth of no
empirical law can be discovered by a "penetration of the essences" of the
objects or states of affairs correlated by that law. In hismost remarkable
formulation of this claim Hume asserts that n& priori, any thing may produce
any thing, and that we shall never discover a reason, why any object may or
may not be the cause of any other, however great, or however little the
resemblance may be betwixt them". (T,247) Most emphatically Hume asserts that
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th© possible resemblances between two states of affairs correlated by an
empirical law in no way compromises the contingency of the law. As he says in
the Treatise:
Some philosophers have imagin'd that there is an
apparent cause for the communication of motion,
and that a reasonable man might immediately infer
the motion of one body from the impulse of another,
without having recourse to any past observation.
That this opinion is false will admit of an easy
proof, For if such an inference may be drawn merely
from the ideas of body, of motion, and of impulse,
it must amount to a demonstration, and must imply
the absolute impossibility of any contrary suppo¬
sition. Every effect, then, beside the communication
of motion, implies a formal contradiction: and 'tis
impossible not only that it can exist, but also that
it can be conoeiv'd. But we may soon satisfy our¬
selves of the contrary, by forming a clear and consis¬
tent idea of one body's moving upon another, and of
its rest immediately upon the eontaot; or of its
returning back in the same line, in which it came;
or of its annihilation: or ciroular or elliptical
motion: and in short, of an infinite number of
other changes, which we may suppose it to undergo.
(5,111)
Nor does the fact that the laws of association are psychological laws in any
way prejudice their contingent character: "The uniting principle among our
Internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and
is not known to us any other way than by experience", (T,169)
Nevertheless, Hume does seem to think that some empirical laws have a
characteristic whereby they explain events more fully than by simply correlat¬
ing them with other events. This is particularly, but not exclusively, true
of the psychological law3 of association. In the case of the laws of associa¬
tion, the fact that the relations of contiguity, causation, or resemblance
obtain between the causally related ideas, and the fact that the causally re¬
lated impressions are resembling, somehow renders the causal connection more
intelligible by showing it to be a natural one,
Hume invokes this concept of more natural causal connections when, in
announcing the fourth law of association, he remarks: "And to what can it
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[i.e. the mind] so naturally change as to affections or emotions, which are
suitable to the temper, and agree with that set of passions, which then prevail?"
(T,283. Italics mine.) He both ad.ilts the function of resemblance in enhancing
the intelligibility of causal connections, end tries to explain this phenomenon,
when he says at the end of the long passage on the communication of motion
quoted abovej
These suppositions are all consistent and natural; and
the reason, why we imagine the communication of motion
to be more consistent and natural not only than those
suppositions, but also than any other natural effect,
is founded on the relation of resemblance betwixt the
cause and effect, which is here united to experience,
and binds the objects in the closest and most intimate
manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them
to be absolutely inseparable. Resemblance, then, has
the same or parallel influence with experience. (T, 111-112)
Because some relation other than causation also obtains between two causally
related states of affairs, the connection between the two states of affairs is
made to seem more natural. Thus, the law of the association of impressions,
for example, does not explain the occurrence of a pleasant passion only by
displaying the correlation which exists between pleasant passions. It also
displays the similarity between the passion to be explained and some other
passion. In this way it seems to confer an increased intelligibility on the
situation in question.
I am suggesting that Hume is admitting, at least at times, and perhaps
reluctantly, a principle of "appropriateness" in the context of empirical ex¬
planations: some causes are appropriate causes of their effects, A separate
pleasure is an appropriate cause of 3uch pleasant passions as love or pride or
joy or hope or desire precisely because it is pleasant. Tlx© thought of one
object is appropriately the cause of the thought of a resembling object pre¬
cisely because the objects are resembling. The same holds for the other prin¬
ciples of association. It is this appropriateness of the causal laws which
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obtain in the soience of mind whioh gives them a greater intelligibility than
that possessed by most of the laws of physical science. This notion of appro¬
priateness will be important when we come to discuss Hume's theories of the
passions and motives.
We may now turn to an element in Hume's theory of associations which we
have noted already, but which is sufficiently important to merit a more detailed
consideration. This is the fact that neither the association of ideas, nor
that of impressions, is supposed to depend for its operation on a recognition
of the relations obtaining between the ideas or the impressions. The relations
by which ideas or impressions are associated are natural relations, not philo¬
sophical ones, and thus function independently of our thinking about them. In
the case of ideas, the laws of association explain thinking - this is the
whole point of the theory - rather than presupposing thinking for their own
occurrence. Hume makes this point quite explicitly, at least for the case of
the association of ideas by causation, when he says:
Thus tho' causation be a philosophical relation, as
implying contiguity, succession, and constant con¬
junction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a natural
relation; and produces an union among our ideas,
that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any
inference from it. (T,%.)
The view that the association of ideas is not dependent on a reflective aware¬
ness of the associating relations is implied, as well, in Hume's statement:
e have already taken notice of certain relations,
whioh make us pass from one object to another, even
tho' there be no reason to determine U3 to that
transition; and "this we my establish for a general
rule, that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly
makes a transition without any reason, it is influenced
by these relations. (T,92. Italics mine.)
In a similar vein he says:
When the mind ... passes from the idea or impression of
one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not
determin' 1 by reason, but by certain principles, which
associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite
them in the imagination. (T,92. Italics mine.)
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The same point is insisted on when Hume remarks that "the understanding or
imagination can draw inferences from past experience, without reflecting on
it". (T,104)
But if the association of ideas operates in terms of natural, not philo¬
sophical relations, that is, without requiring a consciousness of the relation
in question, the question immediately arises: must any other conditions he
satisfied before the various laws of association can be said to operate? That
is to say, are the laws of association sufficient, on their own terns, to ex¬
plain the occurrence which they are alleged to explain. To answer this question,
one must start by distinguishing the association of impressions from the associa¬
tion of ideas. The association of impressions is supposed to be a natural phen¬
omenon, in the sense that no prior experience of the conjunction of resembling
passions is required before the association of impressions may operate. In the
case of the association of ideas, the person must have had a prior experience
of the causal connection between the two states of affairs, or of their re¬
semblance, or spatial or temporal contiguity, before an association of ideas
may operate. This is not the case with the association of impressions. Thus,
in the case of pride, given the occurrence of a separate pleasure caused by
some valuable object or action known to bear a special relation to myself,
pride ocours. This is a purely natural phenomenon, for Hume, and one need not
assume that any special conditioning has taken place.
In the case of the association of ideas, such prior conditioning or ex¬
perience is presupposed. In the association of ideas by the relation of caus¬
ation, it is particularly obvious that, for the principle of association to
work, one must have had a prior experience of the conjunction of the two objects
or events which are the "objects" of the cognitive state in question. This is
one of the principal points Hume makes in his lengthy discussion of causation.
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As he says in his section "Of the probability of causes"s "The habit, which
produces the association, arises from the frequent conjunction of objects".
(7,130. Italics sine) Without a prior experience of the objects in question,
there would be no habit established. And without this habit, there would be
no association of ideas by causation.
Similar considerations apply with respect to the association of ideas by
resemblance or contiguity. Before the thought of one object can give rise to
the thought of another object related to the first by resemblance or contig¬
uity, one must first have had experience of the resembling or contiguous ob¬
jects. It is only by experience that one can learn of the resemblances between
objects, or of their spatial or temporal relationships. (This need not imply
that, in one's prior experience of the objects, one noted their resemblances,
or their spatial or temporal relationships.) All of this is simply a conse¬
quence of Hume's general thesis that all contingent connections between the
objeots of thought can only be known by experience. In some perhaps ill-defined
sense, then, the laws of association of ideas cannot operate independently of a
prior experience of the relations of causation, resemblance, or contiguity ob¬
taining between those objects, the thoughts of which are to be causally connect¬
ed by the principles of association.
Beoause of the peculiarities of Hume's account of the association of ideas
which is part of the fifth law of association, it is Impossible to say '.That Hume
would say, in the present oonneotion, about that law. I will thus turn to a
somewhat different point about the adequacy of Hume* s laws of association. I s
it Hubs's view that the five laws of association can, between them, explain the
occurrence of all mental events? Clearly not. As Hume points out in his very
first account of the theory of association:
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination,
and be united again in any form it pleases, nothing would
be more unaccountable than the operations of that faoulty,
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were it not guided by some universal principles, which
render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all
times and places, (¥,10. Italics mine}
And he goes on to say:
This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider1 d
as an inseparable connexion; for that has already been
excluded from the imagination; nor yet are we to con¬
clude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas;
for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are
only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly pre¬
vails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages
so nearly correspond to eaoh other; nature in a manner
pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are
most proper to be united into a oomplex one. (T,10-11)
It is clear, then, that Hume does not intend his laws of the association of
ideas to be adequate for a scientific account of all cognitive mental states.
He cannot, then, be offering his theory of associations as a complete scienti¬
fic system in the science of mind.
This is obvious, as well, from the many non-ft**ooiative laws which Hume
formulates in the course of the Treaties. Among these laws is that stating
"that the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue,
even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars,
carries on its course without any new i-iqmlse". (T,198) Another law is stated
in the following way;
Nothing is more certain from experience, than that any
contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives
a sensible uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or
from within; from the opposition of external objects, or
from the combat of internal principles. On the contrary,
whatever strikes in with the natural propensities, and
either externally forwards their satisfaction, or internal¬
ly concurs with their movements, is sure to give a sensible
pleasure. (T,205-06)
In consequenoe of this law, when the mind's "uneasiness arises from the
opposition of two contrary principles, it must look for relief by sacrificing
the one to the other", (T,206)
Other laws are stated as emendations of the general scheme of associative
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laws as first formulated. Among these are the laws described as "limitations
of this system" of pride and humility (T,290-294), and the law that "the fancy
finds the same facility in passing from the lesser to the greater, as from
remote to contiguous", (T,343) Another such law is that which states:
Two different degrees of the same passion are surely
related together; but if the smaller be first present,
it has little or no tendency to introduce the greater:
and that because the addition of the great to the little,
produces a more sensible alteration on the temper, than
the addition of the little to the great, (T,345)
It should be quite dear, then, that Hume's theory of associations, and espec¬
ially his first, schematic formulation of that theory, is not intended to be
able to explain all mental phenomena, or even just all those mental phenomena
which are not, from the point of view of an individual* s consciousness, "origin¬
al" (as are, for example, the impressions of sensation).
In commenting on the limits of Hume's associationism, Passmore remarks:
Thus there is a genuine problem, and one which Plume does
nothing whatever to solve, why association sometimes
operates and sometimes fails to operate. Furthermore, some¬
times contiguity operates, at other time3 resemblance; and
one resembling idea, of the many possible resemblances,
exerts the predominant influence - these are facts which Hume
leaves unexplained, and which must he explained, if associa¬
tionism is to be a science of mind,'
Passmore goes on to say that "Hobbes had already offered such an explanation:
*the discourse of the mind is nothing but seeking'; what we think of next will
be assooiated with what we are now thinking of, but precisely what it is will
2
depend upon the direction of our interests",
TPiis is, I would submit, unfair to Hume. It is true that he does not make
any very explicit attempt to deal with the sorts of questions which Passmore
raises against his theory. Nevertheless, just as in Hobbes, the concepts neces¬
sary for the solution of the difficulty are present. We need only look to Hume's
account of abstract ideas. Given Hume's account, the following difficulty might




triangle, and this imagined isosceles triangle might lead me in turn to imagine
an eight-sided polygon. But suppose, on hearing the expression "triangle" I
imagine first an isosceles triangle, and then a scalene triangle, and so on.
What is it that explains the fact that, in the first case, my imagined isosceles
.
triangle was followed by an Imagined heotagon, while in the second case, the
isosoeles triangle was followed by a scalene triangle? Hume's answer is obvious
enough. For one thing, the initial stimulus ("geometrical figure", "triangle")
to the whole train of cognitive experiences is, in each oase, different. But
also, the train of thoughts is determined by considerations similar to that
mentioned by Hobbes. The process of using general terms is very much determined
by "the purposes of life" (T,20); the hearing of a word, besides causing us to
imagine a particular member of the olass of objects designated by the word, puts
us in a state of "readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a
present design or necessity". (T,20. Italics mine.) "The word raises up an
individual idea, along with a certain custom; and that custom produces any
other individual one, for which we may have oooaaion". (T,20-21, Italics mine.)
It would seem, then, that though Hume does not make very extensive use of such
concepts as need, purpose, and design to explain particular occurrences of the
association of ideas or impressions, he had the conoepts ready at hand.
Leaving the question of the adequacy of Hume's theory of associations for
a science of mind, we must notioe two problems which stem fro.s the language Hume
uses to formulate his theory. Despite his insistence that the associating re¬
lations of resemblance, contiguity and causation are natural, not philosophical
relations, Hume's language sometimes suggests that the reverse is true. He
speaks, for example, of "the qualities, from which this association arises, and
by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another".
(T,11. Italics mine.) Similarly he says that "tis impossible the same simple
ideas should fall regularly into complex ones ... without some bond of union
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among them, some associating qualify, bjr which one idea naturally introduces
another". (T,10. Italios mine.) At another point he talks of "certain relations,
which make us pass from one object to another". (T,92)
What is puzzling is the apparent suggestion that it is the relation of,
say, resemblance between two ideas which makes the second appear, given the
occurrence of the first. Or perhaps more accurately expressed, the puzzlement
arises when one tries to understand the apparent suggestion that one idea causes
another idea because the first and second ideas are related by, say, resemblance,
Hither formulation seems to imply a contradictory claim that the second of the
two ideas (the alleged effect) both exists and does not exist at some particular
time, For one cannot say both that A and B are related, and that B does not
yet exist. Nevertheless, Hume seems to want to say this, when he says, in effect,
that at some time, _t, a person is in a particular mental state, that this state
causes the occurrence, at a later time, t^, of another mental state, and that the
later state occurs because it is related to the earlier state.
I would suggest, however, that such remarks by Hume are for the most part
just shorthand, albeit misleading, ways of making the following, less exception¬
able claims: (1) that the objects of different cognitive states may bear various
relations to one another, such as the relation of causation between a fire and
warmth? (2) that two cognitive states, because they must be described by refer¬
ence to their objects, may properly be said to have related objects? (3) that
empirical laws can be formulated correlating such distinct cognitive states.
Nothing requires hume to say or imply that a present cognitive state, and a
future cognitive state, are now resembling. The movement from one oognitive
state to another does not,, in Hume's theory, depend on the contradictory demand
for an already existing relation between the two. Rather, it depends on the
prior experience of the appropriate relations between two objects, and thus a
specific sort of conditioning of the subject, together with the occurrence of
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the thought of one of the two related objects. The relation between A and B
which is alleged to explain the thought of B, given the thought of A, is the
already experienced relation of A and B. Hune's language may be misleading,
but he is not, in fact, contradicting himself.
Another problem with Hume's expression of his theory of association, and
one which may be handled more briefly, is his apparently anthropomorphic use of
the term "force". Thus, at one point he refers to the association of ideas as
a "gentle force, which commonly prevails". (T,10) It is clear, however that
Hume's apparent anthropomorphism stems not from an unacknowledged departure
from his theory of causation, but from a lack of precision in language. Consid¬
er what he says in the first Enquiry about some of the concepts of Newtonian
mechanics:
I need not examine at length the vis inertiae which is so
much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed
to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or
in motion continues for ever in its present state, till put
from it by some new cause; and that a body impelled takes
as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself.
These are facts. When we call this a vis inertiae, we only
mark these facts, without pretending to have any idea of the
inert power; in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity,
we mean certain effects, without comprehending that active
power. (iSHU,73n)
Surely, then, to talk of the "force" of association which connects A and B is
simply to say that an empirical law correlates the occurrence of events like
A with events like B.
2. Mental Dispositions
Dispositional properties play a very large role in Hume's "science of
human nature" in the Treatise. No adequate study of Hume's views on mental
science, in particular, can fail to consider his theory of dispositions. In
the account which follows I shall be especially concerned with the question
whether Hume's theory is a reductive one. In this context I shall take a
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reductive theory to be a theory which in some sense identifies dispositions
with introspectible or publicly observable responses made in appropriate test
conditions. The word "introspectible" in this description is an important one.
Usually a reductive theory is also a behaviorist one, but it would seem that
these are logically independent. Hume's theory of mental dispositions is cer¬
tainly not a behaviorist one: he does not identify mental dispositions with
behavioral responses to appropriate stimuli. As we have seen many times, the
principal subject matter of his mental science is what goes on in a man's mind
when he thinks, believes, remembers, imagines, feels angry, experiences pain,
and so on. Thus, if Hume's theory of mental dispositions is reductive it is
so only in the admittedly unusual sense that mental dispositions are identified
with the occurrence of private, mental events, as well as overt behavioral re¬
sponses, given appropriate stimuli.
The question whether Hume's theory of mental dispositions is a reductive
one in the sense described is a most vexing one. It is notorious that Hume,
at some places in the Treatise, dismisses the concepts of faculties and occult
qualities out of hand. The concept of powers seems to get equally short shrift
when Hume says, for example, that "the distinction, which we sometimes make
betwixt a power and the exercise of it, is ... without foundation" (T,171) or
is "entirely frivolous". (T,311) Despite these remarks, however, Hume very
often makes use of dispositional concepts in ways which are not translatable
into talk of either intvospectible mental events or overt behavioral responses
and appropriate stimuli. I shall argue that though Hume intends to give a re¬
ductive account of mental dispositions, he is unable to do so consistently,
given the materials with which he chooses to work. My argument has the follow¬
ing steps: (1) I shall give an account of several reasonably central passages
in the Treatise ?diere Hume makes use of dispositional concepts and yet is unable
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to provide a reductive analysis of them. This will provide the occasion for
giving a positive account of some aspects of Hume's theory of mental disposi¬
tions. (2) I shall discuss those passages in the Treatise in which Hume endor¬
ses a reductivist theory. This will enable me to complete qy positive account
of Hume's theory. (3) I shall suggest an explanation of the feet that Hume,
while advocating a reductivist theory, found it impossible to deploy such a
theory consistently. This will lead me to discuss the problematic concept of
non-introspectible mental states, and to offer an alternative which Hume does
not seem to have considered.
There are many places throughout the Treatise where Hume both makes use of
dispositional concepts, and gives some account of how these concepts are to be
understood. In his discussions of learning and knowing the meaning of general
terms, of the association of ideas, and of the concepts of property and wealth,
of freedom and determinism, of natural virtues and natural abilities, Hume uses
the dispositional concepts of power, capacity, ability, habit, virtue and char-
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acter. It should be noticed that each of these discussions centers on a topic
of great theoretical importance for Hume's theory of mind and ethical theory.
One can not, therefore, a some that remarks about dispositions made in the course
of these discussions can be dismissed as careless slips by a notoriously care¬
less writer. I shall begin with Hume's psychological account of learning and
knowing the meaning of e general term.
According to Hume learning the meaning of a general term is a matter of
noticing a point of resemblance between one object, or quality, or event and
another, and between each of these and another, and so on. At the same time
one is lea to attach the same word to each of the objects in question in virtue
of that characteristic which it h®3 in common with the others. For example,
^1 would 3tress that I am using "dispositional concept" as a generic term de-
concerned with the differences between dispositions, in the restricted sense,
and capacities.
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one is lead to notice a point of resemblance between (J.P.O. vans, pillar boxes,
and some pomegranates, and to use the word "red" of each object. At some point
one becomes able to do a variety of things, including deciding whether a given
object is red or not, thinking of examples of red objects, correcting someone
who uses the word "red" of things that are not red, etc. This is, in part at
any rate, what having learned the word "red" will amount to.
Now the interesting thing about Hume's account for our present purposes is
this. He quite clearly talks as though, in having learned the use of the word
"red", something has happened to the learner, he has undergone some change, and
the result of this change is a continuing or enduring state which makes it poss¬
ible for him to do various things which anyone who knows the meaning of "red" can
do. The learner has acquired some new intrinsic property as the result of his
conditioning, and this new intrinsic property is one of the causal conditions
which must be satisfied if, for example, he is to recall red objects, imagine
zed objects, or point to red objects, when requested to do so. To give a full
account of the learning process, or of exercising one's knowledge, one must make
mention of this intrinsic property acquired by the learner.
Perhaps it seems strange to talk of Hume making use of a concept of intrin¬
sic properties. In fact the terms he actually uses are "custom", "habit", and
"power", But let us look at the way he himself expresses this view. He says,
for example, that the "application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our
collecting all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an imperfect
manner as may serve the purposes of life". (T,20) "After we have acquired a cus¬
tom of this kind [i.e. of applying the same term to each of several resembling
objects] ... the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects,
and iiakes the imagination conceive it". (T,20) But what is this "imperfect manner"
in which the ideas of various red objects are "collected", and what is it to
"revive" the idea of one of them? Hume goes some way toward answering these
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questions when he says, of the ideas of individual instances of ary kind of
objectj "They are not really and in fact present to the mind, but only in power;
nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the imagination, but keep ourselves in
a readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a present design or
necessity". (T,20) That is to say, the mind is not at all times conscious of
each of the objects to which it would apply the term "red", but nevertheless,
when the occasion demands it, it can recall or imagine an appropriate red object.
Whatever the peculiarities of this view, Hume is certainly suggesting that ideas
may in some sense continue to exist, without being thought.
But Hume is not just saying that the ideas of individual objects must be
able to exist without being thought. He also claims that some sort of custom
continues to exist, even when not operative. The hearing of the word "red" not
only causes one who has learned its meaning (though not, of course, one who has
not learned its meaning) to think of a red object; it also puts him in readi¬
ness, as it were, to think of aiy other red object which the occasion may demand.
In Hume's words, the "word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain
custom; and that custom produces any other individual one, for which we may
have occasion". (T,20-21. Italics mine.) Similarly he says: "After the mind
has produc'd an individual idea, upon which we reason, the attendant custom,
reviv'd by the general or abstract term, readily suggests any other individual,
if by chance we form any reasoning, that agrees not with it". (T,21. Italics
mine.) These customs, then, have at least two veiy interesting properties.
First, just like the ideas of individual red objects, they are capable of exist¬
ing not "really", or "in fact", but only "in power". They are "revived" by the
occurrence of suitable stimuli. Siven the occurrence of such stimuli, they are
moved from a state of inactivity to one of readiness, and ultimately to one of
activity. Their second property is that, when activated, they function as
causal conditions, "producing" individual ideas as the occasion requires.
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Kost surprisingly, perhaps, Hume calls these customs "faculties". In
explaining the fact that a person may not be fully competent in the use of a
word he says: "If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon occasion, it
proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties". (T,21) "On other occasions",
however, "the custom is more entire". (T,21) These customs are also referred
to as "habits". In Hume's words, general terms "excite their particular habits,
and thereby keep the mind in a readiness to observe, that no conclusion be form'd
contrary to any ideas, which are usually compriz'd under them". (T,21-22) Those
particular red objects which we are not thinking of at -riven moment, but which
we would think of, should the situation require it, "are only represented by
means of that habit, by which we recall them, whenever any present oecasion re¬
quires it". (T,22) This habit is similar to other habits "which may be reviv'd
by one single word; as when a person, who has by rote any periods of discourse,
or any number of verses, will be put in remembrance of the whole, which he is at
a loss to recollect, by that single word or expression, with which they begin".
(T,23) Very significantly, however, Hume finds himself somewhat puzzled by the
nature of these customs, powers, habits, or perf ctions of faculties which help
explain our use of general terms. He expresses this puzzlement when he refers
to "those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of magical faculty in
the soul". (T,24. Italics mine.)
The points in Hume's discussion which it seems to me important to notice
are the following: (1) at least some mental powers or capacities are enduring
states of the person to whom the capacity or ability is ascribed; (2) at least
some such abilities or capacities come into existence as the result of experience
4
For an interesting discussion of Hume's use of dispositional concepts in his
account of abstract ideas see David Weisraann, Dispositional Properties (Carbon-
dale and :idwardsville: Southern Illinois University Pres3, 1965;, pp.17-32.
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or training; (3) one can speak of the existence of these mental abilities or
capacities without implying that the person to whom they are ascribed is con¬
scious of thera in the way in which, say, he is aware of what his thoughts are
at a particular moment; (A) these states or capacities are causal conditions
of mental events which occur in a person's mind, and consequently causal con¬
ditions of his overt behavior.
The most important point is perhaps the lastj that capacities or abilities
are causal conditions, Why should Hume say this, and v.hat does his saying it
amount to? The most plausible reason for Hume's sayin* it is that his principle
of determinism, as well as his belief that all events are in fact explainable,
require him to do so. According to the principle of determinism, for every event
that occurs, there is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which deter¬
mine it to occur. It follows from Hume's belief that all events are in fact
explainable that for every event it is in principle possible both to give the
law which governs and thus makes it possible to explain its occurrence, as well
as to locate that logically independent event or set of events which, given the
law, explains the event to be explained.
To fully explain the fact that a person uses the word "red" correctly on a
particular occasion, one must state both that set of conditions which are necess¬
ary and sufficient for the occurrence of the correct use of the word, and that
empirical law which correlates these conditions with the event to be explained.
One of the conditions which, on Hume's account, would have to be mentioned is
that continuing condition which, together with at least the appropriate stimuli,
explains his present correct use of the word. One may symbolize the explanatory
law in this way:
(x) [(Dx . 0x) Rx]
In this formula "D" stands for an intrinsic property of an object, "0" the
stimuli or test conditions (the operations on the object), and "R" the object's
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response, whether internal or external. The arrow represents a causal implica¬
tion.^
Now it might be argued against Hume that even if this formula requires the
inclusion of the intrinsic dispositional property D, it does not follow that D
must be an enduring property, present even when the object in question is not
being operated upon. It could, instead, be a sometime property, present when
the operations 0 are being performed, and absent a- other times. To this
suggestion Hume could rejoin by pointing out that one is then faced with the
problem of explaining D's occurrence wiien it does occur, and by invoking the
principle of parsimony.
In some cases the D in the formula might stand for a known kind-property,
such as sugar. Thus, in the lew governing the solubility of sugar, D stands
for sugar. But this will not do for the sort of laws Hume has in mind, e.g. a
law correlating a particular intrinsic property, as yet not independently
identifiable, with a particular operation and response. In fact, it is the
upshot of Hume*s discussion of abstract ideas that even in cases where we can
not independently identify some intrinsic property in the responding object,
we must assume it to be present. Thus, a place must be made for it in any
explanatory law.
It might be further argued against Hume that an adequate explanatory law-
might be constructed by including references to some known, though not suffi¬
ciently explanatory kind-property, and to the conditioning or training under¬
gone by the object. A law governing the ability to use a particular word might
then be formulated as follows:
(x) [(Kx . Tx . 0x) -4 Rx]
1
The formula, as stated, does not contain the requisite time variables.
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where "K" represents a kind-property such as being a men, and "T" the training
process undergone. This formula would eliminate reference to a dispositional
property. But this clearly would not work, since two persons might receive the
same training, and be subjected to the same stimuli, and one use "red" correct¬
ly, and the other not. One's law must be able to acoount for this difference.
Reference to T, or the training process, may be necessary for explaining a par¬
ticular correct use of "red" but it is not sufficient. And we certainly seem
to think that the precise way in which it would help explain a correct use of
"red" is by explaining how the person cause to have the ability he is exercising
in using the word correctly. The same conclusion would seem to result, as well,
from axy attempt to make an allegedly explanatory law sufficiently explanatory,
without invoking a notion of enduring dispositional properties, by including in
the law references to the previous normally observable history of the person.
Hume elaborates this theory of dispositional properties in his discussion
of "natural abilities" at the very end of the Treatise. There he describes
abilities as "qualities'* or as "mental qualities". He says, for example, that
"natural abilities" and "moral virtues" are "both of them equally mental quali¬
ties". (?,606) He refers as well, to "the sentiment of approbation, which those
qualities [i.e. natural abilities] produce". (T,607) He later gives a list of
"many other qualities of the mind," including the qualities of "industry, per¬
severance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy, ... temper¬
ance, frugality, ©economy, resolution, ... wisdom, good-sense, ... wit, elo¬
quence, (and) ... good humour". (T,610-611) These qualities are, explicitly,
"qualities) of the mind". (T,611».)
pesides being "mental qualities", and in this being like "moral virtues",
"natural abilities" are in some sense modifications of mental faculties.
"There is", Hume states, "a sentiment of esteem and approbation, which may be
excited, in some degree, by ary faculty of the mind, in its perfect state end
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condition". (T,610) This remark clearly suggests a conception of enduring
mental conditions which may be more or less perfectly developed.
But most importantly, Htme is most explicit in distinguishing between
such natural abilities and the actions of which they are in some way the cause.
He says, first, that he has "shewn that it [i.e. free will] has no place with
regard to the actions, no more than the qualities of men". (T,609) Perhaps
ambiguously, he refers to "the general survey or view of any action or quality
of the mind". (T,61A) But most unequivocally he states that "tho' natural
abilities and moral qualities be in the main on the same footing, there is,
however, this difference betwixt them, that the former are almost invariable
by any art or industry} while the latter, or at least the actions that pro¬
ceed from them, may be chang*d by the motives of rewards and punishment,
praise and blame". (T,609»- Italics mine.) Passages such as these, I would
suggest, are simply inconsistent with any attempt to reduce a dispositional
property to any set of behavioral or internal responses to appropriate stimuli.
Further confirmation '♦•hat the view of dispositional properties outlined
thus far is attributable to Hume can be derived from that section of the Treatise
entitled "Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices". In this section Hume
is particularly concerned with the concept of character, and is especially clear
about the claim that a person's character is a causal condition influencing his
behavior. He is also quite clear that a person's character is not reducible to
even those of his actions which we would say are characteristic of him.
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as
a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon
durable principles of the rainn, which extend over the
whole conduct, and enter into the personal character.
Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant
principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or




We are never to consider any single action in our
enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only
the quality or character from which the action pro¬
ceeded. These alone are durable enough to affect our
sentiments concerning the person. Actions are, indeed,
better indications of a character than words, or even
wishes and sentiments; but 'tis only so far as they are
such indications, that they ere attended with love or
hatred, praise or blame". (T,575)
Of characters it is proper to say that they have a tendency to foster the
good or increase the evil of others or of the person whose character it is. "The
reflecting on the tendency of characters and mental qualities," Hume says, "is
sufficient to give us the sentiments of approbation and blame". (T,577) And, as
he says later: "Moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency
of qualities and characters to t^e interests of society". (T,579) Similarly,
"'tis ... from the influence of characters and qualities, upon those who have an
intercourse with any person, that we blame or praise him". (T,582)
Most importantly, however, Hume asserts that a person's character is both
a causal condition which determines, in part, what he feels, does, and says, and
a causal condition that can exist without having its appropriate effect. This
surely is conclusive grounds for saying that Hume makes a distinction between a
dispositional property end its exercise. Consider Hume's own words, when he is
handling an objection that may be raised to his doctrine of sympathy as first
formulated.
Where a person is posses'd of a character, that in its
natural tendency is beneficial to society, we esteem him
virtuous, and are delighted with the view of his character
even tho' particular accidents prevent its operation, and
incapacitate him from being serviceable to his friends and
country. Virtue in rage is still virtue; and the love, which
it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or desart, where the
virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to all
the world. Tt,584. Italics mine."J~
"Where it [i.e. virtue] fails of its end," Hume says, ,Mti3 only an imperfect
means". (T,584) Generalising he says:
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Where aqy object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain
any agreeable end, it naturally gives us pleasure, and
is esteem*d beautiful, even tho* some external circum¬
stances be wanting to render it altogether effectual.
•Tis sufficient if everything be coopleat in the object
itself. (T,584)
The case is similar to that of "a man, whose limbs and shape promise strength
and activity", and who is thus "esteem*d handsome, tho* condemn'd to perpetual
imprisonment". (T,585)
Even more explicitly Hume claims j
Where a character is, in every respect, fitted to be
beneficial to society, the imagination passes easily
from the cause to the effect, without considering that
there are still some circumstances wanting to render the
cause a compleat one .... We know, that an alteration
of fortune may render the benevolent disposition entirely
impotenti and therefore we separate, as much as possible,
the fortune fiom the disposition. (T,585* Italics mine.)
"'Tis a similar case, where any real quality is, by accidental circumstances,
render*d impotent, and is depriv*d of its natural influence on society".
(T,586) A similar distinction between a capacity and its exercise is drawn
when Hume claims, of "indolence", that it "is not suppos'd to deprive one of
his parts and capacity, but only suspends their exercise". (T,587)
At the risk of tedium, we may notice that some of the same points are made,
and at times even more clearly, in the main Treatise discussion of free-will.
There Hume makes the following claim, in criticism of the libertarian thesis:
Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing;
and where they proceed not from some cause in the charac¬
ters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them,
they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound
to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil. The action
itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all the
rules of morality and religion: But the person is not re¬
sponsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him,
that is durable and constant, and leaves nothing of that
nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account,
become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to
the hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as pure and
untainted, after having committed the most horrid crimes,
as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character
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any way concern'd in his actions; since they are not
deriv'd from it, and the wickedness of the one can
never be us'd as a proof of the depravity of the other.
(T,411)
In a similar vein Hume asserts that "a spectator can commonly infer our actions
from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he ooneludes in gen¬
eral, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every oiroumstance of our
situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposi¬
tions". (T,408-9)
On the basis, then, of what Hume says in talking of abstract ideas, natural
abilities, natural virtues and character traits, we can derive the following in¬
complete account of Hume's theory of mental dispositional properties. Mental
dispositions are more or less enciuring intrinsic properties of a subject. By
virtue of having some disposit onal property, the subject is enabled to respond
in a particular way to particular stimuli or test conditions. The dispositional
property is, then, best described as a relatively long-term causal condition
which, if accompanied by appropriate other causal conditions, will bring about seme
effect. A mental dispositional property is neither a conscious mental event
or state nor a bit of publicly observable behaviors such things are rather its
effects. It is properly said to continue to exist, even when it is not being
exercised or having its proper effect. It is quite distinct from, in fact logic¬
ally independent of, its effects. The class of mental dispositional properties
includes at least the follot.^ng sub-classes; abilities, capacities, powers,
habits, virtues, and traits of character.
Despite the evidence adduced so far in support of the thesis that Hume
offers an account of mental dispositions that are not cashable into conscious
mental states or behavioral responses to appropriate stimuli, however, there
are quite good grounds for arguing the contrary view. As we have seen already,
Hume does state that the distinction between a power and its exercise is
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"frivolous" and '•without foundation". He also pointedly attacks the concepts
of faculty, and occult quality, claiming that each is an "illusion". (T,22U)
Talking of both these concepts, he says;
For it being usual, after the frequent use of terms,
which are really significant and intelligible, to omit
the idea, which we wou'd express by them, and to pre¬
serve only the custom, by which we rec&I the idea at
pleasure; so it naturally happens, that after the
frequent use of terms, which are wholly insignificant
and unintelligible, we fancy them to be on the same
footing with the precedent, end to have a secret mean¬
ing, which we might discover by reflection. The resem¬
blance of their appearance deceives the mind, as is usual,
and ma;.es us imagine a thorough resemolance and conformity.
By this means these philosophers set themselves at ease,
and arrive at last, by an illusion, at the same indiffer¬
ence, which the peo/le attain by their stupidity, and true
philosophers by their moderate scepticism. They need only
say, that any phaenomenon, which puzzles them, arises from
a faculty or an oc ult quality, and there is an end of all
dispute and enquiry upon the matter. (T,224)
Taken together, these remarks appear to constitute a direct attack on the
theory of dispositional properties wliich I have been attributing to Hume. My
present task is, then, to inquire whether they are, in fact, inconsistent with
the theory as presented t ius far. I shall begin with Hume's comments on the
notion of a faculty or an occult quality.
The main point of Hume's consent is, I would submit, plain enough. He is
rejecting the claim that an action or event can be explained by reference to
faculties or occult qualit' . He derides the philosophical maneuver by which
someone claims "an end of all disputes and enquiry upon the matter" by saying,
simply, "that any phsenomenon, which puzzles them, arises from a faculty or an
occult quality '. (T,22if) In other words, vacuous explanations are no explana¬
tions at all. No explanation is given of opium's effects by referring to its
dormitive power. Nevertheless, the vacuous explanation of opium's effects by
reference to its dormitivc power must be distinguished from the claim that
opium's affects are explainable, though the explanation may not in fact be known,
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and that the explanation will be, in part, in terms of some continuing proper¬
ties whioh opium has. In saying that opium has a dormitive power one does not,
in fact, explain its effects. This is the burden of Hune's derision of the
concepts of faculty and occult quality. But it is not inconsistent with this
to claim that opium's effects will be explainable in terms of some perhaps un¬
known properties of opium. One could make this latter claim by insisting that
opium has a dormitive power. In saying this one is not, however, explaining
its effects, but saying that its effects are, in principle, explainable by
reference to some intrinsic properties of opium. One is not giving an explana¬
tion; rather one is, in a way, promising an explanation.
Hume is quite correct, then, in asserting that explanation in terms of
faculties and occult qualities are pseudo-explanations, because nothing is in
fact explained in this way. But from this it does not follow that the ooncept
of a faculty or occult quality has no legitimate use. It may be used to mark
a place, as it were, for an as yet unidentified quality, the existence of which
must be assumed if one is to explain a given event. I am not, however, suggest¬
ing that, in the passage quoted, Hume intended to permit this revised use of
the concepts of faculties or occult qualities. Surely he did not. But in
conjunction with reading this passage, one must notice the very many occasions
on which Hume does himself make a legitimate, non-explanatory use of the con¬
cepts of faculty and occult quality. In his use of these concepts he is in
effect taking a line somewhat like this. The principle of universal causation
is an important element in our conceptual scheme. In most, if not all cases,
we expect that even if no explanation of a given event is immediately forth¬
coming, even if no cause for its occurrence can be identified, it is in prin¬
ciple possible to explain the event, in principle possible to identify its
cause. The use of such words as "ability" or "habit" or "capacity" or "power"
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or even the dreaded "faculty" or "occult quality" is an expression of our con¬
viction that this is so. Moreover, in saying that X has the power to fl, one
thing we are also expressing is our conviction that X has some (perhaps at
present unknown) intrinsic property in virtue of which it responds in a certain
way to certain stimuli. The mistake comes when one believes that in thus re¬
ferring to a power one has finished the job of explaining. In fact, one has
just begun. But if this is so, it is plausible to suggest that while Hume was
rejecting one use of the concept of faculty, he was quite legitimately making
use of another.
Let us turn to Hume's much more extensive remarks on the concept of power.
To understand these remarks correctly, it is extremely important to consider the
contexts in which they are made. Consider Hume's claim that "the distinction,
which we often make betwixt power and the exeroise of it, is ... without founda¬
tion". (T,171) This remark is made in the course of Hume's discussion of the
idea of a necessary connection between events. It must, then, be understood in
the light of such other remarks as; "I have just now examin'd one of the most
sublime questions in philosophy, via, that concemir the power and efficacy of
causes" (T,15&)i or "I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency,
power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all near¬
ly synonimous". (T,157) The concept of pxwer which Hume is chiefly interested
in rejecting is one in accordance with which it is possible, by "penetrating
the essence" of some object or event, to "see" its power to bring about some
other object or event. It is a concept of power connected with the notions of
necessary, quasi-logical connections between objects and events, necessary
connections which can be discovered by coming to understand the essences or
natures of things. The oonnotations which the term "power" has for Hume in
this context are well brought out in his statement that "if we go any farther,
and ascribe a power or necessary connexion to these objects; this is what we
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can never observe in them, but must draw the idee of it from what we feel in¬
ternally in contemplating them". (T,163-169. Italics mine) Thus, in rejecting
the concept of power, at least at this point in the Treatise, what Hume is
principally concerned to deny Is the obtaining of quasi-logical connections
between objects and events* He need not be rejecting a concept of powers
according to which the connection between a thing's powers end the way it re¬
sponds to stimuli is a contingent one* That Hume would allow this construc¬
tion to be placed on what he says is clear from what he says elsewhere in the
same section of the Treatise:
I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several
qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with
which we are utterly acquainted; and if we please to
call these power or efficacy, 'twill be of little con¬
sequence to the world. But when, instead of meaning
these unknown qualities, we make the terms of power and
efficacy signify something, of which we have a clear idea,
and which is incompatible with those objects, to which we
apply it, obscurity and error begin then to take place, and
we are led astray by a false philosophy. (T,16S)
Though this interpretation takes some of the sting out of Hume's remarks
on the ooncept of power, however, it is still not clear why he should say that
the distinction between a power and its exercise is without foundation. For
further light on this problem we must turn to Hume's very important discussions
of wealth in Book II* Considering this discussion will also provide the occa¬
sion for completing my positive account of Hume's theory of dispositions.
Htme's theory of dispositions as presented in this section contains the
following elements! (1) there is no distinction to be made between the con¬
cept of a power, and the concept of the exercise of that power; (2) the oon¬
cept of a power is linked with the concepts of possibility and probability;
(3) by means of this conceptual link, the concept of power is connected with
the concept of past experience* I shall begin by trying to elucidate the second
and third points*
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Hume claims that "the only known difference" between two cases, in one
of which we say that X can not ft), and in the other of which we say that X can
fb, is that "in the former case we conclude from past experience, that the
person never will perform that action, and in the latter, that he possibly or
probably will perform it". (T,312) Later he says that "power has always a
reference to its exercise, either actual or probable, and that we consider a
person as endow*d with any ability when we find from past experience, that 'tis
probable, or at least possible he may exert it". (T,313) In a similar vein he
says that "power consists in the possibility or probability of any action, as
discover'd by experience and the practice of the world". (T,313)
A first thing to be noticed here is Hume's suggestion that propositions
ascribing dispositions are to be cashed in terms of what will happen, or, more
precisely, in terns of what possibly will happen, or probably will happen.
They do not, that is to say, have to do only with the present; they direct
one's attention to the future. In a modish phrase, they are inference-tickets,
licensing us to expect certain things to happen, or at least not to be sur¬
prised when they happen.
Another point to be noticed is that such propositions derive this future-
directed character from the way they are connected with our past experience.
We conclude what possibly or probably will happen, by consulting what has
happened before. An event can only be said to be empirically (as opposed to
logically) possible, in a minimal sense of that expression, in two cases: if
an event of that kind has happened before; or if it bears some analogy to
another kind of event, some instance of which has oocurred before. Thus, to
say that X can fb, is to say at least that it is possible that X will and
it is legitimate to assert this possibility only if X has fb-ed in the past,
or some object analogous to X has fi-ed in the past. To say that Smith can play
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the "Moonlight Sonata" is at least to say that it is possible that he will play
the "Moonlight Sonata". And the latter claim is justified in either of two
oases: (a) Smith has played the "Moonlight Sonata" beforej or (b) Smith is
in some relevant respects similar to someone who has played the "Moonlight
Sonata" before, e.g. he can play pieces for which a score is provided, and in
this respect is similar to Jones who has played the "Moonlight Sonata" in such
circumstances in the past.
This example should make it clear that there are some nuances of the
notion of "can" which cannot be elucidated simply by reference to the notion
of possibility. There are, one might say, degrees of empirical possibility.
It should also be clear, however, that to say that X can fb is at least to say
that it is possible that X will j6. But what of the rotion of probability? In
what sense can the assertion "X can ft" be construed as saying that it is prob¬
able that X will ft?
Though there are difficulties in the way of interpreting Hune correctly
at this point, what he intends to say is reasonably clear. If we say that
Smith can play the "Moonlight Sonata" we are saying that, if certain conditions
are fulfilled, it is probable that Smith will play the "Moonlight Sonata", or,
perhaps more accurately, it is probable that Smith will succeed in playing the
"Moonlight Sonata". There is, of course, nothing inconsistent in saying both
that Smith can play the "Moonlight Sonata", and that it is highly unlikely
that he ever will play it. He may, for example, have become so thoroughly
bored with this particular piece that he has resolved never to play it again.
In such a case, the probability that he will ever play it is very low indeed,
but we would still be entitled to say that he can play it. The concept of
probability has, it seems to me, a much more central role to play in the eluci¬
dation of dispositional properties other than those of capacity. In such cases
as "He is a chain-smoker" or "He likes golf", we seem to make much more explicit
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use of this ooncept. If someone likes to play golf, the chances are that he
will play golf on numerous occasions. If a man is a chain-smoker, it is highly
probable that he will have a cigarette at some point during the day. It would
seem, then, that the concepts of possibility and probability do not have iden¬
tical roles to play in talk of dispositional properties. Hume signals this
difference when he says: "we consider a person as endow*d with any ability
when we find from past experience, that 'tis probable, _or at least possible he
may exert it". (T,313» Italics mine.) Despite these differences, however, the
connection which Hume points to between the notion of a dispositional property
and the notions of possibility and probability is a highly illuminating one.
One element of the connections between the notion of capacity and those
of possibility and probability that Hume does not make explicit mention of in
the passage in question is that the possibility or probability that a given event
will occur is a conditional one. That is to say, the claim that it is possible
that R is in fact the claim that it is possible that R , if 0 . Even where the
X X X
identity of the operations 0 is not known, it is assumed that there are such
operations necessary for the response R. Hume does, however, make this point
quite explicitly elsewhere. But making it here enables us to see the exact
nature of Hume's claim about dispositional properties: one is justified in say¬
ing that x has some dispositional property D, if one is justified in saying
either or both: (a) it is possible that if 0 , then R ; or (b) it is probableX X
that if 0x, then R^, where both 0 and R refer to events that are introspectible
or observable in some normal way.
We can now consider Hume's claim that the distinction between a power and
its exercise is without foundation. Is this an ontological claim, or must it
be interpreted in some other way?
As I have argued at several plaoes in this thesis, it is extremely important,
if we are to interpret Hume correctly, to realize that he fails to distinguish,
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ss it seems we must distinguish, between the meaning of an expression, and the
conditions which justify its use. That is to say, he flails to distinguish (a)
the meaning of j>, and (b) how we can tell that jg. Furthermore, in at least
many instances that I have considered elsewhere, Hume seems in fact to be con¬
cerned with the latter problem, rather than with the former. 1 have argued
that this is so at least in the cases of causal propositions and of moral judg¬
ments. I would suggest that the same is true, at least to a large extent, in
the case of propositions ascribing dispositional properties.
For one thing, Hume consistently uses a particular form of expression
which is paradoxical in the extreme if a reductivist theory of dispositions is
attributed to him.1 He says, for example, that an "ability ... (is) exerted
and put in action" (T,311) end that a "power has always a reference to its
exercise". (T,313) The language at least suggests that there is something
which is or can be exercised. The exercise of a power seems to presuppose a
power, just as the stretching of a rubber-band presupposes a rubber-band. To
say that a power _is its exercise sounds as odd as to say that a rubber-band
is its stretching. But perhaps this is just a defect of ordinary language, or
just a lack of care and precision on Hume's part. In any case, my argument
does not rest on it.
More to the point, Hume frequently uses what X would oall the language of
justification, rather than the language of definition. For example, he says
that "neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought posseat of any
ability, unless it be exerted and put in action". (?,311* Italics mine.) In
this, he certainly appears to be olaiming that one can not legitimately say
that some person or object has a given dispositional property unless one has
performed some test or presented certain stimuli, and achieved an appropriate
1I would stress that by "reduotivist theory" here I mean a theory which claims
that mental dispositions are reducible to introspeotible mental states or pub¬
licly observable behavior, given appropriate stimuli.
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response. One is not justified in saying that a given object is elastic unless
one tries to stretoh it and it both stretches and returns to its original shape,
or unless one has other grounds for saying that if one were to try to stretch
it, it would stretch, etc. But to say this is not necessarily to say either
(a) that one's aocount of the test conditions and the response is an account of
the meaning of the proposition whose truth is being tested, or (b) there is
nothing about that object at a particular time when it is not being tested, no
more or less permanent state of that object, in virtue of which it will stretch,
etc., if one tries to stretoh it. Hume need not be saying that an apparently
categorical proposition ascribing a mental disposition to some individual iB
analyzable into an overtly hypothetical proposition correlating test conditions
and response. Nor need he be saying a person may not have mental qualities
which are neither introspectible nor observable in any normal way.
Nor is thi3 an isolated remark on Hume's part. He later says, in a passage
already quoted, that "the only known difference" betwixt them [i.e. the case in
which we say that X can't f6t and the case in which we say that X can fi]" is a
difference in our past experience. (T,312) Likewise, he says that "we consider
a person as endow*d with any ability when we find from past experience, that
'tis probable, or at least possible he may exert it." (T,313* Italics mine.)
He is, in other words, commenting on how we tell that a person has a certain
dispositional property, or on what justified us in saying that he has that prop¬
erty. But to say this is not in any important sense to reduce the property to
its exercise.
Despite the arguments which I have marshalled in support of the view that
Hume does believe that one must distinguish between a dispositional property,
whether ability, capacity, habit, or whatever, and its exercise, however, the
case is surely far from settled. Hume does say that one ought not to distin¬
guish a power and its exercise, and this does seem to mean that a power simply
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is its exercise, no matter how paradoxical this may sound. Perhaps we must
simply say that Hums is inconsistent, talking, at one place or another in the
Treatise, in ways which, at other places, he says are impermissible. I think,
in fact, that Hume jls inconsistent, and that some of the things he says about
knowing the meaning of words, natural abilities, natural virtues, and charac¬
ters cannot be squared with what he says, explicitly, about the concept of
power. But a very interesting question remains: '.'"hat considerations could
have led Hume to be so inconsistent?
We have already seen at some length what I take to be the most serious
consideration which would have led Hume to suggest a distinction between a
power, or any other mental dispositional property, and its exercise, viz. the
requirements of adequate scientific explanation. Another consideration would
be the apparent implioati ns or ordinary language. We do seem to think that,
for example, knowing mathematics is not just a matter of making appropriate
moves, in one's head or on paper, in appropriate situations. A mathematician,
we want to say, knows mathematics even when he is sleeping. It is this know¬
ledge of mathematics which the mathematician has even when he is sleeping that
explains the fact that, in appropriate situations, he makes the appropriate
moves in hia head or on paper. Similarly, sugar _is soluble even when it is not
in water.
On the other hand, given the materials with which he chooses to work, viz.
introspectible mental events or publicly observable behavior, there are insup¬
erable difficulties for Hume in admitting such enduring properties and distin¬
guishing them from their exercise. On very general grounds, unless one can cash
the notion of such an enduring property in terms of something observable, one
simply cannot have, on Hume's principles, an idea of such an enduring property.
This is the whole point of his principle of the priority of impressions over
ideas. More particularly, what possible sense can be made of an alleged mental
-180-
quality which is non-introapectible? The mind is, after all, in Hume's theoxy
"nothing but a biaidle or collection of different perceptions" (T,252). We must
remember, too, Hume's quite explicit and significant restriction of the field
of inquiry for his science of human nature. The proper subject-matter for any
given scientist of human nature is his own perceptions, the contents of his own
mind. At times, of course, the scientist of human nature will consider the
publicly observable causes and effects of his own perceptions. Thus, he may
talk of the actions of A which give rise, in B, to the passion of love for A.
Or he may talk of the kindly actions which B performs for A's benefit, as a
result of the feeling of benevolence which B has for A. But this sets the lim¬
its of the sorts of phenomena with which the scientist of human nature is con¬
cerned. Thus, if such a scientist is to make use of dispositional ooncepts, he
must be able to cash them in terms either of perceptions (i.e. mental states
or events introspeotible by the person whose states or events they are) or of
publicly observable behavior. If this is so, then it can make no sense to talk
of a mathematician having an enduring mental property which exists even when he
is not having mathematical thoughts or writing formulae on paper.
This, it seems to me, provides the clue to understanding Hume's dilemma
about mental dispositions. He wants to talk of enduring mental states, and
many times does so. But he can find no way of cashing talk of such enduring men¬
tal states in terms of introspectible mental processes or publicly observable
behavior. He fails, however, to consider a possibility that was surely open to
him, viz. talk of enduring states of the person's brain. If one were to postu¬
late such enduring brain states as the continuing causal conditions which Hume
seems to require in his talk of enduring mental qualities which are distinct
from their exercise, one could talk of enduring properties which are in principle
observable and which would thus satisfy the requirements of Hume's principle of
the priority of impressions over ideas. Moreover, talk of enduring mental
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properties in this sense would not require the most problematic notion of non-
introspeotible perceptions. One may not, at present, be able to identify those
enduring brain states which, by hypothesis, in part explain the faot that the
mathematician has mathematical thoughts, and writes mathematical formulae on
paper. But this does not affect the issue. What is important is that such
enduring brain states are in principle susceptible to identification. And
this is all that is required for one to be justified in leaving a place for
them in one's explanatory laws concerning mental phenomena, Hume's polemic
against occult qualities was a polemic against allegedly explanatory qualities
which could not, in principle, be identified or observed. But as Hume himself
recognizes in the Treatise, there is nothing illegitimate in talking about the
cause of some event when that cause has not, in fact, been identified,
(of,
Construing talk of mental dispositions along these lines would bring out
what I earlier called the promissory character of propositions making use of
dispositional predicates. As I suggested, part of what we seem to assert when
we ascribe a dispositional predicate is that there is some qualify, perhaps
unknown, of the subjeot, which would serve to explain the response to be ex¬
plained, were it known. What was problematic was the character of the intrin¬
sic property which was to be looked for. The brain-state theory seems a
plausible solution in the case of mental dispositions. An analogy can be drawn
between this suggestion, and the common assumption among natural scientists
that dispositional properties are in faot to be oashed in terms of the adcro-
properties of objects. Thus, the behavior of gasses is to be explained by the
micro-properties described by kinetic theory. Similarly, sugar dissolves in
water, we may assume, because it has certain structural micro-properties whioh
are in principle identifiable. As Arthur Pap says, talking of the dispositional
property of water - solubility in the case of sagar: "It is ... plausible
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to assume that in making an assertion sueh as *A11 sugar is water-soluble* we
are not just generalizing the observed regularity that things with the second¬
ary qualities of sugar dissolve when immersed in a liquid with the secondary
qualities of water, but express our belief that this empirical law admits of
theoretical explanation in terms of the microstructures of sugar and water and
indirectly oonflzmable postulates about the interactions of their constituent
A
particles".
Hume*s dilemma, then, stems from his initial restriction of the subject-
matter proper to his science of human nature. Having decided to talk only of
introspectible mental states or events and bits of publicly observable behavior,
he cannot find a place for enduring mental properties. But scientific explana¬
tion and ordinary language both seem to require ihat we postulate suoh enduring
qualities even when we have not observed than, Hume's mistake, as it seems to
me, is in having rejected the notion of independent, long-term mental qualities
just because alleged explanations in terms of faculties and occult qualities
are vacuous. So long as one can give a reasonable account of the sorts of en¬
tities such enduring mental properties will be, one is justified, other things
being equal, in talking of them. Hume's practice indicates that he found it
essential to do so.
It is interesting to notice that the move of cashing talk of enduring men¬
tal dispositions in terms of permanent or semi-permanent states of the brain
was open to Hume. In restricting the subject-matter of his mental science,
Hume says that "there must be some impressions, which without any introduction
make their appearance in the soul". (T,275) Significantly, however, he goes
on to says "As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination
of them wou'd lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of
1
Pap, Introduction, p. 283.
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anatomy and natural philosophy". (T,275) Ho oven, at one point, indulges in
a hit of armchair theorizing about the physiological basis of thinking, and
says: "'Twould have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the
brain, and have shewn, why upon the conception of any idea, the animal spirits
run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are
related to it". (T,60) He argues, as well, that there is no logical objection
to the claim that physical changes in the body cause oonsoious events. Talking
of the "pause of our perceptions" he says:
Matter and motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools,
however vary'd, are still matter and motion, and produoe
only a difference in the position and situation of objects.
Divide a body as often as you please, 'tis still body.
Place it in any figure, nothing ever results but figure,
or the relation of parts. Move it in any manner, you
still find motion or a change of relation. *Tis absurd
to imagine, that motion in a circle, for instance, shou'd
be nothing but merely motion in a circle; while motion
in another direction, as in a ellipse, shou'd also be a
passion or moral reflexion: That the shocking of two
globular particles shou'd become a sensation of pain,
and that the meeting of two triangular ones shou'd afford
a pleasure. Now as these different shocks, and variations,
and mixtures are the only changes, of which matter is
susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of
thought or perception, 'tis concluded to be impossible, that
thought can ever be caus'd by matter.
Pew have been able to withstand the seeming evidence
of this argument; and yet nothing in the world is more
easy than to refute it. We need only reflect on what
has been prov'd at large, that we are never sensible of
any connexion betwixt causes and effects, and that 'tis
only by experience of their constant conjunction, we can
arrive at any knowledge of this relation. (T,246-247)
Thus, Hume could have suggested that the enduring intrinsic mental properties
which he often assumes when talking of mental dispositions are in fact long-
term physiological states in the person's brain. He did not, however, make
this move. Had he done he could, it seems to me, have avoided his dilemma.
CHAPTER IV
THEORY OF THE PASSIONS
1* The Classification of the Passiona
Hume begins the Treatise with the highly ambiguous remark: "All the
perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds,
which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS". (T, l) One particularly crucial
source of ambiguity is the word "perception". How is one to interpret the
word? Two quite different possibilities present themselves at the outset:
(l) impression' and ideas are perceptions; (?.) impressions and ideas are the
ob.jeots of perceptions. I shall begin with the second interpretation.
According to this interpretation, Hume is saying that a human being can
be of become aware of two more or less different sorts of things, called
"impressions" and "ideas". On this interpretation the expression "All the
perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into ... IMPRESSIONS and
IDEAS" is shorthand for "All the things the human mind perceives (can perceive)
are IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS". "Perceptions" is taken as a (perhaps very general)
cognitive word, for which one might substitute, without fundamental change of
meaning, some such expression as "object of awareness", or "object of attertlon",
or "object of cognition". This would entail that every possible objeot of
awareness is either an impression or an idea. Thus mathematical relations,
cows, municipal, governments, shrieks, memories, fears, and pains would all be,
in some sense or other, either impressions or ideas. All of these things 3ome-
-:ov; "strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness".
(T, l) This i3 to say no more than that I can think of the square root of -2,
be aware of the cow in the meadow, or be conscious of my fear. The distinction
between those objects of perception which are ideas, and those which
are impressions, is framed as a distinction between objects of thought
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and objects of feeling: "Every one of himself will readily perceive the
difference betwixt feeling and thinking". (T, 1-2) Under "feeling" Hume includes
"all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in
the soul". (T, 1) Under "thinking" he places "the faint images of these in thinking
and reasoning; such as, for instanoe, are all the perceptions excited by the present
discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting
the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion". (T, l) Thus, the reader's
awareness of the shape or color of the book at which he is looking, his awareness
of the hardness of the desk on which he is leaning, his anger at the superficial
character of the distinctions made, are all matters of feeling. His recollection
of a similar passage in Locke's Essav. his thought that the word "perception" is
being used ambiguously* or his understanding of the character of the distinction
made are all instances of thinking.
Already, however, a serious problem is obvious. In what sense is the reader's
anger an object of perception? Clearly enough it can be an object of perception in
the sense of an object of thought, in Hume's sense of this expression: years later
the reader may recall his being angered by the book. But can it be an object of per¬
ception in the sense of an object of feeling? Hume explicitly mentions the emotions
as instances of "perceptions" that are matters of "feeling". Moreover, if "perceptions"
is a cognitive word, there must be a sense in which I can be aware of my being angry.
The reader should therefore be able to "perceive" his anger in two very different
ways: he may think about it, in whioh case his anger is an "idea", or he may actually
feel it, in which case it is an "impression".
But it would be highly misleading to use the expression "feel one's anger" if
"feel" is taken as more or less equivalent to "perceive", in cases where the objects
of perception are alleged to be impressions rather than ideas. If "feel" is a sub¬
stitute for "perceive", and "perceive" is a cognitive word, then "feel" is a cognitive
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word, To say "I feel my anger" is, in such a oase, like saying "I am noticing my
anger" or "I am aware of my anger" and not like the ordinary use of "I feel anger"
or "I feel angry". In the latter cases tbelooutions mentioned are equivalent to
"I am angry". In the former cases "I am angry" is, perhaps, implied: but something
more is said as well. Thus, if Hume is construing "perceive" as a cognition word,
and passions oremotions are "impressions", it would seem that Hume is talking of
some inner sense, by means of which we perceive our emotions, just as we perceive
colors and sounds by our external senses
Hume is seriously misleading when he lumps together indiscriminately, under the
heading of "impressions", "all our sensations, passions, and emotions", (T, l) This
is evident if one oonsiders the example he gives of an impression that is also a
(oomplex) sensation: an apple with a particular color, taste, and smell, (T, 2)
It is at least prima faoie plausible to say that one may distinguish the seeing of
an apple from the apple one sees; one can see other things than apples, and one can
smell an apple without seeing it. Moreover, if Hume is taking the possibility of
introspeotion for granted, as he seems to be doing, it should make sense to use
such locutions as "being aware that I am seeing an apple" or "paying attention to
my seeing an apple". Such things might be said by an introspective psychologist.
If "perceive" is being used as a cognitive word, two distinct perceptions are taking
place: my perceiving (seeing) an apple; and my perceiving (being aware of) my per¬
ceiving an apple. In contrast, in the case of my fear, only one perceiving
Anthony Kenrry interprets Hume in this way when, in talking of Hume's theory of
the passions, as well as that of other philosophers, he says: "The pattern of 'act
and object' was present in their accounts but the active verb was 'perceive* and
the objeot was the emotion itself presented to inner perception". See Anthony
Kenny, Action. Emotion and Will (London: Eoutledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), P* 62,
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takea plaoet my perceiving ray fear. % fear is not, in turn, a perceiving, though
my seeing is.
Hume seems to be conflating two very different sorts of cases) what I shall
oall reflective perception and non-refleotive perception. (That is to say, such a
distinction must be made if Hume's classification of perceptions is to have even a
superficially plausible application to experience.) "Perceiving an apple" is a non-
refleotive perception; "perceiving my fear" or "perceiving ay perceiving an apple"
are instances of reflective perception. Reflective perception is perception by an
individual of his own mental states or mental acts; non-reflective perception is
perception of non-mental things, events, or states of affairs# It would follow from
this that Hume's list of psroeptions which am impressions, including "sensations,
passions and emotions", can oiily confuse, because sensations (e.g. the color or taste
of on apple) are objeots of a non-reflective perception, whereas passions and emotions
would be objeots of reflective perception.
My account assumes, of course, that one can distinguish mental acts or mental
states from their objects. As I have already had occasion to remark^ Hume sometimes
does make this sort of distinction in the oourse of the Treatise. But it is clear
why he would prefer, for systematic reasons, to overlook this distinction. His
account of belief requires that the distinction between thought and experience be
stated in terms of vivacity or liveliness) impressions are vivacious, ideas are
not. But if my distinction of reflective and non-reflective perceptions were allowed,
it would seem that thinking, just as seeing or feeling an ; y, would be an impression,
Each of these mental acts or mental states could be the object of a reflective percep¬
tion, and there would be no reason for saying that the mental aot of thinking should
•'■pp. 127-129.
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be any less lively than the mental aot of seeing. Hume would, at best, be able to
say that the ob.jeot of a mental aot of seeing is lively or vivacious, whereas the
object of a mental act of thinking is not. To be acourate, then, Hume*s list of
impression-perceptions would have to comprise not only sensations, emotions, and
passions, but also 3eeings, hearings, thoughts, recollections, imaginings, and so
on (though not the objects of the thoughts, recollections, or imaginings). He
might still use his criterion of liveliness to distinguish impressions from ideas,
but the class of impressions would iiave to include more things than he would normally
oare to mention.
It should be noted that nothing said thus far entails that what I have called
the objects of perception only exist in so far as they are being perceived. That
is to say, Hume, in referring to "all the perceptions of the human mind", is not
necessarily endorsing Berkeley*s principle, "esse is peroipi". It is clear, however,
that Hume is on a slippery slope, in so far as he uses the terms "impression" and
"idea" as possible surrogates for the expression "(objects of) perception". This
seems to permit a whole series of odd locutions or puzzled questions. Do I under¬
stand a scientific theory, or the idea of a scientific theory? Do I recall Paris,
or the idea of Paris? Can I taste apples, or only the impressions of apples? Do
I feel ny anger, or, most oddly, merely the impression of my anger? Hume must not,
however, be interpreted to be insisting on this mentalistic thesis at this early
point in the Treatise. Hie terms "idea" and "is rsres3ion" are, after all, introduced
in a oompletely non-polemical my. As Kemp Smith has observed, Hume introduces his
more or less technical terminology as though nothing of philosophical importance hinges
on the terminology.^"
^"Cf. Kemp Smith, pp. 113-116,
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Koreover, the mentalistic thesis is a special philosophical thesis, one that must
be argued for, and not something Hume can take for granted in the opening pages of
his book.
More importantly for an account of the passions, however, it does not even follow
from what has been said up to now that those objects of perception which I have called
objects of reflective perception, i.e. all mental acts or states, must be perceived
if they are to exist, Hume night want to say that vhenever I am experiencing some
emotion, or whenever I am thinking, etc,,I am neoessarily perceiving my experiencing
the emotion, or my thinking, etc. But he does not argue for this view at this point
of the Treatise. Moreover, such a view would seem to involve an infinite regress,
sinoe, if it is a necessary condition for being a mental act or mental state that
the alleged mental act or state be the object of the mental act of (reflective)
perceiving, the same condition would apply to the alleged mental act of (reflective)
perceiving, and so on, ad infinitum.
At the start of this discussion I suggested smother possible interpretation
of "perception", viz. that impressions and ideas are perceptions, Thi3 view is
suggested by Hume's assertions
It will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining
this distinction /between impressions and ideas/. very one of
himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and
thinking". (T, 1-2 Italics mia©T7
Drawn in this way, Hume's distinction of impressions and ideas looks like a distinc¬
tion between two classes of mental acts. Elucidatod by example, the class of impress¬
ions would then include such things as seeing, hearing, feeling (in the tactual sense),
being in pain, feeling angry, and so oa. The class of ideas would include thinking,
believing, imagining, remembering, and so on. Given such a classification, it is
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diffioult to say where one would list what I earlier called reflective perceptions.
Presumably, if they are oonstrued in terras of an introspective model, they would
be impressions; if a retrospective model were used, they would be ideas.
It is very tempting to interpret Hume in this way, but one oannot do so con¬
sistently. For, given this interpretation, it is impossible to understand Hume's
use of his criterion for distinguishing impressions and ideas, viz. their degrees
of liveliness or vivacity. For one thing, there seams to be no reason why seeing,
qua mental aot, should be considered more lively than thinking, qua mental act.
For another, Hume's examples do not suit this interpretation, A reasonably straight¬
forward instance of the sort of distinction whioh Hume thinks this criterion permits
him to make is the following: "When I shut ray ideas and think of my chamber, the
»
ideas I form are exaot representations of the impressions I felt". (T, 3) The same
distinction is allegedly drawn when Hume says: "All the perceptions of the mind
are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas", (T, 2-3) Clearly here a
distinction is being drawn between different kinds of objects of perception, and
not between different kinds of mental aots.
However one tries to interpret Hume's use of "perception", "impression" and
"idea", major difficulties arise. And there seems no point in pursuing the discussion
further. It is sufficient for our present purposes to draw the following conclusions:
(l) The meaning of Hume's distinctions is not at all apparent; (2) If impressions
and ideas are taken as objects of perception, different levels of perception must
be assumed; (3) If impressions and ideas are taken as kind3 of 1 cntal act, it is not
clear that a distinction between than can be drawn in terms of vivacity or liveliness;
(4) If passions are impressions, and if the interpretation implied in (2) is correct,
then my pasgions are to be classed with odo: s, that I smell, colors that I see.
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shapes that I feel, sounds that I hoar; (5) If passions are impressions, and the
interpretation implied in (3) is correct, then experiencing a passion is like smell¬
ing an odor, seeing a color, feeling a shape, or hearing a sound, and, presumably,
unlike remembering what Paris looks like, or thinking out the solution of a mathe¬
matical puzzle? (6) It does not seem possible to make these alternative interpreter
tlons consistent; (7) On either interpretation, passions are lively or vivacious mental
states. In what follows, since I shall be concerned mainly with passions, I shall
use the term "perception" in the sense of mental aots or ctates, and not in the sense
of objects of perception. In the li$it of my discussion of mental aots or states
in the previous chapter, this is the least misleading of the two senses of "percep¬
tion", It must b» emphasized that, when used in this way, "perception" is not a
coalition word. An act of choosing is, in this usage, as much a perception as an
act of remembering; an emotion is as muoh a perception as is a perception (in the
ordinary-language use of "perception").
Hume distinguishes, within the class of impressions, two kinds, which he calls
"impressions of sensation" and "impressions of reflexion", (T, 7) This is an import¬
ant distinction for Hume's theory of the passions, and so must be oonsidered in some
detail.
The difference between the two is first stated in thi3 wayJ an impression of
sensation "arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes"; impressions of
reflection, on the other hand, are "derived in a great measure from our ideas",(T, 7)
Hume illustrates the distinction by an example:
An impression first strikes upon the sensa% and makes us perceive
heat or oold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or
other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which
remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This
ide«| of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the
new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may prop¬
erly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. (T, 7-8)
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An approp riate instance of an impression of sensation would be the pain we experience
in a dentist's chair; and the fear we experience as we walk up to the dentist's
door on a later occasion and recall our earlier p in would be an impression of
reflection.
Hume gives another account of this distinction later in the Treatise when he
oontrasts "original impressions" and "secondary impressions", (T, 275) (He there
remarks that this division is "the same with that which I formerly made U3e of when
I distinguished them /impressions^/ into impressions of sensation and reflexion".
(T, 275) "Original impressions or impressions of sensation," he says, "are suoh as
without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the
body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external
organs". (T, 275) "Secondary, or reflective impressions," on the other habd, "are
suoh as proceed from sane of these original ones, either immediately or by the inter¬
position of its idea", (T, 275) The olass of impressions of senration includes "all
the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasured; that of the impr©«>-
&X035O of reflection includes "the passions, and other amotions resembling them".
(T, 275)
Hume's second formulation of the distinction is by far the better one, because
it avoids two very misleading apparent implications of the first. In the earlier
formulation, Hume seems to suggest that a prior idea is necessary if one is to have
an impression of reflection. He signals the faot that he feels uneasy about this
by his remark that "the impressions of reflection ... arise mostly from ideas".
(T, 8,Italics mine) There is no uncertainty, however, in his later formulation,
where he 3ays that an impression of reflection arises from an impression of sensation
"either innnediately or by the interposition of its idea". (T, 275)
-195-
The erller formulation also seems to suggest that the impressions of reflection
require a prior impression ®r idea of pleasure or pain. This is not said explicitly,
hut is certainly suggested by Hume's illustration. As examples of impressions of
sensation he mentions "heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain"; not,
interestingly enough, such things as colors, shapes, or sounds. He then refers
to the "idea of pleasure or pain" which "produces" such impressions of reflection
as "desire and aversion, hope and fear". This suggestion is not as clear in the
second formulation. It s true that he does give, hy way of illustration, the case
of a "fit of the gout", which, as a physical pain, is an impression of sensation,
and which "produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear". (T, 276) But
there is nothing in his principal formulation of the distinction of original and
secondary impressions which implies that the perception which precedes a secondary
impression must be a perception of pain or pleasure. Quite the contrary. All Hume
says is that the secondary impressions "proceed from some of these original ones",
(T, 275) It may be the case that Hume does think that secondary impressions require
the prior occurrence of original impressions of pain or pleasure, though, as I shall
argue later, this does not fit what Hume says at various other places in the Treatise.
I would only insist here that Hume's introduction of the concept of an impression
of refleotlon does not have this implication.
What, then, is the difference between an impression of sensation and an impress¬
ion of reflection? The difference, as Hume formulates it, is in terns of the causal
antecedents of each. Impressions of reflection are cau. - by prior perceptions:
impressions of sensation are not. It is for this reason that the former are called
secondary, and the latter primary. This is not at all to say that impressions of
sensation are uncaused. In fact Hume suggests, without argument, that they have
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pbysioal or physiological oauses: "these depend upon natural and physioal
causes". (T, 275) But the point is that they do not have mental causes;
they do not require the prior occurrence of perceptions in order to occur.
One can have an impression of sensation without any specific conscious
occurrence preoeding it; this is (empirically) not the oase with impressions
of reflection. Consider the oase of hearing a sound: I may hear a sound
without being aware of what caused the sound. Of course, I can know what
cause! the sound, I may, for example, see the violinist draw his bow across
the strings of his violin. But this seeing is not neoessary if I am to hear
the sound. The same, Hume would suggest, is &rue of physical pains or
pleasures. I can feel a oramp in my stomach without knowing what physical
condition is causing lie pain. Perhaps Hume's point would be bettor made
by saying that I cannot give my reasons for hearing the sound, or for feel¬
ing the cramp (though I can, of course, have reasons for listening to the
sound, or investigating the causes of my cramp.)
This (empirically) could not be true of those perceptions which are
called impressions of reflection, according to Hume. I (empirically) can¬
not have a feeling of aesthetio pleasure without having sane (prior) aware¬
ness of the object which is the source of my pleasure. I cannot (empirically)
be angry, unless I am aware that someone has, for example, harmed me, or
someone in whan I am interested. And, according to Hume, this is true of
all those perceptions which he classes as secondary impressions or impressions
of reflection. The difference, then, comes to this: the only causal laws
which e.plain the oocurrence of original impressions are laws correlating
the occurrence of physical or physiological events and mental events
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(v-'.z, the original impressions); in the case of secondary impressions it
is possible to discover empirical laws correlating their ooeurrence with
the occurrence of other mental events (i.e. the prior perceptions). Noth¬
ing is said here about the possibility or impossibility of also explaining
the occurrence of secondary impressions by reference to physiological or
physical events. Once again we can see Hume's restriction on the typo of
explanations of mental events which he will offer in his mental science.
The discussion f impressions of sensation stops at this point because "the
examination of them /i.e. their physical causes./ wou'd lead me too far from
my present subject, into the science of anatomy and natural philosophy".
(T, 275-276) Aaong impressions, only the impressions of reflection can
be explained by the sorts of laws proper to Hume's mental soience.
We may now turn to the question whether a necessary causal condition
for the occurrence of an impression of reflection is the prior occurrence
of a perception (whether impression or idea) or plataurre or pain. This is
an especially vexing question for the interpretation of Hume's theory of
the passions, because it involves the interpretation of a notably obsoure
remark he makes in the course of his discussion. It also, as I shall try
to show, has 3ome bearing on Hume's aesthetic theory. Finally, it raises
a material point in Hume's ethics.
The obscure remark mentioned above occurs in Hume's section "Of the
direct passions". Having given brief description of several direct passions
in terms of those conditions other than an awareness of good or evil which
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are necessary for their occurrence, Hume 3ays:
Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the
direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct,
which is perfectly unaccountable* Of w land is the desire
of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friendsj
hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetities, These passions,
properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from
them, like the other affections, (T, if39 Italics nuL d»)
This passage raises a number of problems, but I shall here consider only-
one of them: whether the passions must be preceded by a perception of pleas¬
ure or pain.
One point that seems certain from this passage is that Hume does think
there are passions, and thus, that there are impressions of reflection,
which do not rc.uire, for their occurrence, a prior perception of pleasure
or pain. This point has been noted by several commentators, including Kemp
Smith, who makes use of the expression "primary passions" to classify them,^
2
and Ardal, who follows Kemp Smith in this terminology. Thus, Hume is say¬
ing that I can feel hungry, without having any prior perception of pleasure
or pain which is the cause of my hunger. Similarly with lust. Also, I can
desire the punishment of my enemies, without any prior perception of pain,
or desire the happiness of my friends, without any prior pleasure. There
seem to me to be many problems in all this.
Let us assume that one can make sense of Hume's claim that the desire
for the punishment of our enemies, the desire of the happiness of our* friends,
hunger, lust, and other bodily appetities, are all passions, and thus that
all require, for their occurrence, a prior perception. It would seem plaus¬
ible to accept that hunger, lust, and other bodily appetites do not require
a prior perception of pleasure or pain. For one thing, no candidate for
"Stomp Smith, p. 168 2--Ardal, p. 10.
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suoh a pleasure or pain seems forthcoming. For another, it is difficult
if not impossible to attach sense to the claim that if, for example, I feel
hungry, I feel this way because of seme painful or pleasant experience I
have had. Assuming that hunger and lust are pleasant or painful experiences
(cf. T, 39^), we would perhaps want to say that they are primitive pains
or pleasures in this sense, that one can experience either without first
having experienced seme other pleasure or pain. It cannot be the case that
every pain or pleasure presupposes some other pain or pleasure, sinoe this
would involve an infinite regress. The enumeration of pleasures and pain%
we might say, must stop somewhere, and hunger and lust are two of the places
at which it seems necessary t& stop*
But what of the desire for an enengr's punishment or a friend's happiness?
Hume's mention of these seems most puzzling Indeed. For one thing, in what
respect do these two ddsires differ from the desires which, in another place,
Hume calls "benevolence" and "anger"? Hume describes benevolence as, in
part, "a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd". (T, 382) Anger
he describes as being, in part, "a desire of the misery of the person hated".
(T, 382) Given the very loose way in which Hume uses the terms "friend",
"enemy", "beloved", "hatred", and so on, I fail to see how the two desires
first mentioned differ from benevolence and anger. And, it should be noted,
it is Hume' s view that benevolence and anger are partly caused by a prior
experience of love and hatred, i.e. a prior peculiar perception of pleasure
and pain.
Perhaps, however, Hume is thinking of this sort of case. A man, A,
is my friend. This is to say that he has done certain things, has certain
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qualities which have pleased me and thus have led me to feel something
descrlbable as love for him. This, in turn, granted the occurrence of the
thought of his happiness, leads me to desire his happiness. But there may¬
be a particular oocasion on which, though A is not at that moment doing
anything that pleases me, and though I am not thinking of anything which
A has done and which has pleased, me, I yet have an actual feeling of
benevolence toward him, and perhaps even act kindly toward him, Hume
might want to describe this case as one in which I experience a pleasant
passion (benevolence) without having a particular prior pleasant experience
which triggers it off, as it were. That such a passion is not completely
independent of prior pleasure, and that anger, in a similar situation, would
not be completely independent of a prior pain, is clear, however, from the
faot that the persons toward whom we have these feelings are desoribed as
"friends" and "enemies". There seems, however, to be some reason for saying
that I desired my friend's happiness, or did something thought to be conc¬
eive to his happiness, not because he has done me a good turn, but simply
beoause he is my friend. This may be the sense which we must attach to
Hume's claim that the desire of a friend's happiness does not require a prior
perception of pleasure. But if this is what Hume's intends to say, I can
see no reason for denying that the same may be the case in a given instance
of feeling tenderness toward some person. And thus I can see no reason for
making special mention of this desire as a passion which does not require
a prior pain or pleasure. If this is not what Hume intends to assert, I
can make no sense of his claim.
Is it Hume's view that only passions of the sort mentioned in the
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passage quoted above can occur without the occurrence of a prior perception
of pleasure or pain? If so, Hume's theory of the passions would seem to
have a perhaps unwanted consequence for his moral philosophy. As I pointed
out above, one gets involved in an infinite regress if one asserts that
every passion depends on the prior occurrence of a perception of pleasure
or pain. This regress can be stopped if one says that the requisite per¬
ception of pleasure or pain is physical pleasure or pain, and such physical
sensations are, as impressions of sensations, primitive from the point of
view of the conscious subject. But this would be to say that physioal
pleasures or pains are, in some ultimate sense, the only souroe of the
passions men experience. Every passion would, on this view, be traceable
back to a physical pain or pleasure. If# however, one admits with Hume that
passions suoh as the desire for the punishment of one's enemies or happiness
of one's friends, hunger, lust, etc., are passions that do not require prior
pleasures or pains, one has other possible candidates for stopping the regress
which threatens. We have, however, seen the difficulties in Hume's claim
that such desires relevant to friends and enemies are independent of prior
pains and pleasures. It would seem, then, that Hume is forced to make all
the passions ultimately dependent on physioal pains or pleasures, or bodily
appetites. This conclusion he might be reluctant to draw in his moral theory.
There are, however, very good grounds for asserting that Hume does not
think that these are the only pleasures or pains which do not depend on
prior pleasures or pains. I shall rest my case for this claim on my proof
that at least some aesthetic sentiments (and thus some pleasures and pains
that are not in any ordinary sense physical pleasures or pains) are also
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independent of prior perceptions of pain or pleasure.
How does Hume desoribe the aesthetic sentiments? It is dear, first
of all, that these sentiments are pleasant or painful feelings or sensations.
Hume is quite insistent on this point in his account of how personal beauty
or deformity can be the source of pride or humility. In the course of this
discussion he daims "that beauty is suoh an order and construction of parts,
as either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by paprice.
i3 fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the sod". (T, 299) He
then goes on to say: "Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary
attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence",
(T, 299) Since "beauty like wit, oannot be defin'd, but is discern*4 only
by a taste or sensation, we may conclude, that beauty is nothing but a form,
which produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts, which oonveys
pain". (T, 299) Aesthetio sentiments, then, are pleasant or painful feelings
or sensations. In this they are similar to bodily pleasures and pains.
The question then arises: how do the aesthetic sentiments occur?
Restricting his acoount to explanations appropriate to his science of mind,
Hume dearly means to deny that they are "original", in the sense that physi¬
cal pains and pleasures are "original". The aesthetic sentiments are caused
by prior perceptions, and thus are impressions of reflection. It is always
same quality <.r qualities of a person or object, of whioh we are aware, that
gives rise to the pleasant or painful aesthetic sentiment. The question
next arises: must this prior perception involve either the thought of plea¬
sure or pain, or an experience of pleasure or pain? The carreot answer
to this question, is, I would submit, that in some cases the aesthetic santi-
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menta do require a prior pleasure or pain, and in some oases they do not.
It must "be noted that Hume distinguishes two kinds of beauty, a
"beauty of interest", and a beauty "of form", (T, 3&k) At the very end
of the Treatise a similar distinction is drawn in the oase of moral senti¬
ments, and then applied to those of aesthetics. Moral sentiments, Hume says,
"may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and pass¬
ions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and
of particular persons", (®# 589) His opinion is "that both these causes
are intermix*d in our judgnents of morals; after the same manner a3 they
are in our deoisions concerning most kinds of external beauty", (T, 590)
We need not consider the moral sentiments in detail at this point, but Hume's
thesis is amply clear: some moral judgments are based on utilitarian con¬
siderations, and sane are not. In many, perhaps in most instances, we approve
of a man's action, or of his character, because it is conducive to some state
of affairs whioh is a source of pleasure to others, or even to himself. But
in same cases, Hume suggests, the action or quality of character is itself
pleasurable to the agent or to others. Thus there is no point in commending
them beoause of their utility in bringing about pleasure, A man*s"wit",
or his "easy and disengag'd behavior", Hume claims, "are qualities immediately
agreeable to others", (T, 590) That is to say, there are some qualities
whioh please us because they bring about sane other (distinct) pleasure;
there are other qualities which please U3 without bringing about some other
(distinct) pleasure, These latter are "immediately agreeable". The pleasure
we take in them does not depend on any other pleasure.
The same is time of the aesthetic sentiments. In some instances, an
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object is thought beautiful (i.e, pleases in a oertain way) because of some
property or properties which give rise to a distinct pleasure; in others,
an objeot pleases because it has a certain form or appearance. In a case
of the first sort we may say: "That pleases me in a certain way (i.e, is
beautiful) because it is comfortable (i.e, because it is a source of a
certain pleasure)". In the latter case we might say: "That pleases me in
a certain way (i.e, is beautiful) just because of the way it looks". In
saying this one is, in effect, 3aying that the object which pleases does
not give rise to any other pleasure than an aesthetic one, or at least that
any other pleasures it might give rise to are of no interest, or are
beside the point. To be sure, Hume stresses aesthetio sentiments of the
first sort: his acoount of aesthetic judgments is perhaps regrettably
utilitarian. In noticing the utilitarianism of his aesthetics, however,
we must not fail to notice its non-utilitarian dimension. The very faot
that Hume, despite his utilitarian bias, should consistently make conces¬
sions to a non-utilitarian account reveals the fact of his continuing aware¬
ness of this other dimension. And Hume does consistently make oonoessions
to a non-utilitarian account of aesthetic sentiments. Consider the following
passages:
The order andconvenience of a palace are no less essential to
itsibo&uty^ than its mere figure and appearanoe. (T, 299-Italics mine)
This observation extends to tables, chairs, scritoires, chimneys,
coaches, saddles, ploughs, and indeed to every work of art; it
being a universal rule, that their beauty is chiefly deriv'd from
utility, and from their fitness for that purpose, to which they
are destin'd. (T, 364.Italics mine)
•Tis evident, that nothing renders a field more agreeable than
its fertili-ty, and that scarce anv advantages of ornament or
situation will be able to equal this beauty. (T, 364.Italics mine)
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The ngincipal part of personal beauty is an air of health and
vigour, and such a construction of members as promises strength
and activity# (T, 365'Italics mine-)
In each of these passages, while stressing the utilitarian dimension of
his aesthetic theory, Hume reveals his recognition of instances in which
the aesthetic sentiments occur directly or immediately, from the "mere
figure and appearance" of an object or a person#
Granted this, it is surely implausible to insist that such non-
utilitarian aesthetic sentiments nevertheless depend on a prior pleasure
or pain# That is to say, it is implausible to suggest that, in a case where
one has a pleasant feeling upon contemplating the faoe of a beautiful woman,
this aesthetic feeling is the effect of a prior pleasant feeling. The
case seems rather to be that pleasure enters the situation, as it were,
upon the occurrence of the pleasant (aesthetio) feeling# Suoh aesthetic
feelings suit Hume'3 account of a few passions mentioned earlier: "These
passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil /read: pleasure and pain/
and proceed not from them, like the other affections." (T, 4-39)
Some aesthetic sentiments, then, may properly be described as impress¬
ions of reflection which do not presuppose a prior pleasure or pain. They
are like bodily pleasures and pains in that they do not require a prior pain
or pleasure, but unlike them, and like the other impressions of reflection,
in that they do require a prior (cognitive) perception. Unless one is aware
of an object, one cannot have an aesthetic response to it#3"
must point out here that I am not talking of objective aesthetic senti¬
ments# On Hume's view, for a sentiment to be objective the meohanism of
sympathy must operate, and thus prior pleasures or pains in the sense of
a sympathetic experience of the pleasures or pains of others are involved
in one's slaving the objective sentiment in question. For this reason, no
moral sentiments can oocur without prior pleasures or pains. But I can see
no reason for saying that Hume does not allow non-obJeotive aesthetio 3enti-
ments, and thus aesthetic sentiments which do not depend on prior (sympathetic;
pleasures or pains. For a discussion of these points see the chapter The
natural virtues and sympathy" in Ardal, Passion and Value, pp. 14S-161.
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It follows frail this that the class of impressions of reflection which
do not require a prior perception of pain or pleasure is larger than at
first appears. Besides the desire of the happiness of our friends or of
punishment to our enemies, lust, hunger, and other bodily appetites, this
class includes at least some sentiments of aesthetic pleasure or displeasure.
This class of passions is, in fact, broader still. It would inolude also
the sentiments we receive from those immediately agreeable objects mentioned
in the oourse of Hume's discussion of the moral sentiments, (Whether such
sentiments would themselves be moral sentiments is a question which need
not be considered here.) It would further include the pleasure we derive
from the exercise of our powers (T, 449), from the pursuit of truth (T, 450-4-51}
from novelty (T, 423), and so on. In none of these caser would we say
that the pleasures or emotions involved are physical ones, or the result
of the satisfaction of bodily appetites.. It is not, then, only physical
pleasures which are the source of our values; nor are physical pleasures
and pains the only pleasures and pains fro; vl ich our emotions are derived.
We may now move to that aspect of Hume's classification which is most
prominent in his own presentation of his theory of the passions, the distinc¬
tion between the direct and the indirect passions. 7/hen Hume first introduces
the distinction, he does so in the following wayj
By direct passions I unders ahd such as arise immediately from
good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed
from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities.
(T, 276)
The criterion for the distinction is designed by the word "immediately".
Direct passions arise immediately from pleasure or pain; indirect passions
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arise not immediately from pleasure or pain, but from pleasure or pain
in conjunction other qualities. At this early stage in his account
Hume states that this distinction is not one that he oan "at present just¬
ify or explain anyferther". (T, 276) It must be sufficient to indicate
what passions he will place under each heading. As indireot passions he
mentions "pride, himility, ambition, vmity, love, hatred, envy, pity,
malice, generosity, with their dependents"; under the heading of "direct
passions" come "desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and
security", (T, 276-277)
The distinction between the direct and the indireot passions, then,
is based on alleged differences in the kinds of causal conditions whioh
give rise to each. What are these differences? More particularly, what
are the "other qualities", the "conjunction" of whioh with pleasure or
pain are requisite for the occurrence of the direct passions? We may
notice, at the start, that Hume does not think that pleasure and pain are
alone sufficient for the occurrence of the direct passions. Some element
of cognition is also required: one must be aware of some object or state
of affairs as pleasant or painful. For example, in most cases one must
believe that the occurrence of a given state of affairs would be pleasant
before one can desire its occurrence; one must believe that a "good is
certain or probable" before one can experience joy; it is only when "either
good or evil is unoertain" that one may experience "FEAR or HOPE, according
to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other", (T, 439) Thus
the "other qualities," which, together with pleasure and pain, give rise
to the indirect passions can not be, simply, the ooourrenoe of ary cognitive
state, such as the awareness of such things as the eertainty or probability
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that a state of affairs will or will not oocur, Suoh cognitions may be
constituents of the causal conditions which give rise to the direct passions.
Hume nowhere explicitly redeems his implied promise to give an account
of these "other qualities", but the nature of these other qualities is clear
enough from Hume's discussion of the indirect passions. Consider his
discussion of the possibility that a direct and an indirect passion both
arise from the same prior pleasure or pain. Hume remarks that "the impress¬
ions, which arise from good and evil most naturally, and vtLth the least
preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy,
hope and fear, along with volition". (T, 438) "But," he says, "supposing
that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure the direot
passion/, and that arising from an object related to ourselves or others,
this does not prevent the propensity or aversion /I.e. the direot passion/,
with the consequent emotions, but by concurring with certain dormant prin¬
ciples of the human mind, excites the new impressions of pride and humility,
love or hatred". (T, 438-439) "That propensity", ho continues, "which
unites us to the object, or separates us from it, still continues to operate,
but in conjunction with the indirect passions, which arise from a double
relation of impressions and ideas". (T, 439)
These statements provide the clue to the distinction between the direct
and indirect passions. Roughly, the distinction is this. In the case of
indirect passions, the prior perceptions must include not only the thought
or experience of a pleasant or painful state of affairs, but also the thou^it
of this state of affairs as connected in some way with some person, either
oneself, or someone else. Among the necessary conditions for the occurrence
of an indirect passion is the awareness that a pleasant or painful 3tate of
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affairs was caused by myself or some otter person, or is a property of ny-
8elf or some other person, and so on. Anappropriate cause of an indirect
passion must be some such thing as mj stupid behavior, your ugliness, or
a third person's sharp tongue. One cannot give an adequate causal aocount
of an indirect passion without referring to some person. This is not the
case with respect to the direct passions, and this, I would suggest, is
precisely what is meant by reference to the "immediacy" of these latter
passions.
Take the case of the indirect passion of pride, Hume distinguishes
the object of a feeling of pride from the cause of that feeling, and then,
within the cause of the feeling, he distinguishes a "quality" and the "sub¬
ject" to which that quality is related. Hume offers the case of a man
proud of a beautiful house,
A man, for instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs
to him, or which he has himself built and oontriv'd. Here the
object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful
house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the
quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in
which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the
subject is the house, consider'd as his property or oontrivance.
Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain and
chimerical. Beauty consider'd merely as such, unless plac'd upon
something related to us. never produces any pride or vanity; and
the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else
in its place, has as little influence on that passion. (T, 279.
Italics mine.)
Hume is somewhat misleading in this passage, in that he distinguishes
only two elements of the alleged cause, the "quality" and the "subject",
when in fact he is making use of three. Given his account of the association
of impressions and ideas, Hume must postulate a pleasant or painful feeling,
or at least the idea of one, to explain the feeling-component of the result¬
ant mental state. This pleasant or painful feeling i3 connected with the
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so-called "quality" of the cause, because the quality mentioned is that
property of the cause which gives rise to an independent pleasure or pain.
But to have an association of ideas it is neoessaxy that there be some
relation between the object of the causal cognitive state and the object
of the passion. In the present case this means that the causal conditions
must involve some thought of the person who is the object of the passion
of pride, viz. some thought of the man himself. This is a different oausal
condition than the thought of the "subject" of the "quality", since the
subject is here identified as the house, A full statement of the oausal
conditions of pride requires, then, in Hume's actual practice, not only
the thought of sane quality of an object, together with the separate plea¬
sure or pain produced by that quality, and the thought of the subject of
that quality, but also the thought of the person who possesses or is in
some other way connected with the subject. In the present case it is
necessary that the man (l) be aware of the house; (2) be aware of the beauty
of the house (i.e, have a feeling of pleasure); (3) be aware that the house
belongs to himself. It is this last condition which is not stated with
sufficient clarity in Hume's account, but which is,if my interpretation
of Hume's theory of the indirect passions is correct, essential for disting¬
uishing the indirect from the direct passions.
This interpretation of the alleged causal conditions of pride is more
unequivocally supported by another of Hume's examples:
Thus a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty;
and this pleasure produces the direct PM-Swj,cns | or the impressions
of volition and desire. Again, when these cloaths are oonsider'd
as belonging to ourelf. the double relation conveys to us the
sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion. (T, 439-Italics mine)
The distinction between the two responses to the "fine cloaths" is that,
-209-
in the latter response, the object (in Hume's expression, "subject") whose
qualities give rise to a pleasant feeling, is "consider'd as belonging to
ourself". It is not sufficient that the person be aware of the clothesj
he must be aware of them a3 his own. On Hume's account of pride as a
peculiar pleasant feeling directed toward the self, and his causal explana¬
tion f the occurrence of pride in terms of a double association of impress¬
ions and ideas, it is of course necessary that some reference be made to
the self in his description the causal conditions.
A similar- account is offered of love and hatred. Each is an indireot
passion because xt arises not from a pleasure or pain alone, or even from
an awareness of some state of affairs a3 pleasant or painful, but from an
awareness of some pleasant or painful state of affairs a3 conneoted with
some person other than the person who experiences the love or hatred.
"A prince", Hume says, "that is possess'! of a stately palaoe, commands
the esteem of the people upon that account; and that first, by the beauty
of the palaoe, and secondly, by the relation of property, •.vlJ.ch connects
it with him". (T, 330) Abbreviating his account of love and hatred Hume
remarks: "We may ... suppose with some shew of probability, that the
cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being". (T, 331)
He then goes on to say that this supposition "is not only probable, but too
evident to be contested", (T, 331) Why is this so?
Virtue and vice, when consider*d in the abstract; beauty and
deformity, when plac'd on inanimate objects; poverty and riches,
when belonging to a third person, excite no degree of love or
hatred, esteem or contempt towards those, who have not relation
to them. A person looking out at a window, sees me in the street,
and beyond me a beautiful palace, with which I have no concern:
I believe none will pretend, thatthis person will pay me the same
respect, as if I were the owner of the palace. (T, 331)
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Through all this it is clear that the distinctive feature of the causal
conditions which give rise to the indirect passion of love is the connec¬
tion of the pleasure- or pain-causing quality with some human person. This,
I would submit, is the source of the distinction between a direct and an
indirect passion.
To avoid a possible misapprehension, we may notice that those indirect
passions which Hume desoribes as "desires", Including the passions of ambi¬
tion, benevolence, anger, pity, and malioe, all fall under the heading of
the indirect passions according to the criterion I have indicated. The
oriterion is that the complex cause of the passion include an awareness that
the pleasant or painful state of affairs is oonnected with some person.
Now on Hume's account of these desires, they are immediately caused by a
prior state of love or hatred, (Pride and humility, being "pure emotions
in the soul", do not give rise to desires, aooording to Hume.) But in the
case of both love and hatred, on Hume's theory, one experiences a complex
mental state, comprising both a peculiar pleasant or inful feeling, and
the thought of some person other than oneself. This person is the object
of one's love or hatred. Thus the cause of each of the desires in question
is, in part, the thought of some person. The esires, then, are indirect
passions according to the oriterion described."*"
This account of the desires mentioned seems to imply that, if asked why
he feels benevolence or malevolence toward Afa person can only appropriately
answer that he does so because he loves or hates A, That is, he would raf>r
to another emotion of his own, and not to some valued action or quality of
A's, Whether this account of benevolence and hatred is adequate is a large
question which I shall not tiy to answer here.
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We can now see in what sense a direct passion arises from a prior
pain or pleasure immediately. This is to say that it is not a necessary
(causal) condition for the occurrence of a direct passion that one be aware
of some connection between a pleasant ox nainful state of affairs and 3ome
person. 7fe shall later have occasion to emphasize this difference between
at and an indirect passion when we notice the difference between the
objects of each. Since Hume's account, however, explains the difference
in the objects of the direct and indirect passions by a difference in the
causal conations of each, the criterion for distinguishing them can be
stated exclusively in terms of their causes
I have said nothing thus far concerning a distinction of the passions
on whioh some commentators have placed great stress, the difference between
calm and violent passions. In agreement with Dr. Ardal, I do not feel that
the distinction has the importance for rune's theory of the passions, that
2
some commentators have attributed to it. It certainly does not have the
logical status of the other distinction discussed uI ova. Nevertheless, a
few words are required.
First introducing the distinction of calm and violent impressions of
reflection Hume states:
The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz.
the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of
beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external ob¬
jects, Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief
and joy, pride and humility. (T, 276)
It should be recalled that Hume does not require even the occurrence of a
prior perception of pleasure or pain as a neoesaary (causal) condition for
the occurrence of a direct passion. See my earlier discussion of this point,
^Ardal, pp. 93f.
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"This division," however, "is far from "being exact". (T, 276) The reason
for this inexactness seems to "be that one cannot determine under which of
the two headings to classify a given particular emotional state by consider¬
ing whether, as now experienced, it is a calm emotional state or a violent
one. "The raptures of poetry and music", Hume remarks, "frequently rise
to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called
passions. may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner,
imperceptible". (T, 276) Thus a calm passion may in fact be, as experienced.
violent; and a violent passion may, as experienced, be calm. Hume dispells
this apparent paradox when he explains that "as in general the passions are
more viaScnt than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these im¬
pressions have been commonly distinguish*! from each other". (T, 2760Italics
mine.)
There are two senses, then, of "calm passion". On the one hand, a
passion is calm if it is a passion of the kind that is usually calm, as
experienced. In this sense of "calm" all aesthetic sentiments, and perhaps
other sentiments, are oalm passions. On the other hand, any passion is calm
if, as experienced, it is calm. In this sense seme (most) instances of the
oalm passions are calm, and some (perhaps very few) instances of the violent
passions are calm. The distinction of calm and violent passions as mutually
exclusive olasses of passions, with mutually exclusive kinds of passions as
their members, is not, then, one on which too much stress can be placed.
The distinction is a useful one: "The subject of the human mind being so
copious and various. I shall here take advantage of this ... division,
that I may proceed with the greater order". (T, 276) The division is also,
however, a "vulgar and specious" one, (T, 276)
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It is important not to confuse the distinction between calm and violent
passions with a very different distinction between weak and strong passions.
A passion is violent if its occurrence involves a disturbance of one's mental
state (or if, though calm in this sense, it is a member of a class of passions
instances of which normally involve a disturbance of the mind), A passion
is strong, however, not in virtue of the emotional disturbance it causes,
but in virtue of its actual influence on conduct, "We must," Hume says,
"distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a
strong one", (T, 419) It may, however, be the case that one can establish
an empirical connection between the violence of a passion and its strength.
Thus, it may be the case that, as a rule, violent passions are strong ones,
Hume seems to think this is so, but oautians that the correlation will only
be a probaMistio one; it will not hold in all cases. He expresses this
view when he says; "'tis certain, that when we wou'd govern a man, and push
him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent
than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination, than what
is vulgarly call'd his reason". (T, 419) But there is such a thing as
strength of mind, and this, according to Hume, "implies the prevalence of
the calm passions over the violent", (T, 418)
We must now turn to what is the central question about Hume's classification
of the passions; How is one to distinguish passions, as mental states, from other
mental states. We have already seen one way in which Hume makes this distinction:
passions are different because they are impressions, and because they are
impressions of reflection. As impressions they differ from ideas, and as
impressions of reflection they differ from impressions of sensation. We
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have noted, however, that the distinction Hume makes between impressions
and ideas is not a very satisfactory one because it is not dear whether
he is distinguishing different kinds of object of awareness, or different
kinds of mental acts or states. In some ieppeots, it would seem, Hume's
distinction is intended to be the latter one, but this is not unambiguously
so. Yet it is thi3 distinction which is of interest in understanding Hume's
theory of the passions. We want to know whether Hume has anything of
interest to say about the difference between the passions and other mental
acts or states, other than his unhelpful remarks about vivacity,
: ->r help on thiB question we must turn to the end of Book II and the
beginning of Book III, to the sections entitled "Of the influencing motives
of the will" and "Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason".
In the first of the two sections Hume asserts:
A passion is an original existence, or, if ypu will, modification
of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which
renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When
I am angiy, I am actually possest with the paction, and in that
emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when
I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high, 'Tis im¬
possible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be
contradictor;/ to truth and reason; since this contradiction
consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies,,
with those objects, which they represent. (T, 415)
In the later sections he makes essentially the same point:
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood
consists in ah agreement or disagreement either to the real
relations of jeteis, or to real existence and matter of fact.
Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or
disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can
never be an object of cur reason, How 'tis svxdeni* cux~ pcio,
volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement
or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in
themselves, and Implying no reference to other passions, volitions,
and actions, 'Tis impossible, therefor®, they can be pronounced
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to
reason, (T, 458)
-215-
Many things in "both passages are very odd indeed, and I shall have
occasion in the next chapter to discuss both in much greater detail than
is useful at present. The one point, however, which is necessary for our
present purposes, is reasonably clear, a least in outline. In both passages
Hume is drawing a distinction between 'what I shall call "representative"
merit-:! states, and those which are not represenative, between mental states
which are, in sane sense, "copies", and those which are not. A represent¬
ative mental state is one which "agrees" or "disagrees" with a "relation
of ideas" or a "matter of faot", A non-representative mental state is one
which neither "agrees" nor "disagrees" in this way, because it is not
capable c agreeing or disagreeing. Because representative mental states
nay agree or disagree with relations of ideas or with matters of fact, they
are either true or false; true, if they agree with the way things are, and
false, if they disagree. Because non-representative mental stat® neither
agree nor disagree with the way things are, they are neither true nor false.
One may appropriately criticize a representative suit a : true or false;
such criticise, is inappropriate in the case of non ropreountative mental
states because there simply is no way in which they can either agree or
disagree with the way things are. Such agreement and disagreement are not,
one might say, their point,
Hume does not, so far, say how one determines whether a given mental
state is representative or non-representative; perhaps he thinks of the
difference as an irreducible one which is transparent to consciousness.
In any saso, all representative mental states are grouped under the heading
oj. "reason"; all non-representative mental states under that of "passions".
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The division is roughly the same as that which I drew earlier "between
cognitive states and emotion?! states. Under "emotional states", in this
context, Rime would place "passions" (including "desires"), "volitions",
and, at times, "action?", especially "internal actions", (of, T, 465)
Hume certainly insists on a rigid dichotorry "between reason and the
passions, or between cognitive 3tates and emotional states. They are, for
hin, radically difference kinds of things. This does not, however, involve
him in saying that the -nssions and cognition have no connections, or no
important connections, We have already had occasion to notice his views
about impressions of reflection, and their objects. Moreover, as he says
in a rav ">r different context: "human nature ... /is/ compos'd of two
prinoipal parts, which are requisite in all it3 actions, the affections
and understanding". (T, 493) It is in fact such precedent or accompanying
cognitive states whose occurrence, and whose truth or falsity, lead us to
describe a passion as reasonable or unreasonable; As Hume remarks, " a
passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being
unreasonable . (T, 416) In such a case, however, and this is his point,
"'tis not the paaeion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the
judgment". (T, 416)
In formulating this distinction between cognitive and emotional states
Hume occasionally uses terminology which can only be misleading. In intro¬
ducing the question whether moral distinctions are derived from reason,
Hume adopts the following principle:
ho. .£ perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, viz.
impressions and ileas. this distinction gives rise to a question,
with which we shall open up our present enquiry concerning morals,
whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish
betwixt vice and virtue. and pronounce an action blameable or
praise-worthy? (T. 456)
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The upshot of Hume's argument is that we do not distinguish vice and virtue
by means of our ideas; therefore they must be distinguished by our impress¬
ions# But the term "impression" is too general to suit Hume's purpose,
sinoe it includes perceptions of colors, sounds, tastes, and so on. If
calling moral judgments impressions were sufficient to distinguish the
class of perceptions within which they fall, Hume would still have the
problem of distinguishing moral judgments x*rom other impressions such
as colors, shapes, and sounds, or, on an alternative interprotation of
"perception", from such mental acts as. seeing a color, hearing a sound,
and so on. But it is difficult to believe that Hume does not think he has
already shown, by his criterion of non-representativeness (however that
is to be cashed), th ^ moral judgments are not like these perceptions.
It is difficult, that is to say, to believe that perceptions of colors
are, in the relevant sens>, any less representative than recollecti s
of Paris, or the thought that all triangles have three sides. This is
especially so if we recall Hume's claim that the three traditional "acts
of the understanding", viz. "conception, judgment, and reasoning" all
"resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular -ays
of conceiving our objects", (T, 96-97 n.) There is, of course, the diffi¬
culty that Hume, in the section entitled "Of scepticism with regard to
the senses", asserts that "our senses offer not their impressions as the
images of semething distinct, or independent. and external". (T, 189)
But if Hume were to insist on this point in his later discussion ofreason
and the passions, it mould be extremely difficult to see how he expects
the representative/non-represent itive distinction to e drawn. We mf$r,with
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good reason then, take Hume's point to he that moral judgments are members
of the class of impressions of reflection, and not just the class of
impressions. And the reason for this must he that impressions of reflection
are non-representative, whereas ideas, and impressiore other than impressions
of reflection, are representative.
Even this, however, will not do, for it seems dearly to he the oase
that some impressions of sensation are non-representative, if this means
they are not ahout any matters of fact. I am thinking ahout what Hume calls
physical pains and pleasures. Whereas it seems Hume must want to say that
my seeing a color or hearing a sound is in seme 3ense representative, i.e.
that suoh mental states somehow copy the world, he would surely not want
to say that a mental state descrihahle as my heing in pain in any way copies
the world, or even myself. It is at least prima facie plausible to suggest
that physical pain and pleasure fall on the non-representative side of Hume's
divide. They are, in this respect, more like the passions than like reason.
I mentioned earlier that it is difficult to know how Hum^ in fac^ makes
his non-representative/representative distinction. I suggested that perhaps
he thought the distinction was immediately apparent. My remarks in the
previous paragraph, however, suggest a possible independent criterion which
Hume may have used to distinguish mental acts or states as representative
or non-representative. The criterion is whether the mental act or state
in question has an hedonic quality, whether, that is, it is intrinsically
either pleasant or painful. Perhaps it would he more correct to say that
this new criterion provides, on Hume's theory, for a division of mental acts
or states that is extensionally equivalent with that created by the represent-
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ative/non-representative distinction. It seems to be Hume's view that all
passions, or all impressions of reflection, are, intrinsically, pleasant or
painful feelings. Certainly all those passions whioh are not deaoribed as
desires are thought of as pleasant or painful sensations. And, as I shall
argue in the next seotlon, Hume describes even desires as though they were
pleasant or painful sensations. Moreover, it is tautologous that all physical
pleasures and pains are pleasant or painful sensations. On the other hand,
no representative mental act or statu, qua representative, is described in
this way. By applying the criterion hedonic/non-hedonic, then, Hume seems
to arrive at the same classification of mental states as he does by applying
the criterion non-representative/representative.
A third possible oriterion for this classification of mental acts or
states depends on whether the mental act or stato is a member of that olass
of mental acts or states reference to which provides a logically impeccable
reason for doing anything. But I shall treat this question in detail in
the next chapter, and so shall leave any comment until then.
One further terminological ambiguity in 3 ime's distinction of represen¬
tative and non-representative mental stateo needs' to be noticed. In a passage
quoted earlier, Hume makes the claims "VThen I am angry, I am aotually possest
with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other
object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high", (T, 415)
The ambiguity resides in Hume's use of "object". Griven Hume's account of
"anger" earlier in the Treatise, it is simply untrue tc say that anger has
no "reference to any other object", at least in one possible sense of that
very vague expression. Anger is an indirect passion, and as 3uch always
has an object. Thirst as wellhas an object, unless it be construed simply
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as a physical pain. But Hume*a point in this passage does not depend on
the very dubious claim (which Hume elsewhere rejects) that passions have
no objeots. His remark should rather be read as a way of saying that
passions, unlike cognitive states, are non-representative mental states.
In so far as I am angry, I am not describing the world, or myself, in any
way.
By way of summary of this very long discussion of the classification
of the passions, I will append an outline of Hume's classification of
perceptions, putting particular emphasis on non-representative perceptions.
Several points may be noticed about this classification. It displays the
quite sharp distinction Huiuu -aws between the passions and cognition.
This distinction, in turn, seems very closely connected in Hume's mind with
the view that passions are intrinsically pleasant or painful sensations,
and that it is passions whioh, in some sense, move one to aotion. The
classification also serves to show the close ties between physical pains
or pleasures and the passions, despite their important differences (and
especially despite the fact that passions are reflective impressions). It
points up, as well, a possible source of confusion in Kemp Smith's use of
the expression "primary passions". Saying that a passion is primary is not,
as might initially seem the case, the same as saying that an impression is
original. No original impressions are passions, and no primary passions are
original impressions. All primary passions are non-original in so far as
their occurrence presupposes a prior perception. They ore primary > only
in the sense that they do not presuppose a prior perception of pleasure or
pain. The classification also, in so far as it mentions instances of the
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primaiy passions, shows that some instances of aesthetic sentiment are
primary passions, On this point, my view differs from that of Kemp
X '2
Smith and of Ardal , The classification also makes explicit the criter¬
ion for distinguishing the direct and indirect passions. No mention is made
of the calm or violent passions, since this distinction oould he made
within at lea3t each of the sub-olasses below that of refleotive impressions.
"hcemp Smith, p. 168
Ardal, p, 11.
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Perceptlona (taken as mental acts or states)
(l) Non-representative 8
do not describe ti. world; have
a hedonic quality; reference to




prior perception not a necessary
condition for their occurrence;
this class includes some of Hume's
"impressions of sensation", vis,
physical pleasures and nains.
(l) Primary:
do not require a prior percept¬
ion of pleasure or pain: this class
includes some aesthetic sentiments,
some of fame's "direct" passions,




no necessary connection with a
human person; this clas3 includes
desire, aversion, grief, joy,
hope, fear, and so on.
(2) Represenfcafcf.ve:
describe the world; h , /a no
hedonio quality; reference to








a prior perception is a necess¬
ary condition for their occurr¬
ence; at times Hume uses "pass¬
ions" to designate this class
of perceptions.
(2) Secondary:
require the prior occurrence of
a perception of pain or pleasure:
at times Hume restricts the use
of "passions" to this class of
perceptions.
(2) Indirect:
the awareness of some person a
necessary causal condition for
their occurrence; this class
includes love, hatred, pride,
humility, "benevolence, anger,
and so on.
2* The Nature of the Passions
Having considered at length the way in which Hume classifies the passions,
I turn now to discuss his views on the nature of the passions. I shall pay
particular attention to the following points: Hume*s claim that the passions
are simple impressions; his account of the objects of the various passions;
his account of the relations between the passions and human behavior; his
discussion of the circumstances within which the passions occur; the
elasticity of Hume's use of the term "passion"; and the distinction between
passions as occurrences and passions as dispositions.
More than one commentator has noted that, on Hume's view, the passions are
simple impressions, or simple feeling-states. As Hume remarks of pride and
humility, they are "simple and uniform impressions". (T,277) Similarly, he
says of love and hatred: "they produce merely a simple impression, without any
mixture or composition". (T,329) But what does being a "simple impression"
amount to? Introducing the notion of "simple impressions" very early in the
Treatise Hume says that they are "such as admit of no distinction nor separation".
(T,2) The perceptions of a particular color, a particular taste, or a particular
smell are given as examples. He elucidates the notion of simplicity in his
comments on the simplicity of the impressions of pride and humility. It is a
oonsequence of their simplicity that "'tis impossible we can ever, by a
multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the
passions". (T,277) Similarly, because love and hatred are simple impressions,
it is "altogether impossible to give any definition" of them. (T,329) Moreover,
talking of volition, which he sometimes construes as a passion, Hume observes:
"This impression, like the preceding ones of pride and humility, love and
hatred, 'tis impossible to define". (T,399) Because there are no simpler
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eleraents into vdiich ary passion can be analyzed, there are no more primitive
terms by means of which a definition might be given. Each passion, i.e. each
kind of passion, is fundamentally irreduoible.
The simplicity of the passions does not, on Hume's account, compromise the
possibility of similarities between them. Love and pride, though distinct
simple feeling-states, are similar in that both are pleasant; hatred and
humility are likewise similar in their unpleasantness. In Hume's words, it is
possible for there to be a "similarity or resemblance" between two ideas (and
thus between the impressions of which the ideas are ideas) without it being
"necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance shou'd be distinct or
separable from that in which they differ", (T,637) "Blue and green," Hume
claims, "are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and
scarlet: tho' their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation
or distinction", (T,637) Whether Hume is justified in asserting that simplicity
is consistent with similarity is a point which need not detain us here. It is
sufficient at this point to notice that Hume's causal account of the passions
in terms of the association of impressions and ideas requires that the two
notions be consistent, Hume's explanation depends on a resemblance between two
passions which are, by hypothesis, simple impressions.
It is difficult to know how Hume would draw a line between one distinct
passion and another. Presumably he would think that the ordinary language of
the passions goes some way toward marking the major distinctions. He does,
however, give some indication of the aoouracy of discernment whioh he thinks is
possible on the part of a careful observer at various places in the Treatise.
1 x
For a defense of Hume on this point see Ardal, pp.13-15.
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(Theoretically, it must be remembered, such discernment can only be a matter of
reading the differences of the passions off their faces, as it were.) The
results of one suoh discernment are recorded in a very interesting passage on
the varieties of pleasures and pains:
'Tis evident, that under the term pleasure, we comprehend
sensations, which are very different from each other, and
vdiieh have only such a distant resemblance, as is requisite
to make them be express'd by the same abstraot term. A
good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally
produoes pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is
determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon
that aocount, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of
a good flavour? In like manner an inanimate object, and
the character or sentiments of any person may, both of them,
give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different,
this keeps our sentiments concerning them from being
confounded, and makes us ascribe virtue to one, and not to
the other. Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain,
which arises from charaoters and action, of that peculiar
kind, which makes us praise or oondemn. The good qualities
of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our
esteem and respect, 'Tis only when a character is
considered in general, without reference to our particular
interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as
denominates it morally good or evil. (T,472)
Presumably it is a similar nice discernment which enables Hume to say: "Terror.
consternation, astonishment, anxiety, and other passions of that kind, are
nothing but different species and degrees of fear". (T,447) Apparently, too, it
is possible to distinguish several distinct simple impressions, all of which come
to be grouped under the heading of love: "Love may shew itself in the shape of
tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will. and in many other
appearances". (T,2t48)
I shall try, at a later point, to offer some explanation why Hume should
have insisted that each distinct kind of passion is a unique kind of simple
impression. The account surely has, prima facie, a highly implausible ring to
it. At this point I would merely call attention to the fact that Hume's theory
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is independent of any explicit theory about the language of the emotions.
That is to say, Hume's thesis about the simplioity of the passions is neither
supported by linguistic considerations nor tested against the facts of language.
It is presented as a psychological thesis about what appears to the careful
observer of his own emotions. In faot, there is some reason to believe that
Hume thinks ordinary language does not mark, with sufficient aoouracy, each of
the intrinsically different kinds of passions we may experience, and of which we
may become aware. Speaking generally about the "operations of the mind" Hume
observes that "'tis very difficult to talk of the operations of the mind with
perfect propriety and exactness; because oommon language has seldom made any
very nice distinctions among them, but has generally call'd by the same term all
such as nearly resemble each other". (T,105) It is surely to be expected, then,
that some actual differences between intrinsioally different but closely
resembling passions will not be captured by ordinary language.1
Presumably Hume thinks that kind-differences between two very closely
resembling passions are disoernible by some form of reflective or introspective
attending to one's own feeling-states. The ability to make such distinctions
with any precision may not be common; in fact, great care may need to be
exercised in the project. We may recall Hume's remarks, in the first Enquiry,
about the difficulties of this exercise, which is looked upon as a peculiarly
philosophical one. (EHLJ,13) But, if his claim about the intrinsic differences
of simple impressions is to be sustained with respect to the passions, Hume
1
In this connection it is interesting to note the olaim of a recent writer,
John Benson, that ordinary language is extremely deficient in its specifically
emotional vocabulary. Aocording to Benson, this deficiency is remedied by
our ability to express differences of emotion in language that is not
exclusively emotion-language. See John Benson, "Emotion and Expression",
Philosophical Review, LXXVI (1967), pp.335-357.
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must assume, or have reason to believe, that the project is capable of
prosecution. In fact, he does not think it a difficult task in all cases.
As he says of pride and humility, "the impressions they represent [are] the
most common of ary", and thus "every one, of himself, will be able to form a
just idea of them, without any danger of mistake". (T,277) The same is
alleged to be true of the passions of love and hatred: "These passions of
themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience".
(T,329) But even in the case of these four passions a difficulty arises.
At least at times the terms "love", "hatred", "pride" and "humility" are taken
as designating classes of passions whioh are in turn divisible into intrinsically
different sub-classes, as we have seen above. But on Hume's account, this
division into sub-olasses is justified only if members of one sub-class are
intrinsically different, as "impressions", from members of other sub-olasses.
Despite the difficulties, however, Hume gives some indication of the
discriminatory procedure he envisages, when he describes a case in which someone
might be uncertain whether his judgment of another person's character is a
biased or a moral judgment. On Hume's theory, these two responses are, as
experiences, intrinsically different. Can the claim be justified by intro¬
spection, or by some other form of reflection on one's conscious experience?
Hume describes the problem and the alleged solution in this way:
'Tis true, those sentiments, from interest and morals, are
apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one another.
It seldom happens, that we do not think an eneny vicious,
and can distinguish betwixt his opposition to our interest
and real villaiqy or baseness. But this hinders not, but
that the sentiments are, in themselves, distinct; and a man
of temper and judgment may preserve himself from these
illusions. In like manner, tho* 'tis certain a musical
voice is nothing but one that naturally gives a particular
kind of pleasure; yet 'tis difficult for a man to be
sensible, that the voice of an enemy is agreeable, or to
allow it to be musical. But a person of a fine ear, who
has the command of himself, can separate these feelings,
and give praise to what deserves it. (T,472)
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Clearly, then, Him® thinks that though it is often difficult, it is in principle
possible to distinguish each of those intrinsioally distinct kinds of simple
impressions which he calls passions, by a close and careful inner scrutiny of the
impression qua impression.
In fact, however, Hume does notthink the situation is quite as desperate
as it appears from the description T have given. This is so because clues are
available which assist one to notice the difference between intrinsioally different
but similar passions. Differences in the passions are thought to be lawfully
correlated with differences in the circumstances which give rise to them, their
objeots, and their effects. As Hume remarks at one point in the Treatise:
"'Tis easy to imagine how a different situation of the objeot, or a different
turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion". (T,2»47-448) If
this is so, Hume has some reason for suggesting that by noticing differences in
the circumstances in which we find ourselves, the direction of our attention,
and the character of our behavior, our attention may be drawn to differences
between closely resembling, though unique, feeling-states. This is the procedure
Hume recommends in his methodological remarks in the first chapter of the first
1
Enquiry, as I noted much earlier. Hume touohes on this possibility in the
Treatise as well when, remarking on the impossibility of defining the simple
impressions of pride and humility, he says: "The utmost we can pretend to is a
description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them".
(T,277) He then "enter[s] upon the examination of these passions", and the
examination begins with a discussion of the "causes" and "objects" of each*
Later, talking of love and hatred, Hume elaborates upon this notion of a des¬
cription of a simple impression, referring to a "description of them, drawn
1
Chapter I, section 4.
-229-
from their nature, origin, causes and objects". (T,329) Much of Hume's
associationist account of the passions is, in fact, an attempt to state,
in some detail, the lawful correlations which do obtain.
For the sake of accuracy, we must notioe some difficulties in the view that
Hume insists that all the passions are simple impressions. We have already
quoted Hume's remarks that "'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words,
give a just definition of them [i.e. pride and humility], or indeed of suiy of the
passions". (T,277. Italios mine) Reading this remark in its context, it is
clear that the reason for the impossibility of defining any of the passions is
that each is a simple impression. If a passion were not simple, it would, in
principle at any rate, be possible to define it. At other places in the Treatise.
however, Hume does seem to talk of non-simple passions. Fear and hope, for
example, seem to be non-simple passions: "grief and joy being intermingled with
each other, by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by their
union the passions of hope and fear". (T,44l) Hume mentions, as well, several
"compound passions, which proceed from a mixture of love and hatred with other
affections". (T,394) Of these "compound passions" he pays most attention to
"that love, which arises betwixt the sexes". (T,394) "'Tis plain," he says,
"that this affection, in its most natural state, is deriv'd from the conjunction
of three different impressions or passions". (T,394) Can Hume, consistent with
these statements, maintain the simplicity of all the passions?
It is at least clear that he tries to do so. At one point Hume distinguishes
two kinds of compounds. (T,3o6) Some kinds of compounds are formed by a
"conjunction" of distinct elements that remain distinct in the compound. Compound
ideas (in the sense of objects of perception) are always mere conjunctions:
"Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endow*d with a kind of impenetrability,
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by which they exclude one another". (T,366) Other compounds are formed by a
"mixture" of distinct elements vhich lose their distinctness in the compound.
Impressions and passions form compounds in this way. They are "susceptible of
an entire union: and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each
of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression,
which arises from the whole". (T,366. Italics mine) Hume*s mention of colours
is interesting, and helps explain his meaning. If a painter mixes some yellow
and some red paint the result will be orange. If a normal observer were to be
asked the color of the paint on the painter's palette, he would say it was
orange. Nevertheless, a sense could be attached to the statement that the
paint is red and yellow, or perhaps, a mixture of red and yellow. Saying this
in no way, however, detracts from the truth of the statement: "The paint is
orange". The two statements sue compatible with one another. And this seems
to be Hume's point about the compound passions. If two passions are mixed
together, and not just conjoined, the resultant compound will produce a uniform
impression, i.e. be a simple impression. The point is brought out, in
Hume's discussion of hope and fear, when Hume draws an analogy between the
mixing of grief and joy, and the mixing of lights of different colors. Hope
and fear are mixtures of grief and joy in much the same way as "a colour* d ray
of the sun ... is a composition of two others". (T,2+2*4) (Sense is attached to
this latter statement by referring to the results of passing a ray of light
through a prism.)
Thus it would seem that Hume's talk of compound passions need not compromise
his claim that all passions are simple impressions. Whether this means of
achieving consistencyis used in every instance in which Hume talkB of
compound passions is a further question which I shall not try to answer.
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We may now turn to Hume* s account of the connections between the passions,
construed as simple impressions, and their causes, objects, and effects. I shall
begin with the objects of the passions.
H ume makes particular use of the concept of the object of a passion in his
discussion of the indirect passions, pride and humility, love and hatred. Pride
and humility, he says, "tho* directly contrary, have yet the same object. This
object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we
have an intimate memory and consciousness". (T,277) When I experience pride I
am, in some sense, proud of myself; when I experience humility I am similarly
ashamed of myself. The same is true of love and hatred; "The objeot of love
and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we
are not consoious". (T,329)
What is involved in this notion of an "object" of a passion? Hume tries
to elucidate this notion by a series of metaphors, involving the ideas of being
directed or of having one's thoughts turned. The self is the object of pride:
"Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions".
(T,277) Again, describing the self as "that individual person, of whose
actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious", Hume says: "Here at
last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these passions".
(T,286) Love and hatred, similarly, "are always directed to 3ome sensible
being external to us". (T,329) Hume refers to this phenomenon as a "peculiar
direction of the thought". (T,286) Hume's talk of the direction of the
passions to their objects bears, at least initially, a striking similarity to
Wittgenstein's remark that the emotions have targets:
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Fe should distinguish between the object of fear
and the cause of fear.
Thus a faoe which inspires fear or delight (the
object of fear or delight), is not on that aocount its
cause, but • one might say - its target
It is not at all clear, however, what sense one is to make of Hume's olaim
that each of the indirect passions is directed to some person as its object.
In what sense can a simple impression have a direction? Surely, oua simple
impression, a passion is logically independent of any other state of affairs.
That is to say, if words for passions are words for simple impressions, then
propositions using those words can not entail propositions about other states
of affairs, including other psychological states, in virtue of the meaning of
these words. Hume is on the right track, certainly, when he says that each of
the indirect passions has an object; one oan adduce independent reasons for
making this claim. For example, one can point to the oddity of suoh locutions
as "Jack loves" or "Jill hates". Or one oan point to the fact that in most
uses of "pride", one correctly expects some appropriate answer to the question
2
"What are you proud of?" addressed to someone who says "I am very proud".
But Hume does not mention any faots about the language of the passions, and, in
faot, his thesis of the simplicity of the passions rejects the basis of any
linguistic support for the thesis that passions have objects.
Hume apparently tries to give sense to this notion of the direotion of a
passion by talking of a causal connection between the passion and its object.
The mind, Hume says, "has certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion;
that passion, when produc'd, naturally turns the view to a certain object", (T,396)
•j
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.F.M. Anscombe
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963),1,476.
2
I shall later have occasion to point out that, on Hume's account of the
objects of the indirect passions, the normal sorts of correct answer to this
question would not identify what he calls the object of the passion.
-233-
One oan thus determine the direction of a passion by considering what thoughts
the passion naturally gives rise to. Pride is directed to the self; that is to
say, when one experiences pride, one always thinks of oneself. Love is direoted
to some other person; that is, whenever one experiences the simple impression
of love, one thinks of some other person.
We saw, in the previous chapter, a major difficulty which this account
<1
creates within Hume's associationist scheme. There are, however, more
interesting independent objections to this account, a consideration of which
will reveal the deficiencies of Hume's attempt to show how passions are related
to their objects.
Let us take the case of love. W/hat is it that the feeling of love is
supposed to cause? Whatever this is will be the object of love, and the
identification of it will enable us to say to *faat the passion is directed.
Using the distinction framed earlier between aot and object, there are two
possibilities: either the passion causes the thought of someone other than
nyself; or the passion oauses the object of the thought of someone else,
i.e. someone else.
The second possibility may be rejected immediately as absurd. My love of
Mary doesn't cause Mary; nor does ay pride cause me*. "Love is directed to some
person other than oneself" must, then, if "direction" is to be cashed in terms of
"causal connection", be interpreted as "Love causes the thought of some other
person". But this cannot be the correct interpretation of "Love is directed
to some person other than oneself", if this is supposedly equivalent to "The
object of love is some person other than oneself", because the object of love is
1pp. 143-146.
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not the thought of someone other than oneself, but that person himself (or
herself). If John loves Mazy, the object of John's love is not the thought of
Mazy, but Mazy herself. Even if Hume is correct in saying that the self is
the object of pride, he cannot intend this to mean that the thought of myself
is the object of try pride. But if he wants to say, fairly unexceptionably,
that Mazy is the object of John* s love, he cannot construe the relation between
a passion and its object as a causal one. From this it seems to follow that
the notion of direction cannot be elucidated in terms of the notion of cause
and effect.
It is only an act-object ambiguity in Hume's use of the term "idea" which
could have led him down this particular blind alley. The object of an indirect
passion is not the thought of oneself or of someone else, but, simply, oneself or
someone else. And it is only the accompanying idea, in the sense of cognitive
mental aot or state, that can with ary plausibility be said to be caused by the
passion. Only because the term "idea" sometimes does service for "the thought
of ..." and sometimes for "that of which we think" could this particular attempted
elucidation of "direction" recommend itself. Once this ambiguity is sorted out,
however, it is clear that the notion of causation applies only in cases where one
is not talking about the object of the passions, and the concept of an object of
a passion can be understood only in cases where the relation is not a causal one.
It is worth stressing, however, that it is not in fact clear that Hume
wishes to assert a causal connection between a passion and its object.
Anthory Kerny claims that, on Hume's account, a passion is "not related, except
causally, to any object of its own; for an emotion was private and mental and
its object (frequently) public and physical". This claim has a very peculiar
Venry, p.62.
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ring, because it seems to imply, on Hume's part, the very odd suggestion that
ay (private) pride-feeling causes some public thing or event, vis, its object.
This is the first of the two alternatives mentioned above and rejected; it is
difficult to think Hume wanted to say this. The second of the alternatives
would not, obviously, suit Kenny's description, since thoughts, for Hume at
any rate, are not "public and physical". But what other alternatives are
open to Hume? Perhaps my suggestion in the previous chapter is closer to
2
That Hume wanted to assert. He may, that is, have been primarily concerned
to insist on a lawlike, though contingent, connection between a passion and a
cognitive state. This, of course, does not entail a causal connection between
the two. It is simply to say that, for example, when I am proud my thoughts
are always directed to myself. On this view, the notion of the direction of a
passion would not be cashed in tenns of a causal connection between a passion
and its object, but in terms of the direction of the specific cognitive states
which always accompany specific kinds of passions. Even if this is Hume's
view, however, it is open to two main objections, and is still inadequate for
elucidating the notion of the direction of a passion to its object. If
formulated in the way I have formulated it, the acoount is circular, since it
presupposes a notion of the direction of a cognitive state to its object.
Moreover, this account has the very peculiar consequence that no passions have
objects because, in the situation so envisaged, the self is not, in fact, the
object of the passion but the object of the thought. A proud person would, on
this view, have two mental experiences: the feeling of pride and the thought
1
If Kenny means rather to say that a passion is caused its object, he is
misrepresenting Hume, who insists, as we shall see later, on the difference
between the cause of a passion and its object.
^p, 146 •
-2j6-
of himself. The two experiences would be lawfully related, though contingently
so, but there would be no genuine sense in which the self would be the object of
the pride, as opposed to the objeot of the thought.
It would seem, then, that Hume can offer no satisfactory account of the
object of a passion so long as he construes the passion as a logically independent
simple impression. In fact, construing passions as simple impressions, it seems
contradictory even to say that there is a contingent connection between a passion
and its object; though there is no harm in talking of a contingent conneotion
between a passion and the object of some other mental state. As I said earlier,
Hume is on the right track when he claims that the passions have objects; but
if try subsequent analysis is correct, it is clearly inconsistent with this to
claim that a passion is a logically independent simple impression. If a passion
has an object, the connection between it and its objeot must be something other
than a contingent one.
The faot that Hume* s general theory of the relation between a passion and
its objeot is inadequate does not, of course, mean that Hume has nothing of
interest to say about the objects of the passions. One philosophically interesting
point that may be noticed is Hume* s insistence that a distinction must be made
between the cause of a passion, and its object. Talking of pride and humility
Hume asserts, quite emphatically: "But tho* that connected succession of
perceptions, whioh we call 3elf. be always the object of these two passions,
'tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them".
(T,277-278) Similarly in the case of love and hatred: "But tho' the objects
of love and hatred be always some other person, 'tis plain that the object is not,
properly speaking, the cause of these passions, or alone sufficient to exoite
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them". (T,330) Once again, because of the act-object ambiguity in Hume's
term
use of the/*idea" it is essential to be quite oareful in interpreting Hume.
Is Hume saying (a) that the (complex) mental state which causes pride or
humility, love or hatred, and which comprises both an emotional and a
cognitive element, is a numerically distinct mental state from that cognitive
state describable, ambiguously to be sure, as "the thought of the object of
pn (where "p" stands for a passion); or (b), more restrictedly, that the initial
cognitive state is numerically distinct from the later one describable as "the
thought of the object of p"; or (c), very differently, that the object of the
complex mental state is different from the object of the second, resultant mental
state. Hume would certainly say both (a) and (b), because the truth of both is
presupposed by his associationist account of mental events. But in the passage
quoted he seems rather to be interested in asserting (c). Y<hat, then, is he
asserting in asserting (o)?
Consider Hume's argument in support of the claim that the oause of a passion
is different from the object of that passion. In the case of pride and humility
he claims that, since both passions have the same object (the self), if the self
could justifiably be called the cause of pride, it could with equal justification
be called the cause of humility. But then no reason can be given why one passion
and not the other would arise, given (an awareness of) the self.
For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same
object in oommonj were their object also their cause; it
cou'd never produce any degree of the one passion, but at the
same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which
opposition and contrariety must destroy both ... [slupposing it
to be the view only of ourself, which excited them Li*®* both
pride and humilityJ, that being perfectly indifferent to either,
must produce both in the very same proportion; or in other words,
can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at the same time
raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo
what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfeotly calm and
indifferent. (T,278)
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Precisely the same argument leads to the same conclusion with regard to the
object and cause of love and hatred:
For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their
sensation, and have the same object in common, if that
object were also their cause, it wou'd produce these
opposite passions in an equal degree; and as they must,
from the very first moment, destroy each other, none of
them wou'd ever be able to make its appearance. There
must, therefore, be some oause different from the object.
(T,330)
But what does this argument prove? It does prove that one's description of
the object of love or the object of hatred can not be identical with one's
description of the cause of either. But it does not prove that the object of the
passion can not be mentioned in one's description of the oause. In fact, as we
have seen earlier, the object of the passion must be mentioned in one* s descrip¬
tion of the cause if one is to give an associationist aocount; after all, such
an account requires an association of ideas. Strictly, then, Hume wants to say
not (a) the object of a passion is not a part cause of the passion; but (b) the
object of the passion is not the sufficient cause of the passion. Awareness of
the object of a passion is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the
occurrence of that passion. This interpretation is certainly borne out by Hume's
formulation of his thesis, if read carefully: "tho* ... [the] self, be always the
object of these two passions [i.e. pride and humility], 'tis impossible it can be
their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them". (T,277-278. Italics mine.)
Similarly, "'tis plain that the object [of love or hatred] is not, properly
speaking, the cause of these passions, or alone sufficient to excite them".
(T,330* Only "cause" is italicized in original.) On Hume's account, then, the
object of pride or humility, love or hatred, is that person whose actions,
qualities, etc. cause the passion. I am proud of myself, because of virtue.
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I love Sally because of her kindness tto me. I hate Sam because he has insulted
me in publio.
Hume's thesis seems to amount to this. In the case of the indirect passions
of pride, humility, love, and hatred, the object of each passion is some person,
oneself or someone other than oneself. Somehow or other this is to be inter¬
preted as having one's attention fixed on oneself or someone else. But in aqy
case of any of these passions, there is something else of which I am aware as well.
It is this something else which is properly called the cause of the passion.
At least in the case of the indireot passions, it is necessary to distinguish the
objects of these two different awarenesses, if this expression may be allowed.
It is not sufficient that I be aware of nyself for me to be proud of myself.
I must be aware as well of sane valuable quality I possess, some notable aotion
I have performed, and so on. This is similar to the linguistic thesis that if
I am to give a reason why I am proud, or in love, or experience any other of
Hume's indirect passions, I must do more than mention the objeot of the passion.
It is (logically) insufficient, in reply to the question "7d^ do you love X?"
to say simply "Because I am aware of X". To give a reason, one must mention
some state of affairs connected with Xj not just mention X, For example, one
may say "X has been very kind to me". Just to mention X is to do no more than
give the object of one's love; it is to give no reason for one's love. Vv'hen I
say "I love X because of X's kindness to me" I do at least two things which must,
on Hume's account, be kept separate: I mention the object of my love (X)j I give
the reason for my loving X (X's kindness to me). Similarly in the case of
humility. If I say "I am ashamed of nyself for talking to him like that" I make
explicit mention of the object of my shame (nyself) and give the reason for being
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ashamed (talking to him like that). In the case of the indirect passions,
Hume seems quite correct in making this distinction.
I t is interesting to notice that Hume gives an explicit account of the
objects of the passions only in the cases of some of the indirect passions,
via, pride and humility, love and hatred. Whether Hume thinks that passions
other than these have objects, and, if so, how the relations between these
passions and their objects are to be understood, are questions we may profitably
try to answer. The answers, however, will be far from clear. I shall begin
with the direct passions.
Regrettably, Hume does not seem to have thought out the question whether the
direct passions have objects, and if so, in what sense they have objects. In
talking of the direct passions his use of the term "object" is fairly ambiguous.
Talking of the anxiety which one may experience concerning the well-being of an
absent, ill friend Hume says: "In this case, tho* the principal object of the
passion, vis, the life or death of his friend, be to him equally uncertain when
present as when absent »..". (T,446) On another occasion he refers to "an
object either of desire or aversion", (T,44Q) One is tempted to construe "object"
here analogously to the use of "object" in talk of the indirect passions: i.e. as
designating the state of affairs to which one* s attention is directed, granted
the occurrence of the passion of anxiety. In other cases, however, Hume uses
"objects", where, it would seem, he wants to talk of the causes of a passion.
In the section "Of the causes of the violent passions" Hume remarks: "We ought
to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to encrease the
violence of the passion". (T,419) In a similar way he says that "all depends upon
the situation of the object, and ... a variation in this particular will be able
to change the calm and violent passions into each other". (T,419) It is
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significant that the variations in the situation of the objects to which he refers
come under a discussion of the "causes" of the violent passions. In this
connection "object" seems to be a dumny-word, serving the place of any state of
affairs which might cause the occurrence of a passion. (Cf. Hume's later
remark: "But when along with this, the objects, that pause pleasure or pain,
acquire a relation to ourselves or others; they still continue to excite
desire and aversion, grief and joy: But cause, at the same time, the indirect
passions". (T,574. Italics mine,) It is at least uncertain, then, whether Hume
does think that the direct passions have objects. But, and this must be noticed,
this does not, in his theory, prevent the use of such locutions as "I was
frightened by the orack of thunder" or "I wanted to go to the cinema" or "She was
grief-stricken at the death of her husband". In the three examples, the
expressions which apparently refer to the objects of the passions in question
would be for Hume designations of the pauses of these passions.
This is rather what one would expect, given Hume1 s insistence, in the case of
the indirect passions, on the distinction between the object and the cause of a
passion. In the case of love, it is plausible to distinguish the object, some
person, from the cause, that person's qualities, behavior, and so on. But
consider a direct passion such as joy. Suppose that I am pleased (joyous) by a
sumptuous dinner. If someone were to ask "What has caused you to be so pleased?"
or "tthy are you so pleased?" I would answer by mentioning the sumptuous dinner in
which I am partaking. Let us say that this answer gives the cause, in Hume's
use of the term, of my joy. But I can also say "I am delighted with the
sumptuous dinner" and this seems to be an indication of the object of my joy or
my pleasure. In each case, however, I have mentioned the same state of affairs.
It is thus not quite so easy to distinguish the cause and object of my joy, as it
is to distinguish the cause and object of my love. The difficulty of making this
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distlnction in the case of (some) direct passions may perhaps have lead Hume to
sweep under the carpet a distinction he insisted on with love, hatred, pride, and
humility.
Further support for the view that the direct passions do not have objects,
but only causes, is given by the fact that Hume does not make explicit use of the
fifth law of association in his account of the direct passions. (This law, it
will be recalled, invokes a double relation of impressions and ideas.) That
Hume does not think the direct passions can be explained by the fifth law of
association is implied by a passage in Book III of the Treatise. Hume notes that
the "chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain".
(T,574) The "most immediate effects of pleasure and pain", he oontinues, "are
the direct passions", "But vfoen," he says, "the objeots, that cause pleasure or
pain, acquire a relation to ourselves or othersj they still continue to excite
desire and aversion, grief and joy: But cause, at the same time, the indirect
passions of pride or humility, love or hatred, which in this case have a double
relation of impressions and ideas to the pain or pleasure." (T,574. Italics mine,)
This seems to imply that the direct passions do not "have a double relation of
impressions and ideas to the pain or pleasure", which is equivalent to saying that
they are not explainable by the fifth law of association. It may plausibly be
suggested that this fact is connected with a belief that the direct passions do
not occur oonjointly with a cognitive state related by resemblance of objects to
some prior cognitive state. Since Hume normally connects the concept of the
object of a passion with that of the cognitive state accompanying that passion,
the fact that Hume does not use the fifth law of association in connection with
the direct passions suggests that he does not think the direct passions are
accompanied by a special cognitive state, and thus that the direct passions do not
have objects.
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Another argument In support of the thesis that Hume* s direct passions are
object-less, is to be derived from the admittedly ambiguous way in which Hume
describes the relation between an indirect passion and its object. Pride "turns
the view" to oneself; love "turns one's view" to someone else. Given this aocount
it would be strikingly implausible to suggest that, say, one's delight caused by
a sumptuous dinner turns one's view to the sumptuous dinner in which one is
partaking. After all, one's thoughts are directed to the sumptuous dinner from
the start.
On the other hand, considerations of systematic slmplioity suggest that,
though Hume did not in fact give an associationist account of the direct passions,
he probably assumed that such an account could be given at least in most oases.
For one thing, the direct passions are all impressions of reflection. If my
previous elucidation of this concept is correct, this is to say that the cause of
such a passion comprises among its constituents a cognitive state. It would
then be quite natural for Hume to assume that this cognitive element had a cor¬
respondent associated element in a later complex emotional mental state. As we
have seen earlier, Hume considers the simplicity of its explanatory laws to be a
virtue of any scientific system. Thus we may assume that he would, if possible,
hold that a single model explains both the direct and the indirect passions.
Considerations of this sort lead one to expect that Hume thought that the direct
passions, including desires, have objects. This argument does not, however,
if
settle the issue. We can only conclude that it is uncertain whether Hume thinks
the direct passions have objects in any sense analogous to that in which the
indirect passions have objects.
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A special problem seems to arise concerning the concept of an objeot in
the case of some indirect passions, vis, those described as desires.
Benevolence Hume describes as "a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd,
and an aversion to his misery". (T,367) Anger is "a desire of the misery and
an aversion to the happiness of the person hated". (T,367) Does Hume think
that these desires have objects? He does say that when "we are possess'd with
love or hatred, the correspondent desire of happiness or misery of the person,
who is the object of these passions, arises in the mind, and varies with each
variation of these opposite passions". (T,368) But in this case the objects
referred to are the objects of the love and hatred, not the benevolence or anger,
and love and hatred are not desires. (Cf. T,367)
There is, however, a very good reason for suggesting that Hume would
distinguish the objects of these desires from their causes; vis, the fact that
Hume's assooiationist account, and especially his use of the fifth law of
association, applies to these indireot passions, as well as to pride and humility,
love and hatred. But if this is so, then the occurrence of the (presumably)
simple impression of benevolence must be accompanied by some cognitive state,
and this, again presumably, would involve one in talk of the object of the
benevolence. Unless one can (a) distinguish a cognitive state from the
impression of benevolence, (b) distinguish this cognitive state from that which
aooompanies love, and (c) indicate a resemblance (or some other relation)
between the two cognitive states, one cannot make use of the fifth law of associa¬
tion. It would seem, then, that Hume must, as in the case of love and hatred,
1
It will be recalled that the fifth law of association involves a double
relation of impressions and ideas, or of emotional and cognitive mental
states.
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distinguish the cause of the passion, from the cognitive state accompanying the
passion. It is plausible to suggest that in so far as he makes this move, Hume
would invoke the notion of "objects". Thus benevolence and anger would both
have objects.
Following this line of reasoning would, however, possibly lead Hume to the
rejection of the thesis, argued earlier, that the cause of a passion is distinot
from the objeot of the passion. This problem would not arise if Hume were simply
claiming that one cognitive state is logically distinot from another. But, as I
suggested earlier, Hume seems to be saying that the object of one cognitive state
is distinct from the objeot of another and the object of the first is a (partial)
"oause"of the passion, while the object of the seoond is the "object"of the
passion, Hume's difficulty is seen if we ask how one is to describe the object
of, say, benevolenoe. Benevolence is a desire for the happiness of a beloved
person, or an aversion to his unhappiness. Presumably, the objeot of benevolence,
or the object of the desire, is whatever follows "for" in the formula "desire
for ..." or "to" in the formula "aversion to ,,,", The difficulty is that the
alleged cause of benevolence would, at least in part, be described as "the thought
of the happiness of a beloved person" or "the thought of the unhappiness of a
beloved person". Described in this way, no distinction is made between the
cause and the object of benevolence. Thus Hume's claim about the distinction
between the two seems compromised.
Hume oould perhaps avoid this particular difficulty if he were to describe
the object of the benevolence-desire in terms of the agent's possible actions:
thus, "the desire to bring about or foster the happiness of a beloved person, or
to prevent his unhappiness". In such a formulation, the description of the objeot
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of the desire would differ from the description of the correspondent element
of the pause of the desire. Now in so far as, for Hume, it is one's desires
which "excite" one to action (Cf. T,367) it is plausible to suggest that Hume
would endorse this account of desires. He does not, however, explioitly do so.
At this point it would be well to summarise the results of this overlong
discussion of the passions and their objects. Hume says at least that some
passions have objects, or that some kinds of passions always have objects.
There is also some reason to believe that he thought that all the passions, or
at least that some passions other than the direct passions of pride, humility,
love and hatred, have objects. The case for this claim, however, is far from
conclusive. Hume's principal reason for saying that a passion has an object
seems to be an inner awareness that the passion is "directed" to some state of
affairs, or to some person, or that the occurrence of the passion "turns one's
view" to some state of affairs or to some person. Hume's elucidation of this
notion of "direction" is, however, highly unsatisfactory, since his general
associationist theory only justifies him in saying either (a) that the passion
cause8 some cognitive state whose object is that person or state of affairs
(mis-)described as the object of the passion; or (b) that the passion is
(always) aocompanied by some cognitive state whose object is that person or state
of affairs (mis-)desoribed as the object of the passion. Moreover, given the
act-object ambiguity present in Hume's theory of impressions and ideas, his
account of the relation between a cognitive state and its object is unsatisfactory,
though in a different way than is his account of the relations between a passion
and its object. Finally, the relation between a passion and its object is
wrongly described as a contingent one. If Hume does think that the relation of
a passion to its objeot is that of a cause to its effect, the contingency of the
-247-
relation follows from the fact that the relation is a causal one. Even if the
relation is not alleged to be a causal one, its contingency follows from the
claim that the passions are simple impressions. If we translate Hume's theory
into a linguistic one, it is a contingent matter of faot that all our desires
are for something, or that we are proud of ourselves, or love other people.
For Hume, there can be no logical difficulty in saying that I desire, but that
there is nothing I desire, or that I love, but there is no one whom I love, or
that I am proud, but my pride has no connections with myself,
I turn now to consider some elements in Hume's aocount of the relations between
the passions and human behavior. The main part of this discussion will take place
in the next chapter, but a few comments are necessary at this juncture.
A s I shall argue later, Hume construes the relation between the passions and
human conduct as, either directly or indireotly, a causal one. The fear of X
leads me to aot in such a way as to avoid X, but the connection between my fear and
my behavior is a causal, and thus a contingent one. Similarly my benevolence
towards Smith explains my offering assistance to Smith, but the explanation is a
causal one, invoking an empirical law correlating feeling benevolence with
offering assistance. I shall question the adequacy of this theory later;
at the moment it is just necessary to notice that the connection between a passion
and one's behavior, in being described in causal terns, is implicitly alleged to
be a contingent one.
Let us consider the indirect passions of pride and humility, love and
hatred. ^hat connections does Hume think these passions have with a person's
actions? On Hume's theory none of these passions has an immediate connection
with action. Two of them, however, have a mediate connection, and two do not.
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nThe passions of love and hatred", Hume says, "are always followed by,
or rather conjoin'd with benevolenoe and anger", (T,367) Because of this
lawlike connection with desires, love and hatred have a connection with
human action. This is brought out by Hume's contrast of love and hatred
with pride and humility, "Pride and humility," he observes, "are pure
emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately
exciting us to aotion", (T,367) If Hume is consistent in maintaining
this view, it would seem that one need not ask whether pride and humility
have a contingent or some ether kind of connection with a person's actions,
since they have no connection at all. Love and hatred, on the other hand,
do have a connection with human action. The question thus arises: is
this connection a contingent one? Since the connection, of whatever sort
it be, between love or hatred and human aotion is a mediate one, via the
connection between these passions and the desires of benevolence and anger,
we may refrain here from a discussion of the nature of the connection
between these desires and human aots, and consider, simply, the connection
between love or hatred and benevolence or anger. If this connection is
alleged to be contingent, then the connection between love or hatred and
human actions must be contingent.
In a most remarkable passage Hume seems emphatically to assert the
contingency of the relation between love or hatred and benevolence or
anger. This passage is sufficiently illuminating to deserve quotation
in full:
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TSe may •*. infer, that benevolence and anger are passions
different from love and hatred, and only conjoin'd with
them, by the original constitution of the mind. As
nature has given to the body oertain appetites and
inclinations, which she enoreases, diminishes, or changes
according to the situation of the fluids or solids; she
has proceeded in the same manner with the mind.
Aocording as we are posses'd with love or hatred, the
correspondent desire of the happiness or misery of the
person, who is the object of these passions, arises in
the mind, and varies with each variation of these passions.
This order of things, abstractedly consider'd, is not
necessary. Love and hatred might have been unattended
with any such desires, or their particular connexion
might have been entirely rovers'd. If nature had so
pleas'd, love might have had the same effeot as hatred,
and hatred as love. I see no contradiction in
supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love,
and of happiness to hatred. If the sensation of the
passion and desire be opposite, nature oou'd have
alter'd the sensation without altering the tendency of
the desire, and by that means made them compatible with
each other. (T,368)
"What exactly is being claimed in this passage? For a start, it does not
seem that Hume is thinking of those abnormal cases, presumably familiar to
psychologists, in which the fact that I love someone somehow explains my
desire to injure that person. Hume's account is not so sophisticated as
this. Rather, it seems clear that he wishes to assert that, in all cases.
a person's love for another person could lead him to desire the harm of
that other person. It could, that is, be a true empirical law that love
is correlated with the desire to injure the person loved, that love is
lawfully correlated with malevolence (Hume's "anger"). And it is most
important to notice that this change in the way things are would, on Hume's
principles, involve no change in our concept of love; the only change would
be in our scientific laws. This, I take it, is the waning of the
assertion introduced by "abstractedly consider*d": that there is no
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relation of ideas, and thus no necessary connection, between the idea
of love and that of benevolence.
This, of course, is simply a consequence of Hume's thesis that the
passions are simple impressions. To say that love is a simple impression
is to say that love cannot be analysed; which in turn is to say that no
definition of love is possible. Granted this, if Jack in fact
experiences toward Jill that peculiar non-representative pleasant impression
vMch is the necessary and sufficient condition for Jack's being in love,
then Jack is in fact in love with Jill, no matter how he acts, or desires
to act, towards her.
I n the context of the passage quoted, however, Hume does not invoke this
argument to support his claim that love and benevolence, or hatred and anger,
are only contingently related. Let us look, then, at the argument Hume
actually presents. He begins by remarking that love and hatred, in contrast
to pride and humility, are not "pure emotions in the soul"; they are "not
compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, whioh they produce,
but carry the mind to something farther." (T,367) In the case of love and
* •
.
hatred, the following empirical proposition is true: "The passions of love
and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin*d with benevolence and
anger". (T,367) In somewhat greater detail: "Love is always follow*d by
a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his
misery: As hatred produces a desire of the miseiy, and an aversion to the
happiness of the person hated". (T.367) It is this noticeable conjunction
of love and benevolence, hatred and anger, which Hume sets out to explain.
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Hume immediately places the question in a polemical context by
stating that two different lypotheses may be alleged to account for this
feature of experience. One iypothesis, the one Hume rejects, claims:
Love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another
person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and
aversion constitute the very nature of love and
hatred. They are not only inseparable but the
same. (T,367)
It must be noted, then, that at least one of the points which Hume wishes
to make against this hypothesis is that love and benevolence are distinct
phenomena. He will conclude "that benevolence and anger are passions
different from love and hatred, and only conjoin'd with them, by the
original constitution of the mind". (T,368)
Hume's actual argument in support of this conclusion is a curious one.
He admits that "we never love any person without desiring his happiness,
nor hate ary without wishing his misery". (T,367) He insists, however,
that the necessary (causal) conditions for the occurrence of benevolence
and anger include a condition which is not necessary for the occurrence of
love or hatred, viz. "the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or
enemy", (T,367) Moreover, the passions of love and hatred "may express
themselves in a hundred ways", and not just by benevolence or anger. (T,368)
Finally the passions of love and hatred "may subsist a considerable time
without our reflecting on the happiness or misery of their objects" (T,368),
i.e. without the occurrence of one of the neoessary (causal) conditions for
benevolence and anger. Though love and benevolence, hatred and anger; are
always oonnected, a time-gap is possible between them, and thus love cannot
be identical with benevolence, nor hatred with anger. For Hume, then, to
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show that two states of affairs A and B are logioally distinct states of
affairs, it is sufficient to show (a) that the causal conditions for the
one differ in at least one respect from the causal conditions for the other,
even if in many respects they are the same; and/or (b) that a time-gap may
obtain between the time of the occurrence of A and the time of the
occurrence of B, even if A and B are always conjoined.
Now if we grant Hume's premises, it would follow that love and benevolence
are not identical. And, it should be recalled, it is precisely this point
that Hume sets out to prove. But from the fact that two states of affairs
are not identical, it does not follow that the states of affairs in question
are only contingently related. There is no contradiction in asserting that
two states of affairs A and B are not identioal and yet claiming that there
is a logical connection between them. I may, with perfect consistency,
assert that my desire to ft is different from my actually 0-ing, while
maintaining that the two are logically related. Or, using an example of
Hume's, property is not justice, nor justice property, but the two are
connected by a relation of ideas. Thus, Hume's arguments in the passage
in question, if they show only that love and benevolence are not identical,
would prove the error of the theory Hume sets out to oppose, but they would
not support his larger claim, that the connection between love and
benevolence "abstractedly consider*d, is not necessary". (T,368)
The faot that Hume has mistaken his game here is clear from one Of
the implications of his thesis; viz. that our concept of love would suffer
no change in conditions in which one might truthfully assert the empirical
law: Yihenever someone ldves another person, he subsequently desires the
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unhappiness of that person. This, we want to say, is just not possible,
in a logical sense of "possible", given the concept of "love". Our
problem, then, is to pinpoint the source of Hume*a mistake.
Two possibilities present themselves. On the one hand, one might
want to say that, though there is a logical connection between love and
benevolence, it does not follow from this that in every case of love the
person who loves must also feel benevolence toward the person loved (in the
sense of explicitly thinking of and desiring his happiness). Similarly,
though there is a logical connection between fear and certain sorts of
behavior, we do not say that in every case of fear fearful behavior must
be exhibited. But this does not entail that the connection between fear
and fearful behavior is a contingent one, much less a causal one. Similarly,
it does not appear impossible that a person might feel tenderly toward some
other person, without in fact even thinking of that person* s happiness, or
of aiy ways of securing that person's happiness. But what of the suggestion
that such tender feelings be followed by a desire for the injury of the
person ioved? Perhaps, in an abnormal case, we would permit this to be
said. But the fact that we would look upon the case as abnormal is
symptomatic of our unease in thus using the concepts of love and malevolence.
Even if we are willing to admit that love may sometimes not be accompanied
by feelings of benevolence, we would want to lay down restrictions on the
possible application of the concepts, by asserting that, except in abnormal
cases, we oannot both love X and desire his unhappiness,
A rather different approach would be the following. One might agree
that whatever takes place in a person's mind when he loves someone, assuming
that there are things that go on in a person's mind when he loves someone,
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is causally connected with whatever takes place in his mind when he
explicitly thinks of and desires the happiness of that person. For example,
whenever Jack feels tenderly toward Jill he may have certain visual images,
bodily sensations, and so on, and whenever he feels benevolently toward
Jill, he has certain other visual images, bodily sensations, and so on.
It may also be possible to provide independent identifications of these
phenomena. Moreover, it may be the case that these phenomena are lawfully
correlated. Now if this is what Hume means when he asserts that love
and benevolence are contingently related, there seems to be no prima facie
objection to his thesis. The truth of such laws would, in principle at
least, be open to disconfirmation by experience. Given Hume's doctrine
that the passions are simple impressions, it is at least plausible to suggest
that his own view rons along these lines. But from this it does not
follow that, in normal sense of "love" or "benevolence", love and
benevolence are not logically connected. For it does not seem that the
ordinary ooncept of love refers to such goings-on in one's mind, and to
them alone, nor that the ordinary concept of benevolence refers to such
mental happenings, and to them alone. Assuming, however, that there are
such happenings, and that they are independently identifiable, there seems
no logical reason to insist that they cannot be causally (said thus
contingently) related. The mistake in this case, however, is to say that
love and benevolence are only contingently related. Thus, in so far as
Hume's thesis is one about the lawful correlation of independently identi¬
fiable mental events, he is correct in asserting that such correlations
are only contingent. But if his thesis is about the meaning of "love"
or "benevolence" he is mistaken.
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Returning to the question with which we started this discussion of
love and benevolence, we may conclude that, for Hume, at least some passions
have only a contingent relation with human actions* Some passions, such
as pride and humility, are alleged to have no direct connection with human
action. Others, such as love and hatred, are connected with human
aotions via the desires to which they give rise. But since they are said
to be contingently related with these desires, they must be thought to be
contingently related to action. A question still remains, however,
concerning the nature of the relation between desires and the actions which
they explain. I shall discuss this question at some length in the next
chapter.
Perhaps, however, we are being premature in insisting that Hume views
the connection between love or hatred and human behavior to be a contingent
one. In at least one place Hume talks in a way that at least seems to be
inconsistent with this thesis. The passage in question occurs in the
course of Hume's discussion of the indirect passions of pity and malice.
V,e must discuss this passage in some detail, since the principal objection
to the thesis I am defending here rests on it.
We may begin by noticing the dilemma in which Hume finds himself when he
comes to talk of pity and malice. Hume describes these passions as follows:
"Pity is a concern for, and malice a joy in the misery of others, without
any friendship or enmity to oocasion this concern or joyw. (T,369) Given
Hume's account. In terms of the doctrine of sympathy, of the manner in which
each of these passions arises, however, he is faced with a peculiar
difficulty. For the mechanism of sympathy to work, Hume must say that
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pity is an unpleasant feeling-state, and malice a pleasant one. He does
in faot say this: "pity is an uneasiness, and malioe a joy". (T,38l)
It seems to be the case, however, that, as Hume points out, "There is
always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger
with malice". (T,38l) On Hume's aooount there can be no logical difficulty
in this, but there is a good reason why, on other than logical grounds, Hume
should be bothered by this alleged fact, for it runs counter to his theoiy
of the association of impressions and ideas as stated thus far. Granted
Hume's associationism, how can he explain the fact that the unpleasant
feeling-state which is pity is lawfully correlated with the pleasant feeling-
state which is love? Passions are supposed to cause other passions by
virtue of a resemblance in hedonic quality between them. In the case of
love and pity, one is said to be lawfully correlated with the other despite
a contrariety of hedonic quality. Hume is quite aware of this difficulty:
"as pity is an uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of
others, pity shou'd naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred; and
malice, love." (T,38l)
To get past this dilemma, Hume appears to make some crucial changes in
his general theoiy of the nature of a passion. As we have seen many times,
he considers the passions as simple impressions, each kind of passion being
different from every other kind of passion by virtue of its intrinsic
character as an unanalysable simple impression. Each distinct kind of
passion is in principle identifiable and distinguishable solely by reference
to its character as a feeling-state, independent of reference to the
circumstances within which it occurs, its symptoms, the behavior it leads to,
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and so on. Throughout his aocount, moreover, Hume has insisted that an
explanation of the occurrence of a passion in most cases takes the form of
1
invoking the fourth or fifth law of association. Both laws, in so far as
they refer to the impressions which are the passions, refer only to the
pleasant or unpleasant hedonio quality of the simple impressions. Pleasant
passions give rise to pleasant passions, and unpleasant to unpleasant.
Now, however, a new note is struck. To "understand the full force of
this double relation" of impressions and ideas, Hume observes:
We must consider, that 'tis not the present sensation
alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines
the oharacter of any passion, but the whole bent or
tendency of it from the beginning to the end. One
impression may be related to another, not only when
their sensations are resembling, as we have all along
supposed in the preceding oases; but also when their
impulses or directions are similar and correspondent.
(T,38l)
This remark oertainly seems inconsistent with the view that the passions are
simple impressions. If "'tis not the present sensation alone or momentary
pain or pleasure, which determines the oharaoter of any passion", then
surely, it seems, the passion cannot just be a present sensation or a simple
impression. Great care must be taken, however, in interpreting this claim.
For one thing, love is one of the passions said to have a "bent or tendency",
"impulse or direotion". By the argument above, love would not then be just
a simple impression. But Hume has, quite explicitly, said that love is a
simple impression. (T,329) To suggest that Hume wants now to deny that love
is a simple impression implies that he is quite blatantly contradicting himself.
The fourth law states that one passion (impression) oauses another when they
are related by resemblance. The fifth law states that one complex mental
state, comprising an emotional and a cognitive element, causes another
complex mental state, comprising an emotional and a cognitive element, when
the emotional elements in each are related by resemblance, and the objects of
the cognitive elements of each are related by resemblance, contiguity, or
causation.
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If an alternative interpretation can be offered irtiich salvages both Hume's
thesis about the simplicity of the passions and his present remarks about
the direction or tendency of the passions, it would seem that this alternative
interpretation must be adopted. As I shall try to show, such an alternative
interpretation can be given.
We can begin by considering the notions of "bent or tendency", "impulse
or direction". One thing is clear: to talk of the "bent or tendency",
"impulse or direotion'J of a passion is not the same as to talk of the
direction of a passion to its objeot, as the term "objeot" has been used thus
far. Hume explicitly states that pride and humility do not have such a
"bent or tendency", "direotion or impulse". (T,381-382) The reason for this
is that these are "only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency
to action". (T,382. Italics mine.) But, it will be recalled, pride and
humility both have objects. Thus, the "direction" of a passion, in the
present sense, is not the same as that used when Hume talks of a passion
being direoted to its object. Love and hatred, however, do have such a
"bent or tendency", "impulse or direction". This oannot be in virtue of
their having an object - in this they are in the same condition as pride or
humility. In what sense, then, do they have a "direotion or tendency to
action"?
The reason, I would suggest, why Hume thinks that love and hatred have
a "direction or tendency to aotion" is that they "are attended with a certain
appetite or desire". (T,382. Italics mine.) Vftiat desire? The desires of
benevolence and anger. To say that love and hatred have a "direction or
tendency to action" is simply to say that they are lawfully connected as
causes to effects with these desires. And, via these desires, love and
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hatred are connected vdth human conduct. But, as we saw above, the
connection between love or hatred and benevolence or anger is explicitly-
declared to be an contingent one. Thus, it would seem most implausible,
in fact, to suggest that Hume here intends to reject his thesis about the
contingency of the relation between love or hatred and human conduct.
In saying that the present sensation alone does not determine the character
of a passion, but "the whole bent or tendency of it from beginning to endw,
he is only saying, albeit in a misleading way, that an adequate aocount of
any passion must take into consideration those empirical laws which apply to
the passions. It is a faot about love that those who experience this
passion normally also experience the feeling of benevolence, and those who
experience this latter passion normally act in certain ways. It is in this
sense, on Hume* s view, that one can speak of love's "direction or tendency
to action". But clearly enough, on Hume's theory, this is not at all
inconsistent with speaking of love as a simple impression.
This interpretation of the passage in question is further strengthened
by the fact that, throughout the passage, Hume is at pains to give an account
of the relations between, on the one hand, love, benevolence, and pity, and,
on the other, between hatred, anger, and malice, that squares with his theory
of the association of impressions and ideas. As we have seen, it is this
project which creates Hume's dilemma. But it is a central tenet of Hume's
theory that the laws of association are causal laws, and thus contingent laws.
Thus, when Hume cashes the notion of the direction or tendency of love in
/
terms of its associative connections with benevolenoe, he must be taken to
imply a contingent relation between the two. The genuine novelty in Hume's
theory at this point is not any denial that the passions are simple impressions.
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It is rather the peculiar emendations he seems to make in his account of
the mechanics of the fifth lav of association. But we need not go into
this here.
Since it would seem that Hume construes the connection between the passions
(at least those passions other than desires) and human actions to be a
contingent one, there seems little point in trying to show that, for Hume,
the relation between a passion and what may be called its symptoms is a con¬
tingent one as well. (By "symptoms" I here mean all normally observable
physical or physiologioal changes nhich the person experiencing the passion
undergoes. This inoludes all behavior that would not be said to be motivated
by the passion in question.) This is, after all, a weaker thesis.
Furthermore, it follows with equal rigor from the premise that the passions
are simple impressions. Moreover, there is some textual grounding for this
view. Talking of the pride and humility of animals Hume says: "There are
many evident marks of pride and humility". (T,326, Italics mine.) He then
proceeds to talk of the "port and gait of a swan, or turkey, or peacock";
the "vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing"; the vanity and
emulation "of horses in swiftness, of hounds in sagacity and smell, of the
bull and cook in strength". (T,326) Presumably Hume here refers to aspects
of the behavior of these animals that would not count as actions. This is
suggested by his remark that "pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul,
unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action". (T,367)
Hume nowhere, however, seems to have attempted a clear demarcation of actions
from other elements of a person1 s behavior, from plysiological changes, and
so on. In general, as we shall see later, Hume uses the word "action" to
1
designate all sorts of things that would not normally be called actions.
1pp. 509-5II.
-261-
Perhaps, however, we may assume that Hume would distinguish actions from
symptoms on the grounds that the former are, and the latter are not,
voluntary. But there is no need to press this point here.
Another aspect of Hume* s theory of the passions which is quite
interesting and important to consider is his account of the various circum¬
stances within which the various passions occur. To discuss this topic in
detail would take us too far from the main line of my present argument.
This is not, however, to suggest that the detail is not, at least in some
✓
cases, illuminating. As Dr. Ardal has shown in his detailed account of
Hume* a theory of pride, Hume has muoh to say that is of interest from the
point of view of conceptual analysis.^ Of necessity, however, I must
restrict myself to doing two things: giving a few examples of the sort of
analysis to which I am referring; and considering the charaoter of the
connection alleged between these circumstances and the passions. I shall
then consider one particular circumstance that Hume notes in connection with
many passions, and which seems to have a quite general significance.
The sort of discussion of circumstances I have in mind comes out most
clearly in Hume's account of the indirect passions of pride, humility, love
and hatred, though not in them alone. In the case of pride, Hume points out
that a variety of circumstances must be satisfied if pride or humility are to
occur. Those things or actions or qualities which make us proud must be
valued by us in some way. For example, if it is ny house that makes me
proud the house must be beautiful, or unique, or expensive, or in some other
way describable by me in terms of (positive) valuation. If it is a
particular action which makes me proud, it must likewise be described by me
Ardal. Chanter II. "The indirect naasions". rm. 17-Afi.
-262-
in terms that imply my (positive) valuation of that action. For example,
the action must be heroic, or virtuous, or kind, or dexterously done, or
something of that sort. The same with any qualities that may make me
proud. (in the case of humility, these things must be negatively valued.)
In Hume'a language, the things, or actions, or qualities, which make me
•|
proud must "produce a separate pain or pleasure", (T,285) Besides being
objects of value or disvalue to me, however, the things, actions, or qualities
which make me proud or ashamed must somehow be connected with nyself. In
Hume's words, "the subjects, on which the qualities are plao'd, are related
to self". (T,285-285) That is to say that th^y must be my actions, my
qualities, my possessions, and so on; or the actions, qualities, or
possessions of someone bearing a speoial relation to me. They may, for
example, be the actions, qualities, or possessions of iqy brother, my son,
my fellow-countryman, ny co-religionist, and so on. In short, these actions,
qualities or possessions must be connected with someone somehow bearing a
speoial relationship to myself (or else must be connected directly with
myself) if they are to make me proud.
A similar discussion takes place in the case of love or hatred. Hume
insists that at least two conditions are necessary for a person to experience
either passion. One must be aware of some action, quality or possession
connected with some person other than oneself (the person being that person
who is the object of one's love); and that action, quality or possession must
be considered to be of value in some respect, in the case of love, or disvalued
in some way, in the case of hatred. Hume asserts these conditions in this
way: "The cause of love and hatred must be related to a person or thinking
1
I shall later have occasion to question the adequacy of this formula.
See p.p. 266-267.
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being, in order to produce these passions" (T,33l); the causes of these
passions "excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion". (T,332)
In the case of other passions other conditions are described. For fear or
hope to occur, one must believe that "either good or evil is uncertain".
(T,439) For joy, it is necessary that one believe that some "good is certain
or probable"; for grief or sorrow, that some "evil is in the same situation".
(T,439) And so on for the other passions.
The account I have given of the ciroumstances necessary for the occur¬
rence of the passions is, for the most part, a very schematic one. At least
in the cases of pride, humility, love and hatred, Hume introduces further
restrictions into his description of the conditions necessary for their
occurrence. This schematic account is, however, sufficient for ay present
purpose, which is to show that Hume considers the connection between the passions
and the circumstances of their occurrence to be a contingent one.
Referring to the two conditions of pride and humility mentioned above,
he describes them as "two properties of the causes of these affections".
(T,285. Italics mine.) Likewise, his point is that "the cause of love and
hatred must be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produoe
these passions". (T,331» Italics mine.) Moreover, "all the arguments that
have been employ'd to prove, that the causes of the former passions [i.e. pride
and humility] excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion, will be
applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter [i.e. love and
hatred]". (T,332. Italics mine.) This seems to be Hume's view of the
relation between all the other passions and their circumstanoes. It is, for
Hume, a contingent matter of fact that pride occurs only when I am aware of
the valued actions, qualities, or possessions of myself or of someone bearing
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a special relationship to me. It is an empirical discovery that love occurs
only vhen the person loved is believed to have some quality or to have
performed some action whioh I believe to be commendable. But if the relations
between the passions and the oircumstances within which they occur is a
contingent one, it is logically possible that the passions could occur in
quite different circumstances. I oould, for example, be proud of what I
believe to be the praiseworthy conduct of someone*whom I believe to have no
relation to nyself at all. I could be proud of what I believe to be the
reprehensible conduot of someone I believe to bear no special relation to
myself. I could be proud without having any beliefs about any circumstances
whatever. Similarly in the cases of love, hatred, and the other passions.
All these circumstances are causally necessary conditions for the occurrence
of the appropriate passions; none of them are logically necessary conditions.
But if the possibility of these states of affairs is a consequence of
the claim that the passions are causally related to their circumstances then
the connection must be of some other kind than causal. Y>e cannot (in a logical
sense) be proud of oonduct that we consider to be valueless in every respect,
or of the conduct of someone who is not thought of as bearing some kind of
special relation to ourselves. Nor can we be proud, while not being proud
of anything at all. It is part of the concept of pride that we have
beliefs of the sort described by Hume; without having beliefs suoh as these,
we logically oannot be proud. Thus, if Hume's theory of the passions as
simple impressions implies, as it does, a merely contingent connection
between having the passion in question and having the appropriate beliefs,
the theory is mistaken. And if the theory of the association of impressions
a
Unless, that is, we are using "proud" in the sense of "He's too proud to
accept National Assistance".
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and ideas, of which Hume's account of the circumstances of the passions is a
part, has these consequences, it too must be mistaken*
This is not to say that what Hume has to say about the circumstances of
the various passions is wholly mistaken. A great deal of what Hume actually
says about these circumstances is in fact quite illuminating. It is this
which gives genuine interest to his aocount. Where Hume is mistaken,
however, is in his description of the logical status of the relations between
the passions and the circumstances of their occurrence. To describe these
relations as merely contingent ones is to mistake their nature completely.
One of the circumstances which Hume mentions as conditioning the
occurrence of many of the passions deserves speoial attention because of its
more general interest. This is the oircumstance that the person who
experiences the simple impression which is the passion must believe that the
quality (in Hume's very broad use of the term) which is said to be the cause
of the passion is of value or is lacking in value. The connection between
this belief and the passion is said to be a causal one. In saying this,
Hume is surely mistaken. Despite this defect in his theory, however, Hume's
emphasis on the connections between the passions and evaluation is of great
importance.
We saw earlier, in considering Hume's classification of the passions,
that all passions are impressions of reflection, and that most passions require
the prior occurrence of some pleasure or pain. To say that all passions are
impressions of reflection is in part to say that all depend causally on the
prior occurrence of some "idea", i.e. on the prior awareness of some state of
affairs. In some cases, however, such as some aesthetic sentiments, the
pleasant experience which is the passion is original, in the sense that a
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prior oognitive state is alone sufficient to explain the occurrence of the
passion (at least from the point of view of Hume's mental science). No
prior pleasure or pain is required. In this, these passions are similar to
bodily pleasures or pains. Vie have seen that Hume must have some doctrine
of original pleasures and pains if he is to avoid an infinite regress in
his aocount of the passions.
In other cases, however, the occurrence of one passion (causally)
requires the prior occurrence ofmother pleasure or pain, whether this pleasure
or pain be itself a passion, or just a physical pleasure or pain. This is
the case with all the indirect passions, and with most of the direot passions.
The ooourrence of any one of these passions is in part explained by the prior
occurrence of a distinct pleasure or pain. At one point Hume says:
What I disoover to be true in some instances, I suppose
to be so in all; and take it for granted at present,
without any farther proof, that every cause of pride,
by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure,
and of humility a separate uneasiness. (T,285)
Later in the Treatise Hume makes this point more generally when he says: "the
passions, both direct and indireot, are founded on pain and pleasure". (T,438)
At times, as in the first of the two passages just quoted, Hume
apparently wants to say that the requisite prior pleasure or pain must be an
impression of pleasure or pain, i.e. an aotual experience of pleasure or pain.
i
This is theoretically necessary especially in those cases where he invokes the
fifth law of association, with its reference to a double relation of
impressions and ideas. To have a relation of impressions one must have two
impressions: the passion to be explained, and the prior impression which in
part explains it. At other times, however, the thought of a pleasure or
pain, or the thought that some state of affairs is pleasant or painful, suffices.
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This seems to be the case with some of the direct passions, suoh as fear or
hope. I shall not labor this point, however. It is enough to notice that
one of the necessary conditions for most of the passions is an independent
pleasure or pain.
But what has this to do with valuation? We may take a start from Hume's
remark: "Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the
direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is
perfectly unaccountable". (T,439. Italics mine.) Similarly, he says:
"*Tis easy to observe, that the passions, both direot and indirect, are
founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any
kind, His only requisite to present some good or evil". (T,438. Italics mine.)
That is to s^, the concepts of good and evil, the prime evaluative concepts,
are inseparably linked in Hume's theory with the concepts of pleasure and pain.
A painting is a good painting if it produces the unique pleasure of aesthetic
enjoyment. A man is a good man if the view of his character produces the
unique pleasure of moral approval, and bad if the corresponding pain is
produced. A bottle of wine is a good bottle of wine if it produces its
appropriate pleasure. It is analytio for Hume that if something is good in
any sense of "good" it causes pleasure, and if something is bad it produces
pain. (Other conditions, of course, are neoessaiy, if one is to talk of
different kinds of goodness or pleasure, and evil or pain.) It follows from
this, that the occurrence of any passion, other than a member of that
restricted range of passions which does not require a prior pleasure or pain,
H.
requires the occurrence of some prior evaluation.
In Hume's view, this is an empirical law. If one knows the laws
governing the occurrence of the passions, and if one knows that, say, Smith
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h&tes Jones, one is entitled to say that there is some respect in which
Jones's character, or actions, or whatever, is an object of negative valuation
on Smith's part, (This is like saying that where there is smoke I am entitled
to say that there is fire.) This empirical law will be disconfirmed if it
is true that there is no quality or action or whatever of Jones that is the
object of a negative valuation on Smith's part. Such falsification is a
logical possibility. The same is true of the other passions of the class in
question. Smith cannot (in the causal sense) be ashamed of having done X,
if there is no respect in which he judges doing X to be a bad thing. He
cannot be proud of doing T, if he does not judge that doing Y is a good thing.
He cannot hope that some state of affairs will come about, unless he believes
that, in some respect, the obtaining of this state of affairs is something of
value.
If we disregard Hume's claim that this is a contingent fact about many of
the passions, as well as his assimilation of the concept of valuation to the
ooncepts of pleasure and pain, the point he is stressing is a very important
one. As several reoent philosophers have noted, the connection between
emotion and evaluation is a particularly intimate one. Many of the passions
are connected with evaluations, though the connection is a conceptual one.
Pride is connected with valuation in the sense that I (logically) cannot be
proud of what I consider to be lacking of value in every respect. Hope is
connected with evaluation in the sense that that state of affairs for which
I hope (logically) must be considered by me to have some value, in some
respect. Errol Bedford makes this point concerning hope in a linguistic
way:
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The expression "I hope that ..." implies, in addition to
a very vague estimate of probability, an assessment of what¬
ever is referred to in the olause that follows. I think
it is clear that one oannot hope for something, although
one can expect something, without judging it favorably in
some respect, or from some point of view.1
To this we may compare Hume*s remark: "When either good or evil is uncertain.
it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE". (T,439) Similar intimate connections obtain
between mary other passions and evaluation or assessment. Though he
mistakes the logical status of his claim, Hume's claim is at least significantly
2
similar to one of philosophical interest.
I shall conolude my account of Hume's theory of the passions by considering
two further points: the elasticity of Hume's use of the word "passion"j
and the distinction between passions as dispositions and passions as occur¬
rences. The two topics are interconnected, and commentators on Hume's theory
have paid insufficient attention to both.
I have already drown attention to Hume's criteria for distinguishing the
passions from other mental acts or states. Passions are distinct from
cognitive acts or states because they (i.e. passions) are representative and
either pleasant or painful. Moreover, mention of a passion is necessary if
one is to give a reason for ary action. The passions differ from physioal
pains or pleasures because they (i.e. the passions) are causally dependent
on the prior occurrence of some cognitive mental act or state, whereas
physical pains or pleasures are, from the point of view of mental science,
1
Errol Bedford. "Ekaotions", The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V.C. Chappell
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1962J, p.H8. A similar point is
made in G. Pitoher, "Emotion", Mind. LXXTV (l3b5), esp. pp.333 ff.
^1 would draw attention to the fact that I am not here considering another con¬
nection between evaluation and the passions which has a central place in Hume's
theory. Hume considers that moral evaluations of charaoter are indireot
passions of a unique sort, occurring within unique circumstances. Dr. Ardal
has discussed this point at length in Passion and Value, and so there is no need
for me to consider it here. I would just observe that even these passions
require, on Hume's view, a prior evaluation of some sort.
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original. Whether or not there is in fact such a clear line separating
sensations and passions (construing "passions" here as equivalent to
"emotions") is a question which I shall waive at this point. It is sufficient
to note that, for Hume, if a pleasure or pain is one for which one can assign
a mental cause, that pleasure or pain is a passion.
Let us consider, now, what mental acts or states are alleged to be
passions on these criteria. All those mental states for which our ordinary
language of the emotions is appropriate are passions. Thus, under "passions"
we may list love, hatred, pride, humility, envy, malice, pity, benevolence,
anger, esteem, joy, grief, despair, fear> hope, and so on. Also, we must
include the aesthetic and moral sentiments, i.e. those unique sentiments
which justify us in saying that something or someone is beautiful or ugly, or
that someone is morally good or bad. We must inolude, as well, any act or
state whioh is describable as "a desire for ..." or "an aversion to ...".
Thus, if it is true that I want to buy a textbook in symbolic logic, this
wanting of mine is a passion. If I want not to take sin overnight bus-ride
to London, this wanting-not is a passion. This class of phenomena overlaps
the first. Hume also includes "volitions", though he displays some uneasiness
in doing so. He says, for example, that the will "properly speaking" is "not
comprehended among the passions". (T,399) Also, in giving a list of the
direct passions he significantly separates volition from the others:
"desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition".
(T,438. Italics mine.)
It is more illuminating, however, to take a sample of particular phenomena
which Hume considers to be instances of the passions. In the course of
Books II and III of the Treatise Hume mentions many phenomena which one might
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expeot to be treated as passions: love, hatred, pride, compassion, and so on*
There are also, however, many surprising candidates for the class of passions,
including: "constancy and fidelity" (T,1»j06)j "the desire of showing our
liberty" (T,/f08); "prefer[ing] the destruction of the whole world to the
scratching of ny finger" (T,416)j "ohus[ing] my total ruin, to prevent the
least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me" (T,4l6);
"deair[ing] ary fruit as of excellent relish" (T,417)j "courage and
confidence" (T,420); "curiosity, or the love of truth" (T,41*6) J "hunting
and philosophy" (T,45l)} "gaming" (T,452). None of these various things
would normally be considered emotions. Hume's use of "passions" is not, then,
in fact the same as our ordinary use of "emotions". The former class includes
the latter, rather than being oo-extensive with it. The class of emotions
does not, while the class of passions does, include things such as preferences,
choices, interests, hobbies, occupations, and perhaps others as well. Moreover,
some character traits vhich would not normally be considered emotions, would
have to be included under passions.
It is difficult to see why Hume would consider all of these various
phenomena as passions, especially if passions are considered as pleasant or
unpleasant feeling states. They are, however, much more plausibly oonstrued
as passions on the other two criteria mentioned. In all the instances given
one would want to say that the phenomena are, roughly in Hume's sense, non-
representative. Choices, preferences, interests are, none of them, the sorts
of things that can, even with a bit of stretching, be thought of as true or
false (though they may be reasonable or unreasonable, and so on). Moreover,
the mention of any of these things can, as I shall argue later, suffice to
explain or give a reason for a man's actions. I would suggest, then, that
in fact Hume considers a mental act or state to be a passion if it satisfies
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one or other or both of these latter two criteria. Nevertheless, he does
seem to assume that any phenomenon vhich satisfies these two criteria will
also satisfy that of pleasantness/unpleasantness. He seems in fact to think
that only if a mental state is pleasant or painful can it move a person to
act. The pleasantness or unpleasantness of the mental state provides, for
Hume, the ultimate explanation of that state's power to oause human actions.
I shall return to this point in my next chapter.
But if Hume is so completely wedded to the idea that passions are
pleasant or unpleasant feeling-states, how can he construe traits of character,
interests, preferences, and other such things as passions? Is a charaoter
trait, such as courage, a pleasant (or unpleasant) feeling-state? It's not
very likely. For light on this issue to must recall the distinction made
earlier between occurrences and dispositions.''
It is obvious, at the start, that Hume's interest centers on the passions
as occurrences. This is quite understandable. He wants to give an associa-
tionist account of the passions, but this is necessarily an account of
individual occurrences of the passions. It is one occurrent impression or
idea that is related to some other occurrent impression or idea. Moreover,
as we saw in the previous chapter, Hume finds himself unable to give any very
explioit account of those permanent or semi-permanent conditions of the
subject whose existence he feels he must postulate in order to aocount for
the complex phenomena of human mental life. These two facts would explain
Hume's reluctance to talk of the passions in dispositional terms. Neverthe¬
less, we have seen that Hume does have some theory of mental dispositions.
See Chapter III, Section 2.
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Since this is so, and sinco he does make use of dispositional concepts of
the passions, we may ask what sort of account Hume would give of the
passions as dispositions.
The model Hume is working with when he uses dispositional concepts of
the passions seems to be just a slightly complicated version of the one
already desoribed. A passion is a pleasant or painful sensation dependent
on an awareness of some state of affairs. This model is alleged to cover
not only love, anger, shame, and so on, but also all desires and even choices.
The reader is asked to oonstrue the desire for a long, cool drink as a
pleasant sensation, consequent upon the thought of the drink, which desire
propels one, as it were, towards securing the drink. In the case of dis¬
positional concepts, what is added does not change this basic pattern. If a
man is said to be a proud man, in the dispositional sense of "pride", he is
said to be such a person that, if he or someone related to him performs some
commendable action, or has some notable property, and his attention is drawn
to this fact, he will experience that unique pleasant sensation which is pride,
and which is directed towards himself. Likewise, if a man is said to be a
lover of truth, it is implied that if an occasion presents itself for learning
some truth, he will have the pleasant sensation of a desire to learn, which
desire will propel him to take the necessaiy steps to discovering this truth.
That is to say, the use of dispositional concepts of the passions does not,
in fact, compromise Hume's general theory of the passions. It is simply a
matter of including in one* s analysis of a dispositional statement a reference
to appropriate circumstances and to appropriate occurrences of the passions.
A man is an irascible man (dispositional) because he tends to feel angry
(occurrence), given certain conditions. He is interested in symbolic logic
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if he tends to want (in the occurrence sense) to read books on symbolic logic,
attend lectures, and so on. To ascribe a passion to someone in the dis¬
positional sense involves, of course, saying that he normally experiences the
appropriate passion, in the occurrence Bense. In this respect, somewhat
different information is given when one ascribes a disposition to a passion,
than when one says that a person is experiencing a passion. But, at least
on Hume's view, the dispositional use of the concept of a passion must be tied
down to occurrences of the passions.
It would seem, then, that one cannot object to Hume* s belief that the
passions are pleasant or painful feeling-states by pointing out that he uses
words for passions in a dispositional way. The objection may, however, be
entered against those occurrences to which the disposition is tied.
CHAPTER V
MOTIVES, CAUSES AM) ACTIONS
In previous chapters I have discussed Hume's views on the nature of
explanation in general and the nature of the explanation of mental events in
particular. I have also considered Hume's allegedly scientific account of
the passions, that is, his explanatory account of how the various pa ssions,
considered as internal impressions, occur. In this chapter I shall consider
his theory of the explanation of human actions. I shall try to show what
Hume thinks is involved in the explanation of such actions as those reported
in sentences such as "Smith opened the window" or "Jones picked up his pen".
Questions about the explanation of human actions are closely, and traditionally,
connected with questions about the freedom of human actions. It is, for
example, a serious philosophical problem whether the possibility of explain¬
ing a particular human action is compatible with the claim that that same
action is a free action. The present chapter thus has two sections. In
the first I shall provide an account of Hume's theory of the explanation of
human actions. In the second I shall discuss what he has to say about
human freedom.
1. The Explanation of Actions
The problem of the explanation of human aotions is an enormously complex
one involving a great number of highly controversial philosophical issues.
In addition to the inherent philosophical difficulties of this discussion,
the task of stating Hume's views on the explanation of human actions is
further complicated by the fact that on a number of the issues involved in
the general problem he has not attempted to provide any clearly articulated
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theory. Hume has a great deal to say that is of Interest for an under¬
standing of the nature of the explanation of human actions. But in mary
oases his attention is centered not on questions about explanation but on
specifio problems in ethics, politics, and so on. Thus the interpreter's
problem is one of constructing a theory of the explanation of human actions
that is in fact Hume* s theory, though Hume has himself not attempted to formu¬
late it in any very systematic way. To make this disoussion reasonably
manageable I shall take it in the following stages. I shall first consider
Hume* s views on the conditions which must be satisfied if one is to explain
an action, and the character of such explanations. This will require a
detailed analysis of Hume* s theory of the nature of desires, and of the ways
in which thinking influences a person' a conduot• I shall then consider three
important objections to Hume's theory of desires and the explanation of actions.
This will require a close analysis of what Hume means by the terms "action"
and "volition". I shall begin by stating the problem of the explanation of
actions as clearly as possible, and by defining the terms I shall use.
The problem at issue is this. Vihat is involved in explaining an action
A performed by a person P by saying that P performed A in order to x. I
shall call this sort of explanation of A a "motivational explanation". There
are, of course, other sorts of explanations of actions. One can explain an
action by referring to some dispositional property of the agent. For example,
one can explain the fact that Smith has just lit a cigarette by saying "He's
a chain-smoker". One can explain an action by referring to some agitated
state of the agent. For example, one can explain Smith's shaking his fist
by saying "He's terribly angry with Jones". Neither of these two ways of
explaining actions are incompatible with motivational explanations.
-277-
Smith may have lit a cigarette automatically; but he may ad so have lit it
in order to have a smoke. His shaking his fist at Jones may have been a mere
expression of his anger; but he may also have shaken his fist in order to
make Jones aware of his anger. I shall not, however, discuss these two ways
of explaining actions. Rather, I shall concentrate on explanations such as
"Smith opened the window in order to get a breath of air" or "Jones picked up
his pen in order to write a letter". I shall take explanations of this kind
to be equivalent to explanations given in such other ways as "Smith opened
the window because he wanted a breath of air", "Smith opened the window out
of a desire for a breath of air", "Smith's reason for opening the window was
to get a breath of air", and so on.
In each such case I shall oall that faot about a person P whioh provides
a motivational explanation for his action A his motive. This does not, of
course, acoord very well with the ordinary usage of "motive". Normally, we
only talk of a person's motives in unusual circumstances, as when we believe
that his actions cannot be explained in any straightforward way, or when we
doubt whether the explanation he offers of his actions is a sincere one.
Thus, we may wonder about the motives of a normally selfcentered man who is
going out of his way to be of assistance. We might disbelieve his olaim that
he just wanted to be of assistance, and suspect that he has some hidden or
ulterior motives. Despite its lack of consonance with ordinary usage,
however, my use of the word "motive" should not be misleading, and is conven¬
ient. In this usage, to explain a man's action by saying that he did it in
order to x is to provide the motive of his action.
Three further comments must be made about ny use of "motive" and
"motivational explanation". First, as should be clear from the above
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explanations of "motive" and "motivational explanation", I am restricting the
use of both expressions to cases vhere the motives mentioned or motivational
explanations offered have to do with what may roughly be called occurrences as
opposed to dispositions. Thus, I am concerned not with a motive explanation
of the sort "Smith acted out of vanity" but rather of the sort "Smith related
•j
his exploits in order to draw attention to himself" • Secondly, I am not
concerned with oases of unconscious motives. Thus, ray use of "motive" and
"motivational explanation" is not intended to cover cases of this sort: "He
thought that his reason for saoking Jones was Jones*s incompetence, but in
fact he did so in order to eliminate a possible challenge to his own position
in the firm". Finally, in using "motive" and "motivational explanation" in
the way I propose I do not intend to deny the fact that, in ordinary language,
a motive is not a thing of the same ontologioal status as, say, a thought, or
a feeling, or a desire. That is, I am aware that one makes a category-
mistake if one talks, in the same breath, as it were, of Jones's thoughts and
2
feelings and motives. Nevertheless, my use of "motive" is a convenient and
useful one, especially for giving an account of Hume*s theory. It accords,
as well, with the way Hume uses the word.
We may now turn to Hume's theory of the motivational explanation of
human actions, and may begin with the question: What, according to Hume, must
one mention if one is to give the motive of a person's action, and thus provide
I shall later consider an objection to Hume's theory of motivational
explanations which claims that such explanations are dispositional, and
do not involve mention of occurrences which may be called motives.
See pp. 502-504.
^For an excellent discussion of this point see A.R. White, "The Language
of Motives", Mind. LXVTI (1958), pp.258-263.
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a motivational explanation of that action? According to Hume, one must
mention two things: the person's thoughts and his passions. "Human nature",
he says, is "compos*d of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its
actions, the affections and understanding". (T,493) To explain any action,
then, or at least to provide a fully explioit explanation of any action, we
must make mention of both these factors.
Given his ethical interests, and especially his polemic against various
nationalist theories of ethios, Hume is particularly concerned to stress that
one of these two factors, the passions, is absolutely essential to the
explanation of a human action. The Rationalists, according to Hume, thought
that "every rational creature ... is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason;
and if my other motive or principle challenge the dlreetion of his conduct,
he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at least brought to
a conformity with that superior principle". (T,413) To show the "fallacy of
all this philosophy", Hume proposes to prove two points: "First, that reason
alone can never be a motive to any action of the will} and secondly, that it
can never oppose passion in the direction of the will". (T,L13) Later Hume
claims that the scoond point ia a "consequence" of the first. If it oan be
shown that "reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition",
one may "infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition,
or of diaputing the preference with any passion or emotion", (T,414-415)
"This consequence", Hume says, "is necessary", because it is "impossible
reason oou'd have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving an
impulse in a contrary direction to our passion; and that impulse, had it
operated alone, wou'd have been able to produce volition". (T,415) Thus it
is sufficient, for Hume's purposes, to prove the first point, "that reason
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alone can never be a motive to any action of the will". (T,413)
Hume* a principal argument in support of this claim is a fairly straight¬
forward one. If reason alone can be a motive to an action of the will, then
it must be able to do so in one or other or both of the two distinct ways in
which it (i.e. reason) operates. "The understanding exerts itself after
two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it
regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects,
of which experience only gives us information". (T,413) That is to say, if
reason alone can be a motive of the will it must be possible to be moved to
act by one's belief in necessary or contingent propositions, or by the
conclusions to one's demonstrative or non-demonstrative inferences. But,
Hume insists, it is just not the case that a man is moved to act just by what
he knows or believes. Put somewhat differently, a description of a man's
state of mind that mentions only what he knows or believes is just not
sufficient to explain what he does. Hume takes each of the two kinds of
reasoning in turn.
"I believe", he says, "it scarce vdll be asserted, that the first species
of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action". (T,413) "As it's
proper province is the world of ideas, and as the will always plaoes us in that
of realities, demonstration and volition seem, upon that account, to be
totally remov'd, from each other". (T,413) Hume's point is clearer from his
examples. Taking mathematics and arithmetic as two forms of inquiry which are
exclusively demonstrative in character, Hume asks whether the knowledge of any
truth in either subject is sufficient to move a man to act. This is not to
say that mathematics and arithmetic have no influence on conduct. When
mathematical or arithmetical knowledge is applied in practical situations,
it may have such an influence. "Mathematics, indeed, are useful in all
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mechanical operations, and arithmetic in almost every art and profession".
(T,413) But, Hume insists, "'tis not of themselves they have any influence".
(T,413) A merchant's actions are influenced by his beliefs about the
truth of certain arithmetical propositions, but this is only because he is
interested in collecting proper payment and settling his accounts, and arith¬
metic plays a crucial role in these projects. An engineer's actions are
similarly influenced by his beliefs about the truth of certain mathematical
propositions, but again this is only because he cants to build a bridge that
will support a certain weight, resist oertain wind-velocities, and so on, and
matheraatios is involved in determining these things. In Hume's terminology:
"Abstract or demonstrative reasoning ... never influences any of our actions,
but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects". (T,414)
l
The question thus turns to one about the suffioieney of empirioal
judgments for moving a man to act. Onoe again, it is clear that causal
judgments, to use Hume's expression, influence our actions. If we want to
secure state of affairs A we may try to discover how best to bring A about,
and may discover that by doing B A will be secured. "Here", Hume says,
"reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our
reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation". (T,414)
But, and this is the point Hume insists on:
It oan never in the least concern us to know, that such
objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the
causes and effects be indifferent to us. where the
objects themselves do not affect us, their ocnnexion oan
never give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as
reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it
cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect
us. (T,414)
This is to say that "reason alone can never produce aiy action, or give rise
to volition". (T,414)
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This general thesis has a particular, and very important, application
in the sphere of morals. As we have seen, Hume is attaoking those
philosophers who maintain "that morality, like truth, is discern*d merely
by ideas, and by their juxta-poaition and comparison" (T,456-457)* or that
the moral quality of an action is a "matter of fact, which can be discovered
by the understanding" (T,4£8). Against such philosophers Hume points out
that "common experience, ... informs us, that men are often govern*d by their
duties, and are deter*d from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and
impell'd to others by that of obligation". (T,457) Put somewhat differently,
it seems to be the oase that we believe that an action has received a motiva¬
tional explanation if reference is made to an appropriate moral judgment.
Thus, one can explain the fact that Smith returned Jones* s lost wallet to
Jones by s^ing that Smith felt morally obliged to do so.
Starting from the fact of "common experience" that we are moved to act
by our moral judgments, or that our actions may be explained (motivationally)
by our moral judgments, Hume states his argument in a way remarkable for its
conciseness:
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions
and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv*d
from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have
already prov'd, can never have any such influence.
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.
Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular.
The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of
our reason. (T,457)
If one is to explain the facts that moral judgments can move us to action, or
be used to explain our notions, one must admit that "morality ... is more
properly felt than judg'd of". (T,470) Moral judgments, that is to say, are
matters of passion, not of thought. "The distinguishing impressions, by which
moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures".
(T,47l)
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How good is Hume* s argument to the effect that "reason alone can never
produce any action, or give rise to volition" (T,414), and what does it
amount to? Hume*s argument is, to me, a convincing one. Its force is best
seen if one excludes those cases in which one explains a person's action by a
motive that is a specifically moral one. It is part of our ooncept of the
motivational explanation of human actions, or of explanations of the form
"P did A in order to x", that one has only given such an explanation if one
makes referenoe to what may be called, for want of a less-misleading and
sufficiently general ordinary expression, a pro- or con-attitude on the part
of the person whose action is to be explained. By the expressions
"pro-attitude" and "con-attitude" I mean to designate any member of that
class of things designated by such verbs as "wants", "desires", "likes",
"dislikes", "is interested in", "prefers", "feels obligated to", "feels
repelled by", and so on.
Let us take an example. Suppose Jones to be asked to explain the fact
that he suddenly reduces the speed of his automobile from 90 to 60 m.p.h.
Jones could explain his action by saying "There is a police oar ahead".
In saying this Jones is making a statement of fact, and would certainly
have explained his action of reducing the speed of his automobile. But;
supposing the person viio asked for the explanation were to say (which he
ordinarily would not say, but vhich he would be logically entitled to say):
"I presume, then, that you do not want to be fined for speeding". If Jones
were to say "No, that's not the case" to this and other statements about his
presumed wants or desires, his examiner would certainly be puszled. In fact,
if Jones would agree to no relevant statement other than "There is a police
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o&r ahead" his olaim to have offered a (motivational) explanation of his
behavior would simply be discounted. Unless some assumption is permitted
about his pro- or con-attitudes, he just has not given a (motivational)
explanation of his conduct. One explains one's actions motivationally only
if one says or peraits the assumption of such statements as "I want to x",
and so on. As G.E.M. Anscombe has pointed out, an action is explainable in
the present sense of explainable only if it is capable of a "desirability-
oharacterisation"In Hume's terminology, the (motivational) explanation of
an action requires explicit or implicit reference to a passion.
We ean see the import of Hume's insistence that "reason alone oan never
produce apy action, or give rise to a volition" (T,414) if we consider its
extension to moral situations. If it is the case, as it seems to be, that one
can explain one's action by referring to a moral judgment, a moral belief, a
sense of obligation, and so on, then the logic of moral terms, or at least the
logio of those moral terms which oan be used to explain actions, bears an
important similarity to the logic of suoh non-moral terms as "want", "desire",
"interest", preference", "attitude", eto. and an important dissimilarity to the
logic of such terms as "think", "believe", "know", "understand", and so on.
That is, moral language is on the side of the "affections" in Hume's divide
between "the affections and understanding". (T,493)
This comes out quite clearly in a seoond argument which Hume provides in
support of his thesis about the explanation of human aotions. Having concluded
that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (T,415)» Hume remarks:
A
G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), p.72.
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"As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper
to confirm it by some other considerations*. (T,415) %hat Hume here has in
mind is the question of the possibility of applying the predicates "true* or
"false" to the passions (as well as to volitions and to aetions). Hume takes
it as obvious that "true" or "false" can not be applied to these eases.
"A passion", he says, "is an original existence, or, If you will, modification
of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a
copy of any other existence or modification". (T,415) Thus, it is "impossible
... that this passion [i.e. anger] can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to
truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of
ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, whioh they represent". (T,415)
"Nothing", he says, "can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a
reference to it, and ... the judgments of our understanding only have this
reference". (T,415-416)^ The oontrast Hume has in mind seems to be this.
Of some mental states, such as beliefs or surmisals, one may say that they are
true or false, correct or Incorrect. Thus a man may have a true belief that
Edinburgh is north of London, or a detective may surmise, correotly, that
the butler did it. Of other mental states, such as wants, desires, preferences,
or feelings of obligation, one may not say that they are true or false, correct
or incorrect, in the same sense as above. My belief that there is a beer in
the refrigerator nay be true or false; my desire to drink that beer is neither.
Similarly my wanting to visit Spain, or my preference for baseball over
cricket, or my feeling obliged to pay my income tax are, none of them, either
true or false, correct or incorrect. Apy of these may be reasonable or
^See Hume's succinct re-statement of this thesis at T,458.
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unreasanable, but this is a very different matter from describing them as
true or false. I shall return to the question of reasonableness later on.
Hume*s thesis about the motivational explanation of aotions thus involves
two distinct points. The first is that no motivational explanation can be
given unless one invokes, explicitly or implioitly, the notion of a passion.
The second point 1s that passions can not be described as true or false because
they are not the sorts of things which represent either the relations of ideas
or the way things are in the world. The upshot of this is the thesis that
motives, in the sense explained earlier, are not true or false. Applied to
the sphere of morals, moral motives, such as the judgment that participating
in a war is immoral, or the feeling that one is obliged to voice one's dissent,
are neither true nor false. This is not, of course, to say that a particular
motive may not be truly or falsely ascribed to someone. It is simply to aay
that motives can only be assessed in terms other than those of truth or
falsity.
As we saw earlier, Hume believes that two things must be mentioned to a
motivational explanation of a man's action, vis, his thoughts as well as his
passions. So far, I have said nothing about the role idiich the mention of
thoughts is supposed to play to motivational explanation. To discover the
role which Hume attributes to the mention of thoughts to motivational
explanations, however, it to best to proceed, somevhat obliquely, by considering
in somewhat greater detail how Hume would characterize those mental states
which, because they involve passions, are motives to actions.
It is clearly Hume's view that having a motive, in the requisite sense,
is having a certain desire, such as a desire for the hippiness of another, a
desire for the injury of another, a desire for the obtaining of a certain
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state of affairs thought benefioial to oneself, a desire for the avoidance
of some painful situation, and so on. In saying that all motives are, for
Hume, desires, two clarifying comments are in order. First, it is not the
case that, on Hume's view, mention of any passion provides a motivational
explanation of an action. Not all passions are desires, and if desires alone
provide motives, then not all passions provide motives. Thus, the passions of
pride or humility, love or hatred, none of which are desires, would not
provide motives for an action in the requisite sense. This is not, of course,
to say that these passions play no role in the explanation of a human action,
but only to say that they oannot be mentioned if one is required to provide
that state of mind which immediately explains the action to be explained.
If one is not concerned to mention that immediately preceding state of mind
which provides the motive of the action, one can, on Hume's theory, explain an
aotion by reference to a passion that is not a desire. Thus, one might
explain A's kindly behavior toward B by saying that A loves B, but this is
only possible, on Hume's theory, because the passion of love is normally
followed by the passion of benevolence, and benevolence is a desire. Thus,
the fact that one can explain a person's actions by reference to a passion
that is not a desire does not force one to say that all actions are not caused
only by those passions descrlbable as desires. This point is brought out most
clearly if one contrasts, as we have done earlier, Hume's theory of pride or
humility with his theory of love or hatred. The former passions differ from
the latter in that the former are "pure emotions in the soul" whereas the
latter lead to actions. Moreover, as we have also seen, to say that the
latter lead to action is an elliptical way of saying they are lawfully correlated
with desires, viz. benevolenoe and anger, and these lead to action. It is,
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Hume insists, possible that A love B without feeling benevolence toward B.
But if this were the case, A could not act out of love for B. Thus Hume's
principal thesis about the necessity of a passion to the explanation of human
actions should be emended to read: All human actions require the occurrence
of a member of that sub-class of passions which are desires.
A second comment which must be made on my suggestion that Hume construes
motives as desires is that the term "desire", as used in this way, is not
equivalent to the term "desire" used to identify one of several direct passions
in the Treatise section entitled "Of the direct passions". In that section
Hume describes what he means by "desire" by saying: "DESIRE arises from good
consider'd simply" (T,439), and distinguishes desire from aversion, joy, grief,
hope, and fear. By calling desire a direct passion he also distinguishes it
from such indirect passions, also described as desires, as benevolence or
anger, pity or malice, and so on. In saying that all motives are, for Hume,
desires, I am using "desire" in Hume's general rather than restricted sense.
But is it, in fact, the case that Hume construes those passions which may
be invoked to provide motivational explanations as desires? One reason for
claiming this is a consideration of the way in which, as we have just seen,
Hume draws the contrast between those passions which are pure emotions in the
soul, and those which lead to actions, and yet are not themselves desires.
Love leads to action precisely because. according to Hume, it gives rise to
that desire which is benevolence. Further support for this contention is pro¬
vided by remarks made in the course of Hume's argument to prove that "the
union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy, as that in any-
natural operations" (T,404), or that "all actions of the will have particular
causes" (T,412), or in the course of his remarks on "the influencing motives
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of the will" ^,413) • In countering the claim that a libertarian's purposely
non-characteristic action might show the falsity of the determinist thesis
Hume claims that the "desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our
actions"• (T,408. Xt&lios mine.) Later he says that "when we have the
prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion
of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give
us this uneasiness or satisfaction". (T,414) As we shall see later, these
notions of aversion or propensity are used by Hume to clarify the concept of
desire. The same is true of the notion of a "design*d end" used when Hume
talks of a situation "when in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means
insufficient for the design'd end". (T,4l6) Making a point about the "influen¬
cing motives of the will" Hume makes explloit use of the concept of desire
when he says that a "trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a
desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment"
(T,416. Italics mine.), or when he talks of a person "will[ing] the performance
of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir'd good". (T,417. Italics
mine.) Moreover, in distinguishing those "actions of minds" which, because
they "produce little emotion in the mind", are sometimes mistaken for
activities of reason, he refers to them as "certain calm desires and tendencies",
and remarks that "these desires are of two kinds". (T,417. Italics mine.)
There is, then, ample ©videnoe that when Hume contrasts reason with the
passions, with the intention of showing what is necessary to an "influencing
motive of the will", he is thinking of those passions vhich are desires.
It is one's desires which give rise to one's actions* We must try now to
elucidate Hume's theory of desire.
-290-
As passions, all desires have at least one property, according to Hume's
theory of the passions: they are psychological states possessing what I have
elsewhere called an "hedonic quality", whether pleasant or painful. This is
certainly the case with all those desires discussed under the heading of
"indirect passions". For one thing, all the indirect passions are alleged
to be susceptible of explanation by the fifth law of association, that one
complex mental state, comprising an emotional and a cognitive element, gives
rise to another complex mental state, comprising an emotional and a cognitive
element, when the emotional components of eaoh state are resembling, and the
objects of the cognitive states are related by resemblance or contiguity or causa¬
tion. Moreover, as we have seen elsewhere, by a resemblance between associa¬
ted emotional states Hume normally means that both are pleasant or both are
unpleasant. Passions, or impressions, are normally related by "the present
sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure", (T,38l) The impression of
benevolence, for example, is related to that of love in so far as each is a
pleasant sensation. This comes out quite clearly when Hume, in arguing that
love and benevolence are only contingently related, says: "If the sensation
of the passion [i.e. love] and desire [i.e. benevdlence] be opposite, nature
cou'd have alter'd the sensation without altering the tendency of the desire,
and by that means made them compatible with eaoh other". (T,368. Italics
mine.) Though one can apparently distinguish the tendency and the sensation
of a desire, it remains that a desire has or is a sensation, i.e. has an
hedonic quality or is a pleasant or unpleasant sensation.
This faot about desires comes out clearly, as well, in Hume's discussion
of pity, which is described at one point as "a desire ,., of the happiness of
another, and aversion to his misery". (T,382) Pity presents a problem for
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Hume's association!at account of the passions precisely because he thinks of
it as having or being an unpleasant sensation, and yet being associated with
love, *4iich is a pleasant sensation. Pity arises by means of a sympathetic
communication of the pain of another person, and thus must itself be painful.
Faced with this problem for his associationist theory, Hume alters the theory
somewhat by saying that M,tis not the present sensation alone or momentary
pain or pleasure, which determines the character of ary passion, but the whole
bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end", (T,38l) He can thus
explain the association between love and pity by means of the similarity between
pity and benevolence (both are desires for the happiness of others, and aversions
to their misery), and the similarity between benevolence and love (both are
pleasant sensations). These theoretical gymnastics, however, clearly reveal
that the desires which are pity and benevolence are thought of as pleasant or
painful sensations.
It is not, however, just those desires which come under the heading of
"indirect passions" that Hume construes, at least partially, as pleasant or
painful sensations. Those desires which are direct passions are also, for
Hume, pleasant or painful sensations. The point is not made explicitly by
Hume, but underlies much that he says. Thus, in pointing out that the same
situation may give rise to both an indirect passion such as pride, and a
direct passion such as desire (in the restricted sense), Hume talks of
associative links betv/een the two passions, and the associative link is
precisely the fact that both are pleasant impressions. As he says in the
Treatise:
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These indirect passions, being always agreeable or uneasy.
give in their turn additional force to the direct passions,
and encrease our desire and aversion to the object. Thus
a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty;
and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the
impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these
oloaths are consider'd as belonging to ourself, the double
relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an
indirect passion; and the pleasure, which attends that
passion, returns back to the direct affoptions, and gives
new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope.
fr,439. Italics mine.)
Assuming, too, that the direct passions, inoluding desire and aversion, are,
*
on Hume's theory, open to explanation by the fifth associationist law
governing the double relation of impressions and ideas, there is added reason
to think that Hume construes desires as sensations with an hedonic quality.
Desires, as impressions, are described as well in terms other than those
of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Desires can be characterised as
"propensities]" or "averaion[s]" (T,438); they are "prepense and averse
motions of the mind" (T,574), or "appetites and inclinations" (T,368), or
"emotion[s] of aversion or propensity" (T,414), "impulse[s]" (T,415),
"tendencies" (T,2»17), "active principle[s]" (T,457), "aotuating passion[s]"
(T,518), "impelling passions" (T,479), "propension[s]" (T,537), "instinct[s]"
(T,417,439). That is to say, as impressions or sensations, desires are
describable as felt urges or impulses toward those actions or states of
1
affairs which are said to be their objects. They are felt to push or pull
the agent to the performance of some action or the securing of some state of
affairs. Presumably thir? characteristic of desires is something of which we
simply are aware in having a desire. We feel ourselves impelled toward the
object of our desire. This awareness of a desire as an impulse to perform
1
See my earlier discussion of the question whether desires have objects,
Chapter IV, Section 2.
-293-
some action or secure some desired state of affairs does not, however, Aow
that the desire must give rise to its objeot. As we shall see later, the
conneotion between desires and aotions is alleged to be a oausal one, and
causal connections are contingent. If there is a necessary connection between
desires and aotions, the necessity is a causal neoessity, and not a logical
or quasi-logical one.
It seems to be Hume's view that desires are Impulses precisely because
they are pleasant or painful sensations, though he does not draw out this
implication of his theory in any very explicit way. The economy of the mind,
that is to say, depends on the pleasantness or unpleasantness of some of its
impressions in order for actions to result from what goes on in the mind.
The "chief spring or aotuatlng principle of the human mind", Hume claims, is
"pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are remov'd, both from our
thought and feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or
action, of desire or volition". (T,574) The last part of this passage shows
clearly that Hume is here talking of those pleasures and pains vhich are the
antecedents of desires, rather than of desires themselves. But the point seems
to apply as well to desires. It is only in so far as they are themselves
pleasures or pains that they are "springs" or "actuating principles". That
is to say, in Hume's mental mechanics, it is not just the fact that a prior
pleasure or pain has given rise to a desire (as, for example, in the cases of
love-benevolence or hatred-anger), or that the desired state of affairs is
believed to be pleasant, or eliminative of pain, that explains what takes place
in a man's mind which leads him to act in a certain way. Among the members
of the series of mental events to be accounted for are the pleasant or painful
sensations of desire or aversion, and the fact that these are pleasant or
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painful in part accounts for what follows from them.
A further question concerning the nature of desires concerns the simplicity
or non-simplioity of the impression which is alleged to be the desire. At
least one remark in the Treatise seems to imply the simplicity of desire-
impressions. Talking of pride and humility Hume saysi "The passions of
PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, His impossible we
can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or Indeed of
any of the passions". (T,277. Italics mine.) If desires are passions, then
they too seem to be simple impressions. There is, as well, more indirect
evidence that Hume believed desires to be simple impressions. Talking of
"volitions", which he takes to be impressions, and members of that class of
indirect passions which comprises "desire and aversion, grief and Joy, hope
and fear, along with volition" (T,438) Hume saysj "This impression, like the
preceding ones of pride and humility, love and hatred, His impossible to
define, and needless to desoribe any farther". (T,399) Volition, at any rate,
is an indefinable simple impression. Perhaps, then, desire (in Hume's
restricted sense) and aversion are likewise simple impressions. There seems
to be as muoh (or as little) reason to say that a desire (in the restricted
sense) is a simple impression, as there is to say that volition is a simple
impression. With respect to such "indirect" desires as benevolence or anger,
Hume, though he oonstrues them as impressions, says nothing about their
simplicity or non-simplicity. Nevertheless, if we realize that to talk of a
desire as complex is not, for Hume, to say that a desire comprises a feeling
and a thought, but that, qua feeling, it is complex, it is plausible to
suggest that Hume views the members of all the various classes of passions as
simple impressions. If one takes a desire to be solely an impression, there
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seema to be no way to break it down, as it were, into more simple elements
which are themselves impressions.
Despite his belief that desires are impressions, whether simple or
complex, however, Hume does believe that they are conjoined with thoughts,
the objects of which are said to be the objects of the desires. Though the
desire whioh is benevolenoe is, qua desire, an impression, it is conjoined
with a particular thought, vis, the thought of the happiness of the person
loved. Presumably, the connection between the benevolence-impression and
the thought of the beloved person is a contingent one. Nevertheless, the
benevolenoe-impression always is, as a matter of fact, accompanied by the
thought of the happiness of the person loved.
Another thought which is always, as a matter of fact, conjoined with a
desire is the thought which is, from the point of view of Hume's mental science.
the partial or total cause of the desire. Again taking the example of
benevolence, a partial cause of benevolence is the thought of some person
other than oneself, which thought is the cognitive element of the prior complex
mental state of a person who is said to love someone. If we go one step back
in the causal series, another thought is involved in the causal explanation
of benevolence, viz. the thought of the pleasure-causing quality or action of
the person *hom we come to love. All of this simply follows from Hume's
causal associationist explanation of the desire of benevolence in terms of a
double relation of impressions and ideas. There are, thus, a number of
thoughts vhich are anteoedent to and (partial) causes of the desire of bene¬
volence, as well as a thought ihich accompanies the benevolence-impression,
vis, the thought of the happiness of the person beloved. Though these thoughts
do not make part of benevolence, granted that benevolence is simply a specific
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impression, they always, as it were, surround benevolence.
The same holds true of those desires which are "direot passions". If
desire "arises from good consider'd simply", it is preceded by the thought of
that aotion or state of affairB which is considered good. If a desire is
always a desire to do something, or to secure some state of affairs, the desire
is always accompanied by some thought, vis, the thought of the action or
■i
state of affairs desired. Moreover, even those desires which do not require
the prior occurrence of pleasure or pain do require the prior occurrence of
some thought. This follows from the fact that they are nonetheless
"impressions of reflection". This is just what it means to say that all
passions, and a fortiori all desires, are impressions of reflection.
Moreover, if these desires have objects they too are accompanied, as well as
preceded, by thoughts.
Besides the fact that all desires are impressions of reflection, and have
objects, there is a third way in which, aocording to Hume, thinking is
connected with having a desire. Hume discusses this aspect of the connection
between thought and desire in his account of the two ways in which a passion,
and thus a desire, may be "unreasonable". Passions, Hume says, "can be
contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany* d with some judgment or
opinion". (T,4l6) "Aocording to this prinoiple", he continues, "'tis only
in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable". (T,416)
He then describes these two senses as follows?
First, Y<hen a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or
joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition
of the existence of objeots, which really do not exist.
Secondly, When in exerting any passion in aotion, we
chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive
ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where
Vor a discussion of the question whether Hume distinguishes the objects of
desires which are direct passions from the causes of these desires, see
Chapter IV, Section 2, pp. 240-244.
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a passion is neither founded on false suppositions,
nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the
understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.
(T ,416)
Later Hume recapitulates the two ways in which a judgment or opinion may
accompany a passion, and thus "have an influence on our conduct"s "Either
when it [i.e. reason] excites a passion by informing us of the existence of
something which is a proper objeot of itj or when it disoovers the connexion
of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passions",
(T,459) He further elucidates the two ways in which erroneous judgments
may render a passion "unreasonable" by saying:
A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a
pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no
tendency to produce either of these sensations, or
which produces the contrary to what is iraagin'd. A
person may also take false measures for the attaining
his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct,
instead of forwarding the execution of any projeot.
(T,459)
One peculiarity of Hume's account of the two ways in which an erroneous
judgment may render a passion "unreasonable" should be noted. From the way
Hume describes the second of the two cases, it would seem that what is
rendered "unreasonable" is not a passion but an action. If I do an action A
in order to secure a state of affairs B, and A is either not oonducive to B,
or is in fact conducive to some state of affairs C which is incompatible with
B, then ny judgment about the connection between doing A and securing B is
mistaken, and my action consequently "unreasonable". But Hume's point can,
it seems to me, be restated in such a way that it becomes apparent that not
only ray action is unreasonable, but my passion as well. Thus, if I want to
secure a certain state of affairs B, and I believe that doing A will lead to
B, then, according to Hume, I shall want to do A. That is to say, I want
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to do A because I believe it conducive to B, which I want, or I want to do
A under the description "conducive to B", Doing A is wanted as a means to
securing a state of affairs B which I believe to be pleasant. But there is
surely nothing odd in saying that it is "unreasonable", in Hume*s sense, to
want A if I only want A under the description "conducive to B" and A is not
in fact conduoive to B. In such a case it is "unreasonable" to want A because
A is not, in fact, what I take it to be.
According to Hume*s account of this third way in which thinking is
connected with having a desire, then, the following two types of cases should
be distinguished. On the one hand, a person P may want to do some action A
in order to bring about some state of affairs S, believing that state of
affairs S is a pleasant state of affairs. If he did not believe that S
was in some way pleasant, he would not want S. That is to say, S must be
believed to be capable of a "desirability-characterization". But P may be
mistaken in his belief that S is pleasant. In as much as P*s belief about
the pleasantness of S is mistaken, P's desire for S is "unreasonable".
On the other hand, P may believe that by doing A he can secure S. In such a
case, P may be said to want to do A as a means to bringing about S. P may,
however, be mistaken in his belief that doing A will bring about S. In as
much as this belief is mistaken P*s passion, describable as wanting to do A,
is "unreasonable". According to Hume, once a person comes to realize that
his beliefs either about the pleasantness of S or the efficacy of A in securing
S are mistaken, his ranting S or his wanting to do A will cease.
It should be noted that Hume is using "unreasonable" in an odd, and very strong
sense. From the way Hume speaks, it would follow that a passion is reasonable
only if the beliefs on which it is based are true, and a passion is unreasonable
if the beliefs on whioh it is based are false. That is, Hume shows no aware¬
ness here that the reasonableness of a belief depends on the evidence for
that belief and not on the belief's truth.
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The moment we perceive the falehood of any supposition,
or the insufficiency of any means, our passions yield
to our reason without any opposition. I may desire
any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you
convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases. I may
will the performance of certain actions as means of
obtaining any desir* d good; but as my willing of these
actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition,
that they are oauses of the propose effect; as soon as
I discover the falshood of that supposition, they must
become indifferent to me. (T,416-417)
In the case of the desire for S, this would, it seems to me, follow from
the fact that desires are considered as refleotive passions dependent on
prior pains or pleasures. If S is no longer believed to be characterisable
as pleasant, then we must cease to desire S. The case of wanting to do A is
not, however, so straight-forward. It is important to notice that in the
passage quoted above, my wanting to do A is described as "only secondary"•
Described in this way, it would be the case that upon beooming convinced that
doing A is not efficacious in the way believed, doing A must "become
indifferent to me". But this does not, of course, rule out the possibility
that, having originally wanted to do A in order to secure S, I may have come
to enjoy doing A for its own sake, and thus, even if I become convinced that
doing A is not in fact efficacious in securing S, I might oontinue wanting to
do A. I would simply cease wanting to do A under the description "oonducive
to S".
Having considered the three different ways in yiiich, according to Hume,
thinking is connected with having a desire, we can see that it is possible
for Hume to offer a number of different ways of explaining the same action,
A, that do, in fact, match the many ways in which, in ordinary discourse, we
explain actions. That is to say, Hume does seem able to offer an account of
the explanation of actions that fits with our practice of using what may be
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called "explanatory patterns" in the explanation of actions. Anthony Kenny
suggests that we make use, in motive explanations of human behavior, of "a
single fundamental pattern of description and explanation of human
behavior".^ Hume1s account seems capable of elucidation along these lines.
Let us suppose that a person, acts in a certain way, A, towards another
person, Q, out of benevolence (in Hume's restricted sense of "benevolence").
Hume's account permits at least the following different explanations of P's
doing A: "P loves Q", "Q has acted kindly toward P", "P believes Q has
acted kindly toward him in the past", "P feels benevolent toward Q",
"P believes that doing A will please Q", "P wants to please Q", "P did A in
order to please Q", and so on. Each of these explanations will do the job
of explaining P's doing A. Some, however, refer to P's beliefs, and some to
his desires. Some refer to P's beliefs about past situations, others to his
beliefs about future situations, or about ways of securing future situations.
Some refer to P's being pleased, and some to the pleasure of Q. Each, however,
is in a sense elliptical. That is to say, each does the job of explaining
P's doing A because it implies at least some of the others. "P loves Q"
explains P's doing A only because loving gives rise to benevolence, and
benevolence gives rise to action. "P believes that doing A will please B"
explains P*s doing A only because it implies that P wants to please B, and
thus want3 to do what will please B. Similar considerations hold for the
other sentences given. Consider the result of saying both (a) "P did A
because he believed that doing A would please Q" and (b) "P did not want to
please Q". Or consider a case where one says "P did A because he felt bene¬




On Hume* s view, of course, the use of suoh an explanatory pattern in
idiich the mention of one element of the pattern explains an action by bringing
in its train, as it were, the other elements of the pattern, is based on the
fact that the thoughts and feelings (ideas and impressions) mentioned are
oausally, or at least lawfully, connected. Such-and-such thoughts and
such-and-such feelings just happen, as a matter of faot, to be lawfully
connected. It is logically possible that one have any of the constituents
of this pattern without any or all of the others. We have already seen, in
discussing Hume's theory of the passions as simple impressions, some of the
difficulties in this sort of theory, I shall consider further difficulties
peculiar to Hume* s theory of desires at a later point in this seotion.
It is important, however, to notice that, despite the errors or implausi-
bilities of many aspects of Hume* s theory of motivational explanation, he
does in fact manage to make many illuminating comments on the ways in which
we explain human actions. He is quite correct, it seems to me, in insisting
that a non-elliptical explanation of a human aotion requires mention of both
a person's beliefs and his desires, so long as we oonstrue "desires" in the
broad way described earlier. In insisting on this point, Hume is making
essentially the same and important point which Donald Davidson has stressed
in a recent, well-known articles
Whenever someone does something for a reason ••• he can
be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude
toward actions of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or
knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his
action is of that kind. Under (a) are to be included
desires, wantinga, urges, promptings, and a great variety
of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices,
social conventions, and public and private goals and
values in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes
of an agent directed toward aotions of a certain kind.1
Moreover, in so far as Hume's theory of motivational explanation admits
of interpretation in the way I have described above, that is, as involving
explanatory patterns which enable one to explain actions by reference to a
variety of beliefs and passions of the agent, it illuminates the nature of
motivational explanations in a way at least analogous to that in which the
2 3
accounts of Kenny or Anscombe illuminate such explanations.
There are, however, serious objections which may be raised against
Hume's account of motivational explanation, and to these we must now turn.
I shall consider three objections. One of these objections is the objection
that the whole attempt to construe motivational explanations as explanations
by reference to occurrences, vis, the occurrence of desires, wants, or
whatever, is simply misguided. Motives, it may be alleged, are dispositions,
not occurrences, and thus Hume's theory has got off on the wrong foot.
As Ryle says: "To explain an action as done from a certain motive is not
to correlate it with an ocoult cause, but to subsume it under a propensity
or behaviour-trend"J*" At another place, Ryle contrasts the occult-cause
theory of motivation with his own dispositional theory, by example:
•j
Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", The Journal of Philosophy. DX
(1963), pp. 685-686. In connection with the bread way I have construed
"desire" or "want" it is interesting to note a further remark of Davidson* s:
"It is not unnatural ... to treat wanting as a genus including all pro-




Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1949),
p. 106.
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The statement 'he boasted from vanity' ought, on
one view /the occult-cause view/, to be construed
as saying that 'he boasted and the cause of his
boasting was the occurrence in him of a feeling or
impulse of vanity'. On the other view /Ryle's
dispositional view7, it is to be construed as saying
•he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing
so satisfies the law-like proposition that
whenever he finds a chance of securing the
admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he
thinks will produce this admiration and envy'.''
It does not, however, seem to me that Ryle's arguments prove
his main contention, viz. that motive explanations are always
dispositional ones, requiring no reference to what he terms "occult
causes". Even granted that some motive explanations of a person's
behavior are dispositional, it does not follow that no motive
explanations are non-dispositional. Later on in the Concept of Mind,
in distinguishing "actions done, say, from vanity or affection from
those done automatically in one of these other ways /I.e. from habit,
instinct, or reflex7", Ryle says that with respect to the former
"we imply that the agent was in some way thinking or heeding what he
2
was doing". He then elucidates the notion of "thinking what he
was doing" by saying that the agent is "acting more or less carefully,
3
critically, consistently and purposefully". But, it seems to me,
it is precisely this notion of acting purposefully which Ryle's
dispositional account of motive-explanations does not elucidate
satisfactorily. There is at least a prima facie similarity
"'"Ryle, p. 87.
2Ryle, p. 106.
^Ryle, p. 107. Italics mine.
-304-
between doing some action A "with the purpose of ..." and doing A
"out of a desire to ...". And unless Ryle can provide a purely
dispositional account of "having a purpose" or "having a desire"
he can not provide a purely dispositional account of motive
explanations.
It should be noted that, as we have already seen at several
places, Hume does himself have a concept of dispositional properties,
and thus can give a dispositional account of a person's behavior.
He can, that is, offer an interpretation of "Smith acted out of
vanity" such that the intended explanatory job of this sentence is
just to say, with Ryle, that the vain action to be explained is
"just the sort of thing that /I.e. vanit^;7 was an inclination to do",
and is equivalent, roughly, to saying "he would do that". But this,
on Hume's view, would be little more than a first step toward
explaining Smith's action. Moreover, Hume would differ from Ryle
in his account of dispositions in at least two important respects.
First, some at least of the events which would have to be mentioned
when one cashes a disposition in terms of responses to stimuli are
inner mental events. Secondly, some of these inner events or
occurrences, those, namely, which provide motive explanations, are
desires, wants, etc.
There remain, however, two principal objections to Hume's
theory of motives which are, on the face of it, much more cogent.
The first is that desires or wants just are not the sorts of thing
1Ryle, p. 90
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Hume describes them as being. The second is that whatever account
one gives of the nature of desires or wants, one cannot say that
they cause the actions to which they are said to give rise. I shall
consider each of these objections in turn.
The first objection claims that Hume misdescribes desires and
wants. On Hume's view, a desire is an impression or feeling which
occurs in conjunction with the thought of some action or state of
affairs characterizable as good. If it is true that I desire to
have a beer, it is true that I both (a) have a peculiar and pleasant
feeling, and (b) have the thought of a beer. This feeling and
this thought are only contingently related; I might have either
without the other. As a first point of criticism, we may say that
Hume is simply mistaken about the nature of the connection between
a desire and its object. One cannot have a desire which is not a
desire for anything or jto do anything. Desires, that is to say,
have objects. We identify desires by reference to their objects.
In this, they are unlike twinges or sinking feelings which, we would
say, are objectless. But I have deployed this objection against
Hume at an earlier stage in this dissertation and will not pursue
it further here.
A second possible criticism is that we just do not (can not?)
discriminate desires as specifically different pleasant sensations
from other pleasant sensations. Nor, for that matter, can we
discriminate that allegedly specific desire-sensation which is a




or an anger-desire, as Hume's theory requires#
More importantly, however, it is just false to say that whenever it
is true that I desire something, in a non-dispositional sense of desire,
I have any particular feeling. or, indeed, any feeling at all vis a vis the
object of my desire. I can desire to ley a copy of this morning's newspaper
without having any noticeable pleasant sensations at the thought of buying
it, or unpleasant sensations at the thought of not hay ng a copy# I may, in
some oases, actually have seme such sensations desoribable as a warm, pleasant
glow at the thought of the Mediterranean cruise which I propose to take. But
not all (non-dispositional) cases of desire are like this# Nor, when I desire
something, do I always experience folt urges or impulses toward what I want#
I may have such feelings, as, for example, when, after three hours in a library
where smoking is prohibited, I feel a yen or a craving for a smoke. But this
surely is not the usual case. When I walk into an iironmonger's wanting to
purchase a mole-wrench, I do not experience any felt urge3 or impulses, pushes
or pulls, yens or cravings for a mole-wrench. But I do want one#
William Alston states this sort of objection to Hume's kind of theory
of motives when ha says:
The basic mistake of the "phenomonological" account
is to construe a want as a much more concrete and
directly accessible entity than it is. Pelt impulses,
and ideas of something as pleasant or attractive, are
ways *.n whieh wants manifest themselves in conscious¬
ness xm. time to time. And different wants, under
different circunstanoos, will be manifested consciously
in different ways. No doubt some wants give rise to
more or less insistent felt urges or impulses! this is
typical of sexual desires and other desires based on
identifiable states of physiological tension, as well
as of desire for things that are very Important to us,
3uch as a desire to finish a paper which is very impor¬
tant to one professionally. But suoh manifestations are
not the rule for more routine want3.1
17/iHiaa P. .Alston, "Motives and Motivation," The Itaoyclonedia of Philosophy.
ed. Paul Hdwards (London: Collior4,!acmillan Limited, 1967;, V, pp. WJ2-403.
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Alston presents another objection to Hume's sort of view of
desires which is not, as stated, convincing, but which suggests
a difficulty of which Hume does not seem to be aware* Alston
says that it is difficult to apply Hume's account of desires
"where, as with wanting to get a job, the object of the want
might conceivably be attained by a number of different courses of
1
action". He goes on to say:
How can that want consist in an impulse to do one
particular thing rather than another? In other
words, one-one correlations between wants and
actions designed to satisfy them are the exception
rather than the rule*2
That is to say, Hume's theory of motives is alleged to be unable
to cope with the sort of case Hume himself describes when talking
of the second of the two ways in which a passion or desire may be
"unreasonable"•
But there is no reason to think that, in the sort of case
Alston cites, Hume would suggest that my desire to get a job is
the same desire as my desire to read the job adverts in the newspaper,
or the desire to call on the personnel manager of a particular firm,
or the desire to request a friend to mention my name to his boss.
Hume would probably say that, having a desire to get a job, and
thinking of the various ways in which I might go about getting one,
I would have consequent desires to do the various things which, as





adopts Hume's theory of motives, this would seem to imply that I
have a number of numerically distinct desire-impressions, pleasant
sensations, felt impulses, or whatever, each of which must be
independently discriminable. It is this apparent implication of
Hume's theory that renders it further implausible.
Hume's implausible theory of the nature of motives has, it
would seem, several sources. For one thing, given his principle
of the priority of impressions over ideas, he feels himself required
to discover those reasonably concrete mental entities which are
presumably designated by the term "desire". For another, his view
of mental mechanics seems to require the presence of more or less
concrete entities which act and react with others. For a third,
his associationism seems to require talk of discrete pleasures and
pains which can give rise to other pleasures and pains by virtue of
their resemblance. For a fourth, he seems to have been over-impressed
by cases in which his sort of account does have a prima facie
plausibility, as, for example, the case of a felt sexual desire.
Perhaps most interestingly, however, Hume's account of motives may
have its source in Hume's awareness of the fact that, at least in a good
many cases, we know directly that and what we want. We often, that is
to say, have immediate knowledge of our own wants and desires; we
usually do not have to find out what we want. If Hume's theory were
correct, this fact would be readily understandable. We would know
that we desire and what our desires are in roughly the same way that
we know the colors of objects before our eyes. In rejecting Hume's
theory of the nature of motives, then, one must face the problem of
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offering an alternative account of this immediate knowledge of one's
own desires. I shall not, however, attempt to offer such an
alternative theory at this point.
'7./
> The second major objection to Hume's theory of motivation is
the claim that Hume has completely misconstrued the relationship
between motives and the actions which they explain. Hume believes
that motives are the causes of actions, and thus that motive-
explanations are causal explanations. But, many recent philosophers
have argued, motives cannot be causes, and thus motive-explanations
cannot be causal ones. The case against the causal theory of motives
1
has been ably argued by many philosophers, including A. I. Melden,
2 3 if
G. E. M. Anscombe, Stuart Hampshire, and Anthony Kenny. We must
now consider whether what I take to be the principal argument offered
by these writers against the causal theory of motives concludes the
discussion.
First, however, we must try to determine what precisely Hume is
claiming when he claims that motives are causes of actions. We can
best begin this task by considering the way in which Hume uses some
of his key terms, especially the term "action". Hume uses the term
"action" in a great many ways and takes no pains at all to distinguish
these different uses. Sometimes "action" is used so broadly as to
include any event whatsoever, even the motion of a billiard ball, as
-J
A. I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).
2
G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963)*
"^Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965)*
Zj.
Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1963)*
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when Hume says that "the actions ... of matter are to be regarded
as instances of necessary actions". (T,^00) Such "actions of matter"
are contrasted with "actions of the mind". (T.'fOO) Under "actions
of the mind" Hume sometimes includes all "perceptions" (in the mental-
"1
act sense of "perception" distinguished earlier ), as when he talks
of the "actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating and
thinking". (T,*f56) In such cases "action" is equivalent to "operation
of the mind". (Ttk^6) At times, however, "actions" are distinguished
from "passions and volitions" (T,458), or "motives" (T,400), or from
"passions, motives, volitions and thoughts" (1,^68). In some cases,
"actions" are described as "voluntary actions" (T,609), or as
proceeding from "the exertion of the will (T,12). In such cases,
a person is said to "will the performance of certain actions". (T,*f17)
As examples of "actions" Hume cites killing a parent and incest.
(Ttk67) At other times, however, mere bodily movement is an action.
(T.399. 632-633)
Faced with this bewildering array of ways in which Hume uses
the term "action", we can only select those usages which seem most
appropriate to the present discussion. The particularly crucial
sense I take to be that involved when Hume first begins to talk of
the will, and says: "I desire it may be observ'd, that by the will,
I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of,
when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new
perception of our mind". (T,399) That is, I shall consider only
those cases in which, according to Hume, the will is present or
operative in the way described. I shall take "action" as equivalent
1Pp. 127-129.
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to "voluntary action", and shall sometimes refer to this as the
primary sense of action.
It is clear, I would submit, that Hume is primarily concerned,
in Part 3 of Book II of the Treatise, only with actions in this
primary sense. It is also clear that Hume believes that all actions,
in this primary sense, are caused by "volitions" (T,407) or "act/s7
of volition" (T,415)» or "willing/s7" (T,417)» or a "will or choice"
(T,467). It is these volitions which are alleged to be the immediate
causes of actions. Volitions themselves are caused by motives, but
it is only via volitions that motives cause actions. Thus we have
the reiterated trio of "motives, volitions and actions" (T,407) or
"passions, volitions, and actions" (T,458, 465). Most usually,
however, Hume speaks in an elliptical fashion, and fails to mention
volition. At any number of places he speaks simply of "motives and
actions" (T,4o4, 4-07, 408, 478, 518) or "passions and actions"
(T,457» 410, 518). Nevertheless, he always assumes that volitions
link motives and actions, as is clear from his discussion "Of the
influencing motives of the will". There Hume states the problem as
one of determining what is necessary to "produce any action, or give
rise to volition" (T,4l4), and what is capable of "preventing
volition, or disputing the preference with any passion or emotion"
(T,415).
Granted that all actions are voluntary, or are caused immediately
by volitions, it is not at all clear what a volition is supposed to be.
The best Hume can do explicitly is to say that a volition is the most
"remarkable" of "all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure", is
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an "impression" that "'tis impossible to define", and that it is
"the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we
knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception
of our mind". (T,399) According to this description, then, a
volition or an act of will occurs in a case in which I can truthfully
and sincerely say "I am raising my arm". But what is the volition,
and what the action in such a situation?
Hume gives little help in answering this question. In fact
having given the account of volition just quoted, he says that this
"impression ... 'tis needless to describe any farther; for which
reason we shall cut off all those definitions and distinctions,
with which philosophers are wont to perplex rather than clear up this
question". (T,399) He is, in fact, little concerned to give an
account of this most baffling connection between willing and doing.
Nevertheless, he does make some remarks in his "Appendix" to the
Treatise which throw some light on this matter. In the "Appendix"
Hume mentions, apparently without demurring, the view of some
philosophers that "the motions of our body, and the thoughts and
sentiments of our mind, ... obey the will". (T,632) Arguing that
this fact goes no v;ay toward providing us with a notion of quasi-logical
necessary connections between causes and effects, he remarks:
The will being here consider*d as a cause, has no
more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than
any material cause has with its proper effect. So
far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of
volition, and a motion of the body; 'tis allow'd that
no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and
essence of thought and matter. (T,632)
The caus8l connection, then, is between "an act of volition" and a
"motion of the body", and this is construed as an instance of the
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inexplicable connection between "thought" and "matter". This
two-fold contrast at least suggests a way of interpreting Hume
on this point. Speaking very roughly, if we divide "thought"
from "matter", an "act of volition" falls on the "thought" side of
the divide, and the "motion of the body", caused by the "act of
volition", falls on the "matter" side of the divide. And the
connection between the two is a contingent one. Recalling Hume's
account of volition given earlier, this seems to imply that it may
be the case both that (a) a person may have that "internal impression
we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new
motion of our body" (such as, for example, raising our arm), and (b)
that the arm not go up. Read in this way, an act of volition is
simply, one might say, the mental side of raising one's arm. That
is to say, if, taking "volit" as the verb form of "volition", one
wanted to say that Smith volited his moving his arm, the simplest way
to say this would be: "Smith moved his arm". But if one were talking
only of Smith's volition, and not of his action (and we should be able
to do this on Hume's account, since they are contingently related),
saying "Smith moved his arm" would not imply "Smith's arm went up".
It is a contingent matter, for Hume, that when it is true that Smith
moves his arm (in the sense that Smith volits the moving of his arm)
it is also, at least normally, true that Smith's arm goes up.
The view of volition which I am tentatively attributing to Hume,
thenfis in some respects similar to that of G. N. A. Vesey, in his
-]
article "Volition". Vesey argues for a distinction between "what
2
a person really does" and "what he does", which is at least similar
1
G.N.A. Vesey, "Volition", in Essays in Philosophical Psychology, ed.
Donald F. Gustafson (New York! Anchor Books, 196*0» pp. *+1-57»
2Vesey, p. 55*
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to the distinction between not-necessarily-successful and successful
voliting, as described above. He then points out that in "our
language as it stands" there is "no description of what a person
really does which is as much a part of our everyday language as is
1
the description, 'He moved his arm', of what he does." "But",
Vesey continues, "there is no reason why we should not introduce
some new expression, such as 'So far as he, but not necessarily his
arm, was concerned, he moved his arm', or 'So far as the mental side
of him as sin agent is concerned, he moved his arm', at the same time
stipulating that it is to work like 'He moved his arm1, except that
2
it can be true even when 'His arm moved1 is false".
I must, however, emphasize that I offer this interpretation of
Hume's theory of volition only tentatively, and without full conviction
of its correctness. There seem, in fact, to be three objections to
attributing this view to Hume. First, in so far as Hume construes
a volition as a simple, indefinable impression, there is reason to
think that the volition involved in raising my arm is not appropriately
designated by saying "I moved my arm", even when this sentence is taken
as not implying that my arm moved. The sentence "I moved my arm"
says too much. It refers to more than the occurrence of the simple
volition-impression, just as the sentence "I desire to have a beer"
refers to more than the simple desire-impression. Given Hume's view
about the contingent connection between a desire and its object, it





that I desire". Similarly, he is perhaps suggesting that it is
possible to say "I volited, but there was nothing that I volited".
If this follows from Hume's theory, then the Vesey-like interpretation
would be incorrectly attributed to Hume.
Secondly, it is difficult to see how the Vesey-like interpretation
of volition could be made out in the case of a voluntary "internal"
action, such as "conjuring up an image of the Eiffel Tower". Even
if it be admitted that a Vesey-like account is possible in the case
of bodily movements which are actions, it seems impossible to draw
the same sort of distinction between what a person "really does" when
he conjures up an image of the Eiffel Tower, and what he "does" when
he conjures up an image of the Eiffel Tower. But in the "Appendix"
remarks quoted, Hume indicates no significant differences between
the way "motions of our body" are alleged to "obey the will", and the
way "the thoughts and sentiments of our mind" are alleged to "obey
the will". (T,632)
The third objection to attributing a Vesey-like view of volition
to Hume is of a somewhat different sort. It just seems to be the
case that Hume did not raise the sorts of problems about the concept
of volition that provide the background for a discussion like that
which Vesey conducts. That is to say, Hume's attention was not
fixed on that particular form of the mind-body problem in which the
connection between alleged volitions and overt behavior becomes a
crucial one. Perhaps this is just another instance of Hume's
restricting his attention, in his mental: science, to the mental
side of the supposed mental-physical divide which he mentions in
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the "Appendix". In any case, Hume certainly gives no very explicit
account of volitions, or their relation to overt behavior. Rather,
he centers his attention on the connection between motives and actions,
skipping the volitional linkage between the two. It is the connection
between motives and actions which is the principal object of inquiry
in the third part of Book II. In what follows, I shall assume that
when Hume says that a particular motive causes a particular action
he means that a motive such as the desire of having a beer causes
the action of having a beer. This, at any rate, is the way he
normally speaks.
We may now return to the question of the correctness of Hume's
view that motives cause actions, and may begin by establishing that
this is Hume's view. Hume uses a number of different expressions
to characterize the connection between motives and actions. Motives
"produce ... /an/ action, or give rise to volition". (T,4l^f) Similarly,
they are capable of "preventing volition". (T,415) They "have an ...
influence on the will, and ... able to cause, as well as hinder
any act of volition". (T,415) A motive is a "spring" or "moving
principle" of an action. (T,118) Actions may be considered "as signs
or indications of certain principles in the mind" (T,V77), or "as
signs of motives" (T,479)» We may speak of "the motive, from which
the external action is deriv'd". (T,48o) We may speak, in a similar
vein, of "some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the
action". (T,518) Hume concludes his discussion of liberty and
necessity by claiming to have proved "that all actions of the will
have particular causes". (1,^12)
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The "union betwixt motives and actions," Hume claims, "has the
same constancy, as that in any natural operation". (T^O^f) "No
union," he says, "can be more constant and certain, than that of
some actions with some motives and characters". (T,4o4) This constant
union between some motives and some actions has "its influence on the
understanding ... in determining us to infer the existence of one from
that of another". (1,^0*0 Since the union of motives and actions is,
at least in some cases, one of constant conjunction, the union must
be, on Hume's principles, a merely contingent one. Assuming
volitional links between motives and actions, the contingency of the
connection between motives and actions follows from the contingency of
the connection between volitions and actions. And the contingency of
this latter connection is quite explicitly claimed when Hume asserts
that "the will being here consider'd as a cause, has no more a
discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has
with its proper effect". (T,632) A causal, and thus contingent,
connection between motives and actions, is, moreover, clearly implied
in Hume's whole project of defending the determinist thesis by
asserting that, just as in natural science, one can discover laws
correlating motives and actions.
The principal objection against a causal theory of motives, and
the only one which I shall consider here, is the claim that causes
are only contingently connected with their effects, but motives are
not contingently connected with the actions they explain, and so
motives cannot be causes of actions. According to A. I. Melden,
elaborating on Hume, "the very notion of a causal sequence logically
-318-
implies that cause and effect are intelligible without any logically
1
internal relation of the one to the other". Further, according to
Melden, "there is a logical connection between the concept of a
2
motive and that of an action", or, somewhat differently, there is
a "logical connection between motives and actions"."' The notion of
"logical connection" which Melden has in mind is best brought out in
the course of his comments on Prichard's theory of volitions:
Let the interior event which we call 'the act of
volition' be mental or physical, ... it must be
logically distinct from the alleged effect—this
surely is one lesson we can derive from a reading
of Hume's discussion of causation. Yet nothing
can be an act of volition that is not logically
connected with that which is willed—the act of
willing is intelligible only as the act of willing
whatever it is that is willedT^
That is to say, the act of willing is only identifiable as the act of
willing that action of which it is said to be the cause. Similarly,
the motive which is alleged to cause an action (via an act of willing)
is only identifiable by reference to the action which is its alleged
effect. I can only say what my motive is by saying "It is the desire
to drink a beer", but this identification of my motive makes mention
of the action which it motivates, viz. drinking a beer. Thus a
motive and the action it motivates are logically connected, and thus
a motive cannot be a cause of an action, since causes are only
contingently connected with their effects. Thus Hume, who stressed






Melden, p. 53» Italics mine.
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violated his own principle by saying that motives cause actions.
It is interesting to note that, on Hume's account of motives,
the problem which Melden sees would not even arise. According to
Hume, a desire is a (simple) impression and is independently
identifiable as such. But we have already had occasion to reject
this view of desires, so it cannot be used to defend a causal-theory
of motives against Melden*s criticism. If a causal-theory of motives
is to be defended it must be defended despite the fact that we normally
identify motives by reference to the actions of which they are motives.
The question, then, is; Does it follow from the fact that we normally
identify motives by reference to the actions they motivate that motives
cannot be causes of actions?
David Pears takes a very brief, and to me convincing, course with
the sort of argument offered by Melden, claiming:
This argument is invalid, as can be seen from
countless examples. Fear of a particular accident
may cause that accident, and it is only a contingent
fact that magic wishes do not bring about the events
which are their objects. This, in spite of the
fact that the relevant fear and the relevant wish
cannot be specified except in ways that mention the
very things that are suggested as their effects.
So this objection to the causal account of desire
tries to exclude too much, and fails.1
David Pears, "Desires as Causes of Actions", The Human Agent ("Royal
Institute of Philosophy Lectures", Vol. I; London: Macmillan, 1968),
pp. 86-87. It is interesting to note, in connection with Pears's
reference to "magic wishes", the following passage from the first
Enquiry: "Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains,
or control the planets in their orbit5 this extensive authority
would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension
^than that of the "soul" over the "bodyJ^7". (EHU, 65)
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That is to say, the fact that a description of a motive involves
reference to the action which is its alleged effect does not show that
it is improper to speak of a motive as the cause of the action which
it explains, even though it be admitted that causes and their effects
are only contingently related. To say that motives and actions are
logically, and thus not causally, related requires that one say more
than that the object of the desire, and thus the means by which we
normally identify a desire, is the desired action. Stronger arguments
in support of the thesis that motives and actions are logically, not
causally, related might be constructed by imposing more stringent
conditions for the truth of a statement of the form "X desires to 0n
than are normally required. For example, it might be argued that one
may only legitimately talk of desires when the actions desired actually
1
take place. I shall not deal with arguments of this sort here, but
shall rest content with having made, with Pears, the general point
that the fact that the identification of a desire normally requires
reference to the action desired does not entail that a desire can not
be the cause of an action.
A further point about the assumptions of the logical-connection
theory of motives may be noted. The logical-connection theory
apparently assumes that the identification of desires is possible
solely by reference to the object of the desire, and thus by reference
The largest part of Pears's article is a critique of arguments in
support of a logical-connection theory of motives which impose such
more stringent restrictions on the notion of desire. See Pears,
pp. 87-97.
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to the action desired. It is, however, at least possible that we
may become able to identify desires in ways other than by reference
to their objects. It is conceivable, for example, that we may
become able to identify desires on the basis of neurophysiological
information. But if this be admitted possible, we have further
reason for rejecting the view that desires cannot be causes, at least
in so far as this view depends on the sort of argument outlined above.
There are, of course, many different arguments which have been
deployed against the causal-theory of motives, but which I cannot
consider here. I have, however, considered what I take to be the most
widely used argument in support of the logical-connection theory of
motives. This argument also has the added interest of implying, if
it were convincing, that in the discussion of one of the main topics
in the Treatise. viz. the nature of motives, Hume failed to see the
implications of one of his chief contributions to philosophical
analysis, the thesis that causal connections are contingent ones.
If Hume is not mistaken in his claim that motive-explanations,
whatever else they may be, are causal explanations, this can only make
his discussion of freedom and necessity more plausible. As we shall
see in the next section, Hume's argument for determinism assumes that
we can give motivational explanation of human conduct, and that this
fact supports the thesis of universal causation.
1
Davidson mentions a number of these other arguments in his article
cited earlier, pp. 693-700.
2. Liberty and Necessity
As I noted earlier, questions about the explanation of human actions
are closely, and traditionally, connected with questions about the freedom
of human actions. It is an important philosophical question whether it
follows, from the faot that one can explain human actions, that such actions
are, in some important sense, not free. We may turn, now, to Hume's illumi¬
nating discussion of this question. I shall consider Hume's discussion in
two stages. First, I shall consider the relevant elements of Hume's theory
of the explanation of human actions, and thus the character of Hume's deter¬
minism. Seoondly, I shall consider his positive account of human freedom
and responsibility. This discussion will complete my account of Hume's theoxy
of human actions.
It is important, at the start, to understand the context within which
Hume conducts his discussion of the hoaxy problem of free-will. As we have
seen at many places in the course of this study, Hume's chief interest, in
the Treatise of Human Nature, is in prosecuting a scientific inquiry into
the economy of the human mind along the lines of a Newtonian mechanics. More
generally, Hume was ooncerned to secure a scientific understanding of human
conduct. His interest ranged over many, at least, of what today we would
call the social sciences: psychology, sociology, political science, history,
economics, and so on. He believed that such sciences of human nature were
both possible and impox*tant to achieve, and believed himself to have made
some contribution to their advance. Moreover, in his morephilosophical moods,
he was concerned with problems of the "methodology of the social sciences".1
Passmore, p. 6
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As we have seen in Chapter II, he was interested in such problems as the
nature of soientifio explanation, the character of scientific laws, and the
differences between universal and statistical laws. As we have seen at other
places, he was particularly interested in the application of these discussions
to an elucidation of the oharacter of the social, as opposed to natural,
sciences. Given this context, we can see the importance which Hume attaches
to his discussion of liberty and necessity. If a scientific study of human
behavior is to be possible, it would seem that it must, in principle, be pos¬
sible that the soiences of human nature be capable of explaining and predic¬
ting human actions. That is to say, the notion of scientific explanation
involves the notions of scientific laws, whether universal or statistical,
and scientific prediction. But these latter notions seem to compromise the
concept of human freedom. If it is, at least in principle, possible to explain
and predict a man's actions, how can those actions be free? But the concept
of human freedom is essential to that of responsibility, and thus to those
of morals. Is it not the case, then, that the possibility of a scienoe of
human nature implies the impossibility of morality? And if we are convinced
that a distinction can be drawn between free and non-free behavior, must we
not insist that an adequate science of human nature is a pipe-dream?
Hume's problem can be looked at from the side of the scientist as well
as from that of the moralist. If it be admitted that some human actions are
free, does this not imply that an adequate science of human nature is in
principle impossible? How can an action be both free and predictable or
explainable? If some actions are free, and a free action is inexplicable
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and unpredictable, how oar a scientist of human nature even hope to construct
an adequate science? The possibility of suoh a science seems ruled-out from
the start if one admits free aotions. Thus the problem of human freedom
is right at the heart of Hume,s own most cherished project: a science of
human nature. If the alleged connection between "free", "inexplicable",
and "unpredictable" be allowed, then one must ohoose: science, or morality,
but not both. The main point of Hume's argument is to deny the alleged con¬
nections between the concepts of freedom, inexplicability, and unpredictability.
Along the way, he tries to justify a belief both in the possibility of social
science, and in the distinction between free and non-free human aotions. He
even tries to make out a case for the view that the concept of responsibility
depends on the concept of the causal explanation of human actions. I shall
begin by considering Hume's argument in defense of the social sciences.
Hume begins by considering the (to him) unproblematic case of explanation
and prediction in the natural sciences. In some instances, he points out,
we have universal laws governing the occurrence of physical events, and by
virtue of these universal laws we are oapable of predicting the occurrence
of certain events, given the satisfaction of appropriate conditions, with
perfect assurance, "Every object", Hume says, talking of physical objects,
"is determin'd by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its
motion". (T, 400) In the Enquiry he remarks:
Every natural effect is so preoisely determined by the
energy of its cause that no other effect, in such par¬
ticular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from
it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the
laws of nature, prescribed with 3uch exactness that a
living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two
bodies as motion in any other degree, or direction than
what is actually produced by it. (SHU, 82)
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In fact, in the passages quoted, Hume is asserting not that we have such
universal laws hut that we believe that such universal explanatory laws are
capable of being discovered in natural science, even if we do not in fact
possess suoh laws. Nevertheless, as is dear from his talk on the "influence
/of the constant union of "natural operations"1/ on the understanding, , , in
determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another" (T, 404),
Hume is concerned with the possibility of formulating such universal laws,
and does, in fact, believe that some such laws are in our possession, as,
for example, the laws of Newtonian mechanics, "When any phaenomena are
constantly and invariably conjoin*d together", he says, "they acquire such
V
a connexion in the imagination, that it passes from one to the other, without
any doubt or hesitation", (T, 403)
In some cases, however, we possess only statistical laws,1 "Below this
/i.e, observed oonstant conjunction/," Hume remarks, "there are many inferior
degrees of evidence and probability, nor does one single contrariety of experi¬
ment entirely destroy all ourieasoning. The mind ballances the contrary
experiments, and deducting the inferior from the superior, proceeds with that
degree of assurance or evidence, which remains". (T, 403) We have, however,
already discussed Hume's views on statistical laws at some length, and need
not elaborate that discussion here.
The important point to notice, however, is that even in those oases in
I should point out that, as before, I am using the term "statistical" in a
rather loose way to designate all those laws which are not universal or
formulable in the following way: All A's are B's, Under "statistical laws"
I include both those which are actually statistical, such as "51% of A's
are B's", and those which are less precise, such as "Most A's are B's" or
"The greatest number of A13 are B's."
natural science where we in fact possess only statistical laws we "believe,
according to Hume, that the staining of universal laws is in prlnoiple pos¬
sible*
Even when * * * contrary experiments are entirely equal,
we remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the
operation of contrary and conceal1d causes, we conclude,
that the chance or indifferenoe lies only in our judgment
on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in the things
themselves, which are in every case equally necessary,
tho* to appearance not equally constant or certain. (T, 403-404)
That is to say, even if we can only, at a particular point in time, state a
statistical law governing the occurrence of members of a class of physical
events, given the satisfaction of appropriate conditions, we presume that
it is in principle possible to discover the non-3tatistical laws which govern
the particular class of physical events. Until such time as we discover the
appropriate universal laws, of course, we make do with ur statistical laws.
But scientific inquiry is in principle intent on the discovery of universal
laws. Without such laws we cannot, in faci^ explain events, nor can we predict
the occurrence of events with perfeot assurance,
Hume oontrasts the attitudes of the "vulgar" and "philosophers" /readt
"scientists"/ in terms of the way oach respond to non-uniform regularities
in nature, i*e, to situations covered only by statistical, and not universal
laws:
The vulgar, who take things according to their first
appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an
uncertainty in the causes, as makes them often fail of their
usual unriuence, tho* they meet with no obstacle nor impedi¬
ment in their operation. But philosophers observing, that
almost in every part of nature there is contain'd a vast
variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason
of their minuteness or remoteness, find that 'tis at least
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po33ible the contrariety of events may not proceed
from any contingency in the oause, but from the secret
operation of oontr y oauses. This possibility i3 con¬
verted into certain ,y by farther observation, when they
remark, that upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of
effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and pro¬
ceeds from their mutual hindrance and opposition. A
peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any
clock or watch than to say, that comr only it does not go>
right: But an artisan easily peroeives that the same oroe
in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence
on the wheelsj but fails of its usual effeot, perhaps by
reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole
movement. From the observation of several parallel instan¬
ces, philosophers form a maxim, that the connexion betwixt
all causes and effeots is equally necessary, and that its
seeming uncertainty in soma instances proceeds from the -
secret opposition of contrary oauses. (T, 132. Italics min^)
This illuminating passage prompts several comments. First, Hume indicates
that he construes the prinoiple "All events have oauses" or the principle "All
events are susceptible to explanation by means of universal (i.e. non-statisti¬
cal) laws" as a rule which is used in scientific inquiry, and not a logioally
necessary truth about the world. As he himself argues, the sentence 'All
events are caused", taken as a universal statement, is, if true, only con¬
tingently true. In the passage under discussion, he makes it clear that he
nevertheless believes it appropriate to use this principle s a "maxim" gover¬
ning scientific inquiry. As a maxim adopted by scientists, it has the function
of requiring them, despite failures in the past, to continue their characteristic
search for thoas universal laws which are believed to govern all phenomena in
the physical world.
^Hume considers this paragraph sufficiently important to repeat it almost
verbatim in the first Bnquiry (pp. 86-87).
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Whether this maxim is in fact essential to scientific inquiry is a ques¬
tion which I shall not attemit to answer here. Nevertheless, it is clearly
Hume's view that the use of this maxim is Mfied by the fact that in some
cases where we have observed a merely statistical regularity of phenomena
"upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety
of causes", (T, 132) We may query the "always" in this assertion but Hume's
point is clear enough. The belief in the legitimacy of the principle of
universal causation is justified uy its results in aotual scientific investi¬
gation, Scientists have, in some e '«*, progressed from statistical to
universal laws in the past, and this faot justifies the belief that such
progress is possible in other cr.sss as well. It is, in fact, the adoption
of the principle of universal causation that is one of the marks distinguish¬
ing "philosopher's" from the "vulgar".
Most importantly, however, this passage brings out the connection, in
Hume's theory, between the concept of universal causation (determinism) and
the concept of universal laws in science. The point of the passage is to
defend the belief in universal causation against the objection that in fact,
in at least many cases, we are aware of only statistical regularities in
nature, Hume's point is that it is quite consistent both (a) to admit that
we possess only statistical laws governing the occurrence of many natural
phenomena, and (b) to assert that there are (in fact) no contingent events,
in the sense of uncaused events. And he makes this point by arguing that in
fact, in a good many cases, scientists have discovered those universal laws
governing events which were previously capable of explanation in only a
statistical way. Thus, to say that an event is caused is, for Hume, to say,
at least in part, that is is in principle possible to explain the occurrence
of that event by means of a universal law. To say that all events are caused
is, at least in part, to say that all events are in principle capable of ex¬
planation by universal laws.
The concept of necessity present in Hume'5 determinist thesis is, then,
the conoept of causal necessity. Recalling our earlier discussion of causal
necessity, we may say that the notion of neoessity in question is that invol¬
ved in the notion of legitimately ^erring the occurrence of one event, given
the occurrence of another, and the knowledge of an empirical law correlating
the occurrence o members of the classes of events of which they are members.
We may say that an event A must ocour if we (a) know that another event B
has occurred, and (b) possess a (universal) law correlating the ooourrence
of A-like events and B-like events. Granted our previous discussion of causal
necessity, this interpretation of Hume's determinism is apparent from his comment
"Here then are tvre particulars, which we are to consider as essential to
necessity, vis, the constant union /of events/ and the inference of the mind;
and wherever we discover these we must acknowledge a necessity". (T, 400)
In any case in which we actually possess a universal enprical law, or are
justified in believing that such a law is in principle open to discovery,
in that case we are justified in asserting that the events in question are
caused. This, in fact, is what, on Hume's view, the thesis of determinism




Having elucidated the concept of necessity in the allegedly unproblematio
oase of natural science, Hum turns to discuss the possible application of
this concept to human actions. In effect he is inquiring whether an adequate
science of human conduct is possible. Hume's argument that an adequate
science of human oonduot is possible takes the following form: (a) in some
instances we possess universal empirical laws governing human behavior; (b)
in some instances we possess only statistical laws, but in such cases we may,
with as much justification as in the natural sciences, assume that universal
laws are in principle able to be discovered; (c) in those instances where
human conduct appears completely random, we may still be justified in believ¬
ing that its apparent randomne is a function of our lack of knowledge,
rather than of any genuine contingency in human behavior. Hume in fact issues
a challenge. If human behavior, is, from the point of view of scientific
explanation, in fundamentally the same situation as is the natural world, then
we must, to be consistent, admit that human actions are as necessary as are
physical events. 'The actions ... of matter", he says, "are to be regarded
as instances of necessary actions; and whatever is in this respect on the same
footing with matter, must be acknowleig*& to be necessary". (T, 400)
To avoid misunderstanding Hume at this point is is essential to be clear
about the character of the universal or statistical laws which, as we shall
see, he claims we possess with respect to human conduct. In claiming that we
possess universal or statistioal laws governing human behavior Hume is not
claiming that we possess laws with the formally scientific character of the
laws of Newton's meohanics. When he wrote the Treatise and the first Enquiry
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Hume obviously believed that the sciences of human nature were Just getting
started. As he remarks in the Sfaoutryi "May we not hope, that philosophy
/read: moral philosophy, as opposed to natu. 1 philosophy/, if cultivated
with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its
researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret
springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in it3 operations?"
(KHU, 14. Italics mine.) Hume contrasts the natural sciences, which had
already achieved a high degree or development, with the moral sciences which
were still in their infancy. The Tr ^.tlse Itself had been "an attempt to
introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects". (T, xi.
Italics mine.) ne should not, then, expect that the "laws", whether univer¬
sal or statistical, whioh Hume gives as laws governing human behavior will
have the formal character of the laws of a scienoe. They are rather what
we may call common-~->nse laws, laws which are not very clearly or precisely
formulated, but which we nevertheless find adequate for the ordinary purposes
of our day-to-day activities.
With this reservation made, Hume sets out to "prove from experience,
that our actions have a constant union with oa motives, tempers, and circum¬
stances" (T, 4CXL), and that "as the union betwixt motive and actions has the
same constancy, as that in any natural operations, so its influence on '.he
understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of
one from that of another" (T, 404)•
To "prove from experience, that our actions have a constant union with
our motives, tempers, and circumstances", Hume says ". . .a very slight and
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general view of the common course of human affairs will be sufficient".
(T, 401) "Whether we consider mankind according to the difference of sexes,
ages, governments, conditions, or methods of education; the same uniformity
and regular operation of natural principles are discernible". (T, 401) '//hat
Hume has in mind are rough-and-ready correlations between the sex of a person
and the character of his actions or emotions (T, 401), between a person's age
and mental ability (T, 401), between human needs and the means devised to
supply them (T, 401-402), and so on. Experience teaches us, Hume maintains,
that "there is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the
operations of the sun and climate". (T, 402-403) Moreover, we display our
belief in 3uch a "general course of nature in human actions" by the fact that
we "acknowledge the force of moral evidence, and both in speculation and
practice proceed upon it, as upon a reasonable foundation". (T, 404) By
"moral evidence" Hume means "a conclusion concerning the actions of men,
deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation". (T, 404)
This "kind of reasoning", or this practical knowledge, Hume says, "runs thro'
politics, war, commerce,oeconomy, and indeed mixes itself so entirely in
human life, that 'tis impossible to act or subsist a moment without having
recourse to it". (T, 405) Hume illustrates this practical knowledge of men
and affairs which we make use of in all sorts of situations by a number of
examples:
A prince, who imposes a tax upon his subjects, expects
their compliance. A general, who conducts an army, makes
account of a certain degree of courage. A merchant looks
for fidelity and skill in his factor or super-cargo. A
man, who gives orders for his dinner, doubts not of the
obedience of his servants. (T, 405)
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Hume's oint is more amply illustrated in the first Enquiry, Hs claims,
first, that there are regularities in human conduct:
It is universally acknowledged that thei^e is a great
uniformity among the actions of men, in ail nations
and ages, and that human nature remains still the same,
in its principles and operations. The same motives al¬
ways produce the same actions: The same events follow
from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love,
vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit: these
passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed
through society, have been, from the beginning of the
world, and still are, the source of all the actions
and enterprises, which have ever been observed among
mankind, (EHU, 83)
In an interesting reference to a discipline sometimes taken to be one of the
social scienoes, viz. history, he remarks:
Its chief use is only to discover the oonstant and universal
, 'noiples of human nature, by showing men in all varieties
of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with
materials from which we may form our observations and become
acquainted with the regular springs of human action and
behaviour,(EHU, 83)
It is not, of course, just our reading of history which enables us to under¬
stand the ins and outs of human oonduot. Our own experience, provided it is
sufficiently wide and varied, can provide us with an almost infallible know¬
ledge of the ways different sorts of men will behave in different 3orts of
situations•
Hence likewise the benefit of that experience acquired
by long life and a variety of business and company, in
order to instruct us in the principles of human nature,
and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation.
By means of this guide, m mount up to the knowledge of
men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expres¬
sions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpre¬
tation of their aotions from our knowledge of their motives
and inclinations. The general observations treasured up by
a course of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and
teach us to unravel all its intricacies. (JEHU, 84-85)
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Ifume*s miarks about the regularities in human conduct must not, however,
be read in too simple-minded a fashion. Hume is quite well aware of the marry
variations possible in human conduct, and the com* quent complexity and
subtlety required if our practical knowledge of men and affairs is to do
the job it is required to do, viz. enable us to find our way about in our
dealings with others. Hume points out in the Enquiry;
We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human
actions should be carried to such a length as that all men,
in the same oiroumstances, will act precisely in the same
manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of
characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity
in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the
contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in different
men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which
still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity. (EHU, 85)
As he remarks in the Treatise: " here is a general course of nature in human
aotions as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate". (T, 402-403)
But, and this is the point to be stressed; "There are also characters pecu¬
liar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind".
(T, 403) That i3 to .-.ay, one's practical knowledge of men and affairs in not
just a matter of knowledge of those regularities which obtain in the behavior
of men simply in so far as they are men. Some of the regularities which we
observe are regularities which obtain only in restricted cases, and which
depend on facts about the social, economic, educational, political, religious,
etc. status of the individuals in question. Some of the principles in our
practical knowledge even refer essentially to particular individuals, such
as one's brother, one's wife, one's boss. The better we know an individual,
the more apt we are to know how he will behave in a given situation, and the
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less apt we re to "be taken by surprise.
As I pointed out before, Hume's examples are, pretty well exclusively,
examples of common-sense, non-scientific universal laws. It is difficult
to describe, with any precision, how we come to have such laws, and it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to express them in any formally precise way,
or to display any gystc tic interconnections between them. They aire rough-
and-ready laws, but nevertheless may be perfectly adequate for our ordinary
purposes. The important point, however, is not their formally scient..fie
or non-soientlfio character, but the fact that there do seem to be such
regularities as they express, and we do, quite obviously, act on the assump¬
tion of such regularities. Implicitly, Hume is suggesting that if we once
realize tb -t there are such observable regularities in human behavior, and
that we do, in countless situations, act on the assumption of such regulari¬
ties, we have admitted at least a large part of what the determinist, or, less
polemically, the defender of the sooial soiences, is concerned to insist on,
viz. the fact that tnere are laws, or that it may be possible to discover laws,
which govern human conduct. Once the "lawfulness" of human behavior is admit¬
ted, there can be no genuine objection to progressively making more precise
the laws we actually possess by a continuing scientific inquiry. It is precise¬
ly the legitimacy or the possibility of such a (sooial) scientific inquiry
which, as we have seen, Hune is concerned to defend.
Hume is quite well aware that for the most part the laws of human conduct
which we actually possess are only statistical. But he insists that this fact
about the law3 of conduct should be allowed no greater weight than the fact
than many laws in the natural sciences are similarly non-universal. In the
natural sciences we assume, Hume believes, that our merely statistical laws
are, at least in principle, capable of being replaoed, by dint of further
scientific inquiry, by strictly universal laws, There is no reason, then,
for not allowing a similar assumption to operate in our study of human
behavior. As Hume remarks in the Treatise:
In judging of the actions of pen we must proceed upon the
same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objeots.
When any phaenomena are constantly and invariably conjoin'3.
together, they aoquire such a connexion in the imagination,
that it passes from one to the other, without any doubt or
hesitation. But below this there are many inferior degrees
of evidence and probability, nor does one single contrariety
of experiment entirely destroy all our reasoning. The mind
ballances the contrary experiments, and deducting the infer¬
ior from tibe superior, proceeds with that degree of assurance
or evidence, which remains. Even when these contrary experi¬
ments are entirely equal, we remove not the notion of pauses
- .;d neoessity: but suntosing that the usual contrariety pro¬
ceeds from the operation of contrary and oonoeal'd pauses, we
conclude, that tne chance or indifference lie3 only in our
judgment on account*of our imperfect knowledge. not in the
things themselves, which are in every case equally necessary,
tho* to appearance not equally constant or certain. No union
can be more constant and certain, than that of seme actions
with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the
union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the
operations of body, nor can we conclude any thing from the
one irregularity, which will not follow equally from the
other, (T, 403-401j.» Italics mine.)
The justification of this assumption in the oase of human behavior i3 the
same as that in the case of physical events. As we have seen already, the
justification of this assumption in the oase of physical events is the fact
that in many cases we have in fact progressed from merely statistical to
strictly universal laws. The same is true of human aotions, As Hume points
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out in the Eriuirv of the aotions of men:
The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men
may frequently be accounted for by those who know
every particular circumstance of their character and
situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives
a peevish answer: But he has the toothache, or has not
dined, A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity
in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden piece of
good fortune. (iHU, 88)
Hume concludes from this that "the internal principles and motives may operate
in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same
manner as the winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather cv®
supposed to be governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable
by human sagacity and enquiry", (SHU, 88)
Hume's determinism amounts, then, to this. The principle that all events
are capable, at least in principle, of explanation by means of universal laws
is not a necessary truth. Nevertheless, it is an amply justified "maxim" of
scientific inquiry. This "maxim" has a role to play in the social as well
as the natural soiences. *ts use is a3 justified in the former as in the
latter. In either ^ase our belief in the truth of the proposition expressed
by "All events are capable, at least in principle, of explanation by means
of universal laws" is directly supported by the fact that we do have some
universal laws in our possession. The truth of this proposition is not
discountenanced by the fact that in 3ome cases we are not at present aule to
explain events, or possess only statistical laws. In at least some cases
in the past we have progressed from an inability to explain events, or from
the possession of merely statistical laws, to the discovery of universal laws.
This fact gives us a justified hope for the future, /bid it is, in fact, this
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justified ho 3 that lies at the heart of scientific progress. In sum, the
sciences of human nature are at least possible.
It is convenient, at this point, to notice a most astute remark which
Hume makes to counter a most interesting objection to the possiblity of an
adequate scientific explanation of human conduot. If the ability to explain
an event implies the lity to predict that event, then what of the fact that
human agents may deliberately falsity one's predictions about their behavior?
Hume presents the oase of a libertarian who deliberately falsifies a detor-
minist's prediction of his behavior so as to show the falsity of the deter-
minist thesis. But this, Hume insist^ is no disproof of determinism, because
"the desire of showing pur liberty is the sole motive of our actions", (T, 408)
That is be 'ay, the faot that the libertarian oan act in a "caprioious and
irregular" fashion (T, 408) when faced with a prediction of his behavior
does not succeed in showing that his "capricious and irregular" behavior is
inexplicable. It merely shows that the explanation of his behavior must take
into account his awareness of one's prediction. The point can be generalised.
The fact that the subjectsof any science of human nature are, in Hume's expres¬
sion, "intelligent agents" (SHtJ, 88) requires that a scientist of human nature
take the possibility of deliberate falsification of predictions into consider¬
ation. But there is no reason to think that no laws can be established allow¬
ing for this possibility.
Another objection which Hume considers and rejects depends on what he
oalls "a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference".
(T, 408) Hume points out that "tho' in reflecting on human actions we seldom
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feel 3uch a ooseness or indifference, yet it very commonly happens, that
in performing the actions themselves ne are sensible of something like it",
(T, 408) "We feel", he says, "that our actions a oa subject to our own will
on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will Itself is subject to
nothing". (T, 408) But if Hume's statement of the deteminist thesis is
correct, this objection would have to show that the statement "I feel that
my aotion is inexplicable" implies the truth of the statement "My action is
in fact inexplicable". But this objection rests on a mistaken belief that
the agents cvai "©slings are conclusive, or provide the final answer, with
respeot to the explioability of his actions. Now there are many cases in
whioh we do not allow what the agent says about himself to be the final answer.
We may correctly say that Smitn io acting out of envy despite his sincere
protestations that this is not so. The same, Hume claims, is true of the
present case. The agent has no privileged access to the truth about the
explicability or inexplicability of his behavior. Though he have "a false
sensation or e-pbriouce ... of the liberty of indifferenoe" his behavior
may, in fact, be perfectly explicable. The objection rests on a failure to
see that "the necessity of any action, whether of matter or of the mind, ia
not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking cr intelligent being,
who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought
to inferits existence from some preceding objects". (T, 408) That is to say,
the "necessity" of an agent's actions is a question of whether in fact those
actions are, at least in prinoipie, explainable by a universal empirical law-
And the agent does not have the last say on this question of fact.
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We may now turn to the second major element of Hume's discussion of the
problem of free-will, i.e. his account of the sense in which, within a deter-
minist framework of the kind he outlines, some actions are free and some are
not free. According to Hume, philosophers have confused two different senses
of "liberty". In the Treatise he calls these the "liberty of spontaneity"
and the "liberty of indifference". ^07) To talk of a free action in the
"liberty of indifference" sense is to talk of "a negation of necessity and
causes". (T, 407) An aotion is free in this sense if it is uncaused or a
chanoe occurrence. Though it is logically possible that there be free actions
in this sense, the determinist argument which I have sketched above is an
argument to show that there is no reason to believe that such free actions
do in faot occur. If one acoepts this argument, then one rejects the (empiri¬
cal) possibility of free actions in the "liberty of indifference" sense.
The concept of a free aotion in the "liberty of spontaneity" sense is
a very different concept, and, according to Hume, it is the reality of free
actions in this sense "which it concerns us to preserve". (T, 407-408) To
say that an action is free in this sense is to say that it is not subjeot to
"force, and violence, and constraint". (407) Hume insists that in this
sense of "free" some human actions are free. Unfortunately, however, he does
not say very much about this concept of freedom in the Treatise. His account
in the first Enquiry is somewhat more satisfactory.
In the Enquiry Hume raises the question* "What is meant by liberty, when
applied to voluntary actions?" (EHU, 95) "We cannot surely," he says, "mean
that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circum¬
stances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from
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the other, and that one affords no inference by whioh we can conclude the
existence of the other", (SHU, 95) That is, when we describe an action as
free we do not mean to say that it is uncaused or inexplicable, "By liberty,
then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the
determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we
may; if we choose to move, we also may", (SHU, 95) A free action, then,
is an unconstrained action, A person aots freely if he could have done
otherwise. That is to say, P acts freely in doing A if, had he chosen, he
could have not done A, or could have done B or C Instead of A. A person's
actions are free if they are, in this sense, within his power to do or not
do. This distinction between those actions which are free or unconstrained
and those which are not free or are constrained is to be drawn within that
class of actions which are, in principle, capable of explanation by univer¬
sal laws.
Having made this important point, Hume is less successful in providing
an account of how we determine which actions are, in fact, free in this sense
of free. He tends to restrict his attention to those aotions (or omissions)
which are subject to physical constraint. In the Enquiry he claims that "this
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to evexy one who is not
a prisoner and in chains", (3HU, 95) (As Flew remarks; "He should surely
have added at least the clause; 'and who is not physically incapable of doing
what he wants to do'","*■) There is no reason, however, to think that Hume
Believes that only thoseactions (or omissions) which are physically constrained
are unfree actions. He does not, that is, believe that any notion which is
not physically constrained is a free action. At least at one point in the
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Treatise ha shows some awareness of non-physical forms of oonstraint: "'Tie
commonly allow'd that mad-men have no liberty". (T, kOk) If a man is subject
to psychological compulsions (as in the case of kleptomania) and is unable
not to do what he is (psychologically) compelled to do, his conduct is as
unfree as that of a man subject to physical violence, Hume is aware, as well,
that there is a quite normal sense in whioh a person, though not subject to
some psychological disorder or actual physical force, may be said to be con¬
strained to act or not to act in a certain way. As he observes in the Treatise:
"According to common notions a man has no power, where very considerable
motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine
him to forbear what he wishes to perform", (T, 312) "The fear of the civil
magistrate," he says, may be "as strong a restraint as any of iron", (T, 312)
Elaborating on this remark we may say that a person's behavior is constrained
if, for example, he is threatened with dire consequences if he should aot as
he wishes to act.
Despite these suggestive remarks, however, it must be admitted that Hume
does not give a very full account of the ways in which a person's aotions may
be unfree in the sense of constrained. Perhaps this lacuna in Hume's discussion
of freedom is to be explained by recognizing Hume's principal objective in the
sections on freedom. It is sufficient, for Hume's purposes, that he be able
to show that a sense can be given to the contrast between free and unfree be¬
havior within a determinist framework. If this is Hume's principal objective
in the sections in question, and it surely is, then a careful analysis of the
"'"Flew, p. lltO
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varieties of constraint can have only a secondary importance.
We may now consider a stronger, but closely related, thesis concerning
the notion of human freedom, viz. the thesis that the notion of human free¬
dom depends on the notion of causal necessitation, and thus that the concepts
of morality presuppose a belief in determinism. Having argued that the notion
\
of human freedom is compatible with the determinist thesis, Hume goes on to
make the much stronger claim that one oan only make sense of the concept of
a free 'ction, and thus those of morals, if one assumes the truth of the
thesis of determinism. "I , . . shall venture to affirm that the doctrines,
both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are not only consistent
with morality, but are absolutely essential to its support", (SHU, 97. Italics
mine.) This view has been adopted by a number of recent writers, including
Nowell-Smith, who claims: "Freedom, so far from being incompatible with
causality, implies it."1 The view has, however, recently come under attack
2
by Philippa Foot. I shall try, in what follows, to state this thesis of
Hume's as clearly as possible, and, along the way, defend it.
We may begin, somewhat obliquely, by considering what Hume takes to be
essential to an anti-determinist or libertarian theory. The crux of the
libertarian theory is the claim that at least some actions (or, more accurately,
3ome acts of the will) are not caused. That is, some actions are such that
they oannot be fully explained by reference to a person's motives, character,
or whatever, because the acts of the will which give rise to these actions
"'"P.H. Nowell-Sraith, "Freewill and Moral Responsibility", Mind. LVII (1948),
p. 4*>. """"
2
Philippa Foot, "Free Will as Involving Determinism", The Philosophical Review.
IOT (1957), pp. 439-450.
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are not adequately determined "by a person's motives, character, and so on.
There is no set of oonditions suffioient to explain the occurrence of these
acts of the will. There is no set of conditions given the satisfaction of
which the person must choose to act or not to aot in a certain way. Some
human actions, that is, are caused "by uncaused acts of the will. As we have
seen, it is Hume's view that there are no actions which are not, in principle,
explainable by reference to their antecedent conditions and to the universal
laws correlating these conditions with actions of the kind in question.
The libertarian thesis is not, of course, intended to imply that we may
not legitimately speak of a man's character, or of his motives in doing what
he does. But the libertarian does maintain that talk of a man's oharaoter
or motives is insufficient to explain the occurrence of at least some of his
actions, vis, his free actions. What makes a man's actions free is the
fact that at least one of the conditions of their occurrence, the crucially
important one, is an act of will which is itself uncaused. And if this act
of will is itself unoaused, it is in principle impossible to explain any
actions which flow from it. The explanation of an aotion requires reference
to the sufficient conditions for that action, but for a man's free actions,
so the libertarian claims, no list of sufficient conditions can in principle
be given. Normally the libertarian would claim that the fact that some of
an agent's actions are in principle not capable of being explained in terms
of their sufficient conditions is a faot of which the agent is a?ra.re by some
-..P -
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We have already seen Hume's objection to this last claim. From the fact
that I feel that my action is inexplicable it does not follow that it is in
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fact Inexplicable. A further point at issue, however, is whether the liber-
tartan theory of uncaused acts of the will can do the job it is required to
do, viz. explain the faot that we hold men responsible for some of their
aotions, but not for others. Hume argues two points: that the libertarian
theory cannot make sense of the criteria we actually use for ascribing respon¬
sibility, or for determining degrees of responsibility, and cannot offer other
criteria in place of these; that the libertarian's conception of moral agency
is radically different from that in ordinary use, and there seems no reason
to adopt it. Hume raises these questions in connection with the liability
of an agent to legal punishment. There is no need, however, to restrict
his remarks to the context of punishment. They are equally applicable to
any oase in which we may be said to respond evaluatively to a person or his
aotions, whether this response takes the form of actual punishment, or moral
judgment, or the use of praise and blame.
One question which is, in our ordinary practioe, essential to determining
responsibility is the question whether the person could have done otherwise
than he did. If we judge that a person, even had he wanted to do otherwise
than he did, could not have done so, we do not hold him responsible for what
he did. For example, if we have reason to believe that a person is a Idepto-
maniac we do not punish him for stealing from Woolworth's. If we know that
a person was physically forced to act against his will we do not consider his
action to be his action, in the sense of behavior for which he is responsible.
If we judge that a man acted in a particular way because he was threatened
with consequences which we consider to be such as no man could reasonably be
expected to accept, we do not hold him responsible for what he did. In each
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case we have ways, whether rough-and-ready or more or less soientifio, for
securing an answer to the questions could he have done otherwise? And the
answer to this question determines, at least to some extent, whether or the
degree to which a man is responsible for his conduct.
Ruling out cases of psychological or physical compulsion, we also
determine whether or to what degree a mar is responsible for his conduot by
determining whether he had a motive for acting as he did, whether the action
was intentional, whether it was done on the spur of the moment or as the
result of a more or less complex plan of aotion, whether he oould have fore¬
seen the consequences of his behavior or could have bean reasonably expected
to have taken greater care in determining the consequences of his behavior,
whether his behavior was characteristic of him, and so on. These various
factors play a variety or roles in our determination of whether or to what
degree a person is responsible for his conduct, or the results of his conduct.
Some of them seem to be essential, at least in some cases, to responsibility.
Others seem rather to be principally connected with questions about the likeli¬
hood that a person did the aotion attributed to him, though they may also
contribute to a determination of the degree of a person* s responsibility.
To determine whether Smith committed the crime the detective may try to dis¬
cover a motive that Smith might have had for committing it. He might also
try to discover whether it was the sort of thing Smith might have been expected
to do, i.e. the sort of thing characteristic of Smith. Of course, the faot
aat Smith had a motive for a crime (in the sense that we can see a reason
for Smith's doing it, if he did it), or that the sort of criminal activity
in question is characteristic of Smith, does not prove that Smith is, in faot,
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the culprit. But if Smith did commit the crime, and it was characteristic
of him, this mi^ht lead us to attribute a greater degree of responsibility
to him. In many oases, too, we require that the action in question be an
intentional one. If Smith cut3 me in the street, but does not intend to
do so, I would not consider him responsible for his action, though, of course,
I would not like what he did. But if a man has an office requiring him to
take speoial oare to avoid such unintentional actions, he would be held respon¬
sible for failing to satisfy the more than usually stringent requirements of
that office. If a man kills another in a fit of rage it is one thing; if
he kills him, and has worked out the details of the murder beforehand, it is
another. 7/e admit, in law, a distinction between premeditated and unpremedi¬
tated murder. If it is clear that a person did not realize that in doing one
thing, X, he would also be doing something else, Y, this would, in many oases
at any rate, diminish his responsibility for doing Y, or even absolve him
entirely.
Hume is aware of these facts about our use of the concept of responsibility,
and insists that they fit quite well into his determinist scheme. "Men are
not blam'd for such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually,"
he remarks, somewhat too strongly, "whatever may by their consequences".
(T, 412) And the reason for this is that "the causes of these actions are
only momentary, and terminate in than alone". (T, 412) That is to say, such
aotions do not flow from some more or less permanent elements in a person's
make-up. They are not, in a sense we shall have to elucidate further on,
his actions. "Ken are less blam'd," Hume claims, "for such evil actions,
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as they perform hastily and unpremeditately, than for such as proceed from
thought and deliberation". (T, 412) Why is this so? According to Hume,
"a hasty tei.per, tho' a constant cause in the mind, operates only by inter¬
vals, and Infects not the whole character". (T, 412) This claim raises
problems for Hume which we shall consider later. At the moment, however,
it is sufficient to note Hume's insistence that the way in which we use the
concept of responsibility reveals the fact that we give an important place
to considerations of a person's motives, intentions, circumstances, character
traits, and so on. But if this is so, then our ordinary use of the concept
of responsibility fits very well indeed with Hume's determinist thesis, and
seems to run quite counter to what one would expect if the libertarian thesis
were correct.
When one confronts the libertarian theory with such prominent features
of our use of the concept of responsibility one gets rather peculiar results.
The fact that a person has a motive for doing what he does, and even the fact
that he claims to have acted out of a certain motive, provide no surety that
the requisite free (i.e. uncaused) act of the will has taken place, and thus
give one no grounds for believing that the agent is responsible for his be¬
havior. "Tie person may, but then again he may not, have fheely done the action
for vv ich he claims to have a certain motive. The fact that a person aots
with a motive can not, then, reveal anything about his responsibility. The
same is true of cases in which the agent carefully deliberates about what he
is doing, or intends to do what he does. It is not sufficient to show that
the person deliberated about doing A, or intended to do A, for it is certainly
possible that the person both deliberate about doing A, and intend to do it,
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and yet A not be the result of an uncaused act of the will.
Similar considerations are relevant in the oase of characteristic actions.
The fact that a person does A, and that doing A-like aotions is characteristic
of him, goes no way at all toward determining whether or to what degree he
is responsible for doing A, on the libertarian thesis. A person may perform
an actiou that is wholly characteristic of him, and yet have no responsibility
for it at all, provided the particular action does not have its source in
an unoaused act of the will. The fact that his behavior is wholly uncharac¬
teristic of him likewise in no way diminishes his responsibility, since
responsibility depends, for the libertarian, on the presence or absence of
an uncaused act of the will. The presence or absence of such an uncaused
act of the will has no connections with the fact that the agent's behavior
is uncharacteristic or characteristic. On the libertarian theory, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to account for the fact that a person's respon¬
sibility, or the degree of his responsibility, is affected by the characteristic
or uncharacteristic character of his conduct.
It would seem, too, that according to the libertarian theory it would
not be sufficient, in order to determine a person's responsibility for his
behavior, to show that his behavior was not physically or psychologically
constrained, in the sense usually given to these expressions. For it could
well be true that a man's action not be constrained, either physically or
psychologically, and yet not be free because not the result of an uncaused
act of the will.
The fact that the libertarian theory cannot make sense of the criteria
for responsibility actually in use does not of itself, however, show that the
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libertarian theory should he rejected. It is at least possible that our
criteria for asoribing responsibility or determining degrees of responsibility
should be changed, and that the libertarian's single oriterion, the occurrence
of an uncaused act of the will, be adopted in their place. The difficulty
in such a move, however, is thi3. There seems to be no way in which anyone,
whether observer or agent, can determine that such a free act of will has
taken place. *t is sometimes argued that the agent knows whether his conduct
is free or not by seme form of immediate awareness. Thus, an agent oan tell,
immediately, whether he is constrained or not constrained to do or not to do
some action. This is sometimes taken as "a demonstrative or even intuitive
proof of human liberty". (T, 408) But, as we have seen earlier, this felt
lack of constraint can not prove what it is alleged to prove. What the agent
must have immediate knowledge of is not the fact that his behavior is un¬
constrained, but that it is uncaused. But from the faot that the agent is
unaware of the causes of his behavior it does not follow that there are no
causes of his behavior. Nor does it follow from the fact that no one knows
the causes of his behavior that his behavior is uncaused. Moreover, if, as
the libertarian claims, the fact that we can identity a man's motives, or say
thai on action is characteristic of him, in no way compromises the claim that
his action is uncaused, it is difficult to know when we shall be able to say
that a given action is uncaused (that is, that the act of will from which it
flows is uncaused).
As Hume would be quite prepared to admit, an uncaused act of the will
is a logical possibility. But what has this to do with the notion of respon¬
sibility? Why should we require that a man's action stem from an uncaused
-351-
act of the will if it is to "be called free, and attributed to him as his
responsibility? More importantly, perhaps, how can we operate with this
alleged criterion for responsibility? If it is not sufficient to show that
an action is done with a motive, is intended, is preceded by deliberation,
and is neither pbysioally nor psychologically compelled, then what will count
as an action for which the agent is responsible? It would seem that we
could never know when an action is in principle inexplicable, and thus one
for which the agent may, on the libertarian view, be legitimately held
responsible# The judge, in deciding the fate of the accused, would have
no way of determining whether his criminal action was, in the all-important
libertarian's sense, the accused's own action. It i3 even quite conceivable
that a judge could systematically condemn those who were not, in the liber¬
tarian's sense, guilty, and not condemn those who were, and never be the
wiser. Nor would the accused himself know whether or not he was being
wronged, 3inoe he too would have no way of verifying the occurrence of the
free choice. But to admit this is to admit that the libertarian theoxy
provides no genuine jriterion of responsibility.
As we have seen, Hume simply accepts the normal criteria for ascribing
responsibility, and claims their consonance with his determinist theoxy.
Rather than looking for sorno hypothetical uncaused act of the will, he con¬
siders precisely such things as whether the agent was constrained to act as
he did, whether he had a motive fox doing or intended to do what he was doing,
whether lie deliberated about his action, and whether the action was character¬
istic of him, Vlhat is particularly interesting about Hume's account, however,
is not so much the fact that he accepts the normal criteria for responsibility,
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but the reasons that he gives for doing so. By looking at these reasons
we will be able to see the nature of the second deficiency which he alleges
in the libertarian theory.
Briefly, Hume's argument is this. The principal object of our various
moral responses is not so much a person's aotions but the person who acts.
Or, somewhat differently, we only oonsider a man's behavior to be behavior
for which he is responsible if that behavior has its source in his character.
If a man's conduot gives no indioation about the character of the man, then
he is not held responsible for it. Thus, the way we think of what persons
are (our concept of what is relevant to being a person), and the connected
question of how we elucidate the notion of a person's character, are crucial
for understanding the nature of our moral responses. But our concepts of
personality and character involve the conoepts of such things as motives,
intentions, tendencies, characteristic ways of aoting, and so on. Given such
a concept of personality and of character, the question "When Smith did X,
was X his own action?" mu.t be answered by inquiring into Smith's motives,
intentions, etc. One of the principal weaknesses of the libertarian theoxy
is that it rejects all the common features of our concepts of personality and
character, and thus of moral agency, in f-vor of some difficult to conceive
notion of an agent moved to act by uncaused acts of the will. In what follows
I shall simply comment on the various stages of this argument.
According to Hume "the constant and universal object of hatred or anger
is a person or creature endow*d with thought and consciousnessj and when any
criminal or injurious actions excite that passion, 'tis only by their relation
to the person or connexion with him". (411) This claim must be read in the
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light of Hume's theory of moral sentimentoj i.e. his belief that moral
sentiments are, at least in large part, specialised forms of the indireot
passions of love and hatred, pride and humility."*" If this is so, then the
object of a moral response is a person, i.e. that thinking or conscious
being whose actions are a source of pain or of pleasure to others, or to
himself, 'oral evaluations are, tliat is to say, for the most part forms
of personal evaluation, or evaluation of persona But it is essential that
the pleasure- or pain-causing behavior of a person which gives rise to our
valuation of him have a "relation to the person or connexion with him".
(T, 411) Just as I can only love X because he has done A if I am convinced
that A was an action of X's, so too I can only feel moral approval or dis¬
approval of X for doing A if I believe that A was X's action. Using a
distinction Hume u-.es in his aocount of the indirect passions, the "object"
of a moral valuation is a person, and the "cause" of that valuation is, in
part, that person's action. And it is essential that the aotion have some
more or less intimate connection with the agent if the agent is to be the
I
proper object of a noral valuation because of it.
It is important to realize trhat is required for this more or less intimate
connection between agent and action to obtain. It is not 3uffioient for moral
disapproval that the agent be the physical cause of some "criminal" or
"injurious" state of affairs. For an agent may be the physical cause of
such a 3tate of affairs and yet that state of affairs have only "the mo3t
1 '
See Ardal, Passion and Value, especially Chapter 6, "Moral Sentiments",
pp. 109-147.
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casual and accidental" connection with him. Thus, a person may perform
some "injurious" or "criminal" action purely accidentally, and, thoug^this
in no way reduces its "injuriousness", it does absolve the agent of respon¬
sibility. "Actions," Hume says, "are by their very nature temporary and
perishing; and where they proceed not from seme cause in the characters and
disposition of the person, who perform'd them, the^ infix not themselves
upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if
evil". (T, 411) An action may be "blameable" and "contrary to all the rules
of morality and religion", and yet the person who performed it be "not
responsible for it" and not a proper "object of punishment or ven/seance".
(T, 2(11) He is not responsible for it, and thus not liable to "punishment
or vengeance", if it "proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or con¬
stant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it". (T, 2*11) For a man to
be responsible for a given action his "character" must be in some way "concern'd"
in it; the aotion must benderiv'd" from his character. (T, 2*11) At a later
point Hume says:
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as
a sign of scxae quality or character. It must depend upon
durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole
conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions
themselves, not proceeding from any con; -ant principle,
have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility;
and consequently are never consider'd in morality. (T, 575)
Similarly he says:
We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries
concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or
character from which the aotion prooeeded. These alone
are durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning
the person. Actions are, indeed, better indications of
a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments;
but 'tis only so far as they are such indications, that
they are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame.
(T, 575)
-yy-
The easiest mistake to make in interpreting Hume at this point is to
assume that he is asserting the highly unlikely thesis that we only hold,
or should only hold, a man responsible for those of his actions that are
characteristic of him. Philippa Foot makes at least this mistake when she
says, attempting to elucidate Hume: "It would be possible, of course, that
we should do this /i.e. "pick out for praise or blame only those actions"
for which some "durable and oonstant" underlying principle can be found/,
punishing the cruel action of the cruel man but not th t of one usually
kind"."'' Paul Helm makes the same mistake much more explicitly when be
writes:
But if a person's character does change, if for some reason
a miser becomes generous, then it would seem to be Hume's
view that such a person can only be held responsible for
generous-type actions. That is, the actions of a person
subsequent to his change of character must reflect this
change if they are to be regarded as actions of this per¬
son and still 'redoun 'o his honour, if good, or infamy,
if evil'.2
Later Helm comments: "It would seem to follow ... that lime believed that
if it could be shown that an action was 'out of character' then this would
count as an exculpating circumstance on a par with other exoufpating ciroum-
3stances such as compulsion, absence of intention, aud so on".
But all this is to miss Hume's point. Hume is not claiming that a man
is or should only be held responsible for those of his actions which are, in
1
Foot, p. 448
"Paul Helm "Hume on Exculpation", Philosophy. XLII (1967), p. 267.
^Helm, p. 268.
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the ordinary sens© of the term, characteristic of him. A generous man is
not responsible only for his generous notions, and not for the oocasional
self-centered deed that he does. Nor is the normally faithful husband
absolved from responsibility for an uncharacteristic lapse, Hume is not
saying that a man is not responsible for his unoha -acteristic actions, but,
very differently, that only those elements of his behavior which result :''rom
more or leas long-term aspeots of his character are aotions for which we hold
him responsible. The important point to realize is tfeisi that on Hume,s
theory it does not follow from the fact that an action is uncharacteristic
(in the normal sense of this term) that that notion does not have its
source in the agent's oharaoter. In the way in which Hume is using "character",
both characteristic and uncharacteristic aotions oan, equally, arl © "om a
person's character,
"Inoe this may seem a poo " r view to attribute to Hume I must develop
it in somewhat greater detail. On iry interpretation of Hume any voluntary
action, whether characteristic or not, has its origin in the oharaoter of the
agent, at least under that description which the agent would acknowledge of
the action. If a characteristically selfish man performs a ge. uinely altruistic
act! ,, -dthout being constrained, an1 intending to do so, that action flows
from the man's character. If a man does an action A in order to bring about
a state of affairs B, but in fact doing A brings about a 3tate of affairs
C whioh the man did not foresee, thop, in so far as the action is unconstrained,
and is deserlbable as "doing A in order to bring about B", the action flows
from his character, and in so far as it is describable as "bringing about C"
it does not flow from his character. An action flows from a person's
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charaoter in Hume's sense in so far as it is to be explained by reference
to the agent's wants, desires, needs, intentions, prejudices, principles,
and so on, and i3 unconstrained. It does not flow from his character if
it is not both unconstrained and explainable in terms of his wants, desires,
etc. Helm points out that "it is clearly not necessary that, given that the
action wa3 in chara ter, that it was consistent with our expectations of A,
that it is '„he case that A is responsible; for A could have been blackmailed
into doing the sort of thing he is accustomed to do, but which he did not
on this particular occasion want to do, or saw good reason for not doin
But if the interpretation I am offering of Hume is correct, the case described
by Helm would be an instance of an action that Hume would want to say did not
flow from the person's oharacter, even though it was characteristic of him.
For Hume, a man's actions, just as his words, or wishes, or sentiments,
are "indications of • • • /his/ character". (T, 575) Moreover, given Hume's
viev about the notion of an action, a man's motives, desires, intentions,
decisions, and choices, are also "indications of character". What a man does
or intends to do, what he hopes for and believes to be important, reveal
his character to us. But a description of his character is not exhausted
by a description of whahe normally does or intends to do, hopes for or
believes important. His uncharacteristic as well as characteristic actions,
his uncharacteristic as well as characteristic intentions, have importance
for enabling us to understand his character. In fact, an uncharacteristic
action, intention, or whatever, might, in sane cases, reveal aspects of a
man's character which are, we might say, recessive or normally under control.
But for all that they are still aspects of his character. We might in fact
"Sfelm, p. 270.
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leam a great deal more about the character of a man by observing his un¬
characteristic conduct in unusual circumstances than we do by witnessing
his thoroughly characteristic behavior in the ordinary run of things.
Recalling our earlier discussion of mental disp os itons, we may say that,
for Hume, a man's character is a more or less long-term intrinsic property
of the man, a property which must be postulated as a causal condition to
explain the motives from which he acts on a given occasion, the decisions he
makes, the consequences he is willing to accept, /'hid he actions which result
from a man's character may be more or less characteristic of him. Moreover,
it is precisely because we have this sort of conception of a man's character,
Hume argues, that we make U3e of the criteria for responsibility that we do
use. "Men are not blam'd for such evil actions as they perform imo:*antly
and casually, whatever may bo their consequences ... because the causes of
the30 actions dire only momentary, and terminate in them alone". (T, 412)
That is to say, suoh actions, being unintentional, do not reveal any more or
less long-term aspect of the agent's character which would perhaps lead him
to perform a similar evil aotion in the future. "Repentance," Hume points
out, "wipes off every crime, especially if attended with an evident reformation
of life and manners". (T, 412) This, Hume claims, is to be accounted for
"by asserting that actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs
of oriminal passions or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration
of these principles they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be
criminal". (T, 412) That is to say, the change in our evaluative attitude
toward A brought about by A's sincere repentance is to be explained by the
fact that A's character has changed, and thus it is true that A no longer
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has "criminal passions or principles in . . . /his/ mind". After repentance
A is no longer the same sort of person he was before, and thus is no longer
the appropriate object of a negative moral evaluation, construed as a form
of hatred.
Though our use of moral concepts presupposes, on Hume's view, certain
ways of construing the personality or character of a -oral agent in ten,.: of
more or lesL long-term intrinsic mental properties, it is not just any long-
term mental property which is presupposed by our moral valuations. Some
long-term properties such as mental disorders (e.g. kleptomania) have the
opposite effect of absolving the agent fron responsibility. Thus, though
it is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, on Hume's view, that
a person's behavior have its origin in some aspect of his character, this is
not sufficient for moral responsibility. It is also necessary that the
action which flows from more or 1 ess long-term mental traits of the agen'
be such that the agent could have done otherwise, had he chosen to do so.
For this reason, such long-tera traits is psychological compulsions eliminate
responsibility rather than give rise to it.
Implicit in this view is the suggestion that the concept cf moral agency
involves the notion of the rational determination of one's own conduct. This
suggestion is well brought out by Hume's comments on the fact that if an
action is done in haste it is to that extent, other things being equal,
something for which the agent has diminished responsibility, "Men are leas
blam'd," he says, "for such evil actions, as they perform hastily and unpre-
meditately, than for such as proceed from thought and deliberation". (T, 412)
The reason for this, he suggests, is that "a hasty temper, tho' a constant
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cause in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infeots not the whole
character", (T, 412) If an action is done in haste, the agent is less
responsible for it because it is less clear evidence of a long-term "criminal
passion or principle" in his mind. The paradiga case of a responsible
action is one that is unconstrained, and that is done with reflection and
deliberation, T/hen an action is done in these circumstances it provides the
most unequivocal evidence of the sort of person the agent is. Such actions
provide the clearest insight into the principles of his conduct, They are,
in the fullest sense, his own actions, r, we depart from this paradig ,
a person's actions become less unequivoc 1 evidence of his moral character.
Wq can now consider the notion of moral agency that seems dominant in
the libertarian thesis. Hume makes the rather startling claim that "accord¬
ing to the hypothesis of liberty, • , . a man is as pure and untainted, after
having committed the most horric crimes, as at the first moment of hi3 birth,
nor is his oharacter any way concern* d in his actions; since they are not
deriv'd from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be us'd as a proof
of the depravity of the other", (T, 411) That is to say, in so far as the
libertarian theory implies that certain given facts about an agent, viz. his
having certain intentions or having a oertain character, are irrelevant to
questions of his responsibility as a moral agent, that theory departs from
our common conception of what it is to be a moral agent. It is essential
to our notion of moral agency that the agent acts on the basis of certain more
or Iocs long—tenu characteristics, his wants, desires, principles, and so on.
And it is because the agent is such as he is, that is, has oertain wants,
desires, needs, and principles, that we evaluate him as we do. But for the
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libertarian, the only important question is whether, in a given case, the
agent*s action results from an uncaused act of his will. His desires,
motives, principles, intentions, do not materially affect the issue of
responsibility. He is a moral agent precisely in so far as his acts of will
are uncaused, precisely in so far as hi3 character does not determine the
way he behaves. This, Hume suggests, runs counter to our most fundamental
assumption^ sout the nature of responsibility, nor has any good reason been
given why we should revise our conceptual scheme in this way,
I shall conclude my discussion of Hume*s theory of human freedom by
drawing attention to an interesting, and somewhat neglected, aspect of that
theoiy which is developed toward the and of the Treatise, in the section
"Of natural abilities". In that section Hume points out that a distinction
is sometimes made in ethical theories between natural abilities, such as
"good sense" or "judgment", and ral virtues, such as "honour" or "courage".
Though the two are in many ways similar, natural abilities are commonly
thought to have no moral worth, principally because they are involuntary,
I am not now concerned with the correctness of Hume * 3 rejection of this
view, but only with some comments he makes in the course of the argument.
Taken to-ether, these constitute an argument for tho view that the voluntary-
involuntary distinction is not appropriate in all cases in which vre may
properly speak of a moral response or a moral valuation,
Hume argues, first, that natural abilities cannot be distinguished
from moral virtues on the basis of the involuntary character of the former.
On the contrary, there are many human qualities which are considered to be
moral virtues, and because of which a man is the object of a moral valuation,
and which are nevertheless not voluntary. "Of this nature," he says, "are
constancy, fortitude, magnanimity; and in short, all the qualities which form
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the great man", (T, 608) To a somewhat lesser degree the same is true of
other morally significant qualities as well, "it being almost impossible for
the mind to change its character in any considerable article, or cure itself
of a passionate or splenetic temper, when they are natural to it," (T, 608)
Biren more strikingly, "the greater the degree there is of these blameable
qualities, the more: vicious they become, and yet they are the less voluntary'',
(T, 608)
Hume argues also against the rather a priori character of claims that
voluntarine.s is a necessary condition c moral responsibility:
I wou'd have any one give me a reason, why virtue and vioe
may not be involuntary, as well as beauty and deformity.
These moral distinctions arise from the natural distinctions
cf pain and pleasure; and when we receive those feelings
from the general consideration of any quality of character,
we denominate it vicious or virtuous. Now I believe no one
will assert, that a quality can never produce pleasure or
pain to the person who considers it unless it be perfectly
voluntary in the person who possesses it, (T, 608-609)
Hume*3 argument strikes us today as odd and rather strained. But it
does raise several points that are worth considering. Consider, first, the
question of such common oharacter traits as generosity, spitefulness, con¬
scientiousness, or apathy. Consider, too, what may be oalled "moral wicked¬
ness", i.e. the condition of one who acts consistently on his principles, but
of whose principles we strongly disapprove. Such conditions would not nor¬
mally be described as voluntary, at least in the sense of being the intended
result of a more or less deliberate course of action. Yet we do disapprove
of the apathetic, spiteful, or wicked man, and approve of the generous or
conscientious one. It is true, of course, that we approve or disapprove of
the generous or spiteful action. It is also true that we may disapprove of
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a man not trying to change his character, if it is one of which we disapprove,
or approve of his attempts to change it. But there is also a definite sense
in which we approve of a generous man, simply "because he is generous, or dis¬
approve of an apathetic man, simply "because he is apathetic. We approve or
disapprove, it would seem, of being that sort of man.
Hume's second argument is also suggestive. Is there any reason for claim¬
ing that a possible object of a moral judgment must be such that it can be
described as voluntary or involuntary? As a number of philosophers have
recently and convincingly argued,"1" a man can be responsible for things ho
does that are not voluntary or intentional in any usual sense of these expres¬
sions, I am not suggesting that Hume is arguing for this position, though
it would be perfectly consistent with his general theory. But he is irguing
a similar thosis: that we hold people responsible for non-voluntary aspects
of their character. And his a; ".n contention is, I think, legitimate: that
the question of voluntariness lias a broad, but not universal, application with
respect to the determination of responsibility.
To sum-up Hume's theory of human freedom we may note what I take to be
the principal elements of that theory. All human actions are, in principle,
able to be explained by means of universal empirical law3. This, on Hume's
view, is precisely the thesis of determinism. Within the class of human
actions which are capable of being explained by universal laws it is possible
See, for example: P.S. crdal, "Motives, Intentions and responsibility", The
Philosophical. Quarterly. XV (1965), PP. 146-154; J.L. Austin, "A Plea for
-iccuses", Philosophical apors. pp. 123-152; H.L.A. Hart, "The -Ascription
of Responsibility and Rights", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
XLIX (1948-1949), PP. 171-194.
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to distinguish free and unfree actions by distinguishing those not done
under constraint from those the agent is constrained to do. Using "free"
in this way, "free" is the opposite of "constrained", and not of "caused".
This account of human freedom is consonant with our ordinary use of the
concept of responsibility because it reveals both wiry we use the criteria
we do use for determining responsibility, and what assumptions we make about
the nature of' moral agency. In this it has the advantage over the liber¬
tarian theory of human freedm.
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